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SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION

KAPUNAN, J.:

For better understanding and appreciation of the issues raised in the Motion for Reconsideration, I wish to restate briefly some basic facts.

Petitioner Imelda R. Marcos, and Jose P. Dans, Jr. were charged on January 14, 1992 before the Sandiganbayan with violation of Republic Act No. 3019 (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), to wit:

Criminal Case No. 17449

The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer I, Office of the Special Prosecutor, hereby accuses IMELDA R. MARCOS and JOSE P. DANS, JR. of Violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019, as amended, committed as follows:

That on or about September 8, 1982, and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused IMELDA R. MARCOS and JOSE P. DANS, JR., public officers, being then the Chairman and Vice-Chairman, respectively, of the Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA), a government corporate entity created under Executive Order No. 603 of the former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, while in the performance of their official functions, taking advantage of their positions and committing the crime in relation to their offices, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally conspiring with one another, enter on behalf of the aforesaid government corporation into an agreement for the development of the areas adjacent to the LRTA stations and the management and operation of the concession areas therein, with the Philippine General Hospital Foundation, Inc. (PGHFI), a private enterprise, under terms and conditions manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Criminal Case No. 17450.

The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer I, Office of the Special Prosecutor, hereby accuses IMELDA R. MARCOS and JOSE P. DANS, JR. of Violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019, as amended, committed as follows:

That on or about June 8, 1984, and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused IMELDA R. MARCOS and JOSE P. DANS, JR., public officers, being then the Chairman and Vice-Chairman, respectively, of the Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA), a government corporate entity created under Executive Order No. 603 of the former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, while in the performance of their official functions, taking advantage of their positions and committing the crime in relation to their offices, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally conspiring with one another, enter on behalf of the aforesaid government corporation into a Lease Agreement covering LRTA property located in Pasay City, with the Philippine General Hospital Foundation, Inc. (PGHFI), a private enterprise, under terms and conditions manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Criminal Case No. 17451

The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer I, Office of the Special Prosecutor, hereby accuses IMELDA R. MARCOS of Violation of Section 3(d) of RA 3019, as amended, committed as follows:

That on or about June 8, 1984, and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused IMELDA R. MARCOS, a public officer, being then the Chairman of the Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA), a government corporate entity created under Executive Order No. 603 of the former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, while in the performance of her official functions, taking advantage of her position and committing the offense in relation to her office, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally accepted employment and/or acted as Chairman of (the) Philippine General Hospital Foundation, Inc. (PGHFI), a private corporation duly organized under the laws of the Philippines, which private enterprise had, at that time(,) pending business transactions with the accused, in her capacity as Chairman of the LRTA.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Criminal Case No. 17452

The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer I, Office of the Special Prosecutor, hereby accuses JOSE P. DANS, JR. of Violation of Section 3(d) of RA 3019, as amended, committed as follows:

That on or about June 8, 1984, and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused JOSE P. DANS, JR., a public officer, being then the Vice-Chairman of the Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA), a government corporate entity created under Executive Order No. 603 of the former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, while in the performance of his official functions, taking advantage of his position and committing the offense in relation to his office, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally accepted employment and/or acted as Director of (the) Philippine General Hospital Foundation, Inc. (PGHFI), a private corporation duly organized under the laws of the Philippines, which private enterprise had, at that time(,) pending business transactions with the accused, in his capacity as Vice-Chairman of LRTA.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Criminal Case No. 17453

The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer, Office of the Special Prosecutor, hereby accuses IMELDA R. MARCOS and JOSE P. DANS, JR. of Violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019, as amended, committed as follows:

That on or about June 18, 1984, and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused IMELDA R. MARCOS and JOSE P. DANS, JR., public officers, being then the Chairman and Vice-Chairman, respectively, of the Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA), a government corporate entity created under Executive Order No. 603 of the former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, while in the performance of their official functions, taking advantage of their positions and committing the crime in relation to their offices, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally conspiring with one another, enter on behalf of the aforesaid government corporation into a Lease Agreement covering LRTA property located in Sta. Cruz, Manila, with the Philippine General Hospital Foundation, Inc. (PGHFI), a private enterprise, under terms and conditions manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

After trial, the Sandiganbayan acquitted petitioner Marcos in Criminal Case Nos. 17449 and 17451 and Dans in Criminal Case Nos. 17449 and 17452. However, it convicted both petitioner Marcos and Dans in Criminal Case Nos. 17450 and 17453.

Both appealed to this Court.

In the decision of the Third Division of this Court promulgated on January 29, 1998, the conviction of petitioner Marcos in Criminal Case No. 17450 was affirmed with modification, while her conviction in Criminal Case No. 17453 and that of Dans in Criminal Case Nos. 17450 and 17453 were reversed on reasonable doubt.

On February 18, 1998, petitioner Marcos filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision on the following grounds:

a. It was not petitioner, but accused Jose P. Dans, Jr., who entered into the "Lease Agreement" (Exhibit 'B') on behalf of the Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA), subject matter of Crim. Case No. 17450. And, since accused Jose P. Dans, Jr. has been acquitted of the offense charged in Crim. Case No. 17450, petitioner Imelda R. Marcos may not be convicted of the offense as his co-conspirator.

b. The evidence upon which the finding of the Court that the terms and conditions of the "Lease Agreement" are "manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the Government" does not constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt, sufficient to overcome the presumption of innocence, to establish that the terms and conditions of the "Lease Agreement" (Exhibit 'B') are manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA).

c. The finding of the Court that rendition of the decision by the First Division of the Sandiganbayan and not by the Special Division of Five constituted under Administrative Order No. 288-93 was valid and regular, is based on incorrect facts and erroneous application of the law.

d. Likewise, the finding of the Court that there was no denial of the right of petitioner to counsel before the Sandiganbayan is based on an erroneous perception of the relevant facts.

I

The Information in Criminal Case No. 17450 (Violation of Sec. 3[g] of R.A. 3019, as amended) under which petitioner Marcos was convicted reads:

The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer I, Office of the Special Prosecutor, hereby accuses IMELDA R. MARCOS and JOSE P. DANS, JR., public officers being then the Chairman and Vice-Chairman, respectively, of the Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA), a government corporate entity created under Executive Order No. 603 of the Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, while in the performance of their official functions, taking advantage of their positions and committing the crime in relation to their offices, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally conspiring with one another, enter on behalf of the aforesaid government corporation into a Lease Agreement covering LRTA property located in Pasay City, with the Philippine General Hospital Foundation, Inc. (PGHFI), a private enterprise, under terms and conditions manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019 requires that the following be established:

a. The accused public officer entered, on behalf of the Government, into a contract or transaction, and

b. The contract or transaction entered into by the public officer, on behalf of the Government, is manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the Government.

Under the Information, petitioner Marcos is alleged to have violated Sec. 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019 because while in the performance of her official functions as Chairman of the LRTA, she entered on behalf of said corporation into a Lease Agreement covering the LRTA property located in Pasay City with the PGHFI, under terms and conditions manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government and in conspiracy with Dans.

However, it is clear from the Lease Agreement that it was Dans, not petitioner Marcos, who entered into the said agreement, subject of the Information, in behalf of the LRTA. Petitioner Marcos signed the agreement in her capacity as Chairman of the PGHFI, a private enterprise. Since it is conceded in the decision sought to reconsidered that there was no conspiracy between Dans and Marcos in entering into the contract, it is utterly illogical to acquit Dans who entered into the contract "on behalf of the Government" and convict Marcos who signed the same in her capacity as Chairman of the PGHFI, a private enterprise.

It is the argument of the Solicitor General, to which some members of the Court agree, that since petitioner Marcos was Chairman of the Board of Directors of the LRTA, she must have directly and actively participated in the authorization, approval and execution of the Lease Agreement for and in behalf of the LRTA, manifesting a conflict of interest.

In all due respect, the proposition has no factual moorings; it rests on pure speculations.

First, petitioner Marcos and Dans were virtually charged with conflict of interest in Criminal Case Nos. 17449, 17451 and 17453. But they were cleared by the Sandiganbayan; their acquittal has laid to rest the accusation that they acted in a double capacity.

Second, it is pure speculation and conjecture to allege that petitioner Marcos acted for the LRTA or is assumed to have given her approval to the execution of the Lease Agreement by the LRTA being Chairman thereof. There is no iota of proof at all that petitioner Marcos was present or had participated in any meeting of the LRTA Board of Directors authorizing the agreement. To convict, there should be proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Bare assumptions and speculations cannot be bases for conviction.

Third, if petitioner Marcos had taken part in any action of the Board, why were the other members of the Board not included in the Information for violation of Sec. 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019? The decision of the Third Division of the Court itself has provided the answer when it stated that "this Court's opinion that the alleged conspiracy between the petitioners (Marcos and Dans) was not sufficiently established by the State's evidence" (page 22). Verily, having found that the alleged conspiracy between petitioner Marcos and Dans has not been established, no act committed by Dans may be imputed to Marcos, in the same way that it is purely guesswork to insinuate that the act of the LRTA in authorizing the Lease Agreement may be imputed to petitioner Marcos, absent any semblance of proof.

II

The decision sought to be reconsidered opted to rely solely on the documentary evidence of the prosecution, namely, the Lease Agreement (Exh. "B") and the sub-lease contract (Exh. "D) in rationalizing that the former is "manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government."

We should stress that in affirming the conviction of petitioner Marcos, this Court relies mainly on the prosecution's documentary evidence showing the disparity between the P102,760.00 monthly rental stipulated in Exhibit "B" and the P734,000.00 monthly rental provided in Exhibit "D."¹cräläwvirtualibräry

I feel quite uneasy with the method used by the prosecution in determining that the government was grossly disadvantaged in the Lease Agreement, this is, by simply comparing the rental in the Lease Agreement and that in the sub-lease contract. Just by considering the disparity in the rentals, cannot it be argued as well that the lease rental is fair and reasonable and the sublease rental is too high?

Supposing there was no sublease contract at all, or the sublease rental was equal or lower than that in the Lease Agreement, would the conclusion of the Court be the same, considering that there would then be nothing to compare the lease rental with? The point I am trying to drive at is that proof should have been adduced to determine the fair market value of the Pasay lot based on the market data approach which considers how much properties in that particular area were sold or offered to be sold.

Curiously enough, when Sandiganbayan Chief Prosecutor Leonardo P. Tamayo was asked during the oral argument before the Court on September 10, 1998, why no such independent evidence was presented by the prosecution, he answered that he was not then involved in the case, but added that if he were the prosecutor, he would have adduced such evidence. This is an admission that the prosecution's evidence against Marcos is sorely lacking.

One other point. An essential element of Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019 is that the contract entered into by the public officer concerned is manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government. In the case at bar, a close scrutiny, however, reveals that the main and ultimate beneficiary of the subject transactions was the government-owned hospital, the Philippine General Hospital (PGH). The Philippine General Hospital Foundation, Inc. (PGHFI) was established as a charitable organization.² The funds it raised eventually went to the rehabilitation and support of the PGH as evidenced by the list of various medical equipment, drugs and supplies donated by the foundation to the said hospital.³ There is no allegation, much less proof, that Marcos misappropriated a single centavo from the transactions. Since the major recipient of the high rentals negotiated by PGHFI (with private corporations) was one of the state-run medical facilities, the perceived disadvantage to the LRTA was negated by the benefits reaped by PGH. In the end, therefore, albeit indirectly, the ultimate gain still went to the government.

III

I cannot abide with the manner by which the Sandiganbayan rendered its decision in these cases, aptly termed by Justice Francisco in his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion as the "jurisdictional fiasco between the First and Special Division" of the Sandiganbayan. To my mind, it is not a mere "technical impropriety" which can readily be dismissed, as the majority did. The procedural infraction committed by the Sandiganbayan (First Division), unfortunately, has fatal consequences because it has decidedly placed the whole proceedings in serious doubt. It must be recalled that this is a criminal case. Thus, it is indispensable that all proceedings to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused must be undertaken with nary a hint of irregularity, for what is at stake is one's personal freedom.

To recap, at the initial voting of the First Division of the Sandiganbayan (composed of Presiding Justice Garchitorena, Justice Balajadia and Justice Atienza), Justices Garchitorena and Balajadia voted to convict petitioner Marcos in Criminal Case Nos. 17449, 17450 and 17451 and to acquit her in Criminal Case No. 17453, whereas Justice Atienza voted to convict her in Criminal Case Nos. 17450 and 17453 and to acquit her in Criminal Case Nos. 17449 and 17451. Due to the failure of the First Division to reach a unanimous agreement regarding the disposition of the criminal cases, Presiding Justice Garchitorena on September 15, 1993 created a Special Division to resolve the above cases pursuant to Sec. 5 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended:

SEC. 5. Proceedings, how conducted; votes required.--The unanimous vote of the three justices in a division shall be necessary for the pronouncement of a judgment. In the event that the three justices do not reach a unanimous vote, the Presiding Justice shall designate two other justices from among the members of the Court to sit temporarily with them, forming a division of five justices, and the concurrence of a majority of such division shall be necessary for rendering judgment.

The Special Division was composed of the aforenamed three justices, with Justice Amores and Justice del Rosario in addition.

On September 21, 1993 over a late lunch at a restaurant in Quezon City, after attending a committee hearing in Congress, Justice Garchitorena, Justice del Rosario and Justice Balajadia, in the presence of Justice Regino C. Hermosisima, who was not a member of the First Division (Justices Atienza and Amores were absent), discussed their respective positions in the criminal cases. After learning that Justice del Rosario concurred with the dissent of Justice Atienza, Justices Garchitorena and Balajadia capitulated and decided to adopt Justice Atienza's position. On the rationale that "there had resulted a unanimity among the regular members of the First Division" and thus concluding that there was no longer any need for the Special Division, Presiding Justice Garchitorena upon arrival at his Sandiganbayan office issued on the same day A.O. No. 293-93 dissolving said Special Division. When informed that same day of what transpired at the Quezon City restaurant, Justice del Rosario manifested that he "did not mind" the dissolution of the Special Division, while Justice Amores submitted a written manifestation requesting a fifteen-day extension to give his opinion. No action on Justice Amores' request was made as of September 24, 1993 when the First Division rendered its judgment.

The procedure is highly anomalous, irregular and is not sanctioned by practice. It is a blatant violation of the law, specifically Sec. 5 of P.D. NO. 1606 and Sec. 1(b), Rule XVIII of the Revised Rules of the Sandiganbayan.⁴cräläwvirtualibräry

On this point, the majority of the Third Division of this Court opined:

While it is true that under Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended, when a unanimous vote is not reached by a division, two other justices shall be designated by the Presiding Justice to sit in a special division, and their majority vote shall be required to reach a valid verdict, this provision does not totally rule out a situation where all members of the 3-justice division eventually come to a common agreement to reach a unanimous decision, thus, making another division's participation in these cases redundant. This is exactly what transpired in this case. The change of heart of Justices Garchitorena and Balajadia, though reached unofficially, may be perceived as a supervening event which rendered the Special Division's functions superfluous. xxx.

I beg to disagree for the following reasons:

1. The informal meeting of the Justices at a Quezon City restaurant where the criminal cases were discussed or taken up (perhaps as part of the menu, a Justice of the Court commented during the oral argument) is not sanctioned by law and the rules.

The Sandiganbayan law provides that:

The Sandiganbayan shall have its principal office in the Metro Manila area and shall hold sessions thereat for the trial and determination of all cases filed with it irrespective of the place where they may have arisen, x x x.⁵cräläwvirtualibräry

The Sandiganbayan Rules of Procedure also requires that:

"sessions of the Sandiganbayan, whether en banc or division, shall be held in its principal office in the Metropolitan Manila area where it shall try and determine all cases filed with it xxx.⁶ (Italics supplied.)

Besides, it goes without saying, there are certain formalities to be followed for meetings and deliberations by a collegial body. There should be an agenda, with advance notice of what cases are to be deliberated upon or matters to be taken up. The reason for these formalities is obvious. The members should be notified of the session to assure their presence and to enable them to prepare and discuss intelligently and authoritatively the matters to be taken up. Justices Amores and Atienza were not present because they were not notified. Thus, Justice Amores' views were not ventilated because he was not aware of the meeting.

Hence, I agree with the dissenting opinion of Justice Francisco that whatever discussion and agreement was made among the Justices present in the restaurant cannot be considered as "official business" and, therefore, has no binding effect.

2. The moment the Special Division of five justices was created, it assumed jurisdiction over the criminal cases to the exclusion of the First Division. It is a fundamental rule that once jurisdiction to try a criminal case is acquired, it remains with the court until it is finally decided. The mere fact that the original three members of the First Division of the Sandiganbayan had arrived at a unanimity over the issues on which they had been previously divided did not authorize the Presiding Justice to abolish the Special Division of five justices and refer the cases back to the First Division. Besides, if the majority of the Special Division had already arrived at a consensus and was ready to vote, why did it not simply and promptly vote on the cases and promulgate the judgment itself, instead of resorting to the rigmarole of dissolving the body and returning the cases to the First Division?

I am not persuaded by the contention that since the Rules do not provide how and by whom a special division may be dissolved, the Presiding Justice has the authority to order the dissolution. As already mentioned, once jurisdiction to try a criminal case is acquired, the court retains jurisdiction to try it until finally disposed of. Moreover, a Sandiganbayan regular division and a Special Division of five that may be created in case of lack of unanimity by the former are not one and the same body, albeit three members of the special division are also members of the regular division. When a justice participates in the deliberation of the special division and votes, he does so as a member of that special division, not as a member of the regular division to which he belongs. Whatever opinion or view he had entertained of the case while it was being deliberated upon in the regular division does not bind him as a member of the special division.

How then could three justices of the original division have come to a unanimous decision, when in fact and in law, said division no longer existed, having been replaced by the Special Division? To repeat, under P.D. No. 1606, if a unanimous vote is not reached, a division of five justices shall be formed and it is the majority decision of such division which is required to render a judgment. Quite plainly, this means that the case is removed from the jurisdiction of the regular division and the final decision lies with the Special Division. The law is clear and leaves no room for any other interpretation. On this basis, I find it difficult to accept the majority's sweeping assertion that Section 5 of P.D. No. 1606 "does not rule out a situation where all members of the 3-justice division eventually come to a common agreement to reach a unanimous decision, thus, making another division's participation in these cases redundant." If we follow the majority's logic, suppose another member of the three-man division had changed his mind anew, would a special division of five have been created again? And supposing further, the original members of the three-man division had come to an agreement, should the special division be dissolved again, and so on ad infinitum? The framers of the law, certainly, could not have intended such resultant absurdity.

3. The arbitrary dissolution of the Special Division had inappropriately, perhaps illegally, deprived Justice Amores of the chance to present his own viewpoint and to vote. Justice Garchitorena rationalized that Justice Amores' vote would not change the result of the decision anyway:

If Justice Amores were to have disagreed with the conclusions reached by Justices del Rosario and Atienza (which were subsequently adopted by Justices Balajadia and the undersigned), he would have been outvoted by the other four Justices. On the other hand, if Justice Amores had concurred with the position taken by the four other Justices of the Special Division, it would not have altered the decision as promulgated. Such concurrence would only bring about unanimity in the decision - which would be a very odd situation since a Special Division is constituted precisely because of the existence of a divided court. If the Special Division had remained, the vote of Justice Amores either way would not have resulted in any change in the result of the decision as promulgated.⁷cräläwvirtualibräry

Had Justice Amores been allowed to participate and vote, it is not such a far-fetched idea that in the course of the deliberations of the Special Division, the other justices might have been persuaded by his arguments and might have changed their minds and consequently, their votes, just as what Justice Garchitorena and Balajadia had done.

This case has drawn more than a passing attention, some mixed feelings, because it involves one of the most powerful personalities on the center stage during the difficult years when the light of freedom had been shut out across the land. When, finally, democracy was restored by the EDSA revolution in February 1986, the Filipino people, hurting from the wounds and iniquities inflicted by the dictatorship, vowed never again to allow democracy be taken away from them.

The martial law days may be far behind us but we have certainly not forgotten. No matter the odds, the toil continues to bring to justice all who have abused power and betrayed the Filipino people. This pursuit, however, is, or should be, tempered by the lessons from our past. We must forever be true to our vow to be faithful to the letter of the law and the dictates of due process, and not be distracted by the personalities involved. For the right to due process and the rule of law are immutable principles in a democratic society that should apply to all, even to those we hate. We should take a page from the dissenting opinion of Justice Abraham Sarmiento in Marcos v. Manglapus⁸ on the issue of whether or not the Marcoses may be prohibited from returning to the Philippines after the EDSA revolution. The majority ruled against the Marcoses and opined that at that particular time their return posed a serious threat to national interest and welfare. Justice Sarmiento, who lost a son to, and himself experienced, the cruelties of the martial law regime disagreed and said:

. . . I am for Marcos's return not because I have a score to settle with him. Ditto's death or my arrest are scores that can not be settled.

I feel the ex-President's death abroad (presented in the dailies as "imminent") would leave him "unpunished" for his crimes to country and countrymen. If punishment is due, let this leadership inflict it. But let him stand trial and accord him due process.

Modesty aside, I have staunchly and consistently advocated the human right of travel and movement and the liberty of abode. We would have betrayed our own ideals if we denied Marcos his rights. It is his constitutional right, a right that can not be abridged by personal hatred, fear, founded or unfounded, and by speculations of the man's "capacity" "to stir trouble." Now that the shoe is on the other foot, let no more of human rights violations be repeated against any one, friend or foe. In a democratic framework, there is no such thing as getting even

Any quest no matter how noble will be in vain if pursued for ends other than truth and justice.

WHEREFORE, I vote to grant the motion for reconsideration and acquit petitioner Imelda R. Marcos.

Endnotes:

---

¹ Decision, G.R. Nos. 127073 & 126995, 5 January 1998, pp. 24-25.

² In the Article of Incorporation submitted to the SEC on November 17, 1981 the PGHFI listed the following purposes:

1. To establish, construct, equip, maintain, administer, conduct and operate an integrated and general medical institution which shall provide medical, surgical and related services, facilities and accommodations for the treatment, care, rehabilitation and/or relief of persons suffering from illnesses, injuries and disabilities, primarily for the benefit of the people of the Philippines, particularly those who are without the necessary or sufficient means of support and are incapable of obtaining a comfortable livelihood, in pursuance of the policy of the State to secure the well-being of the people by providing them with the general medical, health and hygienic services and facilities; and for this purpose to manage and expend such money or other property, real or personal, as the corporation may acquire or receive for the above-mentioned purposes, and to all other acts incidental or related to the maintenance of the charity herein described;

2. To carry on any and all educational activities related to rendering care to the sick and injured or the promotion of health, which in the opinion of its Board of Trustees may be justified by the facilities, personnel, funds or other requirements that are, or can be made, available;

3. To promote and carry on scientific research related to the care of the sick and injured insofar as, in the opinion of its Board of Trustees, such research can be carried on, or in connection with the hospital;

4. To participate, as circumstances may warrant, in any activity designed and carried on to promote the general health of the community;

5. To establish and manage similar institutions and/or clinics in other parts of the country as its facilities, funds and personnel can sustain and support;

6. To facilitate the dissemination of ideas and public acceptance of information on medical and health consciousness or awareness, and the development of fact-finding, information and reporting facilities for and in aid of these general purposes or objects aforesaid, especially in general health and physical fitness, and other relevant or related fields;

7. To encourage the training of physicians, nurses, health officers, social workers and medical and technical personnel in the practical and scientific implementation of such persons or personnel;

8. To assist universities and research institutions in the field of medicine, and to encourage and to support educational programs of value to general health;

9. To encourage the formation of other organizations on the national, provincial and/or city and local levels; and to coordinate their various efforts and activities for the purpose of achieving a more effective programmatic approach on the common problems relative to the objectives enumerated herein;

10. To seek and obtain assistance in any form from both international and local foundations and organizations; and to administer grants and funds that may be given to the organization;

11. To help prevent, relieve and alleviate the afflictions and maladies of the people in any and all walks of life, including those who are poor and needy, all without regard to or discrimination, because of race, creed, color or political belief of the persons helped; and to enable them to obtain treatment when such disorders occur;

12. To acquire and/or borrow funds, and to own all funds and/or equipment, educational materials and supplies by purchase, donation, or otherwise, and to dispose and distribute the same in such manner, and, on such basis as the corporation shall, from time to time, deem proper and best, under the particular circumstances, to serve its general and non-profit purposes and objectives;

13. To buy, purchase, acquire, own, lease, hold, sell, exchange, transfer and dispose of properties whether real or personal for purposes herein mentioned; and

14. To do everything necessary, proper, advisable or convenient for the accomplishment of any of the powers herein set forth and to do every other act and thing incidental thereto or connected therewith.

³ Submitted by the Accounting Services Division of the UP-PGH on 13 October 1993 and attached to the Initial Report of the investigating prosecutors submitted to the Sandiganbayan on 26 October 1993 in Crim. Case Nos. 17449-17453; Original Records, pp. 11-14; 49-67.

⁴ (b) In Division.--The unanimous vote of three Justices in a division shall be necessary for the rendition of a judgment or order. In the event that the three Justices do not reach a unanimous vote, the Presiding Justice shall designate by raffle two Justices from among the other members of the Sandiganbayan to sit temporarily with them forming a special division of five Justices, and the vote of a majority of such special division shall be necessary for the rendition of a judgment or order.