SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

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^{CONCURRING OPINION}

PANGANIBAN, J.:

I concur in the ponencia of Mr. Justice Santiago M. Kapunan, holding that the House Electoral Tribunal did not gravely abuse its discretion in ruling that Private Respondent Teodoro C. Cruz remains a natural-born Filipino citizen and is eligible to continue being a member of Congress. Let me just add a few points.

^{The Facts in Brief}

It is undisputed that Congressman Cruz was born on April 27, 1960 in San Clemente, Tarlac, to Filipino parents. He was, therefore, a Filipino citizen, pursuant to Section 1 (2), ¹ Article IV of the Constitution. Furthermore, not having done any act to acquire or perfect the Philippine citizenship he obtained from birth, he was a natural-born Filipino citizen, in accordance with Section 2 ² of the same Article IV .

It is not disputed either that private respondent rendered military service to the United States Marine Corps from November 1985 to October 1993. On June 5, 1990, he was naturalized as an American citizen, in connection with his US military service. Consequently, under Section 1 (4) ³ of CA No. 63, he lost his Philippine citizenship.

Upon his discharge from the US Marine Corps, private respondent returned to the Philippines and decided to regain his Filipino citizenship. Thus, on March 17, 1994, availing himself of the benefits of Republic Act (RA) No. 2630, entitled An Act Providing for Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by Persons Who Lost Such by Rendering Service to, or Accepting Commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, ⁴ Cruz took his oath of allegiance to the Republic and registered the same with the Local Civil Registry of Mangatarem, Pangasinan. On the same day, he also executed an Affidavit of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship.

^{Main Issue}

The main question here is: Did the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) commit grave abuse of discretion in holding that, by reason of his repatriation, Congressman Teodoro C. Cruz had reverted to his original status as a natural-born citizen? I respectfully submit that the answer is No. In fact, I believe that the HRET was correct in its ruling.

^{1. Repatriation Is Recovery of Original Citizenship}

First, repatriation is simply the recovery of original citizenship. Under Section 1 of RA 2630, a person who ha[s] lost his citizenship may reacquire it by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. Former Senate President Jovito R. Salonga, a noted authority on the subject, explains this method more precisely in his treatise, Private International Law. ⁵ He defines repatriation as the recovery of the original nationality upon fulfillment of certain conditions. ⁶ Webster buttresses this definition by describing the ordinary or common usage of repatriate, as to restore or return to ones country of origin, allegiance, or citizenship; x x x. ⁷ In relation to our subject matter, repatriation, then, means restoration of citizenship. It is not a grant of a new citizenship, but a recovery of ones former or original citizenship.

To reacquire simply means to get back as ones own again. ⁸ Ergo, since Cruz, prior to his becoming a US citizen, was a natural-born Filipino citizen, he reacquired the same status upon repatriation. To rule otherwise that Cruz became a non-natural-born citizen would not be consistent with the legal and ordinary meaning of repatriation. It would be akin to naturalization, which is the acquisition of a new citizenship. New, because it is not the same as that with which he has previously been endowed.

In any case, the leaning, in questions of citizenship, should always be in favor of [its] claimant x x x. ⁹ Accordingly, the same should be construed in favor of private respondent, who claims to be a natural-born citizen.

^{1. Not Being Naturalized, Respondent Is Natural Born}

Second, under the present Constitution, private respondent should be deemed natural-born, because was not naturalized. Let me explain.

There are generally two classes of citizens: (1) natural-born citizens and (2) naturalized citizens. ¹⁰ While CA 63 provides that citizenship may also be acquired by direct act of the Legislature, I believe that those who do become citizens through such procedure would properly fall under the second category (naturalized). ¹¹cräläwvirtualibräry

Naturalized citizens are former aliens or foreigners who had to undergo a rigid procedure, in which they had to adduce sufficient evidence to prove that they possessed all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided by law in order to become Filipino citizens. In contrast, as stated in the early case Roa v. Collector of Customs, ¹² a natural-born citizen is a citizen who has become such at the moment of his birth.

The assailed HRET Decision, penned by Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, explains clearly who are considered natural-born Filipino citizens. He traces the concept as first defined in Article III of the 1973 Constitution, which simply provided as follows:

Sec. 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.

Under the above definition, there are two requisites in order that a Filipino citizen may be considered natural-born: (1) one must be a citizen of the Philippines from birth, and (2) one does not have to do anything to acquire or perfect ones Philippine citizenship. ¹³ Thus, under the 1973 Constitution, excluded from the class of natural-born citizens were (1) those who were naturalized and (2) those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers who, upon reaching the age of majority, elected Philippine citizenship. ¹⁴cräläwvirtualibräry

The present Constitution, however, has expanded the scope of natural-born citizens to include [t]hose who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof, meaning those covered under class (2) above. Consequently, only naturalized Filipino citizens are not considered natural-born citizens. Premising therefrom, respondent -- being clearly and concededly not naturalized -- is, therefore, a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. ¹⁵cräläwvirtualibräry

With respect to repatriates, since the Constitution does not classify them separately, they naturally reacquire their original classification before the loss of their Philippine citizenship. In the case of Congressman Teodoro C. Cruz, upon his repatriation in 1994, he reacquired his lost citizenship. In other words, he regained his original status as a natural-born Filipino citizen, nothing less.

^{3. No Grave Abuse of Discretion on the Part of HRET}

Third, I respectfully submit that the HRET has not abused, much less gravely abused, its discretion in holding that Respondent Cruz is a natural-born Filipino citizen who is qualified to be a member of Congress. I stress that the Court, in this certiorari proceeding before us, is limited to determining whether the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing its assailed Decision. The Court has no power to reverse or modify HRETs rulings, simply because it differs in its perception of controversies. It cannot substitute its discretion for that of HRET, an independent, constitutional body with its own specific mandate.

The Constitution explicitly states that the respective Electoral Tribunals of the two chambers of Congress shall be the sole judges of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective members. ¹⁶ In several cases, ¹⁷ this Court has held that the power and the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunals are original and exclusive, as if they remained in the legislature, a coequal branch of government. Their judgments are beyond judicial interference, unless rendered without or in excess of their jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. ¹⁸ In the elegant words of Mr. Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez Jr.: ¹⁹cräläwvirtualibräry

The Court does not venture into the perilous area of trying to correct perceived errors of independent branches of the Government. It comes in only when it has to vindicate a denial of due process or correct an abuse of discretion so grave or glaring that no less than the Constitution calls for remedial action.

True, there is no settled judicial doctrine on the exact effect of repatriation. But, as earlier explained, the legal and common definition of repatriation is the reacquisition of the former citizenship. How then can the HRET be rebuked with grave abuse of discretion? At best, I can concede that the legal definition is not judicially settled or is even doubtful. But an interpretation made in good faith and grounded on reason one way or the other cannot be the source of grave abuse amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The HRET did not violate the Constitution or the law or any settled judicial doctrine. It was definitely acting within its exclusive domain.

Be it remembered that our Constitution vests upon the HRET the power to be the sole judge of the qualifications of members of the House of Representatives, one of which is citizenship. Absent any clear showing of a manifest violation of the Constitution or the law or any judicial decision, this Court cannot impute grave abuse of discretion to the HRET in the latters actions on matters over which full discretionary authority is lodged upon it by our fundamental law. ²⁰ Even assuming that we disagree with the conclusions of public respondent, we cannot ipso facto attribute to it grave abuse of discretion. Verily, there is a line between perceived error and grave abuse. ²¹cräläwvirtualibräry

By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. It must be grave abuse of discretion as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. ²²cräläwvirtualibräry

That the HRET, after careful deliberation and purposeful study, voted 7 to 2 to issue its Decision upholding the qualifications of Congressman Cruz could not in any wise be condemned as gravely abusive. Neither can I find any patent or gross arbitrariness or despotism by reason of passion or hostility in such exercise.

^{4. In Case of Doubt, Popular Will Prevails}

Fourth, the Court has a solemn duty to uphold the clear and unmistakable mandate of the people. It cannot supplant the sovereign will of the Second District of Pangasinan with fractured legalism. The people of the District have clearly spoken. They overwhelmingly and unequivocally voted for private respondent to represent them in the House of Representatives. The votes that Cruz garnered (80,119) in the last elections were much more than those of all his opponents combined (66,182). ²³ In such instances, all possible doubts should be resolved in favor of the winning candidates eligibility; to rule otherwise would be to defeat the will of the people. ²⁴cräläwvirtualibräry

Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the doctrine that in case of doubt, political laws must be so construed as to give life and spirit to the popular mandate freely expressed through the ballot. ²⁵ Public interest and the sovereign will should, at all times, be the paramount considerations in election controversies. ²⁶ For it would be better to err in favor of the peoples choice than to be right in complex but little understood legalisms. ²⁷cräläwvirtualibräry

Indeed, this Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of giving effect to the sovereign will in order to ensure the survival of our democracy. In any action involving the possibility of a reversal of the popular electoral choice, this Court must exert utmost effort to resolve the issues in a manner that would give effect to the will of the majority, for it is merely sound public policy to cause elective offices to be filled by those who are the choice of the majority. To successfully challenge a winning candidate's qualifications, the petitioner must clearly demonstrate that the ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to constitutional and legal principles that overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the people would ultimately create greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously protect and promote. ²⁸

^{5. Current Trend Towards Globalization}

Fifth, the current trend, economically as well as politically, is towards globalization. ²⁹ Protectionist barriers are being dismantled. Whereas, in the past, governments frowned upon the opening of their doors to aliens who wanted to enjoy the same privileges as their citizens, the current era is adopting a more liberal perspective. No longer are applicants for citizenship eyed with the suspicion that they merely want to exploit local resources for themselves. They are now being considered potential sources of developmental skills, know-how and capital.

More so should our government open its doors to former Filipinos, like Congressman Cruz, who want to rejoin the Filipino community as citizens again. They are not aliens in the true sense of the law. They are actually Filipinos by blood, by origin and by culture, who want to reacquire their former citizenship.

It cannot be denied that most Filipinos go abroad and apply for naturalization in foreign countries, because of the great economic or social opportunities there. Hence, we should welcome former Filipino citizens desirous of not simply returning to the country or regaining Philippine citizenship, but of serving the Filipino people as well. One of these admirable Filipinos is private respondent who, in only a year after being absent from the Philippines for about eight (8) years, was already voted municipal mayor of Mangatarem, Pangasinan. And after serving as such for just one term, he was overwhelmingly chosen by the people to be their representative in Congress.

I reiterate, the people have spoken. Let not a restrictive and parochial interpretation of the law bar the sovereign will. Let not grave abuse be imputed on the legitimate exercise of HRETs prerogatives.

WHEREFORE , I vote to DISMISS the petition.

^{1 "} Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines: (2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;

xxx xxx xxx

² Sec. 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. xxx.

³ Section 1. How citizenship may be lost. A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship in any of the following ways and/or events:

x x x

(4) By rendering services to, or accepting commission in, the armed forces of a foreign country: x x x.

⁴ Sec. 1 thereof provides:

Sec. 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired U.S. citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering the same with the Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other citizenship.

⁵ 1995 ed.

⁶ Ibid., p. 165; cited in the assailed HRET Decision, p. 13. (Italics ours.)

⁷ Websters Third New International Dictionary: Unabridged, 1993 ed.

⁸ Websters, ibid., defines reacquire as to acquire again; and acquire as to get as ones own.

⁹ Roa v. Collector of Customs, 23 Phil 315, 338 (1912), per Trent, J.; citing Boyd v. Thayer, 143 US 135.

¹⁰ Ronaldo P. Ledesma, An Outline of Philippine Immigration and Citizenship Laws, 1999 ed., p. 354. See also 14 CJS 1, 1128; 3A Am Jur 2d Aliens and Citizens, 1411.

¹¹ See Ledesma, ibid., p. 355.

¹² Supra.

¹³ Assailed Decision, p. 8.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 9.

¹⁶ Sec. 17, Art. VI. (Emphasis ours.)

¹⁷ Lazatin v. HRET, 168 SCRA 391, December 8, 1988; Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 199 SCRA 692, July 30, 1991; citing Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil 139 (1936).

¹⁸ Co v. HRET, ibid., citing Robles v. HRET, 181 SCRA 780, February 5, 1990; and Morrero v. Bocar, 66 Phil 429 (1938). See also Libanan v. HRET, 283 SCRA 520, December 22, 1997.

¹⁹ Co v. HRET, ibid.

²⁰ Santiago v. Guingona Jr., 298 SCRA 756, November 18, 1998.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Taada v. Angara, 272 SCRA 18, May 2, 1997, per Panganiban, J.

²³ The following were the results of the election:

Teodoro C. Cruz 80,119

Antonio E. Bengson III 53,448

Alberto B. Zamuco 11,941

Manuel R. Castro 622

Mariano A. Padlan 171

(HRET Decision, pp. 2-3; rollo, pp. 37-38.)

²⁴ Sinaca v. Mula, 315 SCRA 266, September 27, 1999.

²⁵ Frivaldo v. Comelec, 257 SCRA 727, June 28, 1996; per Panganiban, J.

²⁶ Olondriz v. Comelec, 313 SCRA 128, August 25, 1999.

²⁷ Frivaldo v. Comelec, supra.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ See Pacifico A. Agabin, Globalization and the Judicial Function, Odyssey and Legacy: The Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa Centennial Lecture Series, complied and edited by Atty. Antonio M. Elicano, published by the Supreme Court Printing Services, 1998 ed. See also Artemio V. Panganiban, Old Doctrines and New Paradigms, a lecture delivered during the Supreme Court Centenary Lecture Series, on February 13, 2001.