SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

PLEASE CLICK HERE FOR THE LATEST ➔ SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

DISSENTING OPINION

MELO, J.:

Although I agree with the majority opinion dismissing Alda Florias complaint against Curie Sunga and Isidro Aperocho, I am constrained to dissent from the majority opinion finding Alda Floria guilty of immorality and dishonesty, it being indubitable that in our previous Resolution dated February 12, 2001, the complaint for immorality and falsification filed against Alda Floria had already been dismissed for lack of merit.

As culled from the record, Alda Floria, Curie Sunga, and Isidro Aperocho are or were employees of the Court of Appeals, Floria being the Assistant Chief of Division of the Court of Appeals Judicial Records Division, Curie Sunga the Assistant Chief of Division of the Information and Statistical Data Division (hereafter ISDD), and Isidro Aperocho the Assistant Information Officer of the ISDD. On August 6, 1999, the position of Chief of the ISDD became vacant Among four applicants, only Floria and Aperocho were nominated for appointment to the vacant position.

On September 8, 1999, seven employees of the ISDD, Sunga and Aperocho included, filed a Manifesto with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) alleging that Floria was guilty of immorality, falsification, and misrepresentation; supposedly because she was maintaining illicit relations with Rodrigo Badilla, a married man, and that she had made false entries in the birth certificates of her children stating that she and Badilla had married each other on May 22, 1972. The Manifesto was considered a complaint by the OCA and docketed as OCA IPI No. 99-18-CA-P.

On the other hand, on September 17, 1999, Floria filed a complaint with the OCA, docketed as OCA IPI No. 99-21-CA-P, against Sunga and Aperocho for Conduct Unbecoming of a Court Employee, alleging that the two were motivated by jealousy and malice when they filed the Manifesto against her and that the same was a ploy employed by the two in order to disqualify her from promotion to Chief of the ISDD. The two complaints, being interrelated, were thereafter consolidated and jointly docketed as A.M. No. CA-01-10-P.

On February 12, 2001, this Court, adopting the Court Administrators recommendation, issued a Resolution dismissing the complaint for immorality, falsification, and misrepresentation filed against Floria for lack of merit. Furthermore, we declared Sunga and Aperocho guilty of causing irreparable harm to Floria and imposed a fine of P5,000.00 on both.

Aggrieved, Sunga and Aperocho filed a motion for reconsideration stating that their inability to prove that Florias adulterous relationship with Badilla was still on-going did not, in any event, erase the fact that she had failed to live up to the moral standards required of judiciary employees. They stressed that they were not impelled by malice or jealousy in filing a complaint against Floria, but by a sincere desire that a qualified employee be appointed as Chief of the ISDD.

As earlier stated, the majority opinion agrees with the asseverations of Sunga and Aperocho and consequently, would dismiss Florias complaint against Sunga and Aperocho for lack of merit. However, the majority opinion goes further. It reverses the former finding exonerating Floria and instead, finds the latter guilty of immorality and dishonesty, imposing upon her a fine of P10,000.00 with a reprimand and warning that a repetition of similar conduct would be dealt with more severely.

Parenthetically, the Philippine Civil Service Law does not allow the complainant to appeal a decision exonerating or absolving a civil service employee (Paredes vs. CSC, 192 SCRA 84 [1990]; Mendez vs. CSC, 204 SCRA 965 [1991]; Magpale vs. CSC, 215 SCRA 398 [1992]; Navarro vs. CSC and Export Processing Zone Authority, 226 SCRA 522 [1993]; University of the Philippines vs. CSC, 228 SCRA 207 [1993]; Del Castillo vs. CSC, 241 SCRA 317 [1995]). This is so because Sec. 39(a) of Presidential Decree No. 807, the Philippine Civil Service Law; as well as Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Section 49(1) of the Administrative Code of 1987, provides that [a]ppeals, where allowable, shall be made by the party adversely affected by the decision ... As held in aforestated Del Castillo case, citing Mendez:

The phrase party adversely affected by the decision refers to the government employee against whom the administrative case is filed for the purpose of disciplinary action which may take the form of suspension, demotion in rank or salary, transfer, removal or dismissal from office. In the instant case, Coloyan who filed the appeal cannot be considered an aggrieved party because he is not the respondent in the administrative case below.

In Paredes, we reiterated that the complainant is not the party adversely affected by the decision since in an administrative case, the complainant is a mere witness, stating that [n]o private interest is involved in an administrative case as the offense is committed against the government.

While this doctrine may have been modified, despite my dissenting opinion, by Civil Service Commission vs. Dacoycoy (306 SCRA 425 [1999]), to allow the Civil Service Commission to appeal decisions exonerating an employee, jurisprudence remains well-settled that the complainant, being a mere witness for the government, cannot appeal the decision rendered, the right to appeal being limited by existing jurisprudence to the respondent or to the CSC, the persons considered as parties adversely affected by the decision. It is thus ineluctable that, excepting the privilege of appeal granted to the Civil Service Commission, Philippine Civil Service Law does not contemplate a review of decisions exonerating officers and employees from administrative charges. From the foregoing, it is thus clear that our February 12, 2001 Resolution exonerating Floria may no longer be reviewed.

It may well be argued that the doctrine prohibiting the complainant from appealing a decision exonerating or absolving the respondent is inapplicable in the case at bar, there being no privilege of appeal in administrative cases for grave or less grave offenses filed against judiciary employees. Section 6, Article VIII of the Constitution provides that [t]he Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof. Likewise, Circular No. 30-91 states that [a]ll administrative complaints for grave or less grave offenses as defined in the Codes hereinbefore referred to shall be immediately referred to the Court En Banc for appropriate action ... Thus, for administrative charges comprising grave or less grave offenses filed against judiciary employees, the same are to be immediately referred to the Court En Banc. Decisions of the Court En Banc in such cases would, obviously be unappealable, there being no judicial authority higher than the Court. In the case at bar, the charge of immorality and falsification against Floria comprise grave offenses, hence the same were referred to the Court En Banc, from whose decision, as stated earlier, there is no appeal.

Does the fact that there is no appeal in this case disallow the application of the doctrine? I submit that it does not. As adverted to earlier, Philippine Civil Service Law does not contemplate a review of decisions exonerating officers and employees from administrative charges. However, while there can be no appeal in administrative cases involving grave or less grave offenses allegedly committed by judiciary employees, the rules allow a motion for reconsideration, as was done by Sunga and Aperocho in this case. As we pointed out in Siy vs. CA (138 SCRA 536 [1985]), the very purpose of a motion for reconsideration is to point out the findings and conclusions of the decision which, in the movants view, are not supported by law or the evidence. The movant is, therefore, very often confined to the amplification or further discussion of the same issues already passed upon by the court... Among the ends to which a motion for reconsideration is addressed, one is precisely to convince the court that its ruling is erroneous and improper, contrary to law or the evidence (Rule 37, Section 1, subsection [c]); and in doing so, the movant has to dwell of necessity upon the issues passed upon by the court. In fine, a motion for reconsideration seeks a review of the issues already passed upon by the court. However, since Philippine Civil Service Law does not contemplate a review of decisions exonerating officers and employees from administrative charges, I submit that for judicial employees charged administratively for a grave or less grave offense, once exonerated or absolved of the charge, a motion for reconsideration of the decision thereof may no longer be filed by the complainant, the latter not being a party adversely affected by the decision.

One more point In my dissenting opinion in Civil Service vs. Dacoycoy and in my concurring opinion in Floralde vs CA (GR No 123048, August 8, 2000), I pointed out that although the complainant may no longer appeal the decision exonerating or absolving the respondent, if the respondent fails to invoke the foregoing rule, he is deemed to have waived this right. In this case, when Sunga and Aperocho filed their motion for reconsideration of our February 12, 2001 Resolution dismissing for lack of merit the complaints against Floria, the latter did not question their right to file a motion for reconsideration. Is Floria deemed to have waived her right to invoke the non-reviewability of administrative decisions exonerating or absolving the respondent thereto? Given the special circumstances obtaining in this case, the answer should be in the negative.

It may be noted that current jurisprudence on the matter deals only with the proscription of the complainants right to appeal in decisions exonerating or absolving the respondent, it does not deal with motions for reconsideration. Given the silence of existing jurisprudence as to the applicability of the doctrine to motions for reconsideration, Floria could, thus, not be reasonably expected to question the propriety of complainants Sunga and Aperochos motions for reconsideration. Note also that in administrative cases involving grave or less grave offenses committed by judiciary employees, there is no appeal. There being no appeal, Floria may not thus be faulted if she failed to invoke the doctrine of non-reviewability of decisions exonerating the respondent against complainants Sunga and Aperocho Given these circumstances, I hold that Florias failure to question Sunga and Aperochos right to file a motion for reconsideration should not be held against her pro hac vice.

ACCORDINGLY , while I concur with the majority opinion insofar as it dismisses Alda Florias complaint against Curie Sunga and Isidro Aperocho, I dissent therefrom insofar as it finds Alda Floria guilty of immorality and dishonesty.