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DISSENTING OPINION

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

I am compelled to take a view contrary to that of my esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug.

From the following antecedent facts summarized in the ponencia, to wit:

During the annual meeting of the stockholders of SMC, held on 18 April 1995, the election of fifteen directors for the ensuing year was taken up. Petitioners, along with private respondents, were among the nominees to the board. Private respondents were nominated by Chairman Magtanggol Gunigundo of the Presidential Commission on Good Government ("PCGG") following the registration in their respective names (at the instance of PCGG) of SMC sequestered shares of stock (the "corporate shares"), belonging to some 43 corporate stockholders led by Archipelago Finance and Leasing Corporation, in order to allow the nominees to qualify for the contested board seats.

During the election, the bulk of the votes cast by petitioner Mendoza in favor of his group had come substantially the same sequestered corporate shares of SMC which were used by the PCGG in voting, in turn, for private respondents.

Following the canvass of the votes cast, private respondents landed on the top 15 slots and were accordingly declared to have been the elected members of the SMC Board of Directors for the year 1995-1996. None of the petitioners (Messrs. Estelito Mendoza, Manuel Cojuangco, Enrique Cojuangco, Gabriel Villareal and Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., who, respectively, landed 16th to the 20th places) made it.

Petitioner Mendoza protested the results of the election contending that the votes he had cast, particularly those in representation of the corporate shares, had not been duly appreciated and reflected in the results, and that had said votes been properly counted he, Manuel Cojuangco and Enrique Cojuangco would have themselves been duly elected. In reply, SMC Corporate Secretary Jose Feria stood by his verbal ruling during the canvassing of votes that only PCGG, through Chairman Gunigundo, could validly vote the sequestered shares.

it is clear, at least to me, that the grievance of the petitioners has nothing to do with the propriety of the sequestration nor with the ill-gotten or crony-related character of Gunigundo's act. It strictly involves a controversy regarding the election of directors and the counting of their votes, which, pursuant to paragraph (c), Section 5 ¹ of P.D. No. 902-A, falls the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) . Whatever its connection with or relation to the sequestered shares is purely peripheral. Pursuant to Garcia vs. Sandiganbayan, ² the controversy does not fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

In yielding to the contention of the petitioners that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the controversy in the petition for quo warranto, the ponencia gives much stress to the observation in PCGG vs. Pea ³ that:

x x x Under Section 2 of the President's Executive Order No. 14 issued on May 7, 1986, all cases of the Commission regarding 'the Funds, Moneys, Assets, and Properties Illegally Acquired or Misappropriated by Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, their Close Relatives, Subordinates, Business Associates, Dummies, Agents or Nominees' whether civil or criminal, are lodged within the 'exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan' and all incidents arising from, incidental to, or related to, such cases necessarily fall likewise under the Sandiganbayan's exclusive and original jurisdiction, subject to review on certiorari exclusively by the Supreme Court. (italics supplied)

and the following statement in PCGG vs. Aquino and Marcelo Fiberglass Corp. vs. PCGG: ⁴ cräläwvirtualibräry

It will be noted that the Sandiganbayan was held ⁵ to have exclusive and original jurisdiction in civil and criminal cases lodged before it, as well as incidents arising from, incidental, or related to such cases, subject to review on certiorari exclusively by the Supreme Court. The attempt to remove special civil actions from the Sandiganbayan's exclusive jurisdiction is of no avail if they similarly involve the powers and functions of the Presidential Commission on Good Government.

as well as this Court's pronouncement in Soriano III vs. Yuson ⁶ and five other cases, to wit:

Now, that exclusive jurisdiction conferred on the Sandiganbayan would evidently extend not only to the principal causes of action, i.e., the recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth, but also to "all incidents arising from, incidental to or related to, such cases," such as the dispute over the sale of shares, the propriety of the issuance of the ancillar writs or provisional remedies relative thereto, the sequestration thereof, which may not be made the subject of separate actions or proceedings in another forum. x x x

I very respectfully submit that it was never the intention of Pea, Aquino, and Soriano to lodge with the Sandiganbayan, as falling within its exclusive and original jurisdiction, every matter incidental or related to or arising from the sequestration of ill-gotten wealth. Section 2 of E.O. No. 14 which provides as follows:

SEC. 2. The Presidential Commission on Good Government shall file all such cases, whether civil or criminal, with the Sandiganbayan, which shall have exclusive and original jurisdiction thereof.

must be read together with Section 1 thereof to fully grasp what is meant by the term "cases." As so read, the term simply refers to "cases investigated by [the PCGG] under Executive Order No. 1, February 28, 1986, and Executive Order No. 2, dated March 12, 1986, as may be warranted by its findings," as expressly stated in said Section 1. Under Section 2 of E.O. No. 1, the PCGG is charged with the task of assisting the President with regard to the following matters:

(a) The recovery of ill-gotten wealth accumulated by Former president Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including the takeover or sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them, during his administration, directly or through nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public office and/or using their powers, authority, influence, connection or relationship.

(b) The investigation of such cases of graft and corruption as the President may assign to the Commission from the time to time.

(c) The adoption of safeguards to ensure that the above practices shall not be repeated in any manner under the new government, and the institution of adequate measures to prevent the occurrence of corruption.

and under Section 3 it is granted with the following powers:

(a) To conduct investigation as may be necessary in order to accomplish and carry out the purposes of this order.

(b) To sequester or place or cause to be placed under its control or possession any building or office wherein any ill-gotten wealth or properties may be found, and any records pertaining thereto, in order to prevent their destruction, concealment or disappearance which would frustrate or hamper the investigation or otherwise prevent the Commission from accomplishing its task.

(c) The provisional take over in the public interest or to prevent its disposal or dissipation, business enterprises and properties taken over by the government of the Marcos Administration or by entities or persons close to former President Marcos, until the transactions leading to such acquisition by the latter can be disposed of by the appropriate authorities.

(d) To enjoin or restrain any actual or threatened commission of acts by any person or entity that may render moot and academic, or frustrate, or otherwise make ineffectual the efforts of the Commission to carry out its tasks under this order.

Under E.O. No. 2 (Regarding the Funds, Moneys, Assets, and Properties Illegally Acquired or Misappropriated by Former President Ferdinand Marcos, Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, Their Close Relatives, Subordinates, Business Assoiciates, Dummies, Agents, or Nominees), the PCGG is further charge with the duty of investigating any claims with respect to such assets and properties. The President, in the same Executive Order, ordered, inter alia, the freezing of all assets and properties in the Philippines in which former President Marcos, is wife, their close relatives, subordinates, business associates, dummies, agents, or nominees have any interest or participation.

It therefore follows that what are referred to in Pea as "all incidents arising from, incidental to, or related to, such cases" which shall "necessarily fall likewise under the Sandiganbayan's exclusive and original jurisdiction," must be those matters which have a substantive nexus to the cases investigated by the PCGG pursuant to its powers under E.O. Nos. 1 and 2. This is precisely what Pea suggests when, in another portion of the ponencia therein, this Court said:

x x x Executive Order No. 14, which defines the jurisdiction over cases involving the ill-gotten wealth of former President Marcos, his wife, Imelda, members of their immediate family, close relatives, subordinates, close and/or business associates, dummies, agents and nominees, specifically provides in section 2 that "The Presidential Commission on Good Government shall file all such cases, whether civil or criminal with the Sandiganbayan which shall have exclusive and original jurisdiction thereof." Necessarily, those who wish to question or challenge the Commission's acts or orders in such cases must seek recourse in the same court, the Sandiganbayan, which is vested with exclusive and original jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan's decisions and final orders are in turn subject to review on certiorari exclusively by this Court. ⁷ cräläwvirtualibräry

This is also thrust of Soriano III when it enumerated examples of what matters may be considered as arising from, incidental to, or related to such cases, viz., 'disputes over the sale of the shares, the propriety of the issuance on ancillary writs or provisional remedies relative thereto, the sequestration thereof."

Now, as to the larger issue of whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the petition for quo warranto, the ponencia answers it in the affirmative in light of the statement in Aquino that:

x x x The attempt to remove special civil actions from the Sandiganbayan's exclusive jurisdiction is of no avail if they similarly involve the powers and functions of the Presidential Commission on Good Government. (italics supplied).

This should not be construed as establishing a doctrine that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over all special civil actions covered by Rules 62 to 71, inclusive, of the Rules of Court. For one thing, it was a reply to the defense of private respondent Edward Marcelo in justification of his filing with the trial of an action for certiorari and prohibition to restrain and enjoin the PCGG from sequestering his assets, properties, records, and documents. In the second place, the ratio decidendi in Aquino is actually the following statement of the Court:

Suffice it to say that the matters involved in these cases [G.R. Nos. 77816 and 78753] are orders of the PCGG issued in the exercise of its powers and functions for they involve the sequestration of the assets of private respondent Marcelo Fiberglass Corporation and Edward T. Marcelo, its president. The propriety of said sequestration and any incident arising from, incidental to or related to such sequestration is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

I am not, of course, unmindful of our decision in Africa vs. PCGG ⁸ where reference is made to the above pronouncement on special civil actions in Aquino. It must, nevertheless, be pointed out that what may have been referred to in Africa as special civil actions filed with the Sandiganbayan were actually complaints for injunction with damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order which, according to this Court, "are in the nature of special and original civil actions for injunction," with a footnote making express reference to Section 4, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court and Article 26 of the Civil Code which contemplate and authorize original actions for injunction brought specially to restrain or command the performance of an act. In short, the said actions are not the special civil actions under Rule 65. Generally speaking, injunction is a provisional remedy.

Does the Sandiganbayan have the jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus as well as over petitions for quo warranto?

It is settled that the authority to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus involve the exercise of jurisdiction which must be expressly conferred by the Constitution or by law. In Garcia vs. De Jesus, ⁹ this Court held:

In the Philippine setting, the authority to issue Writs of Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus involves the exercise of original jurisdiction. Thus, such authority has always been expressly conferred, either by the Constitution or by law. As a matter of fact, the well-settled rule is that jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by law (OROSA v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 76828-32, 28 January 1991; Pacalso v. Ramolete, G.R. No. L-22488, 26 October 1967, 21 SCRA 519). It is never derived by implication. Indeed, '(w)hile the power to issue the writ of certiorari is in some instance conferred on all courts by constitutional or statutory provisions, ordinarily, the particular courts which have such power are expressly designated' (J. Aquino's Concurring Opinion in Pimentel, supra, citing 14 C.J.S. 202; Italics ours).

Thus, our Courts exercise the power to issue Writs of Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus by virtue of express constitutional grant or legislative enactments. To enumerate:

(1) Section 5[1], Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution conferred upon this Court such jurisdiction;

(2) Section 9[l] of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, to the Court of Appeals (then intermediate appellate Court);

(3) Section 21[l] of the said Act, to Regional Trial Courts;

(4) Section 5[1] of Republic Act No. 6734, on the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, to the newly created Shari'ah Appellate Court; and

(5) Article 143[e], Chapter I, Title I, Book IV of Presidential Decree No. 1083, or the Code of Muslim Personal Law, to Shari'ah District Court.

With respect to petitions for quo warranto and habeas corpus, original jurisdiction over them is expressly conferred to this Court, the Court of Appeals, and the Regional Trial Courts by Section 9 (1) and Section 21(1), respectively, of B.P. Blg. 129. ¹⁰ cräläwvirtualibräry

Before the effectivity of R.A. No. 7975 ¹¹ on 6 May 1995, no law vested upon the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus. The said law granted it such power but only "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction." ¹² It must be pointed out that this law was passed by the House of Representatives and the Senate on 16 February 1995 and 20 February 1995, respectively, or four months after this Court promulgated the decision in Garcia. It is to be presumed that Congress was aware of Garcia and its grant to the Sandiganbayan of jurisdiction over the aforementioned extraordinary writs in aid of its appellate jurisdiction merely confirms the Sandiganbayan's prior lack of such jurisdiction and reveals a legislative intent to grant it for the first time, but on a limited scale. Until now, there is no law granting the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction in quo warranto petitions.

I vote then to DISMISS the instant petition.