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FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 119332. August 29, 1997]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JACK SORREL y VILLAR, Accused-Appellant.
D E CI S I O N
VITUG, J.:
Teofilo Geronimo y Nicolas is a 64-year old businessman engaged
in the sale of heavy equipment and spare parts with an office in the JLB
building at the corner of Ronquillo and P. Gomez streets, near the Quiapo
central area, where he would earn around P20,000.00 a month.1
In the morning of 07 November of 1988, while walking along Paterno street on
his way to the office, he was held up and shot to death.
The bullet hit the posterior region of his
head which lacerated his brain and caused abrasions on the right forehead.2
The slug, from a.38 caliber gun, was recovered in his cranial cavity.
The muzzle of the gun must have been poised
only about twenty-four inches from his head.3chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Charged with, and later convicted for, the commission of the crime was Jack Sorrel y Villar.
Sorrel now appeals from the decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila, Branch 28,4
finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of
robbery with homicide under paragraph 1 of Article 294 of the Revised Penal
Code.
The trial court has imposed on
him the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered him to indemnify the
heirs of the victim in the amount of P50,000.00 and to reimburse to them
the amounts of P40,000.00 taken from the victim and P30,000.00
spent by the family for his wake and cremation.
Sorrel pleaded not guilty to the charge. From the records, the following statement of facts and events could be gathered.
Evidence for the Prosecution. -
Benito de la Cruz, the 34-year old eye-witness for the prosecution, testified that at about ten oclock in the morning of 07 November 1988, he was just across the Villagracia Pawnshop in Paterno Street, waiting for the jewelry repair shop of a certain "Mang Roy" to open, when he noticed a man, whom he subsequently identified to be appellant Sorrel, with two other persons just standing ostensibly to while away the time in front of the pawnshop. After a few moments, he saw a man, whom he later found out to be Teofilo Geronimo, passed by. From a distance of approximately four (4) meters, Benito, through a gap between cars, saw appellant suddenly pull out a gun and heard him tell Geronimo, Ibigay mo na lamang sa akin ang iyong bag.5 When Geronimo refused, appellant warned, Akin na, iyang bag mo, kung hindi mo ibibigay sa akin, papatayin kita.6 Geronimo held on to his clutch bag. Then, the sound of gunshot reverberated. Geronimo fell and hit the pavement in front of the Villagracia Pawnshop. Appellant took the clutch bag and walked away with his two companions as if nothing (had) happened.
Soon, people started to gather around the lifeless body of
Geronimo.
When the police arrived,
Benito was among those questioned about the incident. At 11:30 that morning, he executed a sworn statement at the Western
Police District (WPD)
headquarters.7
The following day, the picture of the victim lying on his belly appeared in the
Peoples Journal.
A few days
later, Benito saw in an issue of the same morning daily the picture of
appellant who was so described in the news item as a member of the "Dugo-Dugo"
gang.
Recognizing appellant to be the
man who killed Geronimo, Benito went to Police Station No. 5, along U.N.
Avenue, and informed Pat. Nestor Napao-it that the killer of Geronimo was at
the Quezon City jail.
Brought to the
Quezon City jail, Benito identified appellant among those who were behind bars.8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Pat. Napao-it said that he had received the report on the
shooting incident through a telephone call from Pat. Ramon de la Cruz of the
mobile patrol.
After informing their
chief, P/Capt. Reynaldo Jaylo, of the report, Pat. Napao-it went to the crime
scene with Pat. Habalo.
The two police
officers found the victim still slumped on the pavement.
The victim was identified by a relative.
Benito de la Cruz gave an eyewitness account
of the incident.
The investigators were
informed that the victim had just withdrawn some cash from the PCIBank branch
near the Quiapo Church.9
Pat. Napao-it invited Benito to the police headquarters for a sworn
statement.
He forwarded his advance
information report10
to the Follow-up Unit which had received, a few days after the incident, an
information that appellant was arrested by the Quezon City police.
Benito identified appellant at the Quezon
City jail to have been Geronimos assailant.11chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Cpl. Jesus Faller learned, on 19 November 1988, that Benito had
identified Geronimos assailant through an item in a morning daily.
He accompanied Benito to the Quezon City
jail where the latter pointed to appellant who was inside a jail cell with six
other detained persons.
Pat. Faller
went back to the WPD headquarters with Benito to prepare a written request to
the Quezon City Police that appellant be lent to the Homicide Section of the
WPD.
There, the police took the
additional statement of Benito.12chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Allan Bautista went to the WPD headquarters on 13 November 1988.
He executed a sworn statement13
on 23 November 1988 describing one of the holduppers as medyo mistiso.
He identified appellant from among the
detainees at the WPD headquarters to be the holdupper who grabbed the clutch
bag of Geronimo.
Cpl. Faller likewise
prepared a progress report on the case.14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Evidence for the Defense. -
The defense interposed denial and alibi.
Defense witness Manuel Tuason Sajul, 19 years of age, claiming to
be the best friend of appellant, testified that appellant was with him at 16
Jackie Kennedy Street corner Road 20, Project 8, Quezon City, at about ten
oclock of 07 November 1988.
Appellant
had been there with his daughter Jenny since 8:30 in the morning waiting for
their balikbayan
relative, a
certain Ate Alice (Alicia Campos), to arrive. The whole day was spent planning for a family reunion for their Ate
Alice who arrived at one oclock in the afternoon.15chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Appellant, 44 years old, said that he was a contractor, likewise engaged in the "buy and sell" of appliances, aside from being a part-time movie actor. At 8:30 in the morning of 07 November 1988, he attended a family reunion in the house of Andres Sajul in No. 16, Jacqueline Street, Project 8, Quezon City. He was arrested, along with his distant relative, Rogelio Sajul, at 8:30 in the morning of 16 November 1988 near the YP Cinema in Sucat, Paraaque, by Patrolmen Actibo, Molina and Balana of the Quezon City Police District. The two were dragged to an owner-type vehicle, blindfolded and handcuffed, and brought to a "safehouse" in Quezon City where they were coerced into admitting things they supposedly could not even understand. Appellant was later brought to the WPD headquarters where he was again subjected to various forms of maltreatment after refusing to admit his having killed Geronimo.16 Appellant came to know prosecution witness Benito de la Cruz for the first time only when the latter testified against him in court. He did not notice at any time the presence of Benito at the Quezon City jail.
Teresita Bautista Ocampo, a 60-year-old widow,17
testified that she knew both Benito, a faith healer and an acquaintance, and
appellant whom she got to know through a certain Dado.
When Benito saw the witness going out with
appellant, Benito became jealous of him.18chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Appellant's wife, Josefina Dulzo, learned about her husband's
arrest on 17 November 1988.
Immediately, Josefina went to the police precinct.
She saw him with a blackeye and an injured
shoulder.
Policemen Balajunda, Actibo
and Molina told her that if she would be able to come up with P100,000.00,
the police would not pursue the case against her husband.
Decision of the Trial Court. -
On 03 October 1994, the trial court rendered its assailed judgment19 in Criminal Case No. 88-68508 which concluded:
"WHEREFORE, finding the accused, Jack Sorrel, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the felony of robbery with homicide as defined and penalized under par. 1, Article 294, as amended, of the Revised Penal Code, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
"He shall indemnify the heirs of the victim, Teofilo Geronimo,
in the sum of P50,000.00 for his life, the sum of P40,000.00, the
amount of money taken forcibly from the victim, and the further sum of P30,000.00
as reimbursement for the wake and cremation expenses for the deceased.
The accused shall pay the costs."20chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Hence, the appeal.
Appellant contends that the trial court has erred in giving credence to the testimony of the prosecution's "star witness" (Benito de la Cruz) while completely discarding the evidence for the defense and in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide. He avers that, even if guilty, he could only be held liable for the crime of homicide. In impugning the credibility of Benito de la Cruz, appellant points to the discrepancies between the sworn statement Benito has given to the police investigators and his testimony before the Court.
Judicial experience quite often reminds us that affidavits taken ex-parte simply leave too much to be desired. Almost invariably, sworn declarations are incomplete and inaccurate.21 It could well be since statements in an affidavit, not testified to at the trial, are mere hearsay evidence and have no real evidentiary value.22 And, unlike an affidavit where only the declarant is normally involved in its execution, testimonial evidence exposes the witness not only to detailed examination by counsel for the proponent but also to severe cross-examination by the adverse party. It is at the witness stand where witnesses are tested on the veracity of their averments. Explainably, testimony in court is that which really counts in weighing the evidence.
The conviction for robbery with homicide requires the prosecution to firmly establish these elements: (a) The taking of personal property is perpetrated by means of violence or intimidation against a person; (b) the property taken belongs to another; (c) the taking is characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi; and (d) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, the crime of homicide, here used in its generic sense, is committed.23 The law does not require that the property taken should be specified with particularity. As long as there is apoderamiento of personal property from another against the latter's will through violence or intimidation, with animo de lucro, robbery is the offense imputable to the offender.
If the victim is killed on the occasion or by reason of the robbery, the offense is converted into the special complex crime of robbery with homicide under Article 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code. All those who conspired to take part in the robbery may be held guilty as principals of the crime of robbery with homicide although they do not actually take part in the homicide unless it is clearly shown that they have endeavored to prevent the homicide from being likewise committed.24 There is nothing in the records to show that appellant, even assuming him not to be the gunwielder, has prevented or tried to prevent the killing of Geronimo. Granting that only one of the hold-uppers has carried a gun and that it could have been a cohort, being inconsequential, the result would have still been the same.
Appellant would urge that he should be held guilty only of homicide because the exact amount taken from Geronimo was not clearly proven. The fact of the matter was that appellant had taken the clutch bag of Geronimo against the latter's will. Under the law, the clutch bag, which the victim held on that would unfortunately caused his life, was itself unquestionably an item of personal property. In any event, the trial court's findings on this score could not be said to be entirely baseless.
Appellant, in assailing the credibility of Benito, asseverates
that while he claims to be engaged in the purchase and sale of jewelry, he
actually has only been a fake faith healer.
To appellant, a person who can lie about his job cannot be trusted on
the witness stand.25
The law does not see it that way.
Under
the Rules, a person is qualified and competent to be a witness if (a) he is
capable of perceiving and (b) perceiving, he can make his perception known.26
Unless disqualified,27
such a person would be capable of testifying.28
In consonance with the modern trend to broaden the field of competency of
witnesses and to restrict that of incompetency,29
even a person convicted of a crime or one who has a pending criminal case is
not by that alone disqualified from testifying.30chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The fact that the judge who has penned the decision is not the
trial judge who has heard the case does not render the judgment necessarily
assailable.31
It is axiomatic that a judge who did not hear a case may write the decision
based on the record of the case.32
The continuity of the court and the efficacy of its decision is not adversely
affected by the death, resignation or cessation from the service of the judge
presiding over it33
nor by the fact that its writer merely has taken over from a colleague who
presided at the trial absent a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion in
the factual findings reached by him.34chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Neither might appellant's alibi bail him out of
conviction.
He utterly failed to prove
by a convincing account that it was physically impossible for him to be at the
crime scene at the crucial time.
For alibi
to be credible, the accused should not only prove his presence at another
place at the time of the commission of the offense but he should also
demonstrate that it would have been physically impossible for him to be at the
scene of the crime at that time.35
As the trial court so observed, Project 8 in Quezon City could just be an
hour's ride from Quiapo.
Moreover, alibi
supported by friends36
and relatives,37
like appellant's alibi, would normally deserve the barest evidentiary
weight.
And in the face of appellant's
positive identification by Benito de la Cruz, his alibi easily would
disintegrate.38chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The amounts awarded by the trial court would appear to have been
substantiated.
Exhibit M-3 would show a
withdrawal of P40,000.00 from the PCIBank in just a matter of minutes
before the robbery had taken place.
The
claim for expenses for the wake and cremation of P30,000.00 was
testified to by the victim's son-in-law.
The loss of the receipts showing such expenses was sufficiently explained
to have been due to the confusion during the last rites for the victim.39
The Court sees no cogent reason to reverse the findings of the trial court.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Kapunan, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
1 TSN, 27 September 1989, pp. 5-6.
2 Exhs. F & G.
3 TSN, 31 August 1989, pp. 5-8.
4 Presided by Judge Antonio L. Descallar.
5 TSN, 30 August 1989, p. 8.
6 Ibid., p. 11.
7 Exh. A.
8 TSN, 30 August 1989, pp. 3-21.
9 Exh. M-3, a PCIBank savings account withdrawal slip, shows that Geronimo withdrew the amount of
P40,000.00 at 9:56 of 07 November 1988.10 Exh. I.
11 TSN, 31 August 1989, pp. 10-17.
12 Exh. C.
13 Exh. J or 5.
14 TSN, 06 September 1989, pp. 3-9.
15 TSN, 03 November 1989, pp. 4-8.
16 TSN, 18 July 1991, pp. 3-12.
17 Decision, p. 5.
18 TSN, 30 January 1992, pp. 2-6.
19 Promulgated by Judge Antonio L. Descallar. The case was heard by Judges Sabino de Leon, Jr. and Rosalio de la Rosa.
20 Rollo, p. 22.
21 People v. Cruza, 237 SCRA 410; People v. Sarellana, 233 SCRA 31.
22 Osias v. Court of Appeals, 256 SCRA 101, citing People v. Santos, 139 SCRA 583; People v. Lavarias, 23 SCRA 1301; People v. Carlos, 47 Phil. 626.
23 People v. Cabiles, 248 SCRA 207.
24 People v. Pacapac, 248 SCRA 77.
25 Appellant's Brief, pp. 17-21.
26 Section 20, Rule 130, Rules of Court.
27 The disqualifications enumerated by Rule 130 are: physical disqualification (Sec. 19); disqualification by reason of interest or relationship (Section 20), and disqualification with respect to privileged communication (Section 21).
28 Persons who are convicted of perjury may still become witnesses unless they are co-accused in a crime and are sought to be discharged to be a state witness. In such a case, because perjury involves moral turpitude, under Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court they are disqualified from testifying (Francisco, the Revised Rules of Court, Vol. VII, Part 1, 1990 ed., p. 233).
29 Francisco, supra., p. 233 citing 97 C.J.S. 459.
30 People v. De Leon, 248 SCRA 609.
31 People v. Hatani, 227 SCRA 497.
32 People v. Jaymalin, 214 SCRA 685; People v. De Paz, 212 SCRA 56.
33 Ayco v. Fernandez, 195 SCRA 328.
34 People v. Sadiangabay, 220 SCRA 551.
35 People v. Alcantara, 254 SCRA 384; People v. Melivo, 253 SCRA 347.
36 See People v. Gamiao, 240 SCRA 254.
37 See People v. Lapuz, 250 SCRA 250; People v. Pano, 257 SCRA 274.
38 People v. Pano, supra.; People v. Alberca, 257 SCRA 613.
39 TSN, 27 September 1989, pp. 7-8.