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SEPARATE OPINION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
I concur with the ponencia insofar as it denies the petition and affirms the Court of Appeals Decision and Resolutions finding private respondents guilty only of a violation of office rules and regulations, meting upon them the penalty of reprimand and reinstating them in the civil service.
I beg to disagree, however, insofar as it deprives private respondents their back salaries corresponding to the entire period of their preventive suspension.
Private Respondents Liable
for Violation of Reasonable
Office Rules and Regulations
Like the majority, I do not find any reversible error or abuse of discretion in the factual finding of the Court of Appeals that private respondents did not actually participate in the September 1991 mass actions staged in violation of law by various public schoolteachers. They were, however, found to have absented themselves from their classes without filing an application for leave of absence. For this lapse, they indeed deserve a reprimand, pursuant to Section 23, Rule XIV (Discipline) of the Rules Implementing the Civil Service Law, as well as existing Jurisprudence which I shall cite later.
Private Respondents Entitled
to Back Salaries Without
Qualification or Deduction
Mr. Justice Mendoza's ponencia defines two kinds of preventive suspension for civil service employees charged with offenses punishable with removal or suspension: "(1) preventive suspension pending investigation (51) and (2) preventive suspension pending appeal if the penalty imposed by the disciplining authority is suspension or dismissal but, after review, the respondent is exonerated (47(4))."[1cräläwvirtualibräry
Accordingly, the esteemed justice makes a distinction in the grant of back salaries. In the first instance, he says, the suspended employees (pending investigation) are NOT entitled to back pay, regardless of whether they are eventually exonerated from the charges for which they were investigated. However, if and when they are exonerated after appeal, they may be granted back salaries, but only those corresponding to the appeal or review period until actual reinstatement, and not exceeding five years.
This stance being adopted by the majority reverses several unanimous en banc decisions, in which this Court ordered payment of back salaries without qualification or deduction. In Miranda v. Commission on Audit,[2 the Court, noting that the applicable law mandated that preventive suspension should not be longer than 90 days, deemed Miranda's suspension for almost eight (8) years unreasonable and unjustified. It thus resolved that he was entitled to back wages for the period of his suspension not exceeding five (5) years, consistent with existing jurisprudence.[3cräläwvirtualibräry
In Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals,4 the Court ordered that Petitioner Mariano "be given back wages without deduction or qualification from the time he was suspended until his actual reinstatement which, under prevailing jurisprudence, should not exceed five years." The Court ruled: "To deny petitioner Mariano his back wages during his suspension would be tantamount to punishing him after his exoneration from the charges which [had] caused his dismissal from the service.[5cräläwvirtualibräry
The same rationale was given in Jacinto v. Court of Appeals,[6 in which we also granted Petitioner Jacinto "back wages, without deduction or qualification, from the time she was suspended until her actual reinstatement, the total of which, under prevailing jurisprudence, should not exceed five years.
In fact, in Garcia v. Chairman, Commission on Audit,[7 where the petitioner, several years after he had been summarily dismissed from the government service purportedly for dishonesty, was granted executive clemency "not because of lack of sufficient proof of his commission of the offense but xxx, more importantly, he did not commit the offense charged," the Court found it "fair and just to award petitioner full back wages from 1 April 1975 when he was illegally dismissed, to 12 March 1984 when he was reinstated, xxx without deduction or qualification." Emphatizing with petitioner, the Court held:[8
"xxx Verily, law, equity and justice dictate that petitioner be afforded compassion for the embarrassment, humiliation and, above all, injustice caused to him and his family by his unfounded dismissal. This Court cannot help surmising the painful stigma that must have caused petitioner, the incursion on his dignity and reputation, for having been adjudged, albeit wrongfully, a dishonest man xxx."
Indeed, where the suspension of civil servants has, from the very beginning, no reason other than to ensure an unhampered investigation, there is no justification for withholding their salaries, whether immediately upon investigation or after appeal or petition for review, much less after their exoneration. They need not even be found fully innocent of any misdemeanor, as the public school-teachers concerned in Bangalisan and Jacinto who were actually found to have violated reasonable office rules and regulations. Such administrative offense, however, is punishable with reprimand only, not suspension or dismissal. Hence, they were granted their back salaries for the period of their suspension, because they had not committed any grave act warranting their suspension.
The rationale for the grant of back salaries to suspended public servants is their exoneration from the charges leveled against them that were punishable with either dismissal or suspension. Needless to say, only when the charges carry either of these extreme administrative penalties may they be preventively suspended pending investigation. If, after investigation, they are found to be innocent or culpable of lesser offenses not punishable with suspension or dismissal, they must be immediately reinstated AND granted full back salaries corresponding to the period of their suspension. In the first place, if they have been found to be not guilty of any offense warranting even just a suspension, there is no justifiable reason to deprive them of work and of income therefor. In these cases, their preventive suspension must be deemed unjustified.
The majority admits that preventive suspension pending investigation is not a penalty, but is only a means of enabling the disciplining authority to conduct an unhampered investigation.[9 Not being a penalty, there is therefore NO reason to deny employees their salaries for such period, especially after they are proven innocent of any offense punishable with suspension or dismissal. I respectfully submit that to withhold an exonerated employee's pay for such period would in fact transform the nature of preventive suspension into a penalty -- a penalty which is unauthorized by law, in contravention of the fundamental right of every individual to due process, and therefore unconstitutional.
The "no-work-no-pay" principle should not be applied in these cases. We must consider that, ordinarily, suspended employees are willing to work, but they do not have a choice. Because of some serious charges leveled against them, they are not allowed to report for work. Investigations may take up to ninety (90) days or three (3) months. In the meantime, they do not receive their salaries and other benefits. And yet, the charges against them may have been baseless or aggravated without good reason, in which case their suspensions are unjustified ab initio. In these instances, I repeat, it is but right to grant them full back pays.
Admittedly, the purpose behind preventive suspensions pending investigation is noble. It is intended to enable the disciplining authorities or the investigating officials to probe the charges against respondents by preventing the latter from intimidating or in any way influencing witnesses against them.[10 But, I submit, it would be totally unfair to respondents who are undeserving of the penalty of suspension or dismissal to be deprived of their salaries for such period. To repeat, they cannot be faulted for not rendering any work during the period of preventive suspension, because that is merely what the law mandates.
Significantly, the Civil Service Law does not state that exonerated employees are not entitled to back salaries corresponding to the preventive suspension period. Such silence of the law should not ipso facto be interpreted as a denial of the right, pursuant to rules on statutory construction. In any event, the rules on the interpretation of laws are mere tools used to ascertain legislative intent.[11 They are not necessarily applicable at all times, particularly when the intention to change the meaning of the previous law is not clear. In the case of the present Civil Service Law, which is found in Executive Order No. 292 issued by then President Corazon Aquino in the exercise of her legislative powers under the Freedom Constitution, its legislative purpose cannot be clearly established, because it has no recorded deliberations from which to verify such intent. Consequently, we should not completely rely on the general rule on amendment by deletion.[12 We should not hold the omission of words in the later statute as necessarily altering the construction of the earlier one, for we may do so only "where the intent of the legislature to make such change is clear of construction."[13cräläwvirtualibräry
In any event, in the absence of an express prohibition on the payment of back salaries, any doubt should be settled in favor of the employee. As our fundamental law explicitly mandates, "The State shall afford full protection to labor xxx."[14 This Court has invariably declared that it will not hesitate to tilt the scales of Justice in favor of the working class, for the Constitution dictates that "the State xxx shall protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare."[15 There is no reason not to apply this principle in favor of civil service employees as well, for they are very much part of the working class. And the government as their employer should set the example in upholding the constitutional mandate to safeguard their rights and interests.
Needless to say, our Constitution stands above all laws; more so, above any treatise including that of Mechem which the ponencia cites. The interpretation of general laws on public officers in foreign jurisdictions has no application in the present case, as our law has no explicit injunction against the payment of back salaries for preventively suspended employees. Moreover, the United States Constitution provides no express mandate, similar to that found in our Constitution, to afford full protection to labor" and to "protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare."
The grant of back pay is a matter not merely of compassion and mercy for employees temporarily suspended from work but, more important of Justice and equity. The exoneration of the employees proves that there was no reason at all to suspend them in the first place. To deny them their incomes on the frivolous ground that the law does not expressly provide for the grant thereof would provide a tool for the oppression of civil servants who, though innocent, may be falsely charged of grave or less grave administrative offenses. It plainly opens the door to harassment of public officials and employees by unjustly depriving them of their meager incomes and consequently subjecting them and their families to difficult circumstances.
Even in the private sector, the law and the existing jurisprudence grant employees who are unjustly dismissed from work not only reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges, but also full back wages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their monetary equivalent, computed from the time their compensation was withheld from them up to the time they were actually reinstated.[16
Civil Service Law Different
from Ombudsman Act
In this regard, I believe the Civil Service Law should be distinguished from the Ombudsman Act (RA 6770) which categorically and expressly provides that the suspended employee who is exonerated after preventive suspension is entitled to reinstatement, but not back salaries, viz.:
"SEC. 24. Preventive suspension. - The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively suspend any officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.
"The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman but not more than six months, without pay, except when the delay in the disposition of the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, in which case the period of such delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided." (Emphasis supplied.)
Hence, in Callanta v. Ombudsman,[17 although some of the petitioners were only reprimanded by the Court for violation of the Ethical Standards Law, no back pay was awarded.
WHEREFORE , I vote to DENY the petition and to GRANT private respondents full back salaries, without qualification or deduction, from the time of suspension, including the period of preventive suspension, until actual reinstatement.
Endnotes:
1 Main Decision, p. 6.
2 200 SCRA 657, 662, August 16, 1991, per Paras, J.
3 I believe that this five-year limitation on back salaries of civil servants should be reexamined. This restriction has no statutory basis. Rather, it was founded on the old Mercury Drug rule limiting back wages to ilegally dismissed employees in the private sector. As the Court, through Justice Cecilia Muoz Palma, then held in Cristobal v. Melchor (78 SCRA 175, 187, July 29, 1977; citing Mercury Drug Co., Inc. v. CIR, [56 SCRA 694, April 30, 1974]):
Applying by analogy the rulings of this court in the matter of fixing backwages to employees who were victims of unfair labor practices of their employers, so as to obviate the necessity of a hearing on the point and avoid further delay, and considering the lapse of almost nine years before appellant filed this suit, We resolve to grant back salaries at the rate last received by him only for a period of five (5) years without qualification and deduction.
However, the limitation on back wages in the private sector has been deleted, by virtue of Sec. 34 of RA 6715, amending Art. 279 of the Labor Code, which now reads:
ART. 279. Security of Tenure. xxx An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.
Hence, we ruled in Bustamante v. NLRC (infra, pp. 70-71, per Padilla, J.):
xxx The clear legislative intent of the amendment in Rep. Act No. 6715 is to give more benefits to workers than was previously given them under the Mercury Drug rule or the deduction of earnings elsewhere rule. Thus, a closer adherence to the legislative policy behind Rep. Act No. 6715 points to full backwages as meaning exactly that, i.e., without deducting from backwages the earnings derived elsewhere by the concerned employee during the period of his illegal dismissal. In other words, the provision calling for full backwages to illegally dismissed employees is clear, plain and free from ambiguity and, therefore, must be applied without attempted or strained interpretation. Index animi sermo est.
Therefore, in accordance with R.A. No. 6715, petitioners are entitled to their full backwages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their monetary equivalent, from the time their actual compensation was withheld from them up to the time of their actual reinstatement.
This being the case, I believe that civil service employees should also be granted the same benefit of full back wages without qualification or deduction. The matter, however, has not been raised as an issue in the present Petition. Hence, although I mentioned it during the Courts deliberation, the question could not be ruled upon without violating the fundamental tenets of due process.
4 276 SCRA 619, 634, July 31, 1997, per Regalado, J.
5 At p. 632.
6 281 SCRA 657, 683, November 14, 1997, per Panganiban, J.
7 226 SCRA 356, September 14, 1993, per Bellosillo, J.
8 At p. 365.
9 Main Decision, pp. 6-7.
10 Ibid., p. 6.
11 Ruben E. Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 1990 ed., p. 35.
12 Ibid., pp. 76-77.
13 Ibid, p. 78.
14 3, par. 1, Art. XIII, Constitution.
15 18, Art. II, Ibid.; Bataan Shipyard & Engineering Corp. v. NLRC, 269 SCRA 199, March 4, 1997; Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Santos Jr., 218 SCRA 415, February 4, 1993; Holiday Inn Manila v. NLRC, 226 SCRA 417, September 14, 1993.
16 Art. 279, Labor Code, as amended by RA 6715; Bustamante v. NLRC, 265 SCRA 61, November 28, 1996; PLDT v. NLRC, 276 SCRA 462, July 31, 1997.
17 285 SCRA 648, January 30, 1998, per Panganiban, J.
