Respondents moved for reconsideration. [18] On November 7, 2003, the Special Division of Five of the Former Second Division rendered an Amended Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, our decision dated 13 September 2002 is hereby reconsidered. Accordingly, the Register of Deeds of Quezon City is hereby directed to cancel TCT No. RT-22481 of private respondents and the LRA is hereby directed to reconstitute forthwith petitioners' valid, genuine and existing Certificate of Title No. T-210177.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED. [19]

Petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the amended decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700 was denied, [20] hence, this petition docketed as G.R. No. 162605.

Meanwhile, in CA-G.R. SP No. 66642, the Third Division of the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision [21] on October 29, 2003, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Resolution of the LRA dated 24 June 1998 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. [22]

In so ruling, the Third Division of the Court of Appeals declared that the LRA correctly deferred in giving due course to the petition for reconstitution since there is yet no final judgment upholding or annulling respondents' title. [23]

Respondents' motion for reconsideration was granted by the Third Division of the Court of Appeals on February 24, 2004, thus:

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of this Court dated 29 October 2003 is RECONSIDERED and a new one is entered ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel petitioners' TCT No. RT-22481 and directing the LRA to reconstitute forthwith respondents' TCT No. T-210177.

SO ORDERED. [24]

From the foregoing decisions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700 and CA-G.R. SP No. 66642, petitioners filed separate petitions for review before this Court docketed as G.R. No. 162605 and G.R. No. 162335, respectively.

In G.R. No. 162605, petitioners argue that:

I

THE MAJORITY JUSTICES ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN ORDERING THE CANCELLATION OF PETITIONERS' EXISTING TITLE, CONSIDERING THAT:

a. THEY ORDERED THE CANCELLATION OF TITLE DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE SAME IS NOT PART OF THE RELIEF SOUGHT IN A RECONSTITUTION PROCEEDINGS.

b. THEY ALLOWED A COLLATERAL ATTACK ON A TORRENS CERTIFICATE OF TITLE; and

c. THE COURT OF APPEALS, IN RESOLVING AN APPEAL OF THE DECISION OF THE LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO ORDER THE CANCELLATION OF TITLE, SINCE ONLY A PROPER REGIONAL TRIAL COURT CAN ORDER THE ANNULMENT/CANCELLATION OF A TORRENS TITLE. BY ALLOWING A 'SHORT CUT', THE MAJORITY JUSTICES DEPRIVED THE PETITIONERS OF THEIR PROPERTY AND THEIR CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW.

II

THE MAJORITY JUSTICES GRAVELY MISAPPLIED THE RULING OF THIS HONORABLE COURT IN ORTIGAS V. VELASCO, CONSIDERING THAT:

a. IN THE ORTIGAS CASE, THERE WERE TWO TITLES EXISTING OVER THE SAME PARCEL OF LAND, AS A RESULT OF THE RECONSTITUTED TITLE ISSUED IN THE NAME OF MOLINA. IN THE INSTANT CASE, ONLY PETITIONERS HOLD TITLE TO THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION, AS RESPONDENTS ARE MERELY TRYING TO HAVE TITLE RECONSTITUTED IN THEIR NAMES.

b. IN ORTIGAS, THERE WERE SEVERAL DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT WHICH PREVIOUSLY RESOLVED THE ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP OF ORTIGAS' PROPERTY. HENCE, THERE WAS SUFFICIENT GROUND TO ANNUL MOLINA'S TITLE OUTRIGHT. IN THE INSTANT CASE, THERE ARE NO SUCH DECISIONS IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS WHICH WOULD JUSTIFY THE CANCELLATION OF THE TITLE OF PETITIONERS WITHOUT ANY HEARING. [25]

In G.R. No. 162335, petitioners raise the following issues:

I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (THIRD DIVISION) COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW IN ORDERING THE LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY TO CANCEL TCT NO. RT-22481 OF PETITIONERS MANOTOK NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT SAID COURT WAS FULLY COGNIZANT THAT IT HAS NO JURISDICTION TO EXERCISE SUCH AUTHORITY AND POWER AND THE LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY IS EQUALLY DEVOID OF JURISDICTION ON THE MATTER BECAUSE UNDER THE JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1980 SPECIFICALLY SECTION 19 (2) THEREOF, ONLY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS HAVE EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OVER CIVIL ACTIONS WHICH INVOLVES TITLE TO, OR POSSESSION OF, REAL PROPERTY, OR ANY INTEREST THEREIN.

II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (THIRD DIVISION) COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW IN INVOKING EQUITABLE CONSIDERATION TO JUSTIFY ITS CHALLENGED AMENDED DECISION DATED FEBRUARY 24, 2004 DIRECTING LRA TO CANCEL PETITIONERS MANOTOK'S TITLE NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT, AS STATED, THE LAW EXPLICITLY VESTS EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION TO THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS OVER CIVIL ACTIONS WHICH INVOLVES TITLE TO, OR POSSESSION OF, REAL PROPERTY, OR ANY INTEREST THEREIN.

III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN FAILING TO ORDER THE SETTING ASIDE OF THE CHALLENGED RESOLUTION DATED JUNE 24, 1998 OF RESPONDENT LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY IN LRC ADMIN. CASE NO. Q-547 [97] VIEWED FROM THE FACT THAT SAID RESOLUTION OF LRA IS PATENTLY AT WAR WITH LAW AND CONTROLLING JURISPRUDENCE THAT PROHIBITS RECONSTITUTION OF TITLE BY THIRD PARTY ALLEGED TO HAVE BEEN LOST OR DESTROYED IF ANOTHER VALID TITLE IS EXISTING COVERING THE LAND SUBJECT THEREOF.

IV. THE LRA COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ORDERING THE RECONSTITUTION OF THE TITLE OF HOMER BARQUE, SR. SUBJECT ONLY TO THE CONDITION THAT THE TITLE OF PETITIONERS MANOTOK SHOULD FIRST BE ORDERED CANCELLED BY COURT OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION IN THE FACE OF THE GLARING FACTS THAT SAID TITLE IS HIGHLY SUSPECT AND BEARS BADGES OF FABRICATION AND FALSIFICATION AND THEREFORE NO OTHER LOGICAL AND CREDIBLE CONCLUSION CAN BE DRAWN EXCEPT THAT IT IS A FAKE AND SPURIOUS TITLE.

V. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ALLOWING RESPONDENTS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WHICH WAS CLEARLY FILED OUT OF TIME. [26]

On August 2, 2004, the petition in G.R. No. 162605 was consolidated with the petition in G.R. No. 162335. [27]

In sum, petitioners contend that (a) the LRA has no authority to annul their title; (b) the reconstitution of respondents' Torrens title would be a collateral attack on petitioners' existing title; (c) they were not given the opportunity to be heard, specifically the chance to defend the validity of their Torrens title; (d) the Court of Appeals, in resolving the appeal from the LRA, has no jurisdiction to order the cancellation of petitioners' title; and (e) the ruling in Ortigas 'was misapplied.

The petitions must be denied.

The LRA properly ruled that the reconstituting officer should have confined himself to the owner's duplicate certificate of title prior to the reconstitution. Section 3 of Republic Act (RA) No. 26 [28] clearly provides:

Section 3. Transfer certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such of the sources hereunder enumerated as may be available, in the following order:

(a) The owner's duplicate of the certificate of title;

....

When respondents filed the petition for reconstitution, they submitted in support thereof the owner's duplicate certificate of title, real estate tax receipts and tax declaration. Plainly, the same should have more than sufficed as sources for the reconstitution pursuant to Section 3 of RA No. 26 which explicitly mandates that the reconstitution shall be made following the hierarchy of sources as enumerated by law. In addition, Section 12 of the same law requires that the petition shall be accompanied with a plan and technical description of the property only if the source of the reconstitution is Section 3(f) of RA No. 26. Thus:

Section 12. ' Provided, That in case the reconstitution is to be made exclusively from sources enumerated in section 2(f) or 3(f) of this Act, the petition shall further be accompanied with a plan and technical description of the property duly approved by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office, or with a certified copy of the description taken from a prior certificate of title covering the same property. [29]

Since respondents' source of reconstitution is the owner's duplicate certificate of title, there is no need for the reconstituting officer to require the submission of the plan, much less deny the petition on the ground that the submitted plan appears to be spurious. By enumerating the hierarchy of sources to be used for the reconstitution, it is the intent of the law to give more weight and preference to the owner's duplicate certificate of title over the other enumerated sources.

The factual finding of the LRA that respondents' title is authentic, genuine, valid, and existing, while petitioners' title is sham and spurious, as affirmed by the two divisions of the Court of Appeals, is conclusive before this Court. It should remain undisturbed since only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Findings of fact of administrative bodies are accorded respect, even finality by this Court and, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are no longer reviewable except only for very compelling reasons. Basic is the rule that factual findings of agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions' ' are accorded not only respect but even finality, aside from the consideration that this Court is essentially not a trier of facts. [30]

Such questions as whether certain items of evidence should be accorded probative value or weight, or rejected as feeble or spurious, or whether or not the proofs on one side or the other are clear and convincing and adequate to establish a proposition in issue, are without doubt questions of fact. Whether or not the body of proofs presented by a party, weighed and analyzed in relation to contrary evidence submitted by adverse party, may be said to be strong, clear and convincing; whether or not certain documents presented by one side should be accorded full faith and credit in the face of protests as to their spurious character by the other side; whether or not inconsistencies in the body of proofs of a party are of such gravity as to justify refusing to give said proofs weight ' all these are issues of fact. Questions like these are not reviewable by this court which, as a rule, confines its review of cases decided by the Court of Appeals only to questions of law raised in the petition and therein distinctly set forth. [31] A petition for review should only cover questions of law. Questions of fact are not reviewable. [32]

In Dolfo v. Register of Deeds for the Province of Cavite, [33] this Court categorically declared:

Second. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals made a factual finding that petitioner's title to the land is of doubtful authenticity.

Having jurisdiction only to resolve questions of law, this Court is bound by the factual findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals....

In view of the foregoing, it is no longer necessary to remand the case to the RTC for the determination of which title, petitioners' or respondents', is valid or spurious. This has been ruled upon by the LRA and duly affirmed by the two divisions of the Court of Appeals.

The LRA has the jurisdiction to act on petitions for administrative reconstitution. It has the authority to review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal the decision of the reconstituting officer. The function is adjudicatory in nature ' it can properly deliberate on the validity of the titles submitted for reconstitution. Logically, it can declare a title as sham or spurious, or valid on its face. Otherwise, if it cannot make such declaration, then there would be no basis for its decision to grant or deny the reconstitution. The findings of fact of the LRA, when supported by substantial evidence, as in this case, shall be binding on the Court of Appeals. [34]

In the reconstitution proceedings, the LRA is bound to determine from the evidence submitted which between or among the titles is genuine and existing to enable it to decide whether to deny or approve the petition. Without such authority, the LRA would be a mere robotic agency clothed only with mechanical powers.

The Court of Appeals also properly exercised its appellate jurisdiction over the judgment of the LRA. Under Sections 1 and 3, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, the appellate court has jurisdiction on appeals from judgments or final orders of the LRA, whether the appeal involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law.

Indeed, it would be needlessly circuitous to remand the case to the RTC to determine anew which of the two titles is sham or spurious and thereafter appeal the trial court's ruling to the Court of Appeals. After all, the LRA and the two divisions of the appellate court have already declared that petitioners' title is forged. In Mendoza v. Court of Appeals , [35] we ruled that:

Now, technically, the revocation and cancellation of the deed of sale and the title issued in virtue thereof in de los Santos' favor should be had in appropriate proceedings to be initiated at the instance of the Government. However, since all the facts are now before this Court, and it is not within de los Santos' power in any case to alter those facts at any other proceeding, or the verdict made inevitable by said facts, for this Court to direct at this time that cancellation proceedings be yet filed to nullify the sale to de los Santos and his title, would be needlessly circuitous and would unnecessarily delay the termination of the controversy at bar, .... This Court will therefore make the adjudication entailed by the facts here and now, without further proceedings, as it has done in other cases in similar premises.

No useful purpose will be served if a case or the determination of an issue in a case is remanded to the trial court only to have its decision raised again to the Court of Appeals and then to the Supreme Court. The remand of the case or of an issue to the lower court for further reception of evidence is not necessary where the Court is in position to resolve the dispute based on the records before it and particularly where the ends of justice would not be subserved by the remand thereof. [36]

The Register of Deeds, the LRA and the Court of Appeals have jurisdiction to act on the petition for administrative reconstitution. The doctrine laid down in Alabang Dev. Corp., et al. v. Hon. Valenzuela, etc., et al. [37] does not apply in the instant case. In Alabang, the Court stressed that:

[L]ands already covered by duly issued existing Torrens Titles ' cannot be the subject of petitions for reconstitution of allegedly lost or destroyed titles filed by third parties without first securing by final judgment the cancellation of such existing titles. ' The courts simply have no jurisdiction over petitions by such third parties for reconstitution of allegedly lost or destroyed titles over lands that are already covered by duly issued subsisting titles in the names of their duly registered owners. The very concept of stability and indefeasibility of titles covered under the Torrens System of registration rules out as anathema the issuance of two certificates of title over the same land to two different holders thereof. ' [38]

The Alabang ruling was premised on the fact that the existing Torrens title was duly issued and that there is only one title subsisting at the time the petition for reconstitution was filed. In the instant case, it cannot be said that petitioners' title was duly issued much less could it be presumed valid considering the findings of the LRA and the Court of Appeals that the same is sham and spurious.

The Court of Appeals properly applied the doctrine laid down in Ortigas in refusing to remand the case to the trial court. As expressly declared in Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership v. Velasco: [39]

Ordinarily, the relief indicated by the material facts would be the remand of the reconstitution case (LRC No. Q-5405) to the Court of origin with instructions that Ortigas' and the Solicitor General's appeals from the judgment rendered therein, which were wrongly disallowed, be given due course and the records forthwith transmitted to the appellate tribunal. This, in fact, is a relief alternatively prayed for by petitioner Ortigas. Considering however the fatal infirmities afflicting Molina's theory or cause of action, evident from the records before this Court, such a remand and subsequent appeal proceedings would be pointless and unduly circuitous. Upon the facts, it is not possible for Molina's cause to prosper. To defer adjudication thereon would be unwarranted and unjust.

The same rationale should apply in the instant case. As already discussed, the validity of respondents' and petitioners' title have been squarely passed upon by the LRA and reviewed and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, which factual findings are no longer reviewable by this Court.

A careful examination of the case of Spouses Cayetano, et al. v. CA, et al., [40] where this Court, as claimed by petitioners, have affirmed their title over the disputed property, would reveal that the sole issue resolved therein is whether or not a tenancy relationship exists between the parties. [41] There was no adjudication on ownership. In fact, it cannot even be discerned if the property subject of the Spouses Cayetano case refers to the property subject of the instant controversy.

There is no basis in the allegation that petitioners were deprived of 'their property without due process of law when the Court of Appeals ordered the cancellation of their Torrens title, even without a direct proceeding in the RTC. As already discussed, there is no need to remand the case to the RTC for a re-determination on the validity of the titles of respondents and petitioners as the same has been squarely passed upon by the LRA and affirmed by the appellate court. By opposing the petition for reconstitution and submitting their administratively reconstituted title, petitioners acquiesced to the authority and jurisdiction of the reconstituting officer, the LRA and the Court of Appeals, and recognized their authority to pass judgment on their title. All the evidence presented was duly considered by these tribunals. There is thus no basis to petitioners' claim that they were deprived of their right to be heard and present evidence, which is the essence of due process.

As held in Yusingco v. Ong Hing Lian: [42]

Therefore, it appearing from the records that in the previous petition for reconstitution of certificates of title, the parties acquiesced in submitting the issue of ownership for determination in the said petition, and they were given the full opportunity to present their respective sides of the issues and evidence in support thereof, and that the evidence presented was sufficient and adequate for rendering a proper decision upon the issue, the adjudication of the issue of ownership was valid and binding.

The reconstitution would not constitute a collateral attack on petitioners' title which was irregularly and illegally issued in the first place. [43] As pertinently held in Dolfo v. Register of Deeds for the Province of Cavite : [44]

The rule that a title issued under the Torrens System is presumed valid and, hence, is the best proof of ownership of a piece of land does not apply where the certificate itself is faulty as to its purported origin.

In this case, petitioner anchors her arguments on the premise that her title to the subject property is indefeasible because of the presumption that her certificate of title is authentic. However, this presumption is overcome by the evidence presented, consisting of the LRA report ' that TCT No. T-320601 was issued without legal basis '

.

Thus, petitioner cannot invoke the indefeasibility of her certificate of title. It bears emphasis that the Torrens system does not create or vest title but only confirms and records one already existing and vested. Thus, while it may be true, as petitioner argues, that a land registration court has no jurisdiction over parcels of land already covered by a certificate of title, it is equally true that this rule applies only where there exists no serious controversy as to the authenticity of the certificate.

Under similar circumstances, this Court has ruled that wrongly reconstituted certificates of title secured through fraud and misrepresentation cannot be the source of legitimate rights and benefits. [45]

WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED . In G.R. No. 162335, the February 24, 2004 Amended Decision of the Third Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66642, ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel petitioners' TCT No. RT-22481 and directing the Land Registration Authority to reconstitute respondents' TCT No. 210177; and in G.R. No. 162605, the November 7, 2003 Amended Decision of the Special Division of Five of the Former Second Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700 directing the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel petitioners' TCT No. RT-22481, and the Land Registration Authority to reconstitute respondents' TCT No. T-210177 and the March 12, 2004 Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice