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G.R. No. 166429 ' REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita, the DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS (DOTC) and the MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY (MIAA) vs. HON. HENRICK F. GINGOYON in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 117, and PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL AIR TERMINALS CO., INC.

 

Promulgated:

 

December 19, 2005

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SEPARATE OPINION

 

PUNO, J.:

I join the exhaustive Dissent of Mr. Justice Corona. In addition, I proffer the following thoughts:

I

Agan case did not preclude

right of State to expropriate

 

The majority opinion took excruciating pains to reconcile our Decision in Agan and the inherent right of the State to expropriate private property. 'With due respect, the effort is strained and unnecessary for there nothing in Agan where it can be deduced that the right of the State to expropriate the subject property has been impaired or diminished. In Agan, we simply held:

x x x

This Court, however, is not unmindful of the reality that the structures comprising the NAIA IPT III facility are almost complete and that funds have been spent by PIATCO in their construction. For the government to take over the said facility, it has to compensate respondent PIATCO as builder of the said structures. The compensation must be just and in accordance with law and equity for the government cannot unjustly enrich itself at the expense of PIATCO and its investors.

 

Agan involved solely the issue of the validity of THE PIATCO contracts. After striking down the contracts as void, we ruled that the State must pay just compensation to PIATCO before it could exercise the right to take over considering the undeniable fact that the latter spent a considerable sum of money to build the structures comprising the NAIA IPT III. The Court, however, did not spell out a rigid formula for just compensation to be paid to PIATCO except to say that it must be according to law and equity. The Court's language was carefully crafted to give the trial court sufficient flexibility in determining just compensation considering the exchange of charges and countercharges that the cost in building the said structures was unreasonably bloated. It ought to be stressed again that in Agan, we did not rule that the State cannot expropriate the said structures. Necessarily, we did not also set the procedure on how the expropriation proceedings should be conducted if the State would opt to expropriate said structures. We need not, therefore, strain in attempting to square our ruling in Agan with our ruling in the case at bar. If at all, Agan will later be relevant in fixing just compensation but not in determining which procedure to follow in the expropriation of NAIA IPT III.

II

R.A. No. 8974 cannot

amend Rule 67

 

Article VIII, sec. 5 of the 1987 Constitution gave the Supreme Court the following powers:

x x x

 

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.

 

In Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice [1] we emphasized that the 1987 Constitution strengthened the rule making power of this Court, thus:

The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent judiciary. Among others, it enhanced the rule making power of this Court. x x x

 

The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was given the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. x x x But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress x x x.

 

Undoubtedly, Rule 67 is the rule this Court promulgated to govern the proceedings in expropriation cases filed in court. It has been the undeviating rule for quite a length of time. Following Article VIII, section 5(5) of the 1987 Constitution and the Echegaray jurisprudence, Rule 67 cannot be repealed or amended by Congress. This prohibition against non- repeal or non-amendment refers to any part of Rule 67 for Rule 67 is pure procedural law. Consequently, the Court should not chop Rule 67 into pieces and hold that some can be changed by Congress but others can be changed. The stance will dilute the rule making power of this Court which can not be allowed for it will weaken its institutional independence.

III

On December 12, 2005, the Solicitor General filed a Supplemental Manifestation and Motion. The Solicitor General informed the Court about an Order dated December 2, 2005 of the High Court of Justice, Queen's Bench Division, London which reads:

Claim No.: HT-05-269

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION

TECHNOLOGY AND CONSTRUCTION COURT

MR. JUSTICE RAMSEY

 

BETWEEN:

 

TAKENAKA CORPORATION (PHILIPPINE BRANCH)

First Claimant

 

ASAHIKOSAN CORPORATION

Second Claimant

 

-vs.-

 

PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL AIR TERMINALS CO., INC.

Defendant

 

_______________________________

 

ORDER DATED 2 DECEMBER 2005

_______________________________

 

 

UPON Judgment in default of Defence having been entered on 28 November 2005.

 

AND UPON READING the Application Notice of the Claimants dated 28 November 2005 and the evidence referred to in Part C.

 

AND UPON HEARING the solicitors for the Claimants and the solicitors for the Defendant appearing.

 

IT IS ORDERED THAT:

 

1.                Judgment be entered for the First Claimant in the sum of 21,688,012.18 United States dollars, together with interest in the sum of 6,052,805.83 United State dollars.

2.                Judgment be entered for the Second Claimant in the sum of 30,319,284.36 United States dollars, together with interest in the sum of 5,442,628.26 United Stats dollars.

3.                The Defendant do pay the Claimants' costs in the action, to be subject to detailed assessment if not agreed.

DATED this 2 day of December 2005.

 

To be sure, the said Order is not yet final. Be that as it may, the Court cannot turn a blind eye to this new wrinkle of the case at bar. It is of judicial notice that despite Agan, the subject case has reached the international arbitral tribunals where the government and the private respondent have filed charges and countercharges. There is evident need to avoid the issues pestering the parties from further multiplying and for new proceedings to be started in other courts, lest public interest suffer further irretrievable prejudice. Towards this end, it is respectfully submitted that the Court should exercise its power to compel the parties to interplead pursuant to Rule 62 and invoke the need for orderly administration of justice. The parties may be given reasonable time to amend their pleadings in the trial court.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, I join the Opinion of Mr. Justice Corona except the part calling for the inhibition of the respondent judge. The issues resolved by the respondent judge are not the run of the mill variety. Indeed, their novelty and complexity have divided even the members of this Court. There may have been lapses by the respondent judge but they do not bespeak of a biased predisposition.

 

 

REYNATO S. PUNO

Associate Justice

Endnotes:

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[1] 361 Phil. 76 (1999).