SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

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DISSENTING OPINION

DE LEON, JR., J.:

The twin motions for reconsideration before us concern the issue as to whether the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) has the requisite franchise to manage and/or operate jai alai or Basque pelota games, by itself or with the infrastructure facilities of co-respondents Belle Jai Alai Corporation (hereinafter called BELLE) and Filipinas Gaming Entertainment Totalizator Corporation (hereinafter called FILGAME).

On November 29, 2000, this Court rendered a decision, holding that the management and operation of jai alai games is not covered by the franchise granted to PAGCOR under Presidential Decree No.1869. Thus, the dispositive portion of said decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Respondents PAGCOR, Belle Jai alai Corporation and Filipinas Gaming Entertainment Totalizator Corporation are ENJOINED from managing, maintaining and operating jai alai games, and from enforcing the agreement entered into by them for that purpose.

SO ORDERED.

On December 29, 2000, PAGCOR, through the Government Corporate Counsel, filed its Motion for Reconsideration dated December 26, 2000. Movant PAGCOR argues that:

I. P.D. 1869, otherwise known as the PAGCOR franchise, is not merely a consolidation of P.D. Nos. 1067-A, 1067-B, 1067-C, 1399 and 1622 but is an express amendment of the latter.

II. The provisions of P.D. 1869, taken in their totality, do not limit PAGCOR 's franchise to the operation of gambling casinos.

III. Regardless of the fact that the exercise of PAGCOR 's franchise to operate and manage gambling casinos and other games of chance affect public morals and notwithstanding any perceived bias against the martial law powers of former President Marcos, it remains that P.D. 1869 has the force and effect of law, whose wisdom cannot be validly inquired into by the courts.

IV. The jai alai games as introduced in the Philippine context or setting has never been associated with or appreciated as a game of skill but as a betting game or gambling activity.

V. Pursuant to the agreement of PAGCOR with BELLE/FILGAME, PAGCOR under a joint venture scheme will be the one to manage and operate jai alai games.

VI. The difference in tax treatment between jai alai and other gaming activities is not crucial as would preclude PAGCOR from operating jai alai games.

On December 26, 2000, private respondents BELLE and FILGAME filed their motion for reconsideration dated December 22,2000 based on the following grounds:

I. This Honorable Court's reading of the franchise granted under Presidential Decree No.1869 makes meaningless most of Section 10 of the law, which is specifically meant to express the nature of the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation's franchise, and which categorically confers upon it the "rights, privilege and authority to operate and maintain not only "gambling casinos, " but also "clubs and other recreation or amusement places, sports, gaming pools x x x basketball, football, lotteries, etc, " which plainly includes gaming pools on jai alai.

II. By construing Presidential Decree No.1869 as granting only the right to own and operate gambling casinos, this Honorable Court defeats its plainly expressed intent to "centralize and integrate all games of chance x x x, and fails to consider that the broad "right and authority to operate and conduct games of chance " was not granted to a mere private business corporation, but to a corporate entity to be controlled, administered and supervised by the government, meant to regulate gaming activities and earn funding for socio-economic projects for public good.

On February 1 and 2, 2001, petitioners, filed their respective comments/opposition to the motion for reconsideration filed by respondents alleging, in essence, that:

I. Since there was no mention of the word Jai alai" in the PAGCOR charter, although the legislative authority could have easily included the same, jai alai is deemed to have been excluded from the activities falling within the scope of PAGCOR 's franchise to operate and manage.

II. PAGCOR does not have the franchise to operate and manage jai alai games in the absence of specific rules and guidelines given by the legislative authority for the operation of a game played for bets.

We find merit in the twin motions for reconsideration before us and hold that PAGCOR has the requisite franchise to manage and operate jai alai games and to enter into a joint venture agreement with BELLE and FILGAME.

FIRST . Section 10 of P. D. No.1869 defining the extent and nature of PAGCOR's franchise is couched in language so broad that literally all kinds of sports and gaming pools, including jai alai, are covered therein.

Section 10 of P.D. No.1869 reads:

Section 10. Nature and term of franchise -Subject to the terms and conditions established in this Decree, the Corporation is hereby granted for a period of twenty-five (25) years, renewable for another twenty-five (25) years, the rights, privilege, and authority to operate and maintain gambling casinos, clubs, and other recreation or amusement places, sports, gaming pools, i.e., basketball, football, lotteries, etc. whether on land or sea, within the territorial jurisdiction of the Republic of the Philippines. [underscoring supplied]

A sport is defined as "a game or contest especially when involving individual skill or prowess on which money is staked." ¹ Gaming, on the other hand, is defined as "the act or practice of playing games for stakes." ² P.D. No.1869 has made express mention of basketball and football as example of gaming pools. Basketball and football, however, like jai alai are games of skills. Considering that under Section 10 of P.D. No.1869, games of skill like basketball and football have been lumped together with the word "lotteries" just before the word "etc." and after the words "gaming pools," it may be deduced from the wording of the law that when bets or stakes are made in connection with games of skill, they may be classified as games of chance under the coverage of PAGCOR's franchise.

The meaning of the phrase "et cetera" or its abbreviation "etc." depends largely on the context of the instrument, description and enumeration of the matters preceding the term and subject matter to which it is applied, and when used in a statute, the words should be given their usual and natural signification. ³ Consequently, jai alai, otherwise known as "game of Basque pelota", while in itself is not per se a game of chance, may be categorized as a game of chance when bets are accepted as a form of gambling.

It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that when words and phrases of a statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the language employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says.

SECOND . Petitioners contend that jai alai does not fall within the scope of PAGCOR's franchise inasmuch as there is no specific mention of jai alai as among the games which PAGCOR can operate under P.D. No.1869.

The language of the law defining the scope of PAGCOR's franchise, as earlier mentioned, is broad enough to include the operations of jai alai. The abbreviation "etc." ordinarily refers to others of the like kind, and the rest, and so on, and so forth, being used to point out that other things which could be mentioned are understood. ⁴ Bearing in mind that the law was created to maximize potential sources of additional revenue for the government, it would have been incongruous to expect an enumeration of all the possible games or activities that could be covered by the scope of PAGCOR's franchise.

To adopt the petitioners' stance that there should have been an express mention of jai alai as among the games or activities which PAGCOR can operate and manage under its franchise, would limit the scope of PAGCOR's franchise to games or activities which have been expressly mentioned under P.D. No. 1869 and render ineffective the use of the word "etc." in said law.

It is a universal rule of application that a construction of a statute is to be favored, and must be adopted if reasonably possible, which will give meaning to every word, clause, and sentence of the statute and operation and effect to every part and provision of it. ⁵cräläwvirtualibräry

THIRD . Petitioners maintain that the operations of jai alai was already the subject of a legislative grant by then President Marcos to the Philippine Jai Alai and Amusement Corporation (PJAC), a corporation controlled by his in-laws, the Romualdezes, by virtue of P.D. Nos. 810 ⁶ and 1124. ⁷ Hence, it could not have been his intent to grant PAGCOR the franchise to operate and manage jai alai games inasmuch as it would result in a competition with the business interest of his in-laws.

We need only say that in the interpretation of statutes, it is not proper or permissible to inquire into the motives which influenced the legislative body, except insofar as such motives are disclosed by the statute itself. ⁸ The magnitude of the consideration, political or financial, which may operate upon the legislative mind as an inducement for grants and franchises conferred by statute, do not change the character of the legislation, or vary the rule of construction by which the rights of the grantees must be measured. ⁹cräläwvirtualibräry

Given the broad language of P.D. 1869 defining the scope of PAGCOR's franchise, we find no reason why the operations of jai alai cannot be deemed as included in its franchise. The subsequent repeal of P.D. Nos. 810 and 1124 in 1986 by Executive Order (E.O.) No. 169 only meant that PJAC was no longer entitled to exercise its rights under its former franchise. E.O. No.169, otherwise known as 'Repealing Presidential Decree No. 810 entitled "An act granting the Philippine Jai alai and Amusement Corporation a franchise to operate, construct and maintain a fronton for Basque Pelota and similar games of skill in the Greater Manila Area as amended" and Accordingly Revoking and Cancelling the Right, Privilege and Authority granted therein' in itself did not delimit the scope of the franchise of PAGCOR especially since E.O. No.169 was specific enough to identify the repeal of the particular law (P.D. No.810) granting a certain franchise, i.e. PJAC's franchise.

FOURTH . Petitioners, however, insist that PAGCOR was created to operate games of chance or gaming pools for which no franchises have been granted at the time that P .D. No.1869 went into effect on July 11, 1983. To bolster their claim, petitioners cite Section 1 of P.D. No.1869 which reads:

Section 1. Declaration of policy. -It is hereby the policy of the State to centralize and integrate all games of chance not heretofore authorized by existing franchises or permitted by law in order to attain the following objectives.(underscoring supplied)

The fact that there was an existing jai alai franchise in favor of PJAC the time P.D. No.1869 went into effect does not necessarily mean jai alai can never be the subject of PAGCOR's franchise upon repeal of PJAC's franchise. Monopoly is not an essential feature of a franchise and the strictly legal signification of the term franchise is not always confined to exclusive rights. ¹⁰cräläwvirtualibräry

The Declaration of Policy stated in Section 1 of P.D. No.1869 should be read in conjunction with the purpose of the law, i.e. to generate sources of additional revenue for governmental projects. PAGCOR was created primarily to maximize potential sources of revenue for the government by integrating into just one entity the operation and management of all games of chance. To attain this objective, the legislature saw it fit to couch the scope and nature of PAGCOR's franchise in a broad language.

Statutes should be construed in the light of the object to be achieved and the evil or mischief to be suppressed and they should be given such construction as will advance the object, suppress the mischief and secure the benefits intended. A statute should therefore be read with reference to its leading idea, and its general purpose and intention should be gathered from the whole act, and this predominant purpose will prevail over the literal import of particular terms or clauses, if plainly apparent, operating as a limitation upon some and as a reason for expanding the signification of others, so that the interpretation may accord with the spirit of the entire act, and so that the policy and object of the statute as a whole may be made effectual and operative to the widest possible extent. ¹¹cräläwvirtualibräry

FIFTH . Petitioners maintain that the legislative authority could not have intended to include jai alai in the scope of PAGCOR's franchise in the absence of specific guidelines laid down in P.D. No. 1869 as to how PAGCOR shall conduct the operation and management of jai alai games.

Considering that the intent of the law is to regulate and centralize all games of chance thru an appropriate institution which would enable the government to identify potential sources of additional revenue, it would be impracticable for the law to provide in detail for the manner in which each possible game covered by the franchise is to be maintained and operated by PAGCOR. Significantly, the law has not provided for a set of guidelines as to how basketball and football shall be managed and operated by PAGCOR. Yet, because of the express provision of the law, one could not contend that such games are to be excluded from the scope of the franchise.

If we use the presence or absence of a set of guidelines in the law as to how each possible game should be managed and operated by PAGCOR, as a standard for their inclusion in the scope of PAGCOR's franchise, then we render ineffective the object of the law to maximize potential sources of revenue by integrating all games of chance into just one entity since all games of chance which might have otherwise been covered by the all encompassing word "etc." also do not have a set of guidelines regarding their operation and management by PAGCOR. Such strained interpretation violates the rule of statutory construction that no limitation is to be inferred or implied which would have the effect of defeating the object of the law.

SIXTH . As regards the issue that jai alai, as a form of gambling, is "universally regarded to be a threat to the moral fiber of the society," we need only reiterate the oft quoted principle that courts do not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation, for it is not within their province to supervise legislation and keep it within the bounds of propriety or common sense. Whether or not a given law is the best that could have been enacted on the subject; whether or not it is calculated to accomplish its avowed object; whether or not it accords with what is understood to be the general policy of legislation in the particular jurisdiction -these are questions which do not fall within the province of the courts. A court exceeds its proper office and authority if it attempts, under the guise of construction, to mould the expression of the legislative will into the shape which the court thinks it ought to bear. ¹²cräläwvirtualibräry

Petitioners, who are members of the legislature, should perhaps be reminded that it is their office which, in fact, has the prerogative to correct what it deems to be excesses or omissions in the legislation.

SEVENTH . Petitioners contend that PAGCOR may not enter into a joint venture agreement with private corporations, in this case with BELLE and FILGAME, to operate, manage and conduct jai alai games as well as supervise betting activities both at the fronton site and selected off-fronton betting stations.

Petitioners maintain that PAGCOR's right to enter into management contracts is limited only to those relating to the efficient operation of gambling casinos under Section 11 of P.D. No.1869 which reads:

Sec. 11. Scope of Franchise. -In addition to the rights and privileges granted it under the preceding Section, this Franchise shall entitle the corporation to do and undertake the following:

(1) enter into operating and/or managing contracts with any registered and accredited company possessing the knowledge, skill, expertise and facilities to insure the efficient operation of gambling casinos x x x.

We are not convinced.

A joint venture is an association of persons or companies jointly undertaking some commercial enterprise -generally, all contribute assets and share risks. It requires a community of interests in the performance of the subject matter, a right to direct and govern the policy connected therewith, and duty, which may be altered by agreement to share both in profit and losses. ¹³ In this jurisdiction, a joint venture is a form of partnership and is thus governed by the law on partnerships.

Section 3 of P.D. No.1869 enumerates the following powers and functions of PAGCOR:

x x x

h) to enter into, make, perform, and carry out contracts of every kind and for any lawful purpose pertaining to the business of the Corporation, or in any manner incident thereto, as principal, agent or otherwise, with any person, firm, association or corporation.

x x x

l) to do anything and everything necessary, proper, desirable, convenient or suitable for the accomplishment of any of the purposes or the attainment of any of the objects or the furtherance of any of the powers herein stated, either alone or in association with other corporations, firms or individuals, and to do every other act or thing incidental, pertaining to, growing out of, or connected with, the aforesaid purposes, objects or powers, or any part thereof.

Clearly, the powers granted to PAGCOR are broad enough to include the power to enter into a joint venture agreement with private corporations like BELLE and FILGAME relating to the operation, management and conduct not only of gambling casinos but also of those relating to jai alai as legalized gambling.

Where the language of the statute is clear, it is the duty of the court to enforce it according to the plain meaning of the word. There is no occasion to resort to other means of interpretation.

EIGHTH . Finally, it is contended that PAGCOR cannot enter into a joint venture agreement with BELLE and FILGAME because to do so would grant the two (2) corporations a veritable franchise to operate jai alai games in violation of the principle that the grant of a franchise is a purely legislative act which cannot be delegated without violating the Constitution under the maxim potestas delegata non delegari potest.

Under the maxim potestas delegata non delegari potest a delegated power cannot be delegated. This is based upon the ethical principle that such delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate by the instrumentality of his own judgment acting immediately upon the matter of legislation and not through the intervening mind of another. ¹⁴cräläwvirtualibräry

It should be noted, however, that the legislative grant of franchise to PAGCOR has not accorded unto the latter legislative powers nor quasi- legislative powers. The joint venture agreement entered into by PAGCOR with FILGAME and BELLE was made pursuant to the powers granted under P.D. No. 1869 to PAGCOR to "enter into, make, perform, and carry out contracts of every kind and for any purpose pertaining to the business of the corporation x x x with any person, firm or corporation." Under the joint venture agreement, BELLE and FILGAME will provide financial requirements and technical assistance to PAGCOR in connection with the use of their operational facilities. PAGCOR however shall still manage, regulate and control all aspects of jai alai operations. PAGCOR has entered into a joint venture agreement with the two (2) corporations for the simple reason that without the collaboration of the private sector, it is not financially capable of undertaking the resumption of the operation of jai alai games which will require massive financial outlay. Hence, the joint venture agreement is in consonance with the powers granted to PAGCOR that it may "do anything and everything necessary, proper, desirable, convenient or suitable for the accomplishment of any of the purposes or the attainment of any of the objects or the furtherance of any of the powers herein stated, either alone or in association with other corporations, firms or individuals x x x."

NINTH . The petitioners filed the present suits in their capacity as taxpayers and legislators. However, for a taxpayer's suit to prosper, the petitioners therein must have locus standi. In these instant petitions, it is undisputed that the spending powers of Congress are not involved. There is no allegation of illegal disbursement of public funds. Hence, petitioners' right to sue as taxpayers or concerned citizens cannot be sustained. Neither is there any showing that the assailed official acts of PAGCOR affect the rights and prerogatives of petitioners as members of Congress.

I therefore vote to grant the subject twin Motions for Reconsideration filed by respondents PAGCOR, BELLE and FILGAME.

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Endnotes:

¹ Webster's Third New International Dictionary (Unabridged), 1993 Ed.

² Ibid.

³ Wright v. People, 181 P. 2d 447,450. 116 Colo. 306.

⁴ Osternberg v. Section 30 Development Co., 200 N.W. 738, 739, 160 Minn. 497; Fleck v. Hamstad, 155 A. 875, 877, 304 Pa. 302, 77 ALR 874.

⁵ H.C. Black, HANDBOOK ON THE CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF THE LAWS 322 (2^nd Ed, 1971).

⁶ entitled "An Act granting the Philippine Jai alai and Amusement Corporation a franchise to operate, construct and maintain a fronton for Basque Pelota and similar games of skill in the Greater Manila Area."

⁷ entitled "Amending Presidential Decree No. 810 dated October 16, 1975 entitled 'An Act granting the Philippine Jai alai and Amusement Corporation a franchise to operate, construct and maintain a fronton for Basque Pelota and similar games of skill in the Greater Manila Area.

⁸ Id., at 315 citing Home v. Guy, L.R. 5 Ch Div. 901; Keyport & M.P. Streamboat Co. v. Farmer's Transp. Co. 18 N.J. Eq 13; Kountze v. Omaha, 5 Dill. 443, Fed. Cas. No.7,928; City of Richmond v. Supervisors of Henrico County, 83 Va. 204, 2 S.E. 26, People v. Shepard, 36 N.Y. 285; Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 87, 3 L.Ed. 162; Williams v. Nashville, 89 Tenn. 487, 15 S.W. 364; Pacific Coast S.S. Co. v. United States, 33 Ct. Cl. 36; City of Lebanon v. Creel, 109 Ky 363, 59 S.W.16.

⁹ Id., at 116 citing Union Pac. R. Co.v. United States, 10 Ct. Cl 448.

¹⁰ 36 Am Jur 2d, Franchises 29.

¹¹ H. Black, Op. Cit, note 5 at 320-321.

¹² Id., at 11.

¹³ Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Guingona, Jr., 232 SCRA 110, 144 [1994].

¹⁴ United States v. Barrias, 11 Phil 327, 330 [1908].