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FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 109111 June 28, 2000 CARMELINO M. SANTIAGO, MONTSERRAT M. SANTIAGO, NILDA M. IBOLEON, BELINDA MANAHAN AND JOSEFINA M. CAPINPIN, Petitioners,
vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND METROPOLITAN WATERWORKS AND SEWERAGE SYSTEM, Respondents.
PARDO, J.: On appeal 1 before the Court is the decision 2 of the Court of Appeals declaring respondent Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System ("MWSS") the owner of eleven (11) parcels of land situated in San Mateo, Rizal, and allowing registration of title to the land in its name. The Court of Appeals reversed the "partial decision" 3 of the Regional Trial Court, San Mateo, Rizal. The issue raised is factual, which we do not review. 4 However, since the trial court and the Court of Appeals arrived at different factual conclusions, we depart from the general rule. On July 22, 1980, the MWSS filed with the Regional Trial Court, San Mateo, Rizal an application for registration of title under the torrens system of eleven (11) parcels of land, situated in San Mateo, Rizal. 5 Long before World War II, MWSS buried a 42-inch diameter steel aqueduct pipeline under the subject parcels of land. The pipeline drew water from the Wawa Dam in Montalban, Rizal to the Balara Filters in Quezon City. Fifteen (15) kilometers long, it ran through the municipalities of Montalban, San Mateo and Marikina. 6 On August 21, 1987, MWSS filed with the Regional Trial Court, San Mateo, Rizal a second amended petition alleging ownership of the subject parcels of land. It alleged that by itself and through its predecessors-in-interest, the National Waterworks and Sewerage System ("NAWASA") and the Metropolitan Water District ("MWD"), it has been in "'open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the said parcels of land," under a bonafide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945. On January 27, 1988, petitioners Nilda Manahan Iboleon, Belinda Manahan and Josefina Manahan Capinpin, as heirs of Modesto Manahan, filed an opposition to the application. They alleged ownership of a portion of the land subject of the application. They presented transfer certificates of title, related papers and documents to support their claim. They stated that neither they nor their predecessors-in-interest ever ceded ownership or possession of the property to any person, and even assuming that MWSS possessed the land, it did not acquire ownership by prescription. On October 24, 1988, petitioner Montserrat M. Santiago as heir of Vicente Manahan, likewise filed an opposition. She claimed ownership of a portion of the land included in the application and presented Original Certificate of Title No. 1153 of the Register of Deeds of the Province of Rizal. On October 24, 1988, petitioner Carmelino M. Santiago also filed an opposition, alleging ownership of a portion of the land. He presented Transfer Certificate of Title No. M-39258 of the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Rizal. After due hearings, on November 26, 1990, the trial court decided the case in favor of petitioners. It reasoned: First, the tax declarations presented by MWSS did not prove ownership and merely constituted prima facie evidence of possession. Second, the transfer certificates of title presented by petitioners proved ownership and cannot be attacked collaterally. Third, the pipelines installed by respondent MWSS were buried and hidden under the ground, hence, MWSS' possession was not "open". Further, respondent admittedly discontinued use of the pipelines after 1968, hence, possession was not "continuous". Last, respondents' use and possession of the land was merely tolerated by petitioners and could not ripen into ownership. Thus, the decretal portion of the trial court's partial decision reads:
On January 21, 1991, respondent MWSS appealed to the Court of Appeals. 8 Resolving the appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled differently. Reasoning: First, the property covered by the original and transfer certificates of title presented by petitioners merely adjoins and are adjacent to the property claimed by MWSS. 9 Such is shown by the technical descriptions in the certificates of title presented. The parcels of land covered by the certificates of title do not overlap or encroach on the property claimed by MWSS. In fact, the strips of land where the pipes were laid were deliberately excluded in the survey plans of petitioners' property. The survey served as basis for issuance of petitioners' certificates of title. Second, the aqueducts were installed and buried long before World War II, under untitled land, giving rise to the presumption that such land was "public land". Third, petitioners did not present compelling proof that the land under which the pipelines were buried were owned by their predecessors-in-interest. There was no proof that use of the land by MWSS was merely tolerated by petitioners' predecessors. The testimonies presented by petitioners on the matter are hearsay. Last, MWSS acquired ownership by prescription. True, the pipes were "hidden" under the land. However, it is a matter of public knowledge and judicial notice that the pipes existed and were buried there before World War II. The existence of the pipelines was indicated above the ground by "pilapils" constructed by the adjoining landowners themselves, since they planted rice alongside the strips of land. Further, the fact that use of the pipes was discontinued was not relevant since the pipes had remained buried under the land up to the present. On July 22, 1992, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
On February 17, 1993, the Court of Appeals acting on a motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners, clarified its decision as follows:
Hence, this appeal. 12 Petitioners raise three issues 13 essentially revolving around the question of whether the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are correct. The appeal is not meritorious. The findings of the Court of Appeals are supported by substantial evidence and are binding on this Court. 14 Documents proving ownership such as transfer and original certificates of title are the legs on which petitioners' case stands. Premised on the relevance of these documents, the trial court ruled in favor of petitioners. However, the proverbial legs of evidence are broken. While the titles presented by petitioners show ownership, such ownership is not of the land claimed, but over the adjoining parcels of land. The technical descriptions in the titles presented by petitioners betray them as adjacent and adjoining owners of the land claimed by MWSS for registration. The titles presented are:
A torrens certificate of title covers only the land described therein together with improvements existing thereon, if any, nothing more. 15 The titles presented by petitioners covering as they do land adjacent to that claimed in MWSS' application for registration, do not support their claim, but even defeat it. Further, we agree with the Court of Appeals that if petitioners' predecessors-in-interest being members of the bar and learned in the law merely allowed and tolerated MWD or NAWASA's use of the land, they would have reduced the agreement into writing for use in the registration of their property which at that time was still unregistered. 16 We hold that if petitioners' predecessors were truly the owners of the subject parcels of land, they would have taken steps to have the land properly titled long ago. The land was possessed by MWSS long before World War II. That was over sixty (60) years ago! Petitioners "slept on the rights" they claim to possess. Relief is denied to a claimant whose right has become "stale" by reason of negligence or inattention for a long period of time. 17 MWSS presented tax declarations to buttress its ownership of the land. True, tax declarations do not prove ownership. However, tax declarations can be strong evidence of ownership when accompanied by possession for a period sufficient for prescription. 18 Since MWSS possessed the land in the concept of owner for more than thirty (30) years preceding the application, MWSS acquired ownership by prescription. By placing the pipelines under the land, there was material occupation of the land by MWSS, subjecting the land to its will and Even assuming arguendo that the pipes were "hidden" from sight, petitioner cannot claim ignorance of the existence of the pipes. The possession must be public in order to be the basis for prescription. 20 If the owner proves that the possession is clandestine, it will not affect his possession. 21 Petitioners also cannot claim that MWSS abandoned its possession. There is no showing that by discontinuing the use of the pipes, MWSS voluntarily renounced its claim over the land. Petitioners did not prove that the spes recuperendi was gone and the animus revertendi was given up. WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision of the Court of Appeals, 22 we AFFIRM the same in toto. No costs. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Kapunan and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur. Endnotes:
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