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^{DISSENTING OPINION}

ROMERO, J.:

In the instant petition for review on certiorari, petitioner Asset Privatization Trust (APT) is impugning the decision of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP No. 36484 dated July 17, 1995, grounded upon the following assigned errors which it had allegedly committed:

1) The Court of Appeals erred in not holding that the Makati Regional Trial Court, Branch 62, which had previously dismissed Civil Case No. 9900, had lost jurisdiction to confirm the arbitral award under the same civil case and in not ruling that the application of confirmation should have been filed as a new case to be raffled among the different branches of the RTC;

2) The Court of Appeals likewise erred in holding that petitioner was estopped from questioning the arbitration award, when petitioner questioned the jurisdiction of the RTC-Makati, Branch 62, and at the same time moved to vacate the arbitral award;

3) The Court of Appeals erred in not holding that the respondent Trial Court should have either dismissed/denied private respondents motion/petition for confirmation of arbitration award and/or should have considered the merits of the motion to vacate (the) arbitral award;

4) The Court of Appeals erred in not treating petitioner APTs petition for certiorari as an appeal taken from the order confirming the award; and

5) The Court of Appeals erred in not ruling on the legal issue of when to reckon the counting of the period to file a motion for reconsideration.¹cräläwvirtualibräry

The resolution of these issues will ultimately test the process of arbitration, how effective or ineffective it is an alternative mode of settling disputes, and how it is affected by judicial review. My esteemed colleagues have taken the view that the petition is impressed with merit and that the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals should be reversed. In doing so, I believe they have dealt arbitration a terrible blow and wasted years, even decades, of development in this filed. I beg to differ and, therefore, dissent.

The controversy is actually simpler than it appears. The Marinduque Mining and Industrial Corporation (MMIC) obtained several loans from the Philippine National Bank (PNB) and the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) secured by mortgages over practically all of its assets. As of July 15, 1984, MMICs obligation had ballooned to P22,668,537,770.05.² and it had no way of making the required payments. MMIC and its two creditor banks thus ironed out a complex financial restructuring plan (FRP) designed to drastically reduce MMICs liability through a debt-to-equity scheme.³ This notwithstanding, the creditors opted to sell MMICs mortgaged properties through extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings, where PNB turned out to be the lone bidder.⁴cräläwvirtualibräry

Aggrieved by this apparent bad faith in the part of the creditor banks, private respondents Jesus S. Cabarrus, Sr., and other minority stockholders of MMIC filed a derivative suit⁵ against PNB and DBP before the Makati Regional Trial Court. They prayed for the annulment of the foreclosure and for the restoration of the companys assets, the recognition by the creditor banks of their commitments under the FRP, and the payment of damages, as well as attorneys fees and costs of litigation. The case was raffled to Branch 62 and docketed as Civil Case No. 9900.

In the meantime, the rights and the interests of PNB and DBP, including MMICs indebtedness, were transferred to petitioner, created by virtue of Proclamation No. 50, in relation to Administrative Order No. 14. Hence, petitioner was substituted as party defendant in Civil Case No. 9900.

On October 6, 1992, the parties entered into a Compromise and Arbitration Agreement⁶ providing, inter alia, that they were withdrawing their respective claims, which would be reduced to pure money claims, and that they were submitting the controversy to arbitration under Republic Act No. 876.⁷ The issues for arbitration were thus limited to a determination of the plaintiffs capacity or right to institute the derivative suit in behalf of the MMIC or its directors, and of the propriety of the foreclosure. Of notable import was the provision on the nature of the judgment that the arbitration committee might render, viz.:

10. Binding Effect and Enforcement. The award of the arbitration committee shall be final and executory upon its issuance upon the parties to the arbitration and their assigns and successors-in-interest. In the event the award is not voluntary satisfied by the losing party, the party in whose favor the award has been made may, pursuant to Republic Act No. 876, apply to the proper Regional Trial Court for its enforcement. (Underscoring supplied)

Upon motion of the parties, this agreement was presented to the court a quo for its approval.⁸ On October 14, 1992, said court issued an order (a) dismissing the complaint; (b) substituting the creditor banks with the APT as party defendant; (c) approving the Compromise and Arbitration Agreement dated October 6, 1992; and (d) approving the transformation of the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs in this case into pure money claims.⁹cräläwvirtualibräry

On November 24, 1993, after more than six months of hearing, the arbitration committee¹⁰ concluded that the assailed foreclosure was not valid and accordingly decided the case in favor of MMIC. Hence, petitioner was ordered to pay MMIC actual damages in the amount of P2,531,635,425.02, with legal interest, and moral and exemplary damages amounting to P13,000,000.00, and to pay Jesus S. Cabarrus, Sr., the sum of P10,000,000.00 by way of moral damages, such awards to be offset from the outstanding and unpaid obligations of MMIC with the creditor banks, which have not been converted into equity. The committee likewise decreed its decision to be final and executory.¹¹cräläwvirtualibräry

Nearly a year later, MMIC filed in Civil Case No. 9900, a verified Application/Motion for Confirmation of Arbitration Award.¹² This was opposed by petitioner on two grounds, namely, that Branch 62 no longer had jurisdiction to act on said motion after it dismissed the complaint in its order of October 14, 1992, and that the award far exceeded the issues submitted for arbitration by the parties.¹³ Not wanting to be outdone, MMIC filed a Reply and Opposition, arguing that the "qualified dismissal of Civil Case No. 9900 was merely intended to expedite the submission of the controversy to arbitration and was, therefore, a mere suspension of the proceedings, and that the arbitration committee did not exceed its authority in making the award.

On November 28, 1994, the trial court issued an order¹⁴ confirming the award of the committee in all respects except as to the award of actual damages to MMIC, which was increased to P3,811,757,425.00. The order closed with the following declaration:

In reiteration of the mandates of Stipulation No. 10 and Stipulation No. 8 paragraph 2 of the Compromise and Arbitration Agreement, and the final edict of the Arbitration Committees decision, and with this Courts Confirmation, the issuance of the Arbitration Committees Award shall henceforth be final and executory.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of said order on December 27, 1994, but this was denied by the court a quo in its order dated January 18, 1995 for lack of merit and for having been filed beyond the reglementary period. Thus, it said:

. . . (C)onsidering that the defendant APT, through counsel, officially and actually received a copy of the Order of this Court dated November 28, 1994 on December 6, 1994, the Motion for Reconsideration thereof filed by the defendant APT on December 27, 1994, or after the lapse of 21 days, was clearly filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period prescribed or provided for . . . . (by law) for the filing of an appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments or decisions of any court in all cases, and by necessary implication, for the filing of a motion for reconsideration thereof.

Instead of appealing such denial, petitioner filed on February 15, 1995, an Appeal by Certiorari . . . . under Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court before the Court of Appeals, praying for the nullification of the trial courts orders dated November 28, 1994 and January 18, 1995. It argued that the trial court had no jurisdiction or authority to confirm the arbitral award, considering that the original case, Civil Case No. 9900, had previously been dismissed, and that the trial judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the questioned orders confirming the award and denying the motion for reconsideration thereof.¹⁵cräläwvirtualibräry

On July 17, 1995, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit.¹⁶ From this dismissal, petitioner elevated its cause to this Tribunal for a review, raising the issues stated at the outset.

I find it distressing that, in reaching the outcome of this controversy, the majority has emasculated the process of arbitration itself. This should not be the case for after all, the decision of the arbitration committee is no longer the one being attacked in these proceedings, but the judgment of the Court of Appeals which herein petitioner found to be erroneous. The Court has had occasion to trace the history of arbitration and to discuss its significance in the case of Chung Fu Industries (Phils.), Inc. v. Court of Appeals,¹⁷ viz.:

Allow us to take a leaf from history ad briefly trace the evolution of arbitration as a mode of dispute settlement.

Because conflict is inherent in human society, much effort has been expended by men and institutions in devising ways of resolving the same. With the progress of civilization, physical combat has been ruled out and instead, more specific means have been evolved, such as recourse to the good offices of a disinterested third party, whether this be a court or private individual or individuals.

Legal history discloses that early judges called upon to solve private conflicts were primarily the arbiters, persons not specially trained but in whose morality, probity and good sense the parties in conflict reposed full trust. Thus, in Republican Rome, arbiter and judge (judex) were synonymous. The magistrate or praetor, after noting down the conflicting claims of litigants, and clarifying the issues, referred them for decision to a private person designated by the parties, by common agreement, or selected by them from an opposite listing (the album judicium) or else by having the arbiter chosen by lot. The judges proper, as specifically trained state officials endowed with (their) own power and jurisdiction, and taking cognizance of litigations from beginning to end, only appeared under the Empire, by the so-called cognito extra ordinem.

Such means of referring a dispute to a third party has also long been an accepted alternative to litigation at common law.

Sparse though the law and jurisprudence may be on the subject of arbitration in the Philippines, it was nonetheless recognized in the Spanish Civil Code; specifically, the provisions on compromises made applicable to arbitrations under Articles 1820 and 1821. Although said provisions were repealed by implication with the repeal of the Spanish Law of Civil Procedure, these and additional ones were reinstated in the present Civil Code.

Arbitration found a fertile field in the resolution of labor-management disputes in this Philippines. Although early on, Commonwealth Act 103 (1936) provided for compulsory arbitration as the state policy to be administered by the Court of Industrial Relations, in time such a modality gave way to voluntary arbitration. While not completely supplanting compulsory arbitration which until today is practiced by government officials, the Industrial Peace Act which was passed in 1953 as Republic Act No. 875, favored the policy of free collective bargaining, in general, and resort to grievance procedure, in particular, as the preferred mode of setting disputes in industry. It was accepted and enunciated more explicitly in the Labor Code, which was passed on November 1, 1974 as Presidential Decree No. 442, with the amendments later introduced by Republic Act No. 6715 (1989).

Whether utilized in business transactions or in employer-employee relations, arbitration was gaining wide acceptance. A consensual process, it was preferred to orders imposed by government upon the disputants. Moreover, court litigations tended to be time-consuming, costly, and inflexible due to their scrupulous observance of the due process of law doctrine and their strict adherence to rules of evidence.

As early as the 1920s, this Court declared:

In the Philippines fortunately, the attitude of the court towards arbitration agreements is slowly crystallizing into definite and workable form . . . The rule now is that unless the agreement is such as absolutely to close the doors of the courts against the parties, which agreement would be void, the courts will look with favor upon such amicable arrangements and will only with great reluctance interfere to anticipate or nullify the action of the arbitrator.

That there was a growing need for a law regulating arbitration in general was acknowledged when Republic Act. No. 876 (1953), otherwise known as the Arbitration Law, was passed. Said Act was passed. Said Act was obviously adopted to supplement -- not to supplant -- the New Civil Code on arbitration. It expressly declares that the provisions of chapters one and two, Title XIV, Book IV of the Civil Code shall remain in force.

x x x

In practice nowadays, absent an agreement of the parties to resolve their disputes via a particular mode, it is the regular courts that remain the fora to resolve such matters. However, the parties may opt for recourse to third parties, exercising their basic freedom to establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals good customs, public order or public policy. In such a case, resort to the arbitration process may be spelled out by them in a contract in anticipation of disputes that may arise between them. Or this may be stipulated in a submission agreement when they are actually confronted by a dispute. Whatever be the case, such recourse to an extrajudicial means of settlement is not intended to completely deprive the courts of jurisdiction. In fact, the early cases on arbitration carefully spelled out the prevailing doctrine at the time, thus: . . . a clause in a contract providing that all matters in dispute between the parties shall be referred to arbitrators and to them alone is contrary to public policy and cannot oust the courts of jurisdiction.

But certainly, the stipulation to refer all future disputes to an arbitrator or to submit an ongoing dispute to one is valid. Being part of a contract between the parties, it is binding and enforceable in court in case one of them neglects, fails or refuses to arbitrate. Going a step further, in the event that they declare their intention to refer their differences to arbitration first before taking court action, this constitutes a condition precedent, such that where a suit has been instituted prematurely, the court shall suspend the same and the parties shall be directed forthwith to proceed to arbitration.

A court action may likewise be proper where the arbitrator has not been selected by the parties.

x x x

. . . . It is stated explicitly under Art. 2044 of the Civil Code that the finality of the arbitrators award is not absolute and without exceptions. Where the conditions described in Articles 2038, 2039 and 2040¹⁸ applicable to both compromises and arbitrations are obtaining, the arbitrators award may be annulled or rescinded. Additionally, under Sections 24 and 25 of the Arbitration Law, there are grounds for vacating, modifying or rescinding an arbitrators award. Thus, if and when the factual circumstances referred to in the above-cited provisions are present, judicial review of the award is properly warranted.

What if courts refuse or neglect to inquire into the factual milieu of an arbitrators award to determine whether it is in accordance with law or within the scope of his authority? How may the power of judicial review be invoked?

This is where the proper remedy is certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. It is to be borne in mind, however, that this action will lie only where a grave abuse of discretion or an act without or in excess of jurisdiction on the part of the voluntary arbitrator is clearly shown. For the writ of certiorari is an extraordinary remedy and that certiorari jurisdiction is not to be equated with appellate jurisdiction. In a special civil action of certiorari, the Court will not engage in a review of the facts found nor even of the law as interpreted or applied by the arbitrator unless the supposed errors of fact or of law are so patent and gross and prejudicial as to amount to a grave abuse of discretion or an excess de pouvoir on the part of the arbitrator.¹⁹cräläwvirtualibräry

So, what are the issues that need to be addressed in this action? Certainly not the capacity of the plaintiffs below to file the derivative suit in behalf of MMIC nor the validity of the extrajudicial foreclosure conducted by PNB and DBP. These were the issues submitted for arbitration by the parties and resolved with finality by the arbitration committee upon agreement of the parties themselves. The issues, therefore, all stemming from the judgment of the Court of Appeals, may be narrowed down to three: (1) Was it right in upholding the trial courts authority to confirm the arbitration award considering that said court had earlier dismissed the complaint? (2) Was it correct in finding that herein petitioner was estopped from questioning such award? (3) Was it justified in not treating petitioners petition for certiorari as an appeal from the trial courts order confirming said award?

(1) Petitioner overly stresses the fact that in the trial courts order of October 14, 1992, the complaint was dismissed upon approval of the Compromise and Arbitration Agreement between the parties. Such dismissal, however, far from finally disposing of the controversy as the term denotes, simply suspended it during the period of arbitration. It is, as a colleague pointed out during the deliberation of this action, a mere semantic imperfection. Here is a situation where the intent of the tribunal was obviously not to end the case with finality, but to place the proceedings in abeyance while the parties breathed life into an alternative mode of settling their differences in the most expeditious manner. Arbitration is not a self-enforcing process. It focuses the direction of the hearing and the reception and appreciation of evidence by assigning these tasks to a group of persons chosen by the parties themselves. By this, a circuitous and time-consuming court trial is avoided, leaving the court with the singular duty of confirming the arbitrators decision, and allowing it to devote more if its time to resolving other cases. As the appellate court correctly pointed out:

. . . (T)he dismissal of the Complaint in Civil Case No. 9900 was not intended by the parties and by the court a quo, despite the phraseology in Item No. 4 of the dispositive portion of the Order of October 14, 1992, as a dismissal that would put an end to the case. Rather it was simply a pronouncement for the cessation of the proceedings in the court and the commencement of the arbitration proceedings. It was for all intents and purposes a stay of the civil action until an arbitration has been had or pending the return of the arbitral award. This is evident since the parties submitted to the court below not only an agreement to arbitrate but also a compromise which is always submitted to the court for approval and as a basis for a judgment. x x x²⁰cräläwvirtualibräry

Regarding the trial courts authority to confirm the decision of the arbitration committee, suffice it to say that such was not merely its right but its duty as well. Under Section 22 of R.A. No. 876, upon application or motion of any party to arbitration, the court has the obligation of confirming the arbitrators award absent any specific ground to vacate, modify or correct the same. Herein private respondents did apply for such confirmation on February 7, 1995. This was even opposed by petitioner on the ground that the judgment had not yet become final and executory, in complete disregard of paragraph 10 of the Compromise and Arbitration Agreement and the very decision of the arbitration committee.

The award itself was properly made since it was not vacated, modified or corrected upon any of the grounds enumerated under Sections 24 and 25 of R.A. No. 876, to wit:

Section 24. Grounds for vacating award. In any of the following cases, the court must make an order vacating the award upon the petition of any to the party controversy when such party proves affirmatively that in the arbitration proceedings:

(a) The award was procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue means; or

(b) That there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators or any of them; or

(c) That the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; that one or more of the arbitrators was disqualified to act as such under section nine hereof, and willfully refrained from disclosing such disqualifications or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been materially prejudiced; or

(d) That the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them, that a mutual, final and definite award the subject matter submitted to them was not made.

Where an award is vacated, the court, in its discretion, may direct a new hearing either before the same arbitrators or before a new arbitrators chosen in the manner provided in the submission or contract for the selection of the original arbitrators, and any provision limiting the time in which the arbitrators may make a decision shall be deemed applicable to the new arbitration and to commence from the date of the courts order.

Where the court vacates an award, costs, not exceeding fifty pesos, and disbursements may be awarded to the prevailing party and the payment thereof may be enforced in like manner as the payment of costs upon the motion in an action.

Section 25. Grounds for modifying or correcting award. In any one of the following cases, the court must make an order modifying or correcting the award, upon the application of any party to the controversy which was arbitrated:

(a) Where there was an evident miscalculation of figures, or an evident mistake in the description of any person, thing or property referred to in the award; or

(b) Where the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to them, not affecting the merits of the decision upon the matter submitted; or

(c) Where the award is imperfect in a manner of from not affecting the merits of the controversy, and if it had been a commissioners report, the defect could have been amended or disregarded by the court.

The order may modify and correct the award so as to effect the intent thereof and promote justice between the parties. (Underscoring supplied)

Petitioner utterly failed to prove the existence of any of these grounds. Its strongest argument, that the arbitration award far exceeded the issue submitted for arbitration, apart from being unsubstantiated, does not go into the merits of the award, which is the only way its modification or correction could be justified under the terms of Section 25, aforequoted.

Furthermore, petitioner violated several covenants by asking the court a quo to vacate the arbitration award. First, in paragraph 10 of the Compromise and Arbitration Agreement, it agreed to abide by the arbitration committees decision which shall be final and executory upon its issuance upon the parties to the arbitration and their assigns and successors-in-interest. Next, the decision that the arbitrators did render on November 24, 1993 specifically declared the same to be final and executory. Finally, in the courts confirmation order of November 28, 1994, the finality of the award was reiterated by the court. Arbitration, as an alternative mode of settlement, is gaining adherents in legal and judicial circles here and abroad. If its tested mechanism can simply be ignored by an aggrieved party, one who, it must be stressed, voluntarily and actively participated in the arbitration proceedings from the very beginning, it will destroy the very essence of mutuality inherent in consensual contracts.

2) Petitioner claims that it is not estopped from questioning the arbitration award probably because, notwithstanding its tenacious quest for affirmative relief, it did not translate this pursuit into positive action. The Court of Appeals succinctly puts it in this wise:

. . . The record shows that on its motion, petitioner APT was able to postpone the hearing on therein plaintiffs application/motion for confirmation of arbitral award to a date and time that it chose. However, when said matter was called for hearing, only counsel for therein plaintiffs showed up. Nonetheless, respondent Judge gave APT a period of seven (7) days from notice within which to comment on the application/motion for confirmation. At no time did petitioner APT ask for a hearing to present its evidence. While petitioner APT repeatedly sought to vacate the arbitral award, it made no concrete move to pursue its cause. In fact, at the hearing on its motion for reconsideration, both parties through their respective counsels gave oral arguments and thereafter agreed to submit the motion for reconsideration for resolution. If petitioner APT honestly believed that the respondent Judge erroneously took cognizance of plaintiffs Application/Motion for Confirmation of Arbitration Award, then it should have limited itself to challenging the jurisdiction of said court. The fact remains that petitioner APT repeatedly sought affirmative relief from the respondent Judge in the same Civil Case No. 9900. Under the circumstances, petitioner APT may not be heard now to complain that it was deprived of its right to question the award made by the Arbitration Committee.²¹ (Underscoring supplied)

3) The final issue which, to my mind, has particular relevance to the case at bar, pertains to the alleged error of the Court of Appeals in not treating APTs petition for certiorari as an appeal from the trial courts confirmation order.

Petitioners counsel received a copy of the confirmation order dated November 28, 1994, on December 12, 1994.²² Said order was, for review purposes, a final order because it finally disposed of the case. Other than executing the confirmation order, there was nothing else that the court was duty-bound to perform. Petitioners remedy, therefore, was to question the order, by appeal on certiorari, not before the Court of Appeals, but before the Supreme Court²³ within the reglementary period of fifteen days which expired on December 27, 1994. Instead of appealing, however, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the order on said deadline. Unfortunately, this was denied by the court a quo in its order dated January 18, 1995, a copy of which was received by petitioners counsel on February 1, 1995. Under prevailing procedural laws, it had just one day to perfect its appeal. On February 15, 1995, petitioner opted to filed with the Court of Appeals and Appeal by Certiorari . . . under Sections 1 and 2 of the Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. The reason is obvious: It could no longer file a regular appeal from the assailed order because the period for doing so has lapsed. The Court of Appeals thus made the following pertinent observation:

. . . Assuming arguendo that petitioner APTs counsel received a copy (of the November 28, 1994, order), as claimed by them, on December 12, 1994, then the petitioner had fifteen (15) days therefrom or until December 27, 1994, within which to appeal. The petitioners motion for reconsideration was admittedly filed on December 27, 1994, the last day of the reglementary 15-day period, and the order dated January 18, 1995, denying the same was received by petitioners counsel on February 1, 1995. Petitioner APT had only the following day perfect his appeal. Instead, it chose to file the instant special civil action of certiorari on February 15, 1995.

From the start, petitioner seemed unsure of its position on appeal. While initially questioning the order confirming the award of the arbitration committee, it later stated that it was raising the issue of filing by (herein private respondents) of a Motion for Execution and Appointment of Custodian of proceeds of Execution dated February 6, 1995. The latter recourse is obviously erroneous, for no appeal under either Rule 45 of Rule 65 may be taken from a motion or the filing of one. Under Rule 45, only judgments or final orders of a court or tribunal may be appealed to a higher court, while Rule 65 allows a special civil action where the acts of a tribunal, board or officer are under attack for being performed with grave abuse of discretion.

The applicable law, of course, is R.A. No. 876, which provides for appeals from arbitration awards under Section 29 thereof, viz.:

. . . (A)n appeal may be taken from . . . a judgment entered upon an award through certiorari proceedings, but such appeals shall be limited to questions of law. The proceedings upon such an appeal, including the judgment thereon, shall be governed by the Rules of Court in so far as they are applicable.

The term certiorari in the aforequoted provision refers to an ordinary appeal under Rule 45, not the special action of certiorari under Rule 65. It is an appeal, as Section 29 proclaims. The proper forum for this action is, under the old and the new rules of procedure, the Supreme Court. Thus, Section 2(c) of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states that, in all cases where only questions of law are raised or involved, the appeal shall be to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45. Moreover, Section 29 limits the appeal to questions of law, another indication that it is referring to an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 which, indeed, is the customary manner of reviewing such issues. On the other hand, the extraordinary remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 may be availed of by a party where there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the course of law, and under circumstances where a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions, has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion.²⁴cräläwvirtualibräry

Based on the foregoing, it is clear that petitioner had run out of options after its motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court in its order dated January 18, 1995. To compound its negligence, it filed the wrong action with the wrong forum. These, to my mind, are serious procedural flaws. To rule otherwise, as the majority did, would constitute a grave injustice to private Respondents.

I vote to DISMISS the petition.

Endnotes:

---

¹ Rollo, pp. 11-36 @ 21-22.

² CA Rollo, p. 261.

³ Ibid., pp. 31-34 re commitments of PNB and DBP.

⁴ Id, pp. 134-135.

⁵ The complaint was amended on March 11, 1985; CA Records, pp. 71-77.

⁶ CA Records, pp. 99-103.

⁷ Otherwise known as the Arbitration Law.

⁸ Rollo, pp. 93-94.

⁹ Ibid., pp. 15-16.

¹⁰ Composed of retired Supreme Court Associate Justice Abraham Sarmiento, as Chairman, and former Court of Appeals Associate Justice Magdangal B. Elma, nominee of the plaintiffs and Atty. Jose C. Sison, APTs nominee and its lawyer of record, as members.

¹¹ CA Records, pp. 107-173. Separate Opinions were submitted by Atty. Sison and Justice Elma.

¹² Ibid., pp. 267-284.

¹³ Id., pp. 287-289.

¹⁴ Id., pp. 42-52.

¹⁵ Id., pp. 3-30.

¹⁶ Penned by Martinez, Jr., J.; Ramirez and Morales, JJ., concurring.

¹⁷ 206 SCRA 545 (1992).

¹⁸ Article 2038. A compromise in which there is mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation, undue influence, or falsity of documents, is subject to the provisions of article 1330 of this Code.

However, one of the parties cannot set up a mistake of fact as against the other of the latter, by virtue of the compromise, has withdrawn from a litigation already commenced.

Article 2039. When the parties compromise generally on all differences which they might have with each other, the discovery of documents referring to one or more but not to all of the questions settled shall not itself be a cause for annulment or rescission of the compromise, unless said documents have been concealed by one of the parties.

But the compromise may be annulled or rescinded of it refers only to one thing to which one of the parties has no right, as shown by the newly-discovered documents.

Article 2040. If after a litigation has been decided by a final judgment, a compromise should be agreed upon, either or both parties being unaware of the existence of the final judgment, the compromise may be rescinded.

Ignorance of a judgment which may be revoked or set aside is not a valid ground for attacking a compromise.

¹⁹ Citations omitted.

²⁰ Rollo, pp. 50-51.

²¹ Ibid., pp. 53-54.

²² This date was supplied by petitioner in its Appeal by Certiorari filed before the Court of Appeals.

²³ Section 2(c), Rule 41, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

²⁴ Section 1, Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.