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^{DISSENTING OPINION}

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

With due respect, I disagree with the ponencia of Justice Santiago M. Kapunan. I am convinced that private respondent Teodoro C. Cruz is not a natural born citizen and, therefore, must be disqualified as a member of Congress.

Who are natural-born citizens?

The laws on citizenship its acquisition or loss, and the rights, privileges, and immunities of citizens have given rise to some of the most disputatious and visceral issues resolved by this Court. The problem is compounded in this petition because citizenship is taken up in connection with the sovereign right of voters to choose their representatives in Congress.

In this petition for certiorari, petitioner Antonio Bengson III asks this Court to deny respondent Teodoro Cruz the right to hold the Office of Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan because he does not possess the constitutional requirement of being a natural-born citizen of this country. Respondent, on the other hand, insists that he is qualified to be elected to Congress considering that by repatriation, he re-acquired his status as a natural-born Filipino citizen.

Records show that Teodoro Cruz was born in the Philippines on April 27, 1960 to Filipino parents, spouses Lamberto and Carmelita Cruz. On November 5, 1985, he enlisted in the United States Armed Forces and served the United States Marine Corps. While in the service for almost five years, he applied for naturalization with the US District Court of Northern District of California and was issued his Certificate of Naturalization No. 14556793 as an American citizen. On October 27, 1993, he was honorably discharged from the US Marine Corps. He then decided to return to the Philippines.

Cruz availed of repatriation under R.A. No. 2630, an act providing for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by persons who lost such citizenship by rendering service to or accepting commission in the Armed Forces of the United States. On March 17, 1994, he took his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. The oath was registered with the Local Civil Registry of Mangatarem, Pangasinan. On the same date, he executed an Affidavit of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship. Thus, on April 11, 1994, the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation ordered the cancellation of his Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR No. B-04628111) and Immigration Certificate of Residence (ICR No. 286582) and issued him an Identification Certificate.

The cancellation of his ACR and ICR was affirmed by the Justice Department. On January 18, 1995, the United States Embassy in Manila issued to him a Certificate of Loss of Nationality of the United States.

In the local elections of 1995, Cruz filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor of Mangatarem, Pangasinan, declaring himself to be a naturalized Filipino citizen. He won and served as mayor for one term.

Thereafter, Cruz filed his certificate of candidacy for a seat in Congress, this time declaring himself as a natural-born Filipino. Again, he won with a lead of 26,671 votes over candidate Antonio Bengson, III.

On September 3, 1998, Cruz was proclaimed winner in the congressional race in the Second District of Pangasinan.

Bengson then filed a petition for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) on September 14, 1998, claiming that Cruz, not being a natural-born Filipino citizen when he filed his Certificate of Candidacy on March 15, 1998, is not qualified to run as a member of the House of Representatives. That he should be a natural-born citizen is a qualification mandated by Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution which provides: No person shall be a member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.

After oral arguments and the submission by the parties of their respective memoranda and supplemental memoranda, the HRET rendered a decision holding that Cruz reacquired his natural-born citizenship upon his repatriation in 1994 and declaring him duly elected representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections, thus:

WHEREFORE, the petition for quo warranto is DISMISSED and Respondent Teodoro C. Cruz is hereby DECLARED duly elected Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections.

As soon as this Decision becomes final and executory, let notices and copies thereof be sent to the President of the Philippines; the House of Representatives, through the Speaker, and the Commission on Audit, through its Chairman, pursuant to Rule 76 of the 1998 Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. Costs de oficio.

On March 13, 2000, Bengson filed a motion for reconsideration of the said Decision but the same was denied by the HRET in Resolution No. 00-48.

Bengson now comes to us via a petition for certiorari assailing the HRET Decision on grounds that:

1. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it ruled that private respondent is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines despite the fact that he had ceased being such in view of the loss and renunciation of such citizenship on his part.

2. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it considered private respondent as a citizen of the Philippines despite the fact that he did not validly acquire his Philippine citizenship.

3. Assuming that private respondents acquisition of Philippine citizenship was invalid, the HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it dismissed the petition despite the fact that such reacquisition could not legally and constitutionally restore his natural-born status.

The sole issue raised in this petition is whether or not respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines at the time of the filing of his Certificate of Candidacy for a seat in the House of Representatives.

Section 2, Article IV of the Constitution ¹ provides:

Sec. 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. xxx.

Petitioner and respondent present opposing interpretations of the phrase from birth contained in the above provisions.

Petitioner contends that the phrase from birth indicates that citizenship must start at a definite point and must be continuous, constant and without interruption. The Constitution does not extend the privilege of reacquiring a natural-born citizen status to respondent, who at one time, became an alien. His loss of citizenship carried with it the concomitant loss of all the benefits, privileges and attributes of natural-born citizenship. When he reacquired his citizenship in 1994, he had to comply with the requirements for repatriation, thus effectively taking him out of the constitutional definition of a natural-born Filipino.

For his part, respondent maintains that the phrase from birth refers to the innate, inherent and inborn characteristic of being a natural-born. Since he was born to Filipino parents, he has been a natural-born Filipino from birth. His reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 2630 results in his reacquisition of his inherent characteristic of being a natural-born citizen.

The state of being a natural-born citizen has been regarded, not so much in its literal sense, but more in its legal connotation.

The very first natural-born Filipinos did not acquire that status at birth. They were born as Spanish subjects. In Roa vs. Collector of Customs, ² the Supreme Court traced the grant of natural-born status from the Treaty of Paris, and the Acts of Congress of July 1, 1902 and March 23, 1912, which is a reenactment of Section 4 of the former with a proviso which reads:

Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of other Insular possessions of the United States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who could become citizens of the United States under the laws of the United States, if residing therein.

It was further held therein that under the said provision, every person born after the 11 ^th of April, 1899, of parents who were Spanish subjects on that date and who continued to reside in this country are at the moment of their birth ipso facto citizens of the Philippine Islands.

Under the April 7, 1900 Instructions of President William McKinley to the Second Philippine Commission, considered as our first colonial charter or fundamental law, we were referred to as people of the Islands, or inhabitants of the Philippine Islands, or natives of the Islands and not as citizens, much less natural-born citizens. The first definition of citizens of the Philippine Islands in our law is found in Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902. ³cräläwvirtualibräry

Philippine citizenship, including the status of natural-born, was initially a loose or even non-existent qualification. As a requirement for the exercise of certain rights and privileges, it became a more strict and difficult status to achieve with the passing of the years.

Early decisions of the Supreme Court held that Philippine citizenship could be acquired under either the jus sanguinis or jus soli doctrine. ⁴cräläwvirtualibräry

This liberal policy was applied even as the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law or the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916 appear to have limited citizens of the Philippine Islands to resident inhabitants who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899, their children born subsequent thereto, and later, those naturalized according to law by the Philippine legislature. Only later was jus sanguinis firmly applied and jus soli abandoned.

Hence, the status of being a natural-born citizen at its incipient is a privilege conferred by law directly to those who intended, and actually continued, to belong to the Philippine Islands. Even at the time of its conception in the Philippines, such persons upon whom citizenship was conferred did not have to do anything to acquire full citizenship. ⁵cräläwvirtualibräry

Respondent wants us to believe that since he was natural-born Filipino at birth, having been born in the Philippines to Filipino parents, he was automatically restored to that status when he subsequently reacquired his citizenship after losing it.

Public respondent HRET affirmed respondents position when it pronounced that the definition of a natural-born citizen in Section 2, Article IV of the Constitution refers to the classes of citizens enumerated in Section 1 of the same Article, to wit:

Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution;

(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;

(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and

(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

Thus, respondent HRET held that under the above enumeration, there are only two classes of citizens, i.e., natural-born and naturalized. Since respondent Cruz is not a naturalized citizen, then he is a natural-born Filipino citizen.

I do not agree. I reiterate that Section 2, Article IV of the Constitution defines natural-born citizens as those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship.

Pursuant to R.A. No. 2630, quoted as follows:

Republic Act No. 2630. AN ACT PROVIDING FOR REACQUISITION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP BY PERSONS WHO LOST SUCH CITIZENSHIP BY RENDERING SERVICE TO, OR ACCEPTING COMMISSION IN, THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES, provides:

Section 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship be rendering service to, or accepting commission in the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering the same with the Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other citizenship.

respondent Cruz had to perform certain acts before he could again become a Filipino citizen. He had to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and register his oath with the Local Civil Registry of Mangatarum, Pangasinan. He had to renounce his American citizenship and had to execute an affidavit of reacquisition of Philipine citizenship.

Clearly, he did not reacquire his natural-born citizenship. The cardinal rule in the interpretation and construction of a constitution is to give effect to the intention of the framers and of the people who adopted it. Words appearing in a Constitution are used according to their plain, natural, and usual significance and import and must be understood in the sense most obvious to the common understanding of the people at the time of its adoption.

The provision on natural-born citizens of the Philippines is precise, clear and definite. Indeed, neither HRET nor this Court can construe it other than what its plain meaning conveys. It is not phrased in general language which may call for construction of what the words imply.

In J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Land Tenure Administration, ⁶ this Court held:

Ascertainment of meaning of provisions of Constitution begins with the language of the document itself. The words used in the Constitution are to be given their ordinary meaning, except where technical terms are employed, in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyers document, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the peoples consciousness, its language as much as possible, should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say.

The definition of a natural-born citizen in the Constitution must be applied to this petition according to its natural sense.

Respondent HRET likewise ruled that the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship through any of these modes: (naturalization, repatriation and legislation under Section 3, C.A. No. 63) results in the restoration of previous status, either as a natural-born or a naturalized citizen is a simplistic approach and tends to be misleading.

If citizenship is gained through naturalization, repatriation or legislation, the citizen concerned can not be considered natural-born. Obviously, he has to perform certain acts to become a citizen.

As expressed in the Dissent of Justice Jose C. Vitug ⁷ in the instant case, concurred in by Justice Jose A.R. Melo: ⁸cräläwvirtualibräry

Repatriation is the resumption or recovery of the original nationality upon the fulfillment of certain conditions. While an applicant need not have to undergo the tedious and time consuming process required by the Revised Naturalization Law (CA 473, as amended), he, nevertheless, would still have to make an express and unequivocal act of formally rejecting his adopted state and reaffirming his total and exclusive allegiance and loyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. It bears emphasis that, to be considered a natural-born citizen under the first part of section 2, Article IV, of the 1987 Constitution, one should not have to perform any act at all or go through any process, judicial or administrative, to enable him to reacquire his citizenship. Willoughby opines that a natural-born citizen is one who is able to claim citizenship without any prior declaration on his part of a desire to obtain such status. Under this view, the term natural born citizens could also cover those who have been collectively deemed citizens by reason of the Treaty of Paris and the Philippine Bill of 1902 and those who have been accorded by the 1935 Constitution to be Filipino citizens (those born in the Philippines of alien parents who, before the adoption of the 1935 Constitution had been elected to public office.)

The two dissenting Justices correctly stated that the stringent requirement of the Constitution is so placed as to insure that only Filipino citizens with an absolute and permanent degree of allegiance and loyalty shall be eligible for membership in Congress, the branch of the government directly involved and given the delicate task of legislation.

The dissenting opinion further states:

The term natural-born Filipino citizen, first constitutionally defined in the 1973 Charter, later adopted by the 1987 Constitution, particularly in Section 2, Article IV thereof, is meant to refer to those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their citizenship, and to those who elect Philippine citizenship. Time and again, the Supreme Court has declared that where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation, vacillation or equivocation there is only room for application. The phrase from birth indicates that there is a starting point of his citizenship and this citizenship should be continuous, constant and without interruption.

Thus, respondent is not eligible for election to Congress as the Constitution requires that a member of the House of Representatives must be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.

For sure, the framers of our Constitution intended to provide a more stringent citizenship requirement for higher elective offices, including that of the office of a Congressman. Otherwise, the Constitution should have simply provided that a candidate for such position can be merely a citizen of the Philippines, as required of local elective officers.

The spirit of nationalism pervading the 1935 Constitution, the first charter framed and ratified by the Filipinos (even as the draft had to be approved by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt of the United States) guides and governs the interpretation of Philippine citizenship and the more narrow and bounded concept of being a natural-born citizen.

Under the 1935 Constitution, ⁹ the requirement of natural-born citizenship was applicable only to the President and Vice President. ¹⁰ A person who had been a citizen for only five (5) years could be elected to the National Assembly. ¹¹ Only in 1940, ¹² when the first Constitution was amended did natural-born citizenship become a requirement for Senators and Members of the House of Representatives. ¹³ A Filipino naturalized for at least five (5) years could still be appointed Justice of the Supreme Court or a Judge of a lower court. ¹⁴cräläwvirtualibräry

The history of the Constitution shows that the meaning and application of the requirement of being natural-born have become more narrow and qualified over the years.

Under the 1973 Constitution, ¹⁵ the President, members of the National Assembly, Prime Minister, Justices of the Supreme Court, Judges of inferior courts, the chairmen and members of the Constitutional Commissions and the majority of members of the cabinet, must be natural-born citizens. ¹⁶ The 1987 Constitution added the Ombudsman and his deputies and the members of the Commission on Human Rights to those who must be natural-born citizens. ¹⁷cräläwvirtualibräry

The questioned Decision of respondent HRET reverses the historical trend and clear intendment of the Constitution. It shows a more liberal, if not a cavalier approach to the meaning and import of natural-born citizen and citizenship in general.

It bears stressing that we are tracing and enforcing a doctrine embodied in no less than the Constitution. Indeed, a deviation from the clear and constitutional definition of a natural-born Filipino citizen is a matter which can only be accomplished through a constitutional amendment. Clearly, respondent HRET gravely abused its discretion.

Respondent Cruz has availed himself of the procedure whereby his citizenship has been restored. He can run for public office where natural-born citizenship is not mandated. But he cannot be elected to high offices which the Constitution has reserved only for natural-born Filipino citizens.

WHEREFORE , I vote to GRANTthe petition.

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Endnotes:

¹ 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines.

² 23 Phil 315 (1912).

³ SECTION 4. That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine and then resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the United States, except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain signed at Paris, December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight.

⁴ Roa v. Collector of Customs, supra; Lim Teco v. Collector, 24 Phil 84; (1913) United States vs. Lim Bin, 36 Phil 924 (1917).

⁵ Roa v. Collector of Customs, ibid.

⁶ 31 SCRA 413 (1970).

⁷ Member of the HRET.

⁸ Chairman, ibid.

⁹ This refers to the 1935 Constitution as adopted by the Philippine Constitutional Convention on February 8, 1935, signed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt on March 23, 1935 and ratified by Filipino voters in a plebiscite held on May 14, 1935

¹⁰ Section 3, Article VII, 1935 Constitution.

¹¹ Section 2, Article VI, ibid.

¹² The 1935 Constitution was amended by Resolution Numbered Seventy-three, adopted by the Second National Assembly on the 11^th day of April 1940, and approved by the President of the United States on December 2, 1940.

¹³ Section 4 and 7, Article VI, 1935 Constitution, as amended.

¹⁴ Section 6 and 8, Article VIII, ibid.

¹⁵ This refers to the 1973 Constitution as approved by the Filipino people in a referendum held between January 10, 1973 and January 15, 1973 and which became effective on January 17, 1973.

¹⁶ Section 2, Article VII; Section 4, Article VIII; Sections 3 and 4, Article IX; Section 3 (1) and (2), Article X; Section 1(1) Article XII-B, Section 1(1), Article XII-C; Section 1 (1) Article XII-D, 1973 Constitution.

¹⁷ Section 8, Article XI; and Section 17(2), Article XIII, 1987 Constitution.