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FIRST DIVISION
[
G.R. No. 120008.
PHILIPPINE ADVERTISING COUNSELORS, INC. and/or ADRIEL C. PEA, Petitioners, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and TEODORO M. DIAZ, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
VITUG, J.:
Petitioners assail, in the petition (for certiorari) before us, the decision, dated 29 December 1994 and the resolution, dated 11 April 1995, of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission ("NLRC") reversing the 29th November 1993 ruling of Labor Arbiter Manuel R. Caday in NLRC-NCR-Case No. 00-07-03769-91.
Private respondent Teodoro M. Diaz joined the Philippine Advertising Counselors/BBDO Worldwide, Inc. ("PAC"), in 1976. His initial appointment with the firm was that of an Executive Account Trainee. He later rose to the position of Vice President and concurrently, head of the Account Management Group.
In December, 1990, during a meeting of the companys senior
management officials, Chairman of the Board Antonio G. Cumagun accused Elenita
C. Panganiban, then the owner of fifty-two (52%) percent of PAC, of trying to
manipulate the value of PACs share of stock in order to obtain a better price
of her shares. Cumagun thereupon made
known his intention to organize a new advertising agency. He asked private respondent to join the group
but the latter expressed reluctance to the idea. He, instead, suggested that the owners should
reconcile their differences. On
Ultimately, the Cumagun faction bought out the Panganiban
group. A major reorganization of PAC
followed, The Account Management Group,
then composed of four major divisions, was expanded into six departments. Diazs position was abolished and he was made
to merely head a division of the Account Management Group. On
On
"Lastly anent the third issue of whether or not complainant Diaz is entitled to separation pay and to other monetary benefits like retirement pay accrued vacation leave and proportionate 13th month pay for the year 1991, this Office is of the considered view and so holds that except for the other mentioned monetary benefits to which complainant Diaz is considered to be entitled, he is not entitled to any separation pay for the same reasons in denying him entitlement to damages and attorneys fees, namely his being not dismissed as in fact, it was he who voluntarily severed his employment relationship with the respondent Company.
"Regarding retirement benefits, accrued vacation leave and
proportionate 13th month pay
for the year 1991, these were admitted to be due to complainant and offered to
be paid during the proposed (but aborted) settlement of the case. Under the retirement plan of the Company,
Diaz entitlement of one-half month pay for each year of service will amount to
P240,000.00, computed as follows: P32,000.00 divided by 2 times
15 years.
"As to vacation leave, Diaz has an accrued leave of 24 days
amounting to P29,350.32 and a pro rata 13the month pay for the year 1991
equivalent to 6 months or one-half month pay amounting to P16,000.00.
(Exhs. II and '3-A).
"All in all, herein three (3) monetary benefits due to complainant
amounted to P285,350.32.
"Considering, however, that complainant Diaz unpaid balance on his
car loan plus interest will amount to more than the amount due him, and this
does not include yet his unpaid balance on his housing loan plus interest to
the Dominion Development and Investment, Inc. payment of Diaz monetary
benefits has to be withheld or be considered as payment to offset part of his
outstanding balance on his car loan.
This is in consonance with his commitment in the Promissory note for P303,704.00
car loan (Exh. C and 2), wherein he authorizes the respondent Company to
deduct his outstanding balance from any and all benefits he may received or may
be entitled to receive from the Company and from the employees pension fund as
a result of his termination for any reason whatsoever. In case of any further balance he shall
continue to be liable therefor and the same shall be paid as of date of default
or separation (Exh. 2-B).
"WHEREFORE, premises all considered, the respondents are hereby
ordered to pay complainant Teodoro M. Diaz the sum of TWO HUNDRED EIGHTY FIVE
THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED FIFTY & 32/100 (P285,350.32) as above
computed, subject however to their right to withhold payment thereof and
instead consider it as payment to off-set part of his still outstanding balance
on his car loan.
"As to the other charges or claims of the complainant, the same are hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED."1cräläwvirtualibräry
Dissatisfied with the decision, Diaz appealed to respondent commission.
The NLRCs Second Division2
partly upheld Diaz and, in its decision of
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the appeal is hereby
GRANTED. The Decision, dated 29 November
1993, of the Labor Arbiter a quo is hereby MODIFIED, ordering Appellees
to pay Appellant separation pay equivalent to one-month pay for every year of
his 15 years of service or P600,000.00
(P32,000.00 basic salary + P8,000.00 allowances = P40,000.00
x 15 years = P600,000.00; sick leave and vacation leave benefits plus 13th month pay in proportion to the number
of months in 1991 when he was constructively dismissed on 27 June 1991 in the
amount of P16,000.00; moral damages in the amount of P500,000.00;
and exemplary damages in the amount of P500,000.00 and attorneys fees
equivalent to ten (10%) percent of the total money judgment herein, subject
however to Appellees right to set-off part of the total money judgement herein
as payment for the principal balance of Appellants car loan in the amount of P293,480.29.
"SO ORDERED."3cräläwvirtualibräry
Petitioners brought the case to this Court for relief, alleging that respondent commission-
"x x x acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling for private respondent in the 29 December 1994 Decision and denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration in the questioned resolution dated for the following reasons:
"a. Public respondent NLRC utterly and completely ignored in an arbitrary, capricious and one-sided manner the definitive findings of fact of Honorable Labor Arbiter Manuel Caday, who was in the best position to ascertain the credibility of the witnesses and other evidence during trial, and the compelling evidence adduced and elicited by petitioners in the proceedings below; and
b. Public respondent NLRC, without any factual or legal basis and contrary to this Honorable Courts ruling in Radio Communications of the Philippines vs. Rodriguez (182 SCRA 906) [1990], awarded private respondents moral and exemplary damages and in sums so unconcionably and palpably excessive so as to effect the unjust enrichment of private respondent." [4cräläwvirtualibräry
The first contention is without merit.
The well-settled rule confines the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in the review of decisions of the NLRC under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court only to the issue of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.5 Grave abuse of discretion is committed when the judgment is rendered in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner.6 An abuse of discretion does not necessarily follow just because there is a reversal by the NLRC of the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Neither does the mere variance in the evidentiary assessment of the NLRC and that of the Labor Arbiter would, as a matter of course, so warrant another full review of the facts. The NLRCs decision, so long as it is not bereft of support from the records, deserves respect from the Court. Indeed, as the Solicitor General so maintains in this intance-
"x x x petitioners do not assail public respondents conclusions as not supported by evidence. They simply maintain the view that such contrary conclusion were based solely on Diaz and his witnesses allegedly self-serving statements and testimonies and from copies of memorandas intended to the former and other verbal acts which do not constitute harassment or oppression.
"x x x .
"There being no dispute on public respondents bases or lack of it to adequately form its own conclusion on the case the rule that factual findings if supported by substantial evidence are entitled to great respect and even finality (Loadstar Shipping Co., Inc. v. Gallo, 229 SCRA 654). Absent and showing that such factual findings of public respondent are not supported by the evidence on record, they are, therefore, not correctible by certiorari (Diola v.NLRC, 222 SCRA 860). The above submission is consistent with the general rule that the Honorable Courts original and exclusive jurisdiction to review public respondents decision or resolution does not include a correction of its evaluation of the evidence (Loadstar, supra).
"Besides, since the Labor Arbiters decision was appealed to public respondent the fact that the case would be open for review and the possibility of said decision being reversed or modifies is not remote. In City Fair Corporation v. NLRC (243 SCRA 572, 576) the Honorable Court citing Article 218(c) of the Labor Code held that public respondent may, exercise of its appellate powers, 'correct, amend or waive any error, defect or irregularity whether in substance or in form' the decision of the Labor Arbiter in the interpretation or formation of a conclusion from the evidence adduced by the parties."7cräläwvirtualibräry
In any event, we sustain the view that private respondent did not abandon his employment. For abandonment to exist, it is essential (1) that the employee must have failed to report for work or must have been absent without valid or justifiable reason; and (2) that there must have been a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship manifested by some overt acts.8 Abandonment is not compatible with constructive dismissal. Petitioner argues that private respondent did not suffer any demotion in rank since he has "retained his rank of Vice President, continued to work in the same office, and received the same salaries, benefits and privileges."9 Constructive dismissal, however, does not always involve such kinds of diminution; an act of clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an employer may become so unbearable on the part of the employee that it could foreclose any choice by him except forego his continued employment.
The Court, on the second issue, sees it fit to modify the award
of moral and exemplary damages. While,
it is true, an employee may rightfully recover moral damages when his dismissal
is pernicious in nature,10
as well as exemplary damages when that dismissal is effected in an oppressive
or malevolent manner,11
these damages, however, are not meant to enrich him
[12
but are merely intended, in the case of moral damages, to have some
compensation for the suffering that may have been caused to the injured party
and, in the case of exemplary damages, by way of example or correction for the
public good. Given the circumstance, the
Court, after deliberations, consider it proper to reduce the award of moral
damages to P100,000.00
and exemplary damages to P50,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent National Labor
Relations Commission is AFFIRMED with modification by reducing the award of
moral damages to P100,000.00 and the award of exemplary damages to P50,000.00. Cost against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla (Chairman), Bellosillo, Kapunan, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
[1 Rollo, pp. 85-87.
[2 Through Presiding Commissioner Raul T. Aquino, ponente, and Commissioners Victoriano R. Calaycay and Rogelio I. Rayala, members.
[3 Rollo, pp. 67-68.
[4 Rollo, pp. 4-5.
[5 Sta. Fe Construction co. v. NLRC, 230 SCRA 593.
[6 See Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Confessor, 231 SCRA 41; Oro Enterprises, Inc. v. NLRC, 238 SCRA 105.
[7 Rollo, pp. 755-757.
[8 De Ysasi III v. NLRC, 231 SCRA 173; Bonotan v. NLRC, 237 SCRA 717.
[9 Petition, p. 25. Rollo, p. 26.
[10 See Garcia v. NLRC, 234 SCRA 632.
[11 See Estiva v. NLRC, 225 SCRA 169.
[12 See Korean Airlines Co., Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, 234 SCRA 717; Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 423.