SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

Search for www.chanrobles.com

PLEASE CLICK HERE FOR THE LATEST ➔ SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

^{SEPARATE OPINION}

PUNO, J.:

The salient facts are well established. The instant controversy originated from an application for land use conversion filed on December 11, 1993 before the DAR by Mr. Gaudencio Beduya in behalf of the Bukidnon Agro-Industrial Development Association (BAIDA) and petitioner NQSR Management and Development Corporation concerning its 144-hectare land in San Vicente, Sumilao, Bukidnon. In an Order¹ dated November 14, 1994, DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao denied the application for conversation of the land from agricultural to agro-industrial use and ordered its distribution to qualified landless farmers. BAIDA and NQSR Management and Development Corporation filed a motion for reconsideration² dated January 9, 1995, which was, however, denied in an Order³ dated June 7, 1995. Thereafter, Bukidnon Governor Carlos O. Fortich sent a letter⁴ to President Fidel V. Ramos requesting him to suspend the Garilao Order and to confirm the ordinance enacted by the Sangguniang Bayan of Sumilao converting the subject land from agricultural to industrial/institutional land. Acting on the letter, then Executive Secretary Torres reversed the Garilao Order and upheld the power of local government units to convert portions of their agricultural lands into industrial areas.⁵ Respondent DAR Secretary Garilao filed a motion for reconsideration. Admittedly tardy, which was denied by then Executive Secretary Torres on the ground that his March 29, 1996 decision had already become final and executory in view of the lapse of the fifteen-day period for filing a motion for reconsideration. A second motion for reconsideration was filed during the pendency of which President Ramos constituted the Presidential Fact-Finding Task Force. On November 7, 1997, Deputy Executive Secretary Corona issued the herein-assailed "win-win" resolution which, pursuant to the recommendations of the task force, substantially modified the Torres decision by awarding one hundred (100) hectares of the Sumilao property to the qualified farmer beneficiaries and allocating only forty four (44) hectares for the establishment of an industrial and commercial zone.

In our decision promulgated in Baguio City on April 24, 1998, we annulled the "win-win" resolution on the ground that public respondent Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona committed grave abuse of discretion in modifying an already final and executory decision of then Executive Secretary Ruben T. Torres. It is undisputed that the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) failed to comply with the fifteen-day period for filing a motion for reconsideration.⁶ It received the Torres decision on April 10, 1996 but transmitted its motion for reconsideration to the DAR Records Management Division for mailing to the Office of the President only on May 23, 1996.⁷ The Office of the President received the motion on July 14, 1997. Forthwith, we applied the rule on finality of administrative determinations and upheld the policy of setting an end to litigation as an indispensable aspect of orderly administration of justice. In their motions for reconsideration, respondents and intervenors protest the technical basis of out decision.

I vote to grant their motions for reconsideration and remand the case to the Court of Appeals.

First. It is true that procedural rules are necessary to secure just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.⁸ Procedure, however, is only a means to an end,⁹ and they may be suspended when they subvert the interests of justice. It is self-evident that the prerogative to suspend procedural rules or to grant an exception in a particular case lies in the authority that promulgated the rules.¹⁰cräläwvirtualibräry

Rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts are promulgated by this Court.¹¹ On the other hand, it is the President as administrative head who is vested by the Administrative Code of 1987 to promulgate rules relating to governmental operations, including administrative procedure. These rules take the form of administrative orders.¹² This power is necessary for the President to discharge his constitutional duty faithfully executing our laws.¹³ Under exceptional circumstances, this Court has suspended its rules to prevent miscarriage of justice. In the same breath, we should hold that the President has the power to suspend the effectivity of administrative rules of procedure when they hamper, defeat or in any way undermine the effective enforcement of the laws of the land. Indeed, we already recognize that Congress can suspend its own rules if doing so will enable it to facilitate its task of lawmaking. The three great branches of our government are co-equal and within their own sphere they have the same responsibility to promote the good of our people. There is no reason to withhold the power to suspend rules from the President and grant it alone to the two other branches of government.

A closer scrutiny of the records in the instant case reveals that the fifteen-day rule for filing a motion for reconsideration under Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 18 was suspended by the President when he constituted, on October 15, 1997 or some six (6) months after the promulgation of the Torres decision, the Presidential Fact-Finding Task Force to conduct a comprehensive review of the proper land use of the 144-hectare Sumilao property. At that time, then Executive Secretary Torres had already denied the first motion for reconsideration of the DAR on the ground that his March 29, 1997 decision had already become final and executory. This notwithstanding, the President treated the case as still open and stated in his memorandum that the findings of the Presidential Fact-Finding Task Force " will be inputs to the resolution of the case now pending at the Office of the President regarding the said land" (emphasis ours).14 The President took cognizance of the special circumstances surrounding the tardy filing by the DAR of its motion for reconsideration. The DAR lawyers assigned to the Sumilao case received the Torres decision only after the lapse of the reglementary fifteen-day period for appeal. The copy of the decision intended for them was passed from one office to another, e.g., the Records Section of the DAR, the Office of the DAR Secretary, the Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance, before it finally reached the DAR Litigation Office. It does not appear to be just that DAR will be made to lose a significant case because of bureaucratic lapses. Viewed in this context, we should rule that the President suspended the effectivity of Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 18 and that his exercise of discretion in this regard cannot be assailed as whimsical.

I also respectfully submit this act of the President also finds full sanction under the corollary principles of presidential power of control and qualified political agency.

"This presidential power of control over the executive branch of government extends over all executive officers from Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerk and has been held by us, in the landmark case of Mondano v. Silvosa to mean 'the power of [the President] to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former with that of the latter.' It is said to be at the very 'heart of the meaning of Chief Executive.'

Equally well accepted, as a corollary rule to the control powers of the President, is the 'Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency.' As the President cannot be expected to exercise his control powers all at the same time and in person, he will have to delegate of them to his Cabinet members.

Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, 'all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person o[r] the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.' x x x

Thus, and in short, 'the President's power of control is directly exercised by him over the members of the Cabinet who, in turn, and by his authority, control the bureaus and other offices under their respective jurisdictions in the executive department.'"15

By suspending the fifteen-day period for filing a motion for reconsideration and re-opening the Torres decision, the President clearly exercised his control power over an alter-ego within the framework of a constitutional and presidential system of governance.

The President's suspension of the fifteen-day rule for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be characterized as arbitrary. The Sumilao problem raises fundamental issues which conflict between land reform and the industrialization of the countryside, the power of control by the President over his alter egos vis--vis the power of local government to convert agricultural land to industrial land. The resolution of these has far reaching implications on the success of our land reform program. Indeed, their successful resolution can bring peace or rebellion in our countryside. The President should not be frustrated by an administrative procedural rule that he himself promulgated, from formulating a creative, legal solution to the Sumilao problem. There is no denying the liberal interpretation equally accorded to both administrative and judicial rules in order to promote their object to the extent that technically be not a bar to the vindication of a legitimate grievance. We have trumpeted the truism that when technicality ceases to be an aid to justice, the courts are justified in excepting from its operation a particular case.16 We ought not to deny the same power to the Chief Executive who heads a co-equal branch of government.

Second. The petitioners are estopped from assailing the authority of the Office of the President to re-open the Sumilao case and resolve it based on the report of the Presidential Fact-Finding Task Force. Undeniably, petitioners participated in the processes conducted by the task force. Their participation in the administrative proceedings without raising any objection thereto, bars them from raising any jurisdictional infirmity after an adverse decision is rendered against them.17 Petitioners Carlos O Fortich and Rey B. Baula, Bukidnon Governor and Sumilao Mayor, respectively, were named members of the task force.18 The president ordered the task force to confer with the representatives of, among others, the landowners, namely, petitioner NQSR Management and Development Corporation.19 In a letter dated October 20, 1997 addressed to the President, the counsel for NQSR Management and Development Corporation expressed its reluctance "to comment on the merits and demerits of the [motion for intervention and motion to admit additional evidence filed by the farmer beneficiaries] out of respect of the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals where these cases are presently pending".20 NQSR Management and Development Corporation, however, did not question the authority of the President to constitute the task force despite its express adherence to the declaration by then Executive Secretary Torres as to the finality of his March 29, 1997 decision. It was confident that its interests would be promoted and protected by Bukidnon Governor Fortich who himself filed the appeal from the order of DAR Secretary Garilao21 and Sumilao Mayor Baula who certified as correct Resolution No. 24 approved by the Sangguniang Bayan of Sumilao on March 4, 1993 converting the 144-hectare property from agricultural to industrial/institutional land.22 But when the "win-win" resolution was issued by the Office of the President on November 7, 1997, allowing the conversion into industrial land of only forty four (44) hectares of the 114-hectare Sumilao property and ordering the distribution of the rest to qualified farmer beneficiaries, petitioners were flabbergasted. Mr. Norberto Quisumbing, Jr. could hardly hide his disdain over that resolution in his letter to the provincial agrarian officer protesting as absurd and arbitrary the valuation of the 100 hectares at P5.1 million pesos. That resolution was allegedly an "unprecedented turn-around which is most difficult for the discerning public to appreciate".23

The "win-win" resolution being adverse to petitioners, they now assail the authority of the President to modify the Torres decision. Under the above-mentioned circumstances, however, the principle of estoppel applies to effectively bar petitioners from raising the issue of jurisdiction.24 While lack of jurisdiction of the court or quasi-judicial body may be assailed at any stage, a party's active participation in the proceedings before it will estop him from assailing its lack of jurisdiction.25 This Court has always frowned upon the undesirable practice of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction when adverse.26

Third. Considering the special circumstances of the case as detailed above, it would better serve the ends of justice to obtain a definitive resolution of the issues raised in the instant petition and remand the same to the Court of Appeals where jurisdiction over this appeal lies. Noteworthy, is the pendency in the Court of Appeals of two or more cases involving the Sumilao property: (1) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, entitled, "N.Q.S.R. Management & Development Corporation and Bukidnoon Agro-Industrial Association, Petitioner, v. Hon. Ernesto Garilao, Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform; Rogelio E. Tamin, DAR Regional Director, Region X; Nicanor Peralta, Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer, Region X; Dolores Apostol, Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer, Sumilao, Bukidnon, Respondents";27 and (2) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, entitled. "Rodolfo Buclasan, et al., Petitioners, v. Hon. Leonardo N. Demecillo, as Judge of RTC, Malaybalay, Bukidnon, Branch IX and NQSR Management and Development Corporation, Respondents".28

The remand of the instant petition to the Court of Appeals would enable said court to consolidate the same with the two other cases pending there which undoubtedly contemplate of the same factual milieu and raise invariably the same issues as in this petition, leaving no room for further confusion that will surely be wrought by the rendition of conflicting decisions affecting a single controversy.

For the above reasons, I vote to grant the motions for reconsideration filed by the respondents and the intervenors who should be allowed to intervene pursuant to sec. 1, Rule 19 and to remand the instant petition to the Court of Appeals for appropriate proceedings.

Endnotes:

---

¹ Rollo, pp. 89-98.

² Rollo, pp. 99-106.

³ Rollo, pp. 107-114.

⁴ Dated June 28, 1995, Rollo, pp. 115-120.

⁵ Decision dated March 29, 1996, p. 5, Rollo, p. 167.

⁶ Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 18 which governs appeals to the Office of the President provides:

"SEC. 7. Decisions/resolutions/orders of the Office of the President shall, except as otherwise provided for by special laws, become final after the lapse of fifteen (15) days from receipts of a copy thereof by the parties, unless a motion for reconsideration thereof is filed within such period.

"Only one motion for reconsideration by any one party shall be allowed and entertained, save in exceptionally meritorious cases."