ChanRobles Virtual law Library
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
PLEASE CLICK HERE FOR THE LATEST ➔ SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 113470. March 26, 1997]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DANILO CORBES Y OLAZO, MANUEL, VERGEL Y PASCUAL, and six (6) JOHN DOEs, Accused.DANILO CORBES Y OLAZO and MANUEL VERGEL Y PASCUAL, Accused-Appellants.
D E C I S I O N
BELLOSILLO, J.:
DANILO CORBES y OLAZO and MANUEL VERGEL y PASCUAL appeal from the
decision dated 27 December 1991 of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City,
Br. 124, finding them guilty as principals by conspiracy of the crime of
robbery with homicide under par. 1, Art. 294 of the Revised Penal Code and
sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua plus
damages.1chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The antecedents:
At about
nine o'clock
in the morning of 17
November 1990 six (6) armed men entered the premises of the Caloocan Consortium
Corporation at No. 305 Cordero Street, Caloocan City, and took away from the
establishment P169,000.00 in cash and P4,500.00 from Mateo
Figuracion, an employee therein.
They
also took with them the.38 calibre revolver of security guard Timoteo Palicpic
whom they shot to death.
The
malefactors then ran towards 8th Avenue where Daniel Corbes and Manuel Vergel
had parked their getaway vehicle, a blue passenger jeep.
They then sped away.
That same day, Manuel Vergel went to the Caloocan Police Station
and reported the incident.
He claimed
that the robbers used his passenger jeep in fleeing from the Caloocan
Consortium Corporation, but he denied any previous knowledge of the robbery or
of any intentional participation therein.
However, upon further interrogation by P/Cpl Daniel G. Del Rosario,
Supervisor of the Dayshift Investigation Section, Caloocan City Investigation
Division, Vergel retracted his earlier statements and pointed to Danilo Corbes
who together with the other accused allegedly planned the robbery
and convinced him to drive for them.2 When apprehended and brought to the police
station, Corbes in turn pointed to a certain "Benny" as the brains
behind the crime.3chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Corbes, Vergel and six (6) John Does (still at large) were charged as principals by conspiracy. On the witness stand Vergel however diverged from his earlier story and insisted that the jeep he was driving was merely hired by Corbes and Benny on the pretext of hauling scrap metal from Caloocan City. As soon as he parked his jeep along 8th Avenue, Benny alighted from the jeep leaving him with Corbes. Vergel maintained that at that time he knew nothing of the robbery being perpetrated at the Caloocan Consortium Corporation and that he became aware of it only when Benny came back from the direction of Cordero Street about ten (10) to fifteen (15) minutes later with several armed men who boarded the jeep and threatened him with bodily harm if he would not start its engine and drive. So he did as they ordered. After the men alighted at 9th Avenue, he proceeded to the house of Avelino Vergel, the owner of the jeep, and together they went to the Caloocan City Police Station to report the matter.
Daniel Corbes likewise professed innocence.
Although he admitted having approached
Vergel, he contended that he did so only to accommodate Benny who had sought
his help in looking for a jeep for
hire.
Being the Vice-President
of DAMATA (Damayan ng Maralitang Tahanan), a neighborhood association in Letre,
Malabon, he accompanied Benny to Sangandaan and there waited for Vergel who
agreed to have the jeep he was driving hired for a fee of P250.00.
Then together with Vergel and Benny he left
for Caloocan City allegedly upon Vergel's invitation.
The trial court rejected the pretensions of Corbes and Vergel; instead, it convicted the two (2) accused on the basis of the eyewitness account of Elena San Jose whose testimony established their participation in the robbery as lookout and driver, respectively.
Specifically, Elena San Jose testified that while she was rocking
her baby to sleep in the veranda of her house at 8th Avenue she noticed a
blue-colored jeep parked about three (3) meters away. Vergel was at the driver's seat. She saw Vergel alight several times from the jeep ostensibly to
inspect its engine and other parts as if something was wrong with them, while
Vergel's companion whom she identified as Corbes walked to and fro along 8th
Avenue up to the corner of Cordero Street.
Half an hour later Elena saw four (4) men in a jolly mood approaching
and shouting "Yahoo! Yahoo!" from the direction of Cordero
Street.
They immediately boarded the
jeep as Vergel hurried them up:
"Dalian
n'yo, baka tayo
mahuli!"
The vehicle then drove
away in the direction of F. Roxas Street.4chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The court a quo accorded evidentiary weight to the
testimony of Dante Despida, owner of the Gulf-Pacific Security Agency, Inc.,
who testified that on 19 November 1990 Vergel and Corbes admitted to him inside
the Caloocan Police Station that they participated in the robbery holdup as
driver of the getaway vehicle and as lookout, respectively.
Thus, Vergel and Corbes were sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay jointly and severally,
(a) the amount of cash stolen, (b) the value
of the.38 cal. revolver taken, and (c) P50,000.00 as consequential
damages to the heirs of Timoteo Palicpic.
Appellants contend in this appeal that conspiracy was not sufficiently proved since it cannot be inferred solely from their mere presence at the crime scene. In additon, Vergel disparages the testimony of Elena San Jose as being rehearsed and replete with inconsistencies, while that of Dante Despida relative to the oral confessions allegedly made to him inside the Caloocan Police Station as unworthy of belief considering that he had no business inside the detention cell since he was not even a police investigator, and considering further that he was the uncle5 of security guard Timoteo Palicpic who was gunned down during the robbery.
We sustain the claim of appellants that the evidence failed to
meet the quantum of proof required by law to establish conspiracy which
jurisprudence dictates must be shown to exist as clearly and convincingly as
the commission of the crime itself.6 No less than proof beyond reasonable doubt
is required.7chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In the instant case, no conclusive proof was presented that appellant Manuel Vergel conspired with the other accused to commit robbery. What is indubitable is that he was approached by Corbes who was tasked to look for a getaway vehicle and was persuaded to act as driver in fetching the group from the venue of the robbery. Vergel's feigned ignorance of any prior knowledge of the robbery is negated by his remark, "Dalian n'yo, baka tayo mahuli!" made to the robbers as they were boarding the jeep. Such utterance, which indicates knowledge of the criminal design of the malefactors, coupled with his act of driving for the robbers, makes appellant Vergel guilty as an accomplice, i.e., one who knows the criminal design of the principal and cooperates knowingly or intentionally therewith by an act which even if not rendered the crime would be committed just the same.8 In one case,9 we held that the driver of the taxicab, knowing that his co-accused were going to commit robbery per mitted them to use his taxicab in going to the place where the robbery was committed, is an accomplice.
As regards appellant Danilo Corbes, there is
similarly a lack of adequate evidence of
conspiracy.
The evidence merely points
out that Corbes looked for a jeep to be used as getaway vehicle of the robbers
and, to that end, he intentionally sought out and convinced Manuel Vergel to
act as driver.
Moreover, he went with
Vergel and Benny to Caloocan City where the robbery was staged.
We have also held that the liability of one
whose participation was limited to looking for a banca and providing one to a
gang of bank robbers,10 or one who went with the actual perpetrators
of a crime without conspiring with them, is only that of an accomplice.11 Where the quantum of proof required to establish
conspiracy is lacking, the doubt created as to whether accused acted as
principal or accomplice will always be resolved in favor of the milder form of
liability, that of a mere
accomplice.12 Besides, in several cases wherein the Court
confirmed the existence of conspiracy, some accused were held liable as mere
accomplices only because their role in the commission of the crime was not
indispensable; in other words, minor.13 Courts sometimes draw the inference of
guilty participation in the criminal design from concerted acts in the
consummation of the criminal act and from the form and manner in which
assistance is rendered.
To reiterate,
in case of doubt, the courts naturally lean to the milder form of
responsibility.14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Furthermore, we reduce appellants' liability to the crime of
robbery only.
It was not established by
the evidence that the other accused, who are at large, had agreed to kill if
necessary to carry out successfully the plan to rob. On the contrary, the records show that one of the robbers berated
the gunman for having shot the security guard.15 Therefore, what appellants may be said to have joined was merely the criminal
design to rob, which makes them accomplices.
Their complicity must accordingly be limited to the robbery, not to the
killing of Timoteo Palicpic.
Waiting only at the parked jeep at 8th
Avenue could not have given them the opportunity to prevent the killing, as is
required of one seeking relief from liability for assaults committed during the
robbery.16 The Court had occasion to rule that the jeep
driver, who was unaware of the
killing
perpetrated inside the building as he stayed always near his jeep, could
not be deemed a co-conspirator in the
killing of the guards, as the killing was not part of the original plan but
arose only during the exigency of the moment.17chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The penalty for robbery under par. 5, Art. 294 of the Revised Penal Code is prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period the duration of which is four (4) years two (2) months and one (1) day to ten (10) years. As the robbery was committed by a band under Art. 295 the penalty should be imposed in its maximum period. Since accused-appellants are found guilty only as accomplices to the robbery in band, the imposable penalty shall be one degree lower which is arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period or four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, if only for the purpose of determining the penalty to be imposed, the minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., destierro in its maximum period to arresto mayor in its medium period or four (4) years two (2) months and one (1) day of destierro to four (4) months of arresto mayor medium, while the maximum shall be taken from the maximum of the imposable penalty as herein before stated or four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional medium. Both accused-appellants having already been detained since 20 November 1990,18 or more than the maximum of their indeterminate penalty, they should now be immediately released from custody pursuant to B. P. Blg. 85.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is MODIFIED. Accused-appellants DANILO CORBES y OLAZO and MANUEL VERGEL y PASCUAL are declared GUILTY merely as ACCOMPLICES to the crime of robbery and sentenced accordingly to an indeterminate prison term of four (4) months of arresto mayor medium as minimum to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional medium as maximum.
Accused-appellants Danilo Corbes y Olazo and Manuel Vergel y Pascual having already been detained for more than the maximum of their indeterminate penalty, their immediate release from custody is likewise ordered unless they are held for another lawful cause. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, (Chairman), Vitug, Kapunan, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ, concur.
Endnotes:
1 Decision penned by Judge Rene Victoriano, RTC-Br. 124, Caloocan City; Rollo, pp. 22-31.
2 TSN, 1 April 1991, pp. 16-17.
3 Id.; Exh. "G," Folder of Exhibits.
4 TSN, 6 February 1991, pp. 4-9.
5 Id., 28 January 1991, p. 2.
6 People v. Jorge, G.R. No. 99379, 22 April 1994, 23 SCRA 693; People v. Argawanon, G.R. No. 106538, 30 March 1994, 231 SCRA 614; People v. Garcia, G.R. No. 94817, 4 November 1992, 215 SCRA 349; People v. Donato, G.R. No. 94530, 6 March 1992, 207 SCRA 125; People v. Campos, G.R. No. 91716, 3 October 1991, 202 SCRA 387; People v. Laurio, G.R. No. 95351, 9 August 1991, 200 SCRA 465; People v. Cruz, G.R. No. 74048, 14 November 1990, 191 SCRA 377; Bayan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 77050, 6 February 1990, 181 SCRA 844; De la Concepcion v. People, G.R. No. 73854, 9 May 1989, 173 SCRA 253; Valdez v. People, G.R. Nos. 75896-99, 5 May 1989, 173 SCRA 163; People v. Sabilano, Nos. L-32866-7, 21 September 1984, 132 SCRA 83; People v. Custodio, No. L-30463, 30 October 1972, 47 SCRA 289, 302.
7 Magsuci v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 101545, 3 January 1995, 240 SCRA 13; Fonacier v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 50691, 5 December 1994, 238 SCRA 655; People v. Villagonzalo, G.R. No. 105388, 18 November 1994, 238 SCRA 215; People v. Manuel, G.R. Nos. 93926-28, 28 July 1994, 234 SCRA 532; People v. Orehuela, G.R. Nos. 108780-81, 29 April 1994, 232 SCRA 82; People v. Gaoat, G.R. No. 97028, 21 May 1993, 222 SCRA 385; People v. Divina, G.R. Nos. 93808-09, 7 April 1993, 221 SCRA 209; People v. Camaddo, G.R. No. 97934, 18 January 1993, 217 SCRA 162; People v. Lacao Sr., G.R. No. 95320, 4 September 1991, 201 SCRA 317; Perez v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 76203-04, 6 December 1989, 180 SCRA 9; People v. Tacaa, No. L- 35652, 29 September 1989, 178 SCRA 56; Castaeda v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 61243, 16 March 1989, 171 SCRA 263; Navarro v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 84423, 31 January 1989, 169 SCRA 861; People v. Elizaga, G.R. No. 78794, 21 November 1988, 167 SCRA 516; People v. Drilon Jr., No. L- 33431, 28 June 1983, 123 SCRA 72.
8 People v. Lingad, 98 Phil. 5, 12 (1955); People v. Fronda, G.R. Nos. 102361-62, 14 May 1993, 222 SCRA 71; People v. Custodio, No. L-30463, 30 October 1972, 47 SCRA 289.
9 People v. Lingad, 98 Phil. 5, 12 (1955); see also People v. Ubia, 97 Phil. 515 (1955); People v. Balotan, 45 Phil. 573, 576 (1923) citing United States v. Lagmay, No. L-15009, G.R. No. 15009, 30 August 1919 (unreported).
10 People v. Doble, No. L- 30028, 31 May 1982, 114 SCRA 131.
11 People v. Balili, No. L-14044, 5 August 1966, 17 SCRA 892.
12 People v. Bongo, No.L-26909, 22 February 1974, 55 SCRA 547; People v. Torejas, No. L-29935, 31 January 1972, 43 SCRA 158; People v. Tolentino, No. L-29419, 31 August 1991, 40 SCRA 514; People v. Pastores, No. L-29800, 31 August 1971, 40 SCRA 498; People v. Ablog, No. L-15310, 31 October 1962, 6 SCRA 437.
13 People v. San Miguel, Nos. L-30722-30725, 31 July 1981, 106 SCRA 290; People v. Doble, No. L-30028, 31 May 1982, 114 SCRA 131; People v. Nierra, No. L-32624, 12 February 1980, 96 SCRA 1; People v. Crisostomo, 46 Phil. 775 (1923).
14 People v. Tolentino, No. L-29419, 31 August 1971, 40 SCRA 514; People v. Tatlonghari, No. L-22094, 28 March 1969, 27 SCRA 726; People v. Clemente, No. L-23463, 28 September 1967, 21 SCRA 261; People v. Tividad, No. L-21469, 30 June 1967, 20 SCRA 549; People v. Riveral, No. L-14077, 31 March 1964, 10 SCRA 462.
15 TSN, 5 June 1991, p. 18.
16 Art. 296, The Revised Penal Code; People v. Doble, No. L-30028, 31 May 1982, 114 SCRA 131; People v. Hamiana, 89 Phil. 225, (1951).
17 People v. Adriano, Nos. L-25977, 22 January 1980, 95 SCRA 107.
18 Records, p. 194.