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DISSENTING OPINION

REGALADO, J.:

I join Mr. Justice Davide in his well-reasoned and compelling dissent which fortifies his ponencia in Garcia, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, et al. ¹ would just want to add some further views and observations of my own.

It appears to be the postulation of the majority that the aforesaid case of Garcia, Jr. does not apply because it does not involve ill-gotten wealth cases nor the exercise of the PCGG's power of sequestration; whereas the case at bar involves a challenge to the power of the PCGG to vote or make use of the sequestered shares of stock, which is directly related to the PCGG's authority over alleged ill-gotten wealth. Hence, it is theorized that this case falls within the purview of Section 2, Executive Order No. 14 which vests in the Sandiganbayan original and exclusive jurisdiction thereover.

The majority concedes that, as a general rule, the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over original actions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and quo warranto. However, it is insisted that an exception lies where such action involves an incident arising from, or is related to, PCGG cases over alleged ill-gotten wealth within the context of said Section 2 of Executive Order No. 14. This theory is anchored on the holding in PCGG vs. Pea, etc., et al. ² that all cases falling under the aforestated Section 2 are "lodged within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and all incidents arising from, incidental to, or related to, such cases necessarily fall likewise under the Sandiganbayan's exclusive and original jurisdiction."

This ruling, it is pointed out, was echoed with illustrative examples in Soriano III, et al. vs. Yuzon, etc., et al. ³ which held that the Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive jurisdiction over "'all incidents arising from, incidental to, or related to, such cases,' such as the dispute over the sale of shares, the propriety of the issuance of ancillary writs or provisional remedies relative thereto, the sequestration thereof, which may not be made the subject of separate action or proceedings in another forum." Finally, the majority cites PCGG vs. Aquino, etc., et al. ⁴ where there was a passing statement that "any attempt to remove special civil actions, similarly involving the powers and functions of the PCGG, from the Sandiganbayan's exclusive jurisdiction would be of no avail."

It will be noted, however, that Garcia, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, et al. is exactly on all fours with the case at bar. In that case, a petition for prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and damages, with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order, was filed with the Sandiganbayan, questioning the propriety of therein petitioner's removal or separation as a director of the UCPB. A motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction was filed with and granted by the Sandiganbayan.

When the controversy was elevated to this Court, petitioner Garcia, Jr. argued that the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the petition for quo warranto on the ground that the act of the PCGG in removing him as a director of UCPB is a direct exercise of the PCGG's power of sequestration over the UCPB shares of stock. On the other hand, the Solicitor General countered that the removal of petitioner has no bearing whatsoever on the question of whether or not the sequestered shares of UCPB are ill-gotten, hence the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the case.

This Court declared that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the original and special civil actions of prohibition, mandamus and quo warranto, because the authority to issue these extraordinary writs involves the exercise of original jurisdiction which must be expressly conferred by the Constitution or by law. The Court discussed therein the pertinent laws, such as Executive Order No. 14 and Presidential Decrees Nos. 1606, 1860 and 1861, and concluded that, in the absence of a specific statutory grant of jurisdiction to issue the said extraordinary writs, the Sandiganbayan, as a court with only special and limited jurisdiction, cannot exercise jurisdiction over the petition for prohibition, mandamus and quo warranto filed by petitioner. In fact, if I may add, the conferment of such original jurisdiction is required even for regular courts of general jurisdiction within the integrated judicial system.

It will be noted that in the foregoing case, the Court did not I qualify or distinguish whether or not the special civil actions were filed in connection with the sequestration powers of the PCGG. It did not rule on the issue of whether or not the question of removal of petitioner therein as a director can be considered as an exercise of the power of sequestration of the PCGG and is, therefore, covered by Section 2 of Executive Order No. 14. Since the factual milieu of the present case is substantially and almost exactly the same as the factual setting in Garcia, Jr., no compelling reason exists why the ruling therein should not apply to the case at bar.

The exception allegedly enunciated in Pea and Aquino that the Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over ill-gotten cases and also "all incidents arising from, incidental to, or related to, such cases, such as the dispute over the sale of shares, the propriety of the issuance of ancillary writs or provisional remedies relative thereto, the sequestration thereof, which may not be made the subject of separate actions or proceedings in another forum," will not necessarily apply to or be determinative of the present controversy.

The writ of quo warranto is neither an ancillary writ nor a provisional remedy which can be issued by a court, having jurisdiction over a main case, in the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction to resolve an incident in that case. The writ of quo warranto is an extraordinary and prerogative writ specifically sought as the principal relief in an action addressed against acts of authority unlawfully asserted, and necessarily requires the exercise of the original jurisdiction of a court.

Since the grant of the prerogative writ of quo warranto presupposes the exercise of original jurisdiction as a sine qua non, an original petition therefor cannot be considered as an ancillary remedy against "incidents arising from, incidental to, or related to, such cases." As definitively held in Garcia, et al. vs. De Jesus, et al., ⁵ unlike the ancillary writs issued as provisional remedies, the power to issuer a writ of quo warranto, just like the other extraordinary writs under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, is never derived by implication. Such power must be expressly conferred.

It is true that the grant of jurisdiction to try actions carries with it all necessary and incidental powers to employ writs; processes and other means essential to make its jurisdiction effective. But, this is on the premise that there is such original jurisdiction expressly and priorly granted from which the necessary and incidental powers may be implied. With respect to the Sandiganbayan, it was never expressly granted original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, mandamus, prohibition and quo warranto.

The cases of Pea, (an action for damages, with writ of preliminary injunction, questioning the revocation of the authorization as signatory previously granted to a respondent therein), Aquino, (a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by private respondent before the RTC assailing the sequestration order issued by PCGG), and Soriano III, (involving the question of whether the RTC and SEC can decide the issue of the validity of the sequestration of shares of stock), which are relied upon by the majority in the present case, were all decided in 1988, while the other cited case of Africa vs. PCGG, et al. ⁶ was decided in 1992, all before the decision in Garcia, Jr. was handed down. The doctrine enunciated in Garcia, Jr. should, therefore, be considered as the controlling rule, as those in the aforementioned cases are not in point.

Obviously, because of their disquisition based on the aforesaid previous cases on which they rested their conclusion, the majority found it unnecessary to discuss Republic Act No. 7975. This recent amendment to the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, especially on the specific issue involved in the case at bar, does not offer them any solace either. Republic Act No. 7975, which took effect on May 6, 1995 and vested the Sandiganbayan with exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunction and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, ⁷ is inapplicable to the present case. Jurisdiction is conferred by substantive law ⁸ and, as such, that law vesting additional jurisdiction in the court may not be given retroactive effect. ⁹ cräläwvirtualibräry

It is noteworthy that such additional jurisdiction to issue the writs enumerated therein can be exercised by the Sandiganbayan only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, the same limitation imposed on the Court of Appeals before it was given full certiorari jurisdiction by Section 9 of B. P. Blg. 129. Also, while said amendatory legislation conferred jurisdiction on the Sandiganbayan to issue the aforementioned extraordinary writs, it refrained from including therein the prerogative writ of quo warranto.

This reluctance to vest full authority in the Sandiganbayan in the matter of the issuance of extraordinary writs may be traceable to the fact that as a court of limited or special jurisdiction, its authority is confined to particular causes, or its jurisdiction can be exercised only under the limitations and circumstances prescribed by its governing statute. ¹⁰ In the face of all the foregoing considerations, I cannot accordingly see how and why the majority would wish to sustain its competence to issue a prerogative writ withheld from it both by law and jurisprudence.