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^{SEPARATE OPINION}

MELO, J.:

I vote to deny petitioners motion to refer this case to the Banc. The motions premise is that the motion for reconsideration of petitioner should have been acted upon by the Members of the former Second Division, meaning those who voted to deny the petition outrightly in the October 21, 1998 resolution.

In said motion, petitioner argues that the January 18, 1999 resolution is contrary to SC Resolution No. 98-12-05-SC (En Banc), which in reorganizing the Divisions of the Court, provided for special divisions to resolve motions for reconsideration of decisions or signed resolutions in judicial cases. Said En Banc Resolution states that as a result of the Courts reorganization, the cases raffled to each Member of the Court shall henceforth pertain to the Division to which such member has been assigned: Provided, however, that motions for reconsideration of decisions or signed resolutions penned by such Member while yet a Member of a previous Division shall be resolved by a Special Division composed of the Chairman and Members of the previous division with the Chairman of the former Division as Chairman of the Special Division. Petitioner posits that the Courts October 21, 1998 resolution denying the petition should be considered a decision, and not a resolution, for purposes of the above-quoted directive, and hence, the motion for reconsideration subsequently filed in regard thereto should have been acted upon by the Members of the former Second Division constituted, this time, as a Special Division.

It is to be observed that the October 21, 1998 resolution is not a decision but an extended unsigned resolution. As such, it is a minute resolution which was issued for the prompt dispatch of the action of the Court. The fact that it contains a distinct statement of facts and law does not remove the same from the ambit of minute resolutions. Besides, there is no rule prohibiting the Court from including a statement of facts and law in its minute resolutions. In fact, we have ample discretion to forumulate such resolutions provided a legal basis is given, depending on our evaluation of a case (In Re: Laureta, 148 SCRA 382 [1987]). Minute resolutions denying or dismissing unmeritorious petitions are the result of a thorough deliberation among the Members of the Court although they are promulgated through the Clerk of Court. They need not be signed by the Members of the Court who took part in the deliberations thereon, nor do they require the Certification of the Chief Justice (unlike decisions and signed resolutions) in order to avoid undue delay in the disposition of cases (Borromeo v. Court of Appeals, 186 SCRA 1 [1990]).

Indeed, in any practicing lawyers eyes, an extended, though unsigned resolution, is much better than a simple, short, one-line resolution curtly stating that the petition is denied or dismissed for lack of merit or for failure to show reversible error or grave abuse of discretion without any further explanation or any attempt to spell out why and how these conclusions were arrived at. Of course, the Court is absolutely free to do this for all conclusions of the Court are arrived at after exhaustive deliberations. Rather, the point sought to be driven at is that the resolution in this case denying due course to the petition could just have been a short, terse resolution, instead of the extended one we issued. But here, we took the extra effort of explaining why the petition is denied. This circumstance did not, however, convert it into a signed resolution which is invariably resorted to only after a comment is required and filed.

The October 21, 1998 resolution being an unsigned resolution, a motion for the reconsideration thereof need not be resolved by a Special Division to be constituted pursuant to the aforequoted proviso of En Banc Resolution No. 98-12-05-SC. On the contrary, the applicable portion thereof states that [m]otions for reconsideration of minute resolutions of a Members previous Division shall be resolved by his or her new Division, which, in this case, is the First Division. Only motions for reconsideration of decisions or signed resolutions must be referred to the Special Division composed of the Chairman and Members of the Division which issued the decision or the signed resolution.

I also vote to deny petitioners motion for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration and consequently, to note without action the motion for reconsideration itself. It is relevant to stress that petitioners first motion for reconsideration was not simply denied, but precisely denied with finality on January 18, 1998. The Court explained in Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership vs. Velasco (254 SCRA 234 [1996]) that a second motion for reconsideration is forbidden except for extraordinary persuasive reasons since piece-meal imputation of a judgment by successive motions for reconsideration is anathema. It was therein explained that the denial of a motion for reconsideration signifies that the grounds relied upon have been found, upon due deliberation, to be without merit, as not being of sufficient weight to warrant a modification of the judgment or final order. It not only means that the grounds relied upon are lacking in merit but also that any other ground or argument, not so raised, is deemed waived and may no longer be set up in a subsequent motion for reconsideration. Revealingly, when the new Rules on Civil Procedure (1997) were adopted, Section 2 of Rule 52 thereof expressly, unequivocally, and categorically outlawed second motions for reconsideration, mandating that the same shall not be entertained.

I perceive no justifiable ground which warrants excepting the case at bar from the foregoing settled rule. No overriding and special reason has been given as to why petitioners second motion for reconsideration should be granted. A cursory examination of the second motion for reconsideration shows that it is a mere re-printing and re-filing of the first motion for reconsideration. Should said motion be admitted, what would prevent other litigants from simply re-titling their denied first motion for reconsideration as second motion for reconsideration and thereafter refiling the same motion. When will litigation stop? In Tolentino vs. Ongsiako (7 SCRA 1001 [1963]) and Villaflor vs. Reyes (22 SCRA 385 [1968]), we expressed the view that public policy and sound practice demand that, at the risk of occasional errors (assuming there are in fact any), judgments of courts should become final and irrevocable at some definite date fixed by law. Interes rei publicae ut finis sit litium. Once this Court has denied a motion for reconsideration with finality, this should be reckoned as the definite date when litigation ends and judgment becomes final. If not, there will be no end to litigation. Petitioner should instead explore other remedies allowed by the Rules and the law. I submit that the second motion for reconsideration is not one of the remedies sanctioned by the Rules and the law. Too, the pendency of another case (G.R. No. 135192) with which this case is sought to be consolidated was not mentioned in the petition, but was adverted to only after the denial of the petition.

I, therefore, hold that the proper action to take under the premises is to deny, not only petitioners motion to refer this case to the Court En Banc, but to deny also petitioner's motion for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration, and to simply note without action the second motion for reconsideration attached thereto.