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EN BANC G.R. No. 182434 : March 5, 2010 SULTAN YAHYA "JERRY" M. TOMAWIS, Petitioner, v. HON. RASAD G. BALINDONG, AMNA A. PUMBAYA, JALILAH A. MANGOMPIA, and RAMLA A. MUSOR, Respondents. D E C I S I O N VELASCO, JR., J.: This petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus under Rule 65 seeks to nullify the Orders dated July 13, 2005, September 6, 2005, and February 6, 2008 issued by respondent Judge Rasad G. Balindong of the Sharia District Court (SDC), Fourth Judicial District in Marawi City, in Civil Case No. 102-97 entitled Amna A. Pumbaya, et al. v. Jerry Tomawis, et al. The Facts Private respondents Amna A. Pumbaya, Jalilah A. Mangompia, and Ramla A. Musor are the daughters of the late Acraman Radia. On February 21, 1997, private respondents filed with the SDC an action for quieting of title of a parcel of land located in Banggolo, Marawi City, against petitioner Sultan Jerry Tomawis and one Mangoda Radia. In their complaint, styled as Petition (1) They were the absolute owners of the lot subject of the complaint, being the legal heirs of Acraman Radia, who had always been in peaceful, continuous, and adverse possession of the property; (2) Tomawis assumed ownership of the said property on the claim that he bought the same from Mangoda Radia, who, in turn, claimed that he inherited it from his late father; (3) in 1996, they "were informed that their land [was] leveled and the small houses [built] thereon with their permission were removed" upon the orders of Tomawis; and (4) they had been unlawfully deprived of their possession of the land, and Tomawis actions had cast a cloud of doubt on their title.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary In his answer, Tomawis debunked the sisters claim of ownership and raised, as one of his affirmative defenses treated by the court as a motion to dismiss, SDCs lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. Following the hearing on the affirmative defenses, respondent Judge Rasad Balindong, by Order of April 1, 2003, denied the motion. Apropos the jurisdiction aspect of the motion, respondent judge asserted the SDCs original jurisdiction over the case, concurrently with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), by force of Article 143, paragraph 2(b) of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1083 or the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary On June 16, 2005, Tomawis filed an Urgent Motion to Dismiss with Prayer to Correct the Name of Defendants to Read Sultan Yahya "Jerry" M. Tomawis & Mangoda M. Radia. Unsatisfied, Tomawis later interposed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration with Prayer to Cancel and Reset the Continuation of Trial Until After the Resolution of the Pending Incident. Forthwith, Tomawis repaired to the Court of Appeals (CA), Mindanao Station, on a petition for certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition under Rule 65 to nullify, on jurisdictional grounds, the aforesaid SDC July 13, 2005 and September 6, 2005 Orders.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary By Resolution Undeterred by the foregoing setback before the CA, Tomawis interposed, on January 29, 2008, before the SDC another motion to dismiss on the same grounds as his previous motions to dismiss. The motion was rejected by respondent Judge Balindong per his order of February 6, 2008, denying the motion with finality. Hence, this recourse on the sole issue of:
cralawSimply put, the issue is whether or not the SDC can validly take cognizance of Civil Case No. 102-97. The Courts Ruling Prefatorily, the Court acknowledges the fact that decades after the enactment in 1989 of the law For cases where only errors or questions of law are raised or involved, the appeal shall be to this Court by a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court pursuant to Art. VIII, Sec. 5 of the Constitution and Sec. 2 of Rule 41 of the Rules.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary To be sure, the Court has, on several occasions, passed upon and resolved petitions and cases emanating from Sharia courts. Among these was one involving the issue of whether or not grave abuse of discretion attended the denial of a motion to implement a writ of execution. The instant petition, involving only a question of law on the jurisdiction of the SDC over a complaint for quieting of title, was properly instituted before the Court.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary Petitioner asserts that Sec. 19(2), in relation to Sec. 33(3) of BP 129, as amendedby vesting original exclusive jurisdiction to the RTCs or Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs), as the case may be, over civil actions that involve the title to, or possession of, real propertyeffectively removed the concurrent jurisdiction once pertaining to the SDC under Art. 143(2)(b) of PD 1083. In fine, petitioner contends that Art. 143 of PD 1083, insofar as it granted the SDC concurrent jurisdiction over certain real actions, was repealed by the BP 129 provisions adverted to.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary Disagreeing as to be expected, private respondents balk at the notion of the implied repeal petitioner espouses, arguing that PD 1083, being a special, albeit a prior, law, has not been repealed by BP 129. Putting private respondents contention in a narrower perspective, Art. 143(2)(b) of PD 1083 is of specific applicability and, hence, cannot, under the rules of legal hermeneutics, be superseded by laws of general application, absent an express repeal. Petitioners claim has no basis.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary The allegations, as well as the relief sought by private respondents, the elimination of the "cloud of doubts on the title of ownership" A brief background. The Judiciary Act of 1948 (RA 296) was enacted on June 17, 1948. It vested the Courts of First Instance with original jurisdiction: (b) In all civil actions which involve the title to or possession of real property, or any interest therein, or the legality of any tax, impost or assessment, except actions of forcible entry into and detainer on lands or buildings, original jurisdiction of which is conferred by this Act upon city and municipal courts. Subsequently, PD 1083, dated February 4, 1977, created the Sharia courts, i.e., the SDC and the Sharia Circuit Court, both of limited jurisdiction. In Republic v. Asuncion, Art. 143 of PD 1083 vests SDCs, in certain cases, with exclusive original jurisdiction and with concurrent original jurisdiction over certain causes of action. As far as relevant, Art. 143 reads as follows: ARTICLE 143. Original jurisdiction. (1) The Sharia District Court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over: x x x x d) All actions arising from customary contracts in which the parties are Muslims, if they have not specified which law shall govern their relations; and x x x x (2) Concurrently with existing civil courts, the Sharia District Court shall have original jurisdiction over: x x x x (b) All other personal and real actions not mentioned in paragraph 1 (d) wherein the parties involved are Muslims except those for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, which shall fall under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Circuit Court. (Emphasis added.) On August 14, 1981, BP 129 took effect. Sec. 19 of BP 129, as later amended by RA 7691, Section 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the "Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980", is hereby amended to read as follows: "Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases.Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: x x x x "(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000,00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts." (Emphasis supplied.) As things stood prior to the effectivity date of BP 129, the SDC had, by virtue of PD 1083, original jurisdiction, concurrently with the RTCs and MTCs, over all personal and real actions outside the purview of Art. 143(1)(d) of PD 1083, in which the parties involved were Muslims, except those for ejectment. Personal action is one that is founded on privity of contracts between the parties; On the other hand, BP 129, as amended, vests the RTC or the municipal trial court with exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions that involve the title to or possession of real property, or any interest in it, and the value of the property subject of the case or the jurisdictional amount, determining whether the case comes within the jurisdictional competence of the RTC or the MTC. Orbeta v. Orbeta A real action, under Sec. 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, is one that affects title to or possession of real property, or an interest therein. Such actions should be commenced and tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated. All other actions are personal and may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary Civil Case No. 102-97, judging from the averments in the underlying complaint, is basically a suit for recovery of possession and eventual reconveyance of real property which, under BP 129, as amended, falls within the original jurisdiction of either the RTC or MTC. In an action for reconveyance, all that must be alleged in the complaint are two facts that, admitting them to be true, would entitle the plaintiff to recover title to the disputed land, namely: (1) that the plaintiff is the owner of the land or has possessed the land in the concept of owner; and (2) that the defendant has illegally dispossessed the plaintiff of the land. Given the above perspective, the question that comes to the fore is whether the jurisdiction of the RTC or MTC is to the exclusion of the SDC.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary Petitioners version of the law would effectively remove the concurrent original jurisdiction granted by Art. 143, par. 2(b) of PD 1083 to civil courts and Sharia courts over, among others: All other personal and real actions not mentioned in paragraph 1 (d) wherein the parties involved are Muslims except those for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, which shall fall under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Circuit Court. x x x Petitioners interpretation of the law cannot be given serious thought. One must bear in mind that even if Sharia courts are considered regular courts, these are courts of limited jurisdiction. As we have observed in Rulona-Al Awadhi v. Astih, ARTICLE 2. Purpose of Code. Pursuant to Section 11 of Article XV of the Constitution of the Philippines, which provides that "The State shall consider the customs, traditions, beliefs and interests of national cultural communities in the formulation and implementation of state policies," this Code:
cralawA reading of the pertinent provisions of BP 129 and PD 1083 shows that the former, a law of general application to civil courts, has no application to, and does not repeal, the provisions found in PD 1083, a special law, which only refers to Sharia courts.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary A look at the scope of BP 129 clearly shows that Sharia courts were not included in the reorganization of courts that were formerly organized under RA 296. The pertinent provision in BP 129 states: SECTION 2. Scope. The reorganization herein provided shall include the Court of Appeals, the Court of First Instance, the Circuit Criminal Courts, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts, the Courts of Agrarian Relations, the City Courts, the Municipal Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Courts.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary As correctly pointed out by private respondents in their Comment, We have held that a general law and a special law on the same subject are statutes in pari materia and should be read together and harmonized, if possible, with a view to giving effect to both. In order to give effect to both laws at hand, we must continue to recognize the concurrent jurisdiction enjoyed by SDCs with that of RTCs under PD 1083.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary Moreover, the jurisdiction of the court below cannot be made to depend upon defenses set up in the answer, in a motion to dismiss, or in a motion for reconsideration, but only upon the allegations of the complaint. While we recognize the concurrent jurisdiction of the SDCs and the RTCs with respect to cases involving only Muslims, the SDC has exclusive original jurisdiction over all actions arising from contracts customary to Muslims Given petitioners flawed arguments, we hold that the respondent court did not commit any grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion is present when there is an arbitrary exercise of power owing from passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; or a whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious exercise of power that amounts to a shirking from or refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross for the act to be held as one made with grave abuse of discretion. We close with the observation that what is involved here are not only errors of law, but also the errors of a litigant and his lawyer. As may have been noted, petitioner Tomawis counsel veritably filed two (2) motions to dismiss, each predicated on the sole issue of jurisdiction. The first may have been understandable. But the second motion was something else, interposed as it was after the CA, by resolution, denied Tomawis petition for certiorari for want of jurisdiction on the part of the appellate court to review judgments or orders of the SDC. The CA stated the observation, however, that Tomawis and his counsel may repair to this Court while the Sharia Appellate Court has yet to be organized. Petitioner waited two years after the CA issued its denial before filing what virtually turned out to be his second motion to dismiss, coming finally to this Court after the same motion was denied. The Court must express disapproval of the cunning effort of Tomawis and his counsel to use procedural rules to the hilt to prolong the final disposition of this case. From Alonso v. Villamor, WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Petitioner Yahya "Jerry" Tomawis and Atty. Edgar A. Masorong are ADMONISHED to refrain from engaging in activities tending to frustrate the orderly and speedy administration of justice, with a warning that repetition of the same or similar acts may result in the imposition of a more severe sanction. No costs. SO ORDERED. PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. WE CONCUR: REYNATO S. PUNO
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA C E R T I F I C A T I O N Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court. REYNATO S. PUNO cralaw Endnotes:
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