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SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 120592. March 14, 1997]
TRADERS ROYAL BANK EMPLOYEES UNION-INDEPENDENT, Petitioner, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and EMMANUEL NOEL A. CRUZ, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
REGALADO, J.:
Petitioner Traders Royal Bank Employees Union and private
respondent Atty. Emmanuel Noel A. Cruz, head of the E.N.A. Cruz and Associates
law firm, entered into a retainer agreement on February 26, 1987 whereby the
former obligated itself to pay the latter a monthly retainer fee of P3,000.00
in consideration of the law firms undertaking to render the services
enumerated in their contract.1 Parenthetically, said retainer agreement was
terminated by the union on April 4, 1990.2chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
During the existence of that agreement, petitioner union referred
to private respondent the claims of its members for holiday, mid-year and
year-end bonuses against their employer, Traders Royal Bank (TRB).
After the appropriate complaint was filed by
private respondent, the case was certified by the Secretary of Labor to the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) on March 24, 1987 and docketed as
NLRC-NCR Certified Case No. 0466.3chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On September 2, 1988, the NLRC rendered a decision in the foregoing case in favor of the employees, awarding them holiday pay differential, mid-year bonus differential, and year-end bonus differential.4 The NLRC, acting on a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution filed by private respondent as counsel for petitioner union, raffled the case to Labor Arbiter Oswald Lorenzo.5cräläwvirtualibräry
However, pending the hearing of the application for the writ of
execution, TRB challenged the decision of the NLRC before the Supreme
Court.
The Court, in its decision
promulgated on
August 30, 1990,6 modified the decision of the NLRC by
deleting the award of mid-year and year-end bonus differentials while affirming
the award of holiday pay differential.7chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The bank voluntarily complied with such final judgment and
determined the holiday pay differential to be in the amount of P175,794.32.
Petitioner never contested the amount thus
found by TRB.8 The latter duly paid its concerned employees
their respective entitlement in said sum through their payroll.9chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
After private respondent received the above decision of the
Supreme Court on September 18, 1990,10 he notified the petitioner union, the TRB
management and the NLRC of his right to exercise and enforce his attorneys
lien over the award of holiday pay differential through a letter dated October
8, 1990.11chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Thereafter, on July 2, 1991, private respondent filed a motion
before Labor Arbiter Lorenzo for the determination of his attorneys fees,
praying that ten percent (10%) of the total award for holiday pay differential
computed by TRB at P175,794.32, or the amount of P17,579.43, be declared
as his attorneys fees, and that petitioner union be ordered to pay and remit
said amount to him.12
The TRB management manifested before the labor arbiter that they did not wish to oppose or comment on private respondents motion as the claim was directed against the union,13 while petitioner union filed a comment and opposition to said motion on July 15, 1991.14 After considering the position of the parties, the labor arbiter issued an order15 on November 26, 1991 granting the motion of private respondent, as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby ordered that the
TRADERS ROYAL BANK EMPLOYEES UNION with offices at Kanlaon Towers, Roxas
Boulevard is hereby ordered (sic) to pay without delay the attorneys fees due
the movant law firm, E.N.A. CRUZ and ASSOCIATES the amount of P17,574.43
or ten (10%) per cent of the P175,794.32 awarded by the Supreme Court to
the members of the former.
This constrained petitioner to file an
appeal with the NLRC on December 27, 1991, seeking a reversal of that order.16chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On October 19, 1994, the First Division of the NLRC promulgated a resolution affirming the order of the labor arbiter.17 The motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was denied by the NLRC in a resolution dated May 23, 1995,18 hence the petition at bar.
Petitioner maintains that the NLRC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in upholding the award of
attorneys fees in the amount of P17,574.43, or ten percent (10%) of the
P175,794.32 granted as holiday pay differential to its members, in
violation of the retainer agreement; and that the challenged resolution of the
NLRC is null and void,19 for the reasons hereunder stated.
Although petitioner union concedes that the NLRC has jurisdiction to decide claims for attorneys fees, it contends that the award for attorneys fees should have been incorporated in the main case and not after the Supreme Court had already reviewed and passed upon the decision of the NLRC. Since the claim for attorneys fees by private respondent was neither taken up nor approved by the Supreme Court, no attorneys fees should have been allowed by the NLRC.
Thus, petitioner posits that the NLRC acted without jurisdiction in making the award of attorneys fees, as said act constituted a modification of a final and executory judgment of the Supreme Court which did not award attorneys fees. It then cited decisions of the Court declaring that a decision which has become final and executory can no longer be altered or modified even by the court which rendered the same.
On the other hand, private respondent maintains that his motion to determine attorneys fees was just an incident of the main case where petitioner was awarded its money claims. The grant of attorneys fees was the consequence of his exercise of his attorneys lien. Such lien resulted from and corresponds to the services he rendered in the action wherein the favorable judgment was obtained. To include the award of the attorneys fees in the main case presupposes that the fees will be paid by TRB to the adverse party. All that the non-inclusion of attorneys fees in the award means is that the Supreme Court did not order TRB to pay the opposing party attorneys fees in the concept of damages. He is not therefore precluded from filing his motion to have his own professional fees adjudicated.
In view of the substance of the arguments submitted by petitioner and private respondent on this score, it appears necessary to explain and consequently clarify the nature of the attorneys fees subject of this petition, in order to dissipate the apparent confusion between and the conflicting views of the parties.
There are two commonly accepted concepts of attorneys fees, the so-called ordinary and extraordinary.20 In its ordinary concept, an attorneys fee is the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal services he has rendered to the latter. The basis of this compensation is the fact of his employment by and his agreement with the client.
In its extraordinary concept, an attorneys fee is an indemnity for damages ordered by the court to be paid by the losing party in a litigation. The basis of this is any of the cases provided by law where such award can be made, such as those authorized in Article 2208, Civil Code, and is payable not to the lawyer but to the client, unless they have agreed that the award shall pertain to the lawyer as additional compensation or as part thereof.
It is the first type of attorneys fees which private respondent demanded before the labor arbiter. Also, the present controversy stems from petitioners apparent misperception that the NLRC has jurisdiction over claims for attorneys fees only before its judgment is reviewed and ruled upon by the Supreme Court, and that thereafter the former may no longer entertain claims for attorneys fees.
It will be noted that no claim for attorneys fees was filed by private respondent before the NLRC when it acted on the money claims of petitioner, nor before the Supreme Court when it reviewed the decision of the NLRC. It was only after the High Tribunal modified the judgment of the NLRC awarding the differentials that private respondent filed his claim before the NLRC for a percentage thereof as attorneys fees.
It would obviously have been impossible, if not improper, for the NLRC in the first instance and for the Supreme Court thereafter to make an award for attorneys fees when no claim therefor was pending before them. Courts generally rule only on issues and claims presented to them for adjudication. Accordingly, when the labor arbiter ordered the payment of attorneys fees, he did not in any way modify the judgment of the Supreme Court.
As an adjunctive episode of the action for the recovery of bonus
differentials in NLRC-NCR Certified Case No. 0466, private respondents present
claim for attorneys fees may be filed before the NLRC even though or, better
stated, especially after its earlier decision had been reviewed and partially
affirmed.
It is well settled that a
claim for attorneys fees may be asserted either in the very action in which
the services of a lawyer had been rendered or in a separate action.21chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
With respect to the first situation, the remedy for recovering
attorneys fees as an incident of the main action may be availed of only when
something is due to the client.22 Attorneys fees cannot be determined until
after the main litigation has been decided and the subject of the recovery is
at the disposition of the court.
The
issue over attorneys fees only arises when something has been recovered from
which the fee is to be paid.23chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
While a claim for attorneys fees may be filed before the
judgment is rendered, the determination as to the propriety of the fees or as to
the amount thereof will have to be held in abeyance until the main case from
which the lawyers claim for attorneys fees may arise has become final.
Otherwise, the determination to be made by
the courts will be premature.24 Of course, a petition for attorneys fees
may be filed before the judgment in favor of the client is satisfied or the
proceeds thereof delivered to the client.25chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
It is apparent from the foregoing discussion that a lawyer has two options as to when to file his claim for professional fees. Hence, private respondent was well within his rights when he made his claim and waited for the finality of the judgment for holiday pay differential, instead of filing it ahead of the awards complete resolution. To declare that a lawyer may file a claim for fees in the same action only before the judgment is reviewed by a higher tribunal would deprive him of his aforestated options and render ineffective the foregoing pronouncements of this Court.
Assailing the rulings of the labor arbiter and the NLRC,
petitioner union insists that it is not guilty of unjust enrichment because all
attorneys fees due to private respondent were covered by the retainer fee of P3,000.00
which it has been regularly paying to private respondent under their retainer
agreement.
To be entitled to the
additional attorneys fees as provided in Part D (Special Billings) of the
agreement, it avers that there must be a separate mutual agreement between the
union and the law firm prior to the performance of the additional services by
the latter.
Since there was no
agreement as to the payment of the additional attorneys fees, then it is
considered waived.
En contra, private respondent contends that a retainer fee is not the attorneys fees contemplated for and commensurate to the services he rendered to petitioner. He asserts that although there was no express agreement as to the amount of his fees for services rendered in the case for recovery of differential pay, Article 111 of the Labor Code supplants this omission by providing for an award of ten percent (10%) of a money judgment in a labor case as attorneys fees.
It is elementary that an attorney is entitled to have and receive a just and reasonable compensation for services performed at the special instance and request of his client. As long as the lawyer was in good faith and honestly trying to represent and serve the interests of the client, he should have a reasonable compensation for such services.26 It will thus be appropriate, at this juncture, to determine if private respondent is entitled to an additional remuneration under the retainer agreement27 entered into by him and petitioner.
The parties subscribed therein to the following stipulations:
x x x
The Law Firm shall handle cases and extend legal services under the parameters of the following terms and conditions:
A. GENERAL SERVICES
1. Assurance that an Associate of the Law Firm shall be designated and be available on a day-to-day basis depending on the Unions needs;
2. Legal consultation, advice and render opinion on any actual and/or anticipatory situation confronting any matter within the clients normal course of business;
3. Proper documentation and notarization of any or all transactions entered into by the Union in its day-to-day course of business;
4. Review all contracts, deeds, agreements or any other legal document to which the union is a party signatory thereto but prepared or caused to be prepared by any other third party;
5. Represent the Union in any case wherein the Union is a party litigant in any court of law or quasi-judicial body subject to certain fees as qualified hereinafter;
6. Lia(i)se with and/or follow-up any pending application or any papers with any government agency and/or any private institution which is directly related to any legal matter referred to the Law Firm.
B. SPECIAL LEGAL SERVICES
1. Documentation of any contract and other legal instrument/documents arising and/or required by your Union which do not fall under the category of its ordinary course of business activity but requires a special, exhaustive or detailed study and preparation;
2. Conduct or undertake researches and/or studies on special projects of the Union;
3. Render active and actual participation or assistance in conference table negotiations with TRB management or any other third person(s), juridical or natural, wherein the presence of counsel is not for mere consultation except CBA negotiations which shall be subject to a specific agreement (pursuant to PD 1391 and in relation to BP 130 & 227);
4. Preparation of Position Paper(s), Memoranda or any other pleading for and in behalf of the Union;
5. Prosecution or defense of any case instituted by or against the Union; and,
6. Represent any member of the Union in any proceeding provided that the particular member must give his/her assent and that prior consent be granted by the principal officers. Further, the member must conform to the rules and policies of the Law Firm.
C. FEE STRUCTURE
In consideration of our commitment to render the services enumerated above when required or necessary, your Union shall pay a monthly retainer fee of THREE THOUSAND PESOS (PHP 3,000.00), payable in advance on or before the fifth day of every month.
An Appearance Fee which shall be negotiable on a case-to-case basis.
Any and all Attorneys Fees collected from the adverse party by virtue of a successful litigation shall belong exclusively to the Law Firm.
It is further understood that the foregoing shall be without prejudice to our claim for reimbursement of all out-of-pocket expenses covering filing fees, transportation, publication costs, expenses covering reproduction or authentication of documents related to any matter referred to the Law Firm or that which redound to the benefit of the Union.
D. SPECIAL BILLINGS
In the event that the Union avails of the services duly enumerated in Title B, the Union shall pay the Law Firm an amount mutually agreed upon PRIOR to the performance of such services. The sum agreed upon shall be based on actual time and effort spent by the counsel in relation to the importance and magnitude of the matter referred to by the Union. However, charges may be WAIVED by the Law Firm if it finds that time and efforts expended on the particular services are inconsequential but such right of waiver is duly reserved for the Law Firm.
x x x
The provisions of the above contract are clear and need no
further interpretation; all that is required to be done in the instant
controversy is its application.
The P3,000.00
which petitioner pays monthly to private respondent does not cover the services
the latter actually rendered before the labor arbiter and the NLRC in behalf of
the former.
As stipulated in Part C of
the agreement, the monthly fee is intended merely as a consideration for the
law firms commitment to render the services enumerated in Part A (General
Services) and Part B (Special Legal Services) of the retainer agreement.
The difference between a compensation for a commitment to render
legal services and a remuneration for legal services actually rendered can
better be appreciated with a discussion of the two kinds of retainer fees a
client may pay his lawyer.
These are a
general retainer, or a retaining fee, and a special retainer.28chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
A general retainer, or retaining fee, is the fee paid to a lawyer to secure his future services as general counsel for any ordinary legal problem that may arise in the routinary business of the client and referred to him for legal action. The future services of the lawyer are secured and committed to the retaining client. For this, the client pays the lawyer a fixed retainer fee which could be monthly or otherwise, depending upon their arrangement. The fees are paid whether or not there are cases referred to the lawyer. The reason for the remuneration is that the lawyer is deprived of the opportunity of rendering services for a fee to the opposing party or other parties. In fine, it is a compensation for lost opportunities.
A special retainer is a fee for a specific case handled or special service rendered by the lawyer for a client. A client may have several cases demanding special or individual attention. If for every case there is a separate and independent contract for attorneys fees, each fee is considered a special retainer.
As to the first kind of fee, the Court has had the occasion to expound on its concept in Hilado v. David29 in this wise:
There is in legal practice what is called a retaining fee, the purpose of which stems from the realization that the attorney is disabled from acting as counsel for the other side after he has given professional advice to the opposite party, even if he should decline to perform the contemplated services on behalf of the latter. It is to prevent undue hardship on the attorney resulting from the rigid observance of the rule that a separate and independent fee for consultation and advice was conceived and authorized. A retaining fee is a preliminary fee given to an attorney or counsel to insure and secure his future services, and induce him to act for the client. It is intended to remunerate counsel for being deprived, by being retained by one party, of the opportunity of rendering services to the other and of receiving pay from him, and the payment of such fee, in the absence of an express understanding to the contrary, is neither made nor received in payment of the services contemplated; its payment has no relation to the obligation of the client to pay his attorney for the services for which he has retained him to perform. (Emphasis supplied).
Evidently, the P3,000.00 monthly fee provided in the
retainer agreement between the union and the law firm refers to a general
retainer, or a retaining fee, as said monthly fee covers only the law firms
pledge, or as expressly stated therein, its commitment to render the legal
services enumerated.
The fee is not
payment for private respondents execution or performance of the services
listed in the contract, subject to some particular qualifications or
permutations stated there.
Generally speaking, where the employment of an attorney is under
an express valid contract fixing the compensation for the attorney, such
contract is conclusive as to the amount of compensation.30 We cannot, however, apply the foregoing rule
in the instant petition and treat the fixed fee of P3,000.00 as full and
sufficient consideration for private respondents services, as petitioner would
have it.
We have already shown that the P3,000.00 is independent
and different from the compensation which private respondent should receive in
payment for his services.
While
petitioner and private respondent were able to fix a fee for the latters
promise to extend services, they were not able to come into agreement as to the
law firms actual performance of services in favor of the union.
Hence, the retainer agreement cannot control
the measure of remuneration for private respondents services.
We, therefore, cannot favorably consider the suggestion of petitioner that private respondent had already waived his right to charge additional fees because of their failure to come to an agreement as to its payment.
Firstly, there is no showing that private respondent unequivocally opted to waive the additional charges in consonance with Part D of the agreement. Secondly, the prompt actions taken by private respondent, i.e., serving notice of charging lien and filing of motion to determine attorneys fees, belie any intention on his part to renounce his right to compensation for prosecuting the labor case instituted by the union. And, lastly, to adopt such theory of petitioner may frustrate private respondents right to attorneys fees, as the former may simply and unreasonably refuse to enter into any special agreement with the latter and conveniently claim later that the law firm had relinquished its right because of the absence of the same.
The fact that petitioner and private respondent failed to reach a meeting of the minds with regard to the payment of professional fees for special services will not absolve the former of civil liability for the corresponding remuneration therefor in favor of the latter.
Obligations do not emanate only from contracts.31 One of the sources of extra-contractual obligations found in our Civil Code is the quasi-contract premised on the Roman maxim that nemo cum alterius detrimento locupletari protest. As embodied in our law,32 certain lawful, voluntary and unilateral acts give rise to the juridical relation of quasi-contract to the end that no one shall be unjustly enriched or benefited at the expense of another.
A quasi-contract between the parties in the case at bar arose
from private respondents lawful, voluntary and unilateral prosecution of
petitioners cause without awaiting the latters consent and approval.
Petitioner cannot deny that it did benefit
from private respondents efforts as the law firm was able to obtain an award
of holiday pay differential in favor of the union. It cannot even hide behind the cloak of the monthly retainer of P3,000.00
paid to private respondent because, as demonstrated earlier, private
respondents actual rendition of legal services is not compensable merely by
said amount.
Private respondent is entitled to an additional remuneration for
pursuing legal action in the interest of petitioner before the labor arbiter
and the NLRC, on top of the P3,000.00 retainer fee he received monthly
from petitioner.
The law firms
services are decidedly worth more than such basic fee in the retainer
agreement.
Thus, in Part C thereof on Fee
Structure, it is even provided that all attorneys fees collected from the adverse
party by virtue of a successful litigation shall belong exclusively to private
respondent, aside from petitioners liability for appearance fees and
reimbursement of the items of costs and expenses enumerated therein.
A quasi-contract is based on the presumed will or intent of the
obligor dictated by equity and by the principles of absolute justice.
Some of these principles are:
(1) It is presumed that a person agrees to
that which will benefit him; (2) Nobody wants to enrich himself unjustly at the
expense of another; and (3) We must do unto others what we want them to do unto
us under the same circumstances.33chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
As early as 1903, we allowed the payment of reasonable professional fees to an interpreter, notwithstanding the lack of understanding with his client as to his remuneration, on the basis of quasi-contract.34 Hence, it is not necessary that the parties agree on a definite fee for the special services rendered by private respondent in order that petitioner may be obligated to pay compensation to the former. Equity and fair play dictate that petitioner should pay the same after it accepted, availed itself of, and benefited from private respondents services.
We are not unaware of the old ruling that a person who had no knowledge of, nor consented to, or protested against the lawyers representation may not be held liable for attorneys fees even though he benefited from the lawyers services.35 But this doctrine may not be applied in the present case as petitioner did not object to private respondents appearance before the NLRC in the case for differentials.
Viewed from another aspect, since it is claimed that petitioner obtained respondents legal services and assistance regarding its claims against the bank, only they did not enter into a special contract regarding the compensation therefor, there is at least the innominate contract of facio ut des (I do that you may give).36 This rule of law, likewise founded on the principle against unjust enrichment, would also warrant payment for the services of private respondent which proved beneficial to petitioners members.
In any case, whether there is an agreement or not, the courts can fix a reasonable compensation which lawyers should receive for their professional services.37 However, the value of private respondents legal services should not be established on the basis of Article 111 of the Labor Code alone. Said article provides:
ART. 111. Attorneys fees. - (a) In cases of unlawful withholding of wages the culpable party may be assessed attorneys fees equivalent to ten percent of the amount of the wages recovered.
x x x
The implementing provision38 of the foregoing article further states:
Sec. 11. Attorneys fees. - Attorneys fees in any judicial or administrative proceedings for the recovery of wages shall not exceed 10% of the amount awarded. The fees may be deducted from the total amount due the winning party.
In the first place, the fees mentioned here are the extraordinary
attorneys fees recoverable as indemnity for damages sustained by and payable
to the prevailing part.
In the second
place, the ten percent (10%) attorneys fees provided for in
Article 111 of the Labor Code and Section
11, Rule VIII, Book III of the Implementing Rules is the maximum of the award
that may thus be granted.39 Article 111 thus fixes only the limit on the
amount of attorneys fees the victorious party may recover in any judicial or
administrative proceedings and it does not even prevent the NLRC from fixing an
amount lower than the ten percent (10%) ceiling prescribed by the article when
circumstances warrant it.40chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The measure of compensation for private respondents services as against his client should properly be addressed by the rule of quantum meruit long adopted in this jurisdiction. Quantum meruit, meaning as much as he deserves, is used as the basis for determining the lawyers professional fees in the absence of a contract,41 but recoverable by him from his client.
Where a lawyer is employed without a price for his services being
agreed upon, the courts shall fix the amount on quantum meruit
basis.
In such a case, he would be
entitled to receive what he merits for his services.42chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
It is essential for the proper operation of the principle that
there is an acceptance of the benefits by one sought to be charged for the
services rendered under circumstances as reasonably to notify him that the
lawyer performing the task was expecting to be paid compensation therefor.
The doctrine of quantum meruit is a
device to prevent undue enrichment based on the equitable postulate that it is
unjust for a person to retain benefit without paying for it.43chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Over the years and through numerous decisions, this Court has laid down guidelines in ascertaining the real worth of a lawyers services. These factors are now codified in Rule 20.01, Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and should be considered in fixing a reasonable compensation for services rendered by a lawyer on the basis of quantum meruit. These are: (a) the time spent and the extent of services rendered or required; (b) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved; (c) the importance of the subject matter; (d) the skill demanded; (e) the probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the proffered case; (f) the customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP chapter to which the lawyer belongs; (g) the amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from the services; (h) the contingency or certainty of compensation; (i) the character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and (j) the professional standing of the lawyer.
Here, then, is the flaw we find in the award for attorneys fees
in favor of private respondent.
Instead
of adopting the above guidelines, the labor arbiter forthwith but erroneously
set the amount of attorneys fees on the basis of Article 111 of the Labor
Code.
He completely relied on the
operation of Article 111 when he fixed the amount of attorneys fees at P17,574.43.44 Observe the conclusion stated in his order.45
x x x
FIRST. Art. 111 of the Labor Code, as amended, clearly declares movants right to a ten (10%) per cent of the award due its client. In addition, this right to ten (10%) per cent attorneys fees is supplemented by Sec. 111, Rule VIII, Book III of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, as amended.
x x x
As already stated, Article 111 of the Labor Code regulates the amount recoverable as attorneys fees in the nature of damages sustained by and awarded to the prevailing party. It may not be used therefore, as the lone standard in fixing the exact amount payable to the lawyer by his client for the legal services he rendered. Also, while it limits the maximum allowable amount of attorneys fees, it does not direct the instantaneous and automatic award of attorneys fees in such maximum limit.
It, therefore, behooves the adjudicator in questions and circumstances similar to those in the case at bar, involving a conflict between lawyer and client, to observe the above guidelines in cases calling for the operation of the principles of quasi-contract and quantum meruit, and to conduct a hearing for the proper determination of attorneys fees. The criteria found in the Code of Professional Responsibility are to be considered, and not disregarded, in assessing the proper amount. Here, the records do not reveal that the parties were duly heard by the labor arbiter on the matter and for the resolution of private respondents fees.
It is axiomatic that the reasonableness of attorneys fees is a
question of fact.46 Ordinarily, therefore, we would have
remanded this case for further reception of evidence as to the extent and value
of the services rendered by private respondent to petitioner.
However, so as not to needlessly prolong the
resolution of a comparatively simple controversy, we deem it just and equitable
to fix in the present recourse a reasonable amount of attorneys fees in favor
of private respondent.
For that
purpose, we have duly taken into account the accepted guidelines therefor and
so much of the pertinent data as are extant in the records of this case which
are assistive in that regard.
On such
premises and in the exercise of our sound discretion, we hold that the amount
of P10,000.00 is a reasonable and fair compensation for the legal
services rendered by private respondent to petitioner before the labor arbiter
and the NLRC.
WHEREFORE, the impugned resolution of respondent National
Labor Relations Commission affirming the order of the labor arbiter is
MODIFIED, and petitioner is hereby ORDERED to pay the amount of TEN THOUSAND
PESOS(P10,000.00) as attorneys fees to private respondent for
the latters legal services rendered to the former.
SO ORDERED.
Romero, Puno, Mendoza,and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
1 Rollo, 26-30.
2 Ibid., 45, 105.
3 Ibid., 4.
4 Ibid., 5.
5 Ibid., 106.
6 Traders Royal Bank v. NLRC and Traders Royal Bank Employees Union, G.R. No. 88168.
7 Ibid., 31-38.
8 Ibid., 106.
9 Ibid., 17, 106.
10 Ibid., 106.
11 Ibid., 112-113.
12 Ibid., 39-43.
13 Ibid., 107.
14 Ibid., 44-45.
15 Ibid., 46-49.
16 Ibid., 7.
17 Ibid., 17-21.
18 Ibid., 22-25.
19 Ibid., 7-8.
20 Pineda E.L., Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1994 ed., 220.
21 Tolentino v. Escalona, G.R. No. L-26556, January 24, 1969, 26 SCRA 613.
22 Quirante, et al. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., G.R. No. 73886, January 31, 1989, 169 SCRA 769.
23 Otto Gmur, Inc. v. Revilla, et al., 55 Phil. 627 (1931).
24 See Quirante, et al. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., supra, Fn. 22.
25 Palanca v. Pecson, 94 Phil. 419 (1954).
26 De Guzman vs. Visayan Rapid Transit Co., Inc., et al., 68 Phil. 643 (1939).
27 Rollo, 26-30.
28 Pineda, op. cit., 224-225, Fn. 20.
29 84 Phil. 579 (1949), citing 7 C.J.S. 1019.
30 Francisco v. Matias, G.R. No. L-16349, January 31, 1965, 10 SCRA 89.
31 Article 1157, Civil Code.
32 Article 2142, Civil Code.
33 Tolentino, A.M., Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code, Vol. V, 1992 ed., 575.
34 See Perez v. Pomar, 2 Phil. 682 (1903).
35 Orosco v. Heirs of Hernandez, 1 Phil. 77 (1901).
36 Corpuz v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. L-40424, June 30, 1980, 98 SCRA 424.
37 Panis v. Yangco, 52 Phil. 499 (1928).
38 Sec. 11, Rule VIII, Book III of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code.
39 Sebuguero, et al. v. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 115394, September 27, 1995, 248 SCRA 532.
40 Taganas v. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 118746, September 7, 1995, 248 SCRA 133.
41 Sesbreo v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 117438, June 8, 1995, 245 SCRA 30.
42 Lorenzo v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 85383, August 30, 1990, 189 SCRA 260.
43 Agpalo, R.E., The Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers, 1991 ed., 257.
44 The amount is short by
P5.00 because 10% ofP175,794.32 isP17,579.43.45 Rollo, 48-49.
46 Gonzales v. National Housing Corporation, G.R. No. 50092, December 18, 1979, 94 SCRA 786.