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Republic of the Philippines Republic
of the EN BANC PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, cralawG.R. No. 172370 Plaintiff-Appellee, cralaw Present: cralawPUNO, C.J., cralawQUISUMBING, cralawYNARES-SANTIAGO, cralaw
cralaw CARPIO, cralawAUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, - versus
-cralaw cralawcralawcralawCARPIO MORALES, cralawAZCUNA, cralaw
cralawTINGA, CHICO-NAZARIO, cralaw VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,**
REYES, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and BRION, JJ. FLORENDA CASTRO and Promulgated: CHRISTOPHER TALITA, Accused-Appellants.cralaw cralawOctober 6, 2008 x - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x D E C I S I O N REYES, R.T., J.: cralawTHE BRUTAL
crimes of parricide and murder are on target in this automatic review of the
Decision[1]
of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming with modification that of the Regional
Trial Court ( The Facts cralawOn
Alfredo and his welder Jaime
Carrazcal did as they were told. They,
however, failed to locate Betty in Santol. That same night, Christopher re-emerged at the
Castro household in Pandi, Bulacan and volunteered to accompany them to the job
site the next morning.[3] On May 19, at around cralawAs
Elpidio arrived on board the service jeepney, he turned to Christopher and said
Pare, sandali lang. He then instructed Alfredo and Jaime to board
the vehicle. Jaime was the first to
board and took the back seat. As Alfredo
was about to enter the vehicles passenger side, Christopher unexpectedly drew
a .38 caliber revolver. He then fired at
Alfredo twice, hitting him in the head. At
that time, Alfredo and Christopher were a mere arms-length of each other.[5] cralawChristopher
then went around the jeepney and trained his gun at Elpidio, shooting him
twice. Elpidio instantly fell down. As Alfredo lay sprawled on the ground, Christopher
shot him again.[6] Jaime immediately got down from the
vehicle as the first shot was fired. He
hid for cover at a nearby fence.[7] cralawAfter
the shooting, Christopher stood at the crime scene, waiting for something. A few minutes later, a mint green Nissan
Sentra arrived. In it were three
passengers, including appellant Florenda, who was seated behind the driver. The door at the passenger side of the said car
was open. Christopher boarded the car,
which then sped away from the locus
criminis.[8] cralawAlfredo
died instantaneously from massive
external and intracranial hemorrhage due to multiple
gunshot wounds. Elpidio was rushed to
the nearest hospital where he was treated for injuries in the abdomen and
thorax. He expired two days later.[9] cralawAccording
to Lolita Castro, she incurred cralawOn
Criminal Case No.
1087-M-98 (Murder): cralawThat
on or about the 19th day of May 1998 in the municipality of Pandi,
province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping
one another, armed with a gun and with intent to kill one Elpidio Castro y de
Leon, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with evident
premeditation and treachery, attack, assault and shoot with the said gun said
Elpidio Castro y de Leon, hitting the latter on the different parts of his
body, thereby inflicting mortal wounds which directly caused his death.[13] Criminal Case No. 1087-M-98 (Parricide): cralawThat
on or about the 19th day of May 1998 in the municipality of Pandi,
province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, having deliberately planned to kill Alfredo
Castro with whom she was united in a lawful wedlock, conspiring and
confederating with one another, accused who were armed with a gun, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with treachery and evident
premeditation, attack, assault and shot with said gun said Alfredo Castro,
hitting him in the head and chest thereby inflicting mortal wounds which
directly caused his death.[14] cralawAt
their arraignment, both appellants entered a negative plea. Trial on the merits ensued. The evidence for the People, which
portrayed the foregoing facts, was principally supplied by Godofredo del
Rosario, Christopher del Rosario, Francisco Domingo, Jaime Carrazcal, Ruperto
Cruz and Lolita de Leon Castro, wife to Elpidio and mother to Alfredo. cralawIt
was further revealed that appellant Florenda and the victim Alfredo had been
separated since February 1998. Florenda
also had a falling-out with her father-in-law over an unpaid debt. Elpidio likewise resented Florendas bad
credit standing which tended to bring shame to the Castro name.[15] Florenda did not attend the five-day
wake of her husband and father-in-law. On
the date of the burial, however, she was seen filing a claim for death benefits
before the Bureau of Customs, where her husband was previously employed. cralawUpon
the other hand, denial and alibi were appellants main exculpating line. For her part, appellant Florenda narrated that
she and the victim Alfredo were married on Florenda testified that the first
five years of her marriage with Alfredo were blissful, although they failed to
conceive a child of their own. Sometime
in February, 1998, she decided to leave their home in Pandi after she and Alfredo
had a heated argument. She refused to
extend a loan amounting to She denied that she was in Pandi,
Bulacan the day her husband Alfredo and father-in-law Elpidio were shot to
death. According to Florenda, she could
not have left their Appellant Christopher denied that he
knew appellant Florenda. He testified that he was in cralawOn
cralawWHEREFORE,
the foregoing considered, this Court hereby finds accused Florenda Castro
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of Murder in Crim. Case No.
1087-M-98 and Parricide in Crim. Case No. 1088-M-98, and accused Christopher
Talita GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of Murder for Crim. Cases
Nos. 1087 and 1088-M-98, and sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of
DEATH for each count and to pay private complainant Lolita de Leon Castro the
amounts of cralawSO
ORDERED.[20] cralawPursuant
to People v. Mateo,[21]
which modified Rules 122,
124 and 125 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal
Procedure insofar as they provide for direct appeals from the cralawOn
cralawWHEREFORE,
in view of the foregoing, the decision dated cralaw(1)
in Criminal Case Nos. 1087-M-98 and 1088-M-98, to pay solidarily (in solidum)
the heirs of the victims Elpidio Castro and Alfredo Castro the amount of cralaw(2)
in Criminal Case No. 1087-M-98, to pay solidarily (in solidum) the heirs of the
victim Elpidio Castro the amounts of cralaw(3)
in Criminal Case No. 1088-M-98, to pay solidarily (in solidum) the heirs of the
victim Alfredo Castro the amounts of SO ORDERED.[22] cralawHence,
this review. Issues cralawOn
cralawIn
the main, appellants impute to the trial court twin errors, viz.: I. THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO PROVE THE GUILT
OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT; II. THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ACCUSED,
FLORENDA CASTRO, CONSPIRED WITH HER CO-ACCUSED, CHRISTOPHER TALITA, IN
ALLEGEDLY KILLING ELPIDIO CASTRO Our Ruling I.cralawProof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. A. Alleged contradiction
vis--vis positive testimonies In minimizing the sufficiency of the
proof of their guilt, both appellants assail the contradictory testimonies and
credibility of prosecution witnesses. According
to them, there is conflict as to the position of Alfredo prior to and at the time
of the shooting; as to the entry and exit points of the bullets fired; as to when
witness Jaime started to run away; and as
to the origin, position, model and color of the get-away vehicle. They harp on these inconsistencies, claiming
that these do not refer merely to trivial matters but strike at the very manner
of the commission of the crime. We
have consistently ruled that not all inconsistencies in the witnesses
testimony affect their credibility.
Inconsistencies on minor details and collateral matters do not affect
the substance of their declaration, their veracity, or the weight of their
testimonies.[24]
Thus, although there may be inconsistencies on the testimonies of witnesses on
minor details, they do not impair credibility where there is consistency in
relating the principal occurrence and positive identification of the
assailants.[25] In
People v. Sabalones,[26]
it was alleged that the prosecution account had inconsistencies relating to the
number of shots heard and the interval between the gunshots and the victims
positions when they were killed. The
Court dismissed those allegations as minor and inconsequential flaws which
strengthen, and rather than impaired, the credibility of said eyewitnesses. In the same breath, the Court held then that
such harmless errors are indicative of truth, not falsehood,[27]
and did not cast serious doubt on the veracity and reliability of the testimony
of complainant. Also, in People v. Gonzales,[28]
the Court held that testimonial discrepancies could be caused by the natural
fickleness of memory which tends to strengthen rather than weaken credibility
as they erase any suspicion of rehearsed testimony. We
hold that the cited inconsistencies refer to trivial matters and are
insufficient to destroy credibility. The
testimonies of the witnesses for the People placed appellants at
the locus criminis. More importantly, the witnesses steadfastly
related the principal occurrence and have consistently and invariably
identified appellants as the perpetrators of the gruesome killings. cralawFor instance, at the bail hearing for
appellant Florenda, where Christopher was absent, Godofredo del Rosario
testified: Pros. Santiago: Q:If this assailant, the one who shot Elpidio and Alfredo, is now
in Court, would you be able to recognize him again? A:Yes, Sir. Q:Will you please point to him if he is now in Court? A:He is not here.[29] x x x x Pros. Santiago: Q:This Florenda, if she is now in Court, would you be able to
identify her? A:Yes, Sir. Q:Will you please point to her if she is now in Court? A:She is the one. (Witness
pointing x x x) Q:Will you please go down and pat her shoulder? A:(Witness patting the shoulder of the person, who, when asked,
answered to the name Florenda Castro). Q:Do you know Florenda Castro? A:Yes, Sir. Q:Why do you know her? A:She is the wife of Alfredo. Q:The one shot by the assailant? A:Yes, Sir. Q:And since when have you known Florenda Castro? A:For a long time because she resided in our place for a long time
also. Q:Let us go back to your sketch, what did the car do when it stops
(sic) from this place? A:The car is (sic)
approaching the corner near the gunman. Q:Where did the car stop? A:The car stop (sic) at
the middle near a corner. Q:When the car stopped at the middle of this place, what did you
see or notice? A:The woman is (sic)
pointing to someone. Q:You are referring to Florenda Castro? A:Yes, Sir. Q:Towards what direction was the woman pointing? A:Towards the gunman.[30] For her
part, private complainant Lolita Castro partly testified: Q:cralawAfter the shooting incident, what happened next? A:cralawWhen my husband and son fell down, I am about to approach them and so the gunman and I met. Q:cralawWhen meeting the gunman, what happened next? A:cralawHe poked a gun at me that is why I returned. Q:cralawTo your house? A:cralawYes, Sir. Q:cralawWhat did you do in your house? A:cralawThe gunman followed me but he stopped at the gate. I proceeded to the terrace to call to the municipal building to ask for help. x x x x Q:cralawAfter the lapse of one minute, what happened next? A:cralawA car arrived, the front door was already opened and the gunman boarded the said car. Q:cralawWhat kind of car arrived? A:cralawColor mint green. Q:cralawWere you able to recognize the driver of the jeep (sic)? A:cralawI did not recognize the driver because my focus was on the passengers. Q:cralawAside from the driver, there are others who are occupants of the car? A:cralawYes, Sir. Q:cralawWho? A:cralawMy daughter-in-law, Florenda. Q:cralawIf Florenda Castro is now in Court, would you be able to recognize him (sic) again? A:cralawYes, Sir. Q:cralawWill you please point to her? A:cralaw(Witness
pointing to the person who, when asked, answered the name of Florenda Castro).[31] Admittedly,
an accused in a criminal case may only be convicted if his or her guilt is
established beyond reasonable doubt. But
proof beyond reasonable doubt requires only a moral certainty or that degree of
proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind; it does not demand
absolute certainty and the exclusion of all possibility of error.[32] After all, We do not
expect witnesses to give an error-free testimony. Hindi tayo umaasa na ang mga saksi ay
makapagsasalaysay nang walang anumang kamalian. B. Credibility of the
witnesses for the People. Upon a review of the entire records,
the Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the findings and conclusions
reached by both the trial and the appellate courts. cralawOn
this point, the trial court aptly observed: Buttressing the above findings
of the Court are the credible, consistent, straightforward and categorical
testimonies of prosecution witnesses, particularly Godofredo del Rosario,
Francisco Domingo, Lolita Castro, Ruperto Cruz, Corazon del Rosario, and Jaime
Carrazcal, as supported by the testimonies of the two medico-legal officers, All
their testimonies, as well as those of the representatives of the Bureau of
Customs, if woven together and taken in the light of the supporting documentary
exhibits point to nothing but the clear and unequivocal guilt of accused
Florenda Castro and Christopher Talita. That
some of the prosecution witnesses are relatives of the victim does not affect
their credibility. Blood
or conjugal relationship between a witness and the victim does not per se
impair the credibility of the witness on the contrary, relationship itself
could strengthen credibility in a particular case, for it is unnatural for an
aggrieved relative to falsely accuse someone other than the actual
culprit. (People v. Rendoque, 322 SCRA 622). Private
complainant Lolita Castro, who herself witnessed the incident, testified
categorically on every detail of it. As
ruled: The testimony of the widow of the victim is far more credit-worthy than
not because of her natural interest to bring to justice the real perpetrators.
(People v. Repollo, 332 SCRA 375). The
prosecution likewise showed beyond doubt the identities of herein two
accused. Eyewitnesses Godofredo del
Rosario, Francisco Domingo, Lolita Castro, Corazon del Rosario, Ruperto Cruz
and Jaime Carrazcal positively identified accused Florenda Castro as the one
they saw inside the get-away car.
Witnesses Lolita Castro and Jaime Carrazcal, however, pointed to accused
Talita as the assailant. The
Court finds no reason to doubt the testimonies of aforesaid witnesses on their
identification of herein two accused.
The incident happened at around Where
conditions of visibility are favorable and the witnesses did not appear to be
biased against the accused, their assertions as to the identity of the
malefactors should normally be accepted. (People
v. Geral, 333 SCRA 453) All
of the eyewitnesses knew both the victims and accused Castro even before the
subject incident. When
the prosecution eyewitnesses were familiar with both victim and accused, and
where the locus criminis afforded
good visibility, and where no improper motive can be attributed to them for
testifying against the accused, then their version of the story deserves much
weight. (People v. Tolibas, 326 SCRA 453). Moreover,
on these prosecution witnesses from the eyewitnesses, to the police
investigator, to the NBI agent, and the Bureau of Customs employees, not to
mention the two medico-legal officers no improper motive can be imputed.[33] cralawIn
the same vein, the CA found: There is likewise no basis to doubt the
positive identification of accused-appellants by the prosecution eyewitnesses. Witnesses Godofredo Del Rosario, Christopher
del Rosario and Ruperto Cruz were residents of Poblacion, Pandi, Bulacan where
accused-appellant Florenda Castro and her husband Alfredo Castro resided before
they separated; witness Francisco Domingo is a jeepney driver who regularly
passes by at Poblacion, Pandi, Bulacan and has known accused-appellant Florenda
Castros husband Alfredo Castro since their childhood days in Siling Bata,
Pandi, Bulacan; and witness Lolita Castro is accused-appellants mother-in-law
while witness Jaime Carascal works as welder in their iron works business. In view of their familiarity with
accused-appellant Florenda Castro, these witnesses could not have been mistaken
as to the identity of the woman seated at the back seat of the gunmans get
away vehicles. Said vehicle had lightly
tinted windows and was traveling at a slow pace, providing said eyewitnesses
with a good look at its occupants. On the other hand, the assailant
accused-appellant Christopher Talita was positively identified by witnesses
Lolita Castro and Jaime Carascal as the same person who was at the residence of
the victim Alfredo Castro on x x x x That witnesses Lolita Castro and Christopher
del Rosario are relatives of the victims is no reason to denigrate their
testimonies, for it is established rule that the mere fact that the witness is
a relative of a victim is not a valid or sufficient ground to disregard the
formers testimony nor does it render the same less worthy of credit. Finally, the testimonies of the abovenamed
prosecution eyewitnesses, as corroborated by the evidence furnished by Dr.
Benito Caballero who conducted the post mortem examinations on the bodies of
victims Elpidio and Alfredo Castro, and Dr. Joselito Mendoza, who performed the
emergency surgery operation on Elpidio Castro before he eventually died,
confirm that the fatal wounds sustained by the victims could definitely have
been inflicted by the weapon they have seen held by accused-appellant
Christopher Talita during the commission of the crime. x x x x Furthermore, accused-appellants aver that the
testimonies of prosecution witnesses are inconsistent with the entries in the
police blotter, i.e., the color of the gunmans get away car was white, and not
green as testified to by the prosecution eyewitnesses; the non-identification
of the gunman who was merely alleged to be accused-appellant Florenda Castros
former bodyguard; and no mention about the presence of accused-appellant
Florenda Castro during the incident.
Suffice it to state, however, that entries in a police blotter should
not be given significance or probative value as they do not constitute
conclusive proof of the truth thereof. A
police blotter, like any other extrajudicial statement, cannot prevail over testimony
in an open court. They are not given
undue significance or probative value as they are not evidence of the truth of
their contents but merely of the fact that they were recorded. We thus give full credence to the
appreciation of testimonial evidence by the trial court. The oft-repeated principle is that where the
credibility of a witness is an issue, the established rule is that great
respect is accorded to the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses by the
trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses
firsthand and note their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling
examination.[34] This Court places great weight on the
factual findings of the trial judge. He
conducted the trial and heard the testimonies of the witnesses. He personally observed their conduct, demeanor
and deportment while responding to the questions propounded by both the
prosecutor and defense counsel. He had
the opportunity to pose clarificatory questions to the parties. Tersely put, when a trial judge makes his
findings as to the issue of credibility, such findings bear great weight, at times even finality, on the appellate court.[35] In People v. Quijada,[36]
the Court, speaking through then Chief Justice Hilario Davide, aptly held: x x x Settled is the rule that the factual findings
of the trial court, especially on the credibility of witnesses, are accorded
great weight and respect. For, the trial
court has the advantage of observing the witnesses through the different
indicators of truthfulness or falsehood, such as the angry flush of an insisted
assertion or the sudden pallor of a discovered lie or the tremulous mutter of a
reluctant answer or the forthright tone of a ready reply; or the furtive
glance, the blush of conscious shame, the hesitation, the sincere or the
flippant or sneering tone, the heat, the calmness, the yawn, the sigh, the
candor or lack of it, the scant or full realization of the solemnity of an
oath, the carriage and mien. x x x[37] Our pronouncement in People v. Sanchez[38] is
further illuminating on this point: The matter of assigning values to
declarations on the witness stand is best
and most competently
performed by the trial judge who had the unmatched opportunity to observe the
witnesses and to assess their credibility by the various
indicia available but not reflected in the record. The demeanor of the
person on the stand can draw the line between fact and fancy. The
forthright answer or the hesitant pause, the quivering voice or the angry tone,
the flustered look or the sincere gaze, the modest blush or the guilty blanch
these can reveal if the witness is telling the truth or lying in his teeth.[39] II.cralawProof
of conspiracy versus denial and alibi Both appellants relied on the defenses of denial and alibi. It bears stressing that positive
identification by credible witnesses of the accused as the perpetrator of the
crime demolishes the alibi the much abused sanctuary of felons.[40] In the case under review, appellant Florenda
was positively identified by key prosecution witnesses as one of the passengers
of the get-away vehicle used by the assailant Christopher. The witnesses for the People are sufficiently
and adequately familiar with Florenda. The witnesses for the prosecution were either
appellants neighbors or related to her by affinity. As for appellant Christopher, the evidence
pointing to him as the triggerman that fell both Alfredo and Elpidio is
overwhelming. Moreover,
appellants failed to present corroborating evidence to buttress their respective
alibi. Other than their bare
allegations, no witness Unsubstantiated
by clear and convincing proofs, accused-appellants respective denials
necessarily fail. An intrinsically weak
defense, denial must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability in
order to merit credibility. Mere denial,
just like alibi, is a self-serving negative evidence which cannot be accorded
greater evidentiary weight than the declaration of credible witnesses who
testify on affirmative matters. Denial
and alibi are weak defenses which are unavailing in the face of positive
identification. At
any rate, it was for the trial judge, using his sound discretion and his
observations at the trial, to determine whom to believe among the witnesses of
the parties who gave conflicting testimonies on the whereabouts of
accused-appellants in the unholy morning of In fine, the defense of denial and
alibi is an issue of fact that hinges on the credibility of witnesses. As adverted to earlier, We find the
determination by the trial and the appellate courts on the matter of the
credibility of the prosecution witnesses to be clearly consistent. Thus, it must be accepted.
All told, the Court is
convinced that the evidence for the People proved beyond reasonable doubt that
appellant Florenda is guilty of parricide for the killing of her husband
Alfredo and for murder for the death of her father-in-law Elpidio. The crime of parricide, defined in Article 246
of the Revised Penal Code, states: Art.
246. Parricide.
Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be
guilty of parricide and shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. Parricide is committed when: (1) a person
is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; (3) the deceased is the
father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate
other ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of accused.[44] The
elements of murder, penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, are:
(1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by accused; (3) the killing
is attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code; and (4) the killing is neither parricide nor
infanticide.[45] The
records bear out that appellant Florenda conspired and confederated with her
co-appellant Christopher in carrying out the brutal killing of Alfredo and
Elpidio. While Christopher acted as the
gunman, Florenda sowed the seeds of violence by masterminding the reprehensible
deed. Undeniably, their concerted actions showed community
of purpose cralawThe Court, however, was recently informed[46]
that appellant Florenda Castro died on cralawVerily, the CA sentencing needs
modification with respect to appellant Florenda. Proper penalty Since
the killings were committed in 1998, the trial court as well as the CA were correct
in imposing upon appellant Christopher the
supreme penalty of death. In view,
however, of the passage and effectivity of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9346[48]
on cralawSec.
2. In lieu of the death penalty, the
following shall be imposed: a.cralawthe penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the
nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code; or b.cralawthe penalty of life imprisonment, when the
law violated does not make use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the
Revised Penal Code. Sec.
3. Persons convicted of offenses
punished with reclusion perpetua or
whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion
perpetua by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole
under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended. (Underscoring supplied) The
applicability of R.A. No. 9346 is undeniable. In criminal law, it is axiomatic that favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa
restrigenda, penal laws which are favorable to the accused are given
retroactive effect.[50]
Ang
mga batas sa krimen na pabor sa nasasakdal ay binibigyan ng balik-bisa. cralawThe CA disposition
on civil liabilities imposed on appellant Christopher in favor of the heirs of
the victims needs clarification. Only
the amount of Anent the CA awards of civil indemnity of cralawIn
Malana v. People,[51]
We convicted the accused of murder and ordered him to pay the victim the
amounts of As to
exemplary damages, the victims or the heirs are likewise entitled to exemplary
damages if aggravating circumstances, whether qualifying or generic, are
present. In the case under review,
treachery and evident premeditation were clearly established. Verily, an award of cralawWHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION
as follows: cralaw(1)
The cases against appellant Florenda Castro are dismissed, as her criminal and
civil liabilities are EXTINGUISHED by reason of her death; (2) Appellant Christopher Talita is sentenced to reclusion perpetua without eligibility
for parole. He is also ordered to pay cralawSO ORDERED. RUBEN
T. REYES Associate Justice WE
CONCUR: REYNATO S.
PUNO Chief Justice LEONARDO A. QUISUMBINGcralaw
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice Associate
Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate Justicecralaw
Associate Justice
(On official leave) RENATO
C. CORONA CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice Associate
Justice ADOLFO S. AZCUNA DANTE O. TINGA
Associate
Justice Associate Justice cralaw MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate
Justicecralaw
Associate Justice (No part) ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice Associate Justice ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13,
Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court. REYNATO S. PUNO cralaw cralawChief Justice Endnotes:
* On official leave per Special Order No. 520
dated ** No part. Justice Nachura participated as Solicitor General in the instant case. [1] Penned by Associate Justice Rosalinda Asuncion-Vicente, with Associate Justices Edgardo P. Cruz and Sesinando E. Villon, concurring; rollo, pp. 3-22. [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] Exhibit S. [11] Exhibits T to T-4. [12] Exhibits S & T to T-3. [13] CA rollo, p. 213. [14] [15] [16] CA rollo, p. 62. [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] G.R.
Nos. 147678-87, [22] Rollo, p. 21. [23] CA rollo, p. 98. [24] People v. Bato, G.R. No. 134939, [25] People v.
Valla, G.R. No. 111285, [26] G.R. No. 123485, [27] [28] G.R.
No. 106098, [29] [30] [31] [32] People v. Rayles, G.R. No. 169874, [33] CA rollo, pp. 69-70. [34] [35] People v. Rayles, supra note 32; People v. Lua, G.R. Nos. 114224-25, [36] G.R.
Nos. 115008-09, [37] People v. Quijada, id. at 212-213. [38] G.R.
Nos. 121039-45, [39] People v. Sanchez, id. at 45. [40] People v. Pamor,
G.R. No. 108599, [41] People v. Sanchez, supra note 38; People v. Enciso, supra note 40. [42] People v. Sanchez, G.R. No. 131116, [43] CA rollo, pp. 224-225. [44] Reyes, L.B., The Revised Penal Code, Vol. 2, 1993, p. 414. [45] People v. Delmo, G.R. Nos. 130078-82, [46]
Letter dated [47] Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code provides: 1.
By the death of the convict, as
to the personal penalties; and as to
pecuniary penalties, liability therefore is extinguished only when the death of
the offender occurs before final judgment. [48] An Act
Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the [49] Republic Act No. 9346, Sec. 1 provides: cralawSec. 1. The imposition of the penalty of death is hereby prohibited. Accordingly, R.A. No. 8177, otherwise known as the Act Designating Death by Lethal Injection is hereby repealed. R.A. 7659, otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law, and all other laws, executive orders and decrees, insofar as they impose the death penalty are hereby repealed or amended accordingly. [50] Revised
Penal Code, Art. 22. [51] G.R. No. 173612, March 26, 2008. [52] G.R.
No. 169877, [53] G.R.
No. 174194, [54] G.R.
No. 172966, [55] People v. Gandia, G.R. No. 175332, |
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