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^{CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION}

MELO, J.:

While I agree in the result that the petition should be granted and that, the assailed orders dated February 1, 1994 and August 1, 1994 issued by Branch 59 of the Regional Trial Court of San Carlos City, Negros Oriental, in Cadastral Case No. RTC-280 should be nullified, I would like to take exception to the majoritys basis thereof.

It may be duly noted that, indeed, the action filed by petitioner with the regional trial court was an offshoot of the labor case in the petitioner participated in the auction sale of the judgment was completely satisfied as a consequence of full payment received by the prevailing party on account of the consummated sale on execution conducted by the sheriff of the Regional Arbitration Branch concerned, where the aforesaid pieces of property levied on execution were bought by petitioner, a juridical entity not a party to the case. The jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Commission Arbitration Branch ended when judgment in favor of the prevailing party was fully satisfied upon the payment of the proceeds of the execution sale to said party. When judgment in favor of the judgment creditor is fully and completely satisfied, the reason for which the courts tribunals jurisdiction has been invoked and thereafter exercised, ceases to exist and there is nothing more to be done. Hence, the courts or tribunal jurisdiction must be deemed terminated. In the present case, therefore, even as the controversy may be said to have been an offshoot of the execution sale conducted by the NLRC Regional Arbitration Branch in a labor dispute, the labor tribunals limited jurisdiction may not be further invoked.

Strictly speaking, there can be no splitting of cause of action under the present circumstances even as petitioner invokes the rightful jurisdiction of the regular court. Complaints cause of action in the labor case ceased to exist as soon as their cause had been completely satisfied with the full payment of judgment in their favor. Logically, a non-existent cause of action is incapable of being split. The present case should be distinguished from one where the prevailing party also turns out to be the highest bidder in the execution sale. There is no full and complete satisfaction of judgement in such latter case until and unless title is duly transferred to the actual possession delivered to the prevailing party. Moreover, it is worth noting that petitioner, the highest bidder in the execution sale, is not even a party to the subject labor case. It can be easily gleaned therefore, that petitioners cause of action is a new one altogether and it cannot be considered to be a continuation of the labor dispute falling within the jurisdiction of the labor tribunal.

Even granting that the labor tribunal has the general supervisory control over the process the execution of its judgments, including the power to determine every question of fact and law which may be involved in the execution (Balais vs. Velasco, 252 SCRA 707 [1996]), the labor tribunal lacks ample power and jurisdiction to grant full and complete relief to petitioner in this case. The most that the labor tribunal can do is to compel private respondent, under pain of contempt, to surrender the owners duplicate copies of the certificates of title to the registry of deeds. In the present case, private respondent stubbornly refused to deliver said copies of the certificates of title unless ordered by the said courts. It would be inutile for petitioner to seek relief from the labor tribunal because the said tribunal cannot order the register of deeds to cancel the outstanding certificates of title of private respondents unless the owners duplicate copies thereof are surrendered. Instead, the Land Registration Law (Act No. 496) directs the aggrieved party to apply by petition to the court because it is the court which has the power to decree the annulment of the same and to order the issuance of a new certificate of title, to wit:

SEC 111. In every case where the clerk or any register of deeds is requested to enter a new certificate pursuance of an instrument purporting to be executed by the registered owner, or by reason of any instrument or proceedings which divest the title of the registered owner against his consent, if the outstanding owners duplicate certificate is not presented for cancellation when such request is made, the clerk or register of deeds shall not enter a new certificate, but the person claiming to be entitled thereto may apply petitioner to the court. The court, after hearing, may order the registered owner or any person withholding the duplicate copy to surrender the same, and direct the entry of a new certificate title upon such surrender.

If in any case the person withholding the duplicate certificates is amenable to the process of the court or if for any reason the outstanding owners duplicate certificate cannot be delivered up, the court may by decree annul the same, and order a new certificate of title to be entered. Such new certificate and all duplicates thereof shall contain a memorandum of the annulment for the outstanding duplicate.

If in any case an outstanding mortgagees or lessees duplicate certificate is not produced and surrendered when a mortgage is discharged or extinguished or the lease is terminated, like proceedings may be held to obtain registration as in the case of non-production of an owners duplicate. (Amended by P.D. 1529, Sec. 107; Emphasis supplied.)

From the foregoing provision, it is my humble submission that petitioner, who logically wants full and complete relief, is left with the sole encourse of proceeding to the regular court and not the labor tribunal. To reiterate, only a regular court has jurisdiction to hear and determine disputes relating to entries of a certificate of title in the registration book, and thereafter order the entry of a new certificate of title, the entry or cancellation of a memorandum upon a certificate, or grant any other relief upon such terms and conditions, as it may deem proper. This should be done by filing the petition in the original case in which the decree of registration was entered, i.e., in the original cadastral case. This is expressly provided for in Section 112, of the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496), to wit:

SEC. 112. No erasure, alteration, or amendment shall be made upon the registration book after the entry of a certificate of title or memorandum thereon and the attestation of the same by the clerk or any register of deeds, except by order of the court. Any registered owner or other person in interest may at any time apply by petition to the court, upon the ground that registered interest of any description, whether vested, contingent, expectant, or inchoate, have terminated and ceased; or that the new interest have arisen or been created which do not appear upon the certificate, or that any error or omission, or mistake was made in entering a certificate; or that the name of any person on the certificate has been changed; or that the registered owner has been married; or, if registered as married, that the marriage has been terminated; or that a corporation which owned registered land and has been dissolved has not conveyed the same within three years after dissolution; or upon any other reasonable ground; and the court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine the petition after notice to all parties in interest, and may order the entry of a new certificate, the entry or cancellation of a memorandum upon a certificate, or grant any other relief upon such terms and conditions, requiring security if necessary, as it may deemp proper: Provided, however, that this section shall not be construed to give the court authority to open the original decree of registration, and that nothing shall be done or ordered by the court which shall impair the title or other interest of a purchaser holding a certificate for value and in good faith, or his heirs or assigns, without his or their written consent.

Any petition filed under this section and all petitions and motions filed under the provisions of this Act after original registration shall be filed and entitled in the original case in which the decree of registration was entered. (Emphasis supplied)

The regional trial court, to my mind, therefore, had jurisdiction to grant the relief to sought for by petitioner therein. Respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

Incidentally, it may likewise be significantly noted that respondent regional trial court also committed grave abuse of discretion when it declared the order dated October 22 and 30, 1991 of Judge Basa, and the April 8, 1992 order of Judge Layumas, all of which were already final and executory, and not merely interlocutory orders for they did finally adjudicate the merits of the case. Verily, only the Court of Appeals may annul a final and executory order of a regional trial court on an original action for annulment of judgment (Section 9, Batas Pambansa Bilang 129).

Over and above the ground of estoppel by laches, I vote to grant the petition as the regional trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the cadastral case in the present case where petitioner correctly invoked the jurisdiction vested upon the regional trial court by Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, as amended in realtion to the above-cited provisions of the Land Registration Act, to consolidate its title to and to obtain full and actual possession of the pieces of property it bought on execution sale and other incidents thereto.