G.R. No. 136845 :
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. GUILLERMO FLORENDO alias IMONG, appellant.
D E C I S I O N
GUILLERMO FLORENDO alias Imong was found guilty of parricide with the aggravating circumstance of cruelty and sentenced to death. He was ordered to indemnify the heirs of his wife, Erlinda Ragudo Florendo, the amount of P500,000.00 in moral and exemplary damages and to pay the costs of suit. His conviction is the subject of this automatic review.1cräläwvirtualibräry
The records show that on
Agustin, who was resting at that time, witnessed the incident. Instead of stopping appellant, Agustin left the house for fear that his son would also attack him. Agustin sought help from his immediate neighbor, Ernesto Anical, and told him, Kasano Erning, patayen yen met ni Imong ni baketnan (How is this Erning, Imong is killing his wife)!3 Ernesto too became frightened and did not go out of his house; instead, he told Agustin to go to the barangay captain for assistance.
Agustin went to the house of Barangay Captain Godofredo Apuya to report the incident but the latter was not there. Thus, the wife of the barangay captain, upon being apprised of what happened, hurriedly went out to look for any available barangay tanod for assistance and was able to contact Barangay Tanod Felipe Adora. Agustin, on the other hand, restrained by fear and shock, stayed at the barangay captains house and when he finally returned at about 4:00 oclock in the afternoon Erlinda was already dead.
In the meantime, appellant ran to the house of the barangay captain after hacking his wife. When Barangay Tanod Felipe Adora arrived at the house of the barangay captain, he found appellant there holding a bloodied bolo, his hands and feet dripping with blood. Felipe advised appellant to yield his bolo but the latter did not respond. This prompted Felipe to grab his hand and take away his bolo. When Barangay Captain Godofredo Apuya arrived, he asked appellant why his hand and feet were covered with blood but the latter did not answer. Appellant was later taken to the La Paz District Hospital for treatment of his wound and the police authorities of La Paz thereafter took him into custody pending investigation of the incident.
Dr. Corazon Lalin Brioso, Municipal Health Officer of La Paz, autopsied the cadaver of the victim and found that she sustained sixteen (16) wounds on various parts of her body, four (4) of which were considered fatal and resulted in her instantaneous death due to hypovalemic shock caused by massive hemorrhage.4cräläwvirtualibräry
At the pre-trial conference, appellant admitted killing his wife but put up the defense of insanity to claim exemption from criminal liability. At the initial hearing, the prosecution presented Agustin Florendo, Godofredo Apuya, Ernesto Anical, Felipe Adora and Dr. Corazon Lalin Brioso as witnesses.
Agustin Florendo attested that his son was not in his proper senses on the day of the incident and repeated on cross-examination that appellant was crazy and had been behaving strangely for one (1) year before the incident.8cräläwvirtualibräry
Barangay Captain Godofredo Apuya, on the other hand, stated that he already knew that appellant was mentally ill because in two (2) instances, three. (3) months prior to the incident, he saw him singing, dancing and clapping his hands in their yard.9 Witness Ernesto Anical stated further that on the day of the incident appellant was not in his right senses as he saw him sharpening his bolo with his eyes red and looking very sharp. Yet, he likewise testified that appellant would join the people in their barangay in their drinking sprees and when already drunk he would beat his wife.10cräläwvirtualibräry
Felipe Adora also testified that appellant had been
behaving oddly and was somewhat crazy as he saw him ten (10) days before the
incident singing and talking to himself.11
Both Godofredo Apuya and
Felipe Adora stated that appellant suspected that his
wife was having an affair with Godofredo for he once
went to the house of Godofredo looking for her. But before the trial could prosper, the
presiding judge received a letter from the provincial warden asking for the
recommitment of appellant to the BGHMC because of his unstable mental
In the assailed Decision dated
Appellant Florendo now contends that the trial court erred in not acquitting him on the ground of insanity; for appreciating cruelty instead as an aggravating circumstance in the commission of the crime, and for upholding the legitimacy of his common-law relationship with the victim in order to bring the killing within the ambit of Art. 246 of The Revised Penal Code.
The Court rejects the plea of insanity. Insanity under Art. 12, par. 1, of The Revised Penal Code exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, i.e., appellant is deprived of reason; he acts without the least discernment because of complete absence of the power to discern; or, there is a total deprivation of freedom of the will. The onus probandi rests upon him who invokes insanity as an exempting circumstance, and he must prove it by clear and convincing evidence.13cräläwvirtualibräry
The alleged insanity of Florendo was not substantiated by sufficient evidence. He was not completely bereft of reason or discernment and freedom of will when he mortally hacked his wife. The following circumstances14 clearly and unmistakably negate a complete absence of intelligence on his part when he committed the felony: (a) He was apparently well until about three (3) to four (4) months prior to his admission in the hospital when he was noted to have blank stares, claiming that he was in deep thought because he suspected his wife of having an extramarital affair, and at times would confront his wife about the matter but the latter would deny it; (b) That he became irritable at home and was easily angered by his childrens slightest mistakes; (c) That due to his jealousy he claimed that he only wanted to frighten his wife with his bolo in order to confront her but hacked her instead many times to death; (d) He denied having hallucinations at that time or being possessed by an evil spirit; (e) Immediately after the incident he went to the barangay captain, never thought of running away, and apparently felt guilty about what happened; (f) In jail, he said he started having auditory hallucinations where he would hear voices commanding him to do something but refused to elaborate on this; and, (g) He claimed that he frequently thought of his three (3) children whom he missed so much. These were hardly the acts of a person with a sick mind.
A perusal of appellants testimony would show that he was aware of his emotions, bearing and temperament. Except for his testimony in open court that he had no recollection of what happened on 28 August 1996, he attested that he saw his children a few days before the incident; that he was brought to the provincial jail by the police authorities; and, that he thumbmarked a form given him in jail. Since he remembered the vital circumstances surrounding the ghastly incident, he must have been in full control of his mental faculties. His recall of the events that transpired before, during and after the stabbing incident, as well as the nature and contents of his testimony, does not betray an aberrant mind. An insane person has no full and clear understanding of the nature and consequences of his act.
The issue of insanity is a question of fact for insanity is a condition of the mind, not susceptible of the usual means of proof. As no man would know what goes on in the mind of another, the state or condition of a persons mind can only be measured and judged by his behavior. Establishing the insanity of an accused requires opinion testimony which may be given by a witness who is intimately acquainted with appellant, or who has rational basis to conclude that appellant was insane based on the witness own perception of appellant, or who is qualified as an expert, such as a psychiatrist.15cräläwvirtualibräry
The first four (4) witnesses of the prosecution were one in alleging that appellant was crazy and had lost his mind as they noticed him to be behaving oddly, i.e., singing, dancing and talking to himself. The prosecution witnesses may have testified that appellant appeared to them to be insane prior to, during and subsequent to the commission of the crime, but there is a vast difference between an insane person and one who has worked himself into such a frenzy of anger that he fails to use reason or good judgment in his action. The fact that a person behaves crazily is not conclusive that he is insane. The prevalent meaning of the word crazy is not synonymous with the legal terms insane, non compos mentis, unsound mind, idiot, or lunatic. The popular conception of the word crazy is being used to describe a person or an act unnatural or out of the ordinary. A man may behave in a crazy manner but it does not necessarily and conclusively prove that he is legally so.16cräläwvirtualibräry
The evidence adduced consisting of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that appellant was insane immediately before or on the day the crime was committed consisted merely of assumptions, and is too speculative, presumptive and conjectural to be convincing. Their observation that appellant manifested unusual behavior does not constitute sufficient proof of his insanity because not every aberration of the mind or mental deficiency constitutes insanity hence exempting.
In the case at bar, appellant was diagnosed to be suffering from schizophrenia when he was committed to the BGHMC a few months after he killed his wife. Medical books describe schizophrenia as a chronic mental disorder characterized by a persons inability to distinguish between fantasy and reality, and is often accompanied by hallucinations and delusions. Symptomatically, schizophrenic reactions are recognizable through odd and bizarre behavior apparent in aloofness or periods of impulsive destructiveness and immature and exaggerated emotionality. During the initial stage, the common early symptom is aloofness, a withdrawal behind barriers of loneliness, hopelessness, hatred and fear. Frequently, the patient would seem preoccupied and dreamy and may appear far away.17cräläwvirtualibräry
Well-settled is the rule that an inquiry into the mental state of an accused should relate to the period immediately before or at the very moment the felony is committed.18 The medical findings of the BGHMC, which diagnosed appellants mental disorder as schizophrenic psychosis, paranoid type, refer to appellants treatment after the incident happened. It is bereft of any proof that appellant was completely deprived of intelligence or discernment at the time or at the very moment he killed his wife. It is inconclusive as to whether he was insane at the time immediately preceding or at the very moment of the killing.
In compliance with this Courts Resolution of
As can be gleaned from the reports, appellant could only be undergoing the percursory stages of a disease prior to and at the time of the killing. It is, therefore, beyond cavil that assuming that he had some form of mental illness by virtue of the premonitory symptoms of schizophrenia, it did not totally deprive him of intelligence. The presence of his reasoning faculties, which enabled him to exercise sound judgment and satisfactorily articulate certain matters such as his jealousy over the supposed infidelity of his wife, sufficiently discounts any intimation of insanity when he committed the dastardly crime. While appellant on many occasions before the commission of the crime did things that would indicate that he was not of sound mind, such acts only tended to show that he was in an abnormal mental state and not necessarily of unsound mind that would exempt him from criminal liability. Mere abnormality of mental faculties will not exclude imputability.21 The odd or bizarre behavior of appellant prior to the commission of the crime as described by the prosecution witnesses, if anything else, did not completely deprive the offender of consciousness of his acts. If the defense of insanity is sustained, the floodgates to abuse will be opened by the cunning and ingenious public. Testimony that a person acted in a crazy or deranged manner days before the commission of the crime does not prove insanity. The grant of absolution on the basis of insanity should be done with utmost care and circumspection as the State must keep its guard against murderers seeking to escape punishment through a general plea of insanity.
We cannot sustain the ruling of the trial court that cruelty
aggravated the killing simply because according to the autopsy report the
victims body bore sixteen (16) wounds all in all, four (4) of which were
severe, deep and fatal. The number of wounds is not a test for determining
cruelty; it is whether appellant deliberately and sadistically augmented the
victims suffering. Thus, there must be proof that the victim was made to
agonize before appellant rendered the blow which snuffed out her life.22
Although Erlinda received sixteen (16) wounds in all
there is no showing that appellant deliberately and inhumanly increased her
suffering. At any rate, even if cruelty is proved, it cannot be appreciated
against appellant to raise the penalty to death as this was not alleged in the
Information. Under Sec. 9, Rule 110, of The
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which took effect on
As to the marriage of the victim and appellant, the trial court properly upheld its legitimacy. In parricide, the best proof of relationship between appellant and the deceased is the marriage certificate, and in the absence thereof, oral evidence of the fact of marriage may be considered. The testimony of appellant that he was married to the deceased is an admission against his penal interest. It is a confirmation of the sem per praesumitur matrimonio and the presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.23 Even if the marriage certificate was not presented, that the victim was the legitimate wife of appellant is evident from the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. In open court, appellant himself volunteered the information in his offer of evidence through counsel and on direct examination that the victim was his legitimate wife.
Appellant was properly convicted of the crime of parricide.24 Parricide not being a capital crime per se, as it is not punishable by the mandatory death penalty but by the flexible penalty of reclusion perpetua to death which are two (2) indivisible penalties, the application of the lesser or the greater penalty depends on the presence of mitigating and aggravating circumstances. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance appreciated for appellant, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua is imposed.25 Nonetheless, clinical findings at the time of evaluation of the psychological and psychiatric condition of appellant show that despite maintenance of anti-psychotic medication he remains to be symptomatic. It is imperative that there should be continuous maintenance of his anti-psychotic medications and regular psychiatric follow-up to achieve and sustain remission of psychotic symptoms.
As the trial court failed to award indemnity in favor of the heirs of the victim, the amount of P50,000.00 should be adjudged as civil indemnity ex delicto, which award is mandatory and requires no proof other than the victims death.26cräläwvirtualibräry
WHEREFORE, the conviction of accused-appellant GUILLERMO FLORENDO alias IMONG of parricide under Art. 246 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by Sec. 5, of RA 7659, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that he should suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, instead of death. He is further ordered to pay the heirs of his wife, the deceased Erlinda Ragudo Florendo, the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for her death, and to pay the costs.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Corona, J., on leave.
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