March 2009 - Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
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[A.M. No. RTJ-09-2174 [Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 08-2864-RTJ] : March 30, 2009] MEDEL E. AVILES V. EXECUTIVE JUDGE EFREN M. CACATIAN, RTC, BRANCH 35, SANTIAGO CITY, ISABELA:
[A.M. No. RTJ-09-2174 [Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 08-2864-RTJ] : March 30, 2009]
MEDEL E. AVILES V. EXECUTIVE JUDGE EFREN M. CACATIAN, RTC, BRANCH 35, SANTIAGO CITY, ISABELA
Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated 30 March 2009:
A.M. No. RTJ-09-2174 [Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 08-2864-RTJ] (Medel E. Aviles v. Executive Judge Efren M. Cacatian, RTC, Branch 35, Santiago City, Isabela)
In a complaint dated July 10, 2007, Medel E. Aviles, Marketing and Channels/Distributor Director-Food of Unilever Philippines, Inc. (Unilever), charged Executive Judge Efren M. Cacatian of the RTC, Branch 35 in Santiago City, Isabela with gross ignorance of the law and misconduct, relative to Civil Case No. 3456 entitled Creative Sales Distribution Center Corporation, et. at. (Creative Sales) v. Unilever Philippines, Inc., et al. for specific performance and damages with prayer for temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or preliminary injunction.
In his affidavit-complaint, Aviles charges that Judge Cacatian patently violated the Rules of Court, when the latter did not conduct a raffle of Civil Case No. 3456 within 72 hours after he issued an ex-parte TRO[1] as provided for in Sections 4[2] and 5[3] of Rule 58. This failure of the judge, according to Aviles, amounts to gross ignorance of the law. Aviles further asserts that the unexplained failure to apply the rules, accompanied by the extension of the TRO to its full 20 days[4] without the benefit of a raffle as clearly required by the Rules of Court, is even more reprehensible because of the undue interference of Judge Cacatian during the hearing, his prejudgment of the case, and refusal to inhibit himself from the case.
According to Aviles, because of the extension of the 72-hour TRO, Unilever and its co-defendant, Laicom, Inc., with whom Unilever had entered into a new distribution contract, were constrained to discontinue their distribution operations, thus incurring further business losses at the alleged average rate of PhP 500,000 a day. "Moreover, Aviles says that at the same time that Judge Cacatian declared that Unilever and Creative Sales had a live contract, the May 28, 2007 Order extending the life of the TRO also effectively restrained Laicom, Inc. from distributing Unilever products during the effectivity of the TRO such that even Creative Sales also could not resume distribution operations in its assigned areas despite having in its possession Unilever products in the million of pesos.[5]
Aviles likewise claims that Judge Cacatian unduly interfered in the presentation of evidence when the latter asked numerous questions of Noel Landrito, another co-defendant in Civil Case No. 3456, thereby assuming the dual role of magistrate and advocate for Creative Sales.
Aviles further accuses that Judge Cacatian had prejudged Civil Case No. 3456 when he stated in the May 28 Order that (1) there was a live contract between Unilever and Creative Sales; (2) that there was no proof of breach by Creative Sales of such contract; (3) that Unilever had already engaged Laicom as its distributor, which act is constitutive of a gross violation of its existing and valid agreement; and (4) that Unilever through its co-defendant, Landrito, appears not to be acting in good faith in its business transactions and undertakings with others like Creative Sales and even Laicom, which acts would seem to set a modus operandi favorable to its interest but in gross disregard to the rule on the mutuality of contracts and honesty.[6]
In his Comment, Judge Cacatian points out that although Aviles is a director in Unilever, he is not a party-litigant in Civil Case No. 3456, thus has no standing in the civil case. The defendants therein are Unilever, Landrito, and Laicom Inc. that are represented by Arty. Felipe A. Mercado of the Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsiako law offices. Judge Cacatian surmises that the reason Aviles filed the administrative case against him is to simply harass him. He opines that if Aviles had interest to protect in the case, then Aviles' proper recourse is to file a motion to intervene.
As to the circumstances surrounding his issuance of the TROs, Judge Cacatian explains that Civil Case No. 3456 was filed on May 22, 2007 and since it contained an Extremely Urgent Prayer for a TRO and Preliminary Injunction, the case was referred to him. On May 25, a Friday, he issued the 72-hour TRO and set the same for hearing the following Monday, May 28, 2007. On the said day, he extended the life of the TRO to a full term of 20 days and set the hearing of the preliminary injunction on June 6, 2007. The hearing, however, did not push through since Unilever filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration, Dissolution of the TRO or in the alternative, to admit a counterbond. Moreover, the judge explained that the regular raffle of cases was not held on the said Monday as was usually done since Atty. Norberto Bong S. Obedeza, the Officer-in-Charge Clerk of Court (OIC-COC) was hospitalized for more than two weeks and reported for work only on June 19, 2007. Since there were only a few cases for raffle that day, the raffle was held instead on June 12, 2007 in the presence of the other judges but without Atty. Obedeza. Judge Cacatian avers that he honestly believes he was in good faith and faithfully followed the procedures laid by the rules.
We shall first dispense with the complaint that Judge Cacatian unduly interfered with Civil Case No. 3456 and prejudged the main issues in the case.
Before a judge grants a TRO or any injunctive relief, he must first inquire into specific facts and conclusions of law showing that the requirements for the grant of the relief sought are met. The judge is given ample judicial discretion to ask clarificatory queries to ferret out the truth. Further, the propriety of a judge's questions is determined by their quality and not necessarily by their quantity and, in any event, by-the test of whether the defendant was prejudiced by such questioning or not.[7] Judicial discretion, by its very nature, involves the exercise of the judge's individual opinion and the law has wisely provided that its exercise be guided by well-known rules which, while allowing the judge rational latitude for the operation of its own individual views, prevent them from getting out of control.[8] In the instant case, we find no abuse of authority nor intent to commit an injustice on the part of Judge Cacatian when he asked co-defendant Landrito the alleged "hundred" questions. Filing an administrative case is not the proper remedy for correcting the actions of a judge perceived to have gone beyond the norms of propriety, when other judicial remedies exist.
We have repeatedly reminded practitioners and litigants that judges cannot be held administratively accountable for every erroneous order or decision they make. They are not infallible and for as long as they act in good faith, they may not be disciplined for errors of judgment unless there is proof that the error is made with a conscious and deliberate intent to commit an injustice.[9] In the instant complaint, there is nothing on record to show that Judge Cacatian had acted in bad faith with the intent of committing dishonesty nor corruption when he asked Landrito numerous questions and when he gave the May 28 Order and the justifications why he did.
Now, in this administrative complaint, the primordial issue is whether or not Judge Cacatian is administratively accountable for issuing the orders dated May 25 and May 28, 2007 granting the 72-hour TRO and then extending the same to its full term of 20 days, respectively.
We have carefully reviewed the records of this complaint and the records show that on May 25, 2007, Judge Cacatian issued an ex-parte 72-hour TRO to restrain Unilever from further committing acts or omissions in violation of the distributorship agreement between Cteative Sales and Unilever. In the hearing on May 28, 2007, Judge Cacatian issued the Order extending the effectivity of the TRO to cover the period of 20 days. According to Aviles, it was only on June 6, 2007 during the hearing of Creative Sales' Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration when it was discovered that no raffle was conducted after Judge Cacatian himself mentioned that Civil Case No. 3456 has yet to be raffled for trial of the main case. Unilever filed a Motion to Raffle the Case and, thereafter, the case was raffled on June 12, 2007 to the RTC, Branch 35.
When Judge Cacatian extended the 72-hour TRO without a raffle, he clearly violated the rules on the issuance of TROs. Administrative Circular No. 20-95, Re: Special Rules for Temporary Restraining Orders and Preliminary Injunctions clearly provides:
Accusations that 'TROs for sale" have become a major source of corruption in the judiciary have seriously cast shadows of doubts on the credibility of the judiciary, and have constrained the Court to implement meticulous and strict rules and procedures. Administrative Circular No. 20-95 was widely distributed in all courts and published in newspapers, and seminars were conducted by the Court in its desire to put an end on the anomalies surrounding issuances of TROs. Although judges have in their favor the presumption of regularity and good faith in the performance of their official function, a blatant disregard of the clear and unmistakable intent of the rules renders the judge susceptible to administrative sanctions. Good faith in situations of fallible discretion inhered only within the parameters of tolerable judgment and does not apply where the issues are simple and the applicable legal principles evident and basic as to be beyond possible margins of error.[10] Observance of the law which they are bound to know and sworn to uphold is required of all judges. When the law is sufficiently basic, judges owe it to their office to simply apply it; anything less than that would be constitutive of gross ignorance of the law. On this score, we are constrained to rule that Judge Cacatian had, indeed, violated a very fundamental and familiar rule on the issuance of TROs. Finding no proof that Judge Cacatian was motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, and corruption, we agree with the findings and recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator that Judge Cacatian's failure to comply with Administrative Circular No. 20-95 constitutes violation of Supreme Court rules, directives, and circulars which is a less serious crime under Sec. 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, the imposable sanction of which under Sec.11 of the same rule is suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one nor more than three months; or a fine of more than PhP 10,000 but not exceeding PhP 20,000. But under the circumstances of this case, and considering further that this is the first violation of respondent judge, we believe that a fine of PhP 8,000 on Judge Cacatian should serve the purpose of sanction.
WHEREFORE, we find Executive Judge Efren M. Cacatian GUILTY of violating Administrative Circular No. 20-95. A penalty of FINE in the amount of eight thousand pesos (PhP 8,000) is hereby imposed on him with STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
WITNESS the Honorable Leonardo A. Quisumbing, Chairperson, Honorable Conchita Carpio Morales, Dante O. Tinga, Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. and Arturo D. Brion, Members, Second Division, this 30th day of March 2009.
A.M. No. RTJ-09-2174 [Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 08-2864-RTJ] (Medel E. Aviles v. Executive Judge Efren M. Cacatian, RTC, Branch 35, Santiago City, Isabela)
In a complaint dated July 10, 2007, Medel E. Aviles, Marketing and Channels/Distributor Director-Food of Unilever Philippines, Inc. (Unilever), charged Executive Judge Efren M. Cacatian of the RTC, Branch 35 in Santiago City, Isabela with gross ignorance of the law and misconduct, relative to Civil Case No. 3456 entitled Creative Sales Distribution Center Corporation, et. at. (Creative Sales) v. Unilever Philippines, Inc., et al. for specific performance and damages with prayer for temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or preliminary injunction.
In his affidavit-complaint, Aviles charges that Judge Cacatian patently violated the Rules of Court, when the latter did not conduct a raffle of Civil Case No. 3456 within 72 hours after he issued an ex-parte TRO[1] as provided for in Sections 4[2] and 5[3] of Rule 58. This failure of the judge, according to Aviles, amounts to gross ignorance of the law. Aviles further asserts that the unexplained failure to apply the rules, accompanied by the extension of the TRO to its full 20 days[4] without the benefit of a raffle as clearly required by the Rules of Court, is even more reprehensible because of the undue interference of Judge Cacatian during the hearing, his prejudgment of the case, and refusal to inhibit himself from the case.
According to Aviles, because of the extension of the 72-hour TRO, Unilever and its co-defendant, Laicom, Inc., with whom Unilever had entered into a new distribution contract, were constrained to discontinue their distribution operations, thus incurring further business losses at the alleged average rate of PhP 500,000 a day. "Moreover, Aviles says that at the same time that Judge Cacatian declared that Unilever and Creative Sales had a live contract, the May 28, 2007 Order extending the life of the TRO also effectively restrained Laicom, Inc. from distributing Unilever products during the effectivity of the TRO such that even Creative Sales also could not resume distribution operations in its assigned areas despite having in its possession Unilever products in the million of pesos.[5]
Aviles likewise claims that Judge Cacatian unduly interfered in the presentation of evidence when the latter asked numerous questions of Noel Landrito, another co-defendant in Civil Case No. 3456, thereby assuming the dual role of magistrate and advocate for Creative Sales.
Aviles further accuses that Judge Cacatian had prejudged Civil Case No. 3456 when he stated in the May 28 Order that (1) there was a live contract between Unilever and Creative Sales; (2) that there was no proof of breach by Creative Sales of such contract; (3) that Unilever had already engaged Laicom as its distributor, which act is constitutive of a gross violation of its existing and valid agreement; and (4) that Unilever through its co-defendant, Landrito, appears not to be acting in good faith in its business transactions and undertakings with others like Creative Sales and even Laicom, which acts would seem to set a modus operandi favorable to its interest but in gross disregard to the rule on the mutuality of contracts and honesty.[6]
In his Comment, Judge Cacatian points out that although Aviles is a director in Unilever, he is not a party-litigant in Civil Case No. 3456, thus has no standing in the civil case. The defendants therein are Unilever, Landrito, and Laicom Inc. that are represented by Arty. Felipe A. Mercado of the Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsiako law offices. Judge Cacatian surmises that the reason Aviles filed the administrative case against him is to simply harass him. He opines that if Aviles had interest to protect in the case, then Aviles' proper recourse is to file a motion to intervene.
As to the circumstances surrounding his issuance of the TROs, Judge Cacatian explains that Civil Case No. 3456 was filed on May 22, 2007 and since it contained an Extremely Urgent Prayer for a TRO and Preliminary Injunction, the case was referred to him. On May 25, a Friday, he issued the 72-hour TRO and set the same for hearing the following Monday, May 28, 2007. On the said day, he extended the life of the TRO to a full term of 20 days and set the hearing of the preliminary injunction on June 6, 2007. The hearing, however, did not push through since Unilever filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration, Dissolution of the TRO or in the alternative, to admit a counterbond. Moreover, the judge explained that the regular raffle of cases was not held on the said Monday as was usually done since Atty. Norberto Bong S. Obedeza, the Officer-in-Charge Clerk of Court (OIC-COC) was hospitalized for more than two weeks and reported for work only on June 19, 2007. Since there were only a few cases for raffle that day, the raffle was held instead on June 12, 2007 in the presence of the other judges but without Atty. Obedeza. Judge Cacatian avers that he honestly believes he was in good faith and faithfully followed the procedures laid by the rules.
We shall first dispense with the complaint that Judge Cacatian unduly interfered with Civil Case No. 3456 and prejudged the main issues in the case.
Before a judge grants a TRO or any injunctive relief, he must first inquire into specific facts and conclusions of law showing that the requirements for the grant of the relief sought are met. The judge is given ample judicial discretion to ask clarificatory queries to ferret out the truth. Further, the propriety of a judge's questions is determined by their quality and not necessarily by their quantity and, in any event, by-the test of whether the defendant was prejudiced by such questioning or not.[7] Judicial discretion, by its very nature, involves the exercise of the judge's individual opinion and the law has wisely provided that its exercise be guided by well-known rules which, while allowing the judge rational latitude for the operation of its own individual views, prevent them from getting out of control.[8] In the instant case, we find no abuse of authority nor intent to commit an injustice on the part of Judge Cacatian when he asked co-defendant Landrito the alleged "hundred" questions. Filing an administrative case is not the proper remedy for correcting the actions of a judge perceived to have gone beyond the norms of propriety, when other judicial remedies exist.
We have repeatedly reminded practitioners and litigants that judges cannot be held administratively accountable for every erroneous order or decision they make. They are not infallible and for as long as they act in good faith, they may not be disciplined for errors of judgment unless there is proof that the error is made with a conscious and deliberate intent to commit an injustice.[9] In the instant complaint, there is nothing on record to show that Judge Cacatian had acted in bad faith with the intent of committing dishonesty nor corruption when he asked Landrito numerous questions and when he gave the May 28 Order and the justifications why he did.
Now, in this administrative complaint, the primordial issue is whether or not Judge Cacatian is administratively accountable for issuing the orders dated May 25 and May 28, 2007 granting the 72-hour TRO and then extending the same to its full term of 20 days, respectively.
We have carefully reviewed the records of this complaint and the records show that on May 25, 2007, Judge Cacatian issued an ex-parte 72-hour TRO to restrain Unilever from further committing acts or omissions in violation of the distributorship agreement between Cteative Sales and Unilever. In the hearing on May 28, 2007, Judge Cacatian issued the Order extending the effectivity of the TRO to cover the period of 20 days. According to Aviles, it was only on June 6, 2007 during the hearing of Creative Sales' Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration when it was discovered that no raffle was conducted after Judge Cacatian himself mentioned that Civil Case No. 3456 has yet to be raffled for trial of the main case. Unilever filed a Motion to Raffle the Case and, thereafter, the case was raffled on June 12, 2007 to the RTC, Branch 35.
When Judge Cacatian extended the 72-hour TRO without a raffle, he clearly violated the rules on the issuance of TROs. Administrative Circular No. 20-95, Re: Special Rules for Temporary Restraining Orders and Preliminary Injunctions clearly provides:
1. "Where an application for a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) or Writ of Preliminary Injunction is included in a complaint or any initiatory pleading filed with the trial court, such complaint or initiatory pleading shall be raffled only after notice to the adverse party and in the presence of such party or counsel.
2. The application for a TRO shall be acted upon only after all parties are heard in a summary hearing conducted within twenty-four (24) hours after the records are transmitted to the branch selected by raffle. The records shall be transmitted immediately after raffle.
3. If the matter is of extreme urgency, such that unless a TRO is issued, grave injustice and irreparable injury will arise, the Executive Judge shall issue the TRO effective only for seventy-two (72) hours from issuance but shall immediately summon the parties for conference and immediately raffle the case in their presence. -Thereafter, before the expiry of the seventy-two (72) hours, the Presiding Judge to whom the case is assigned shall conduct a summary hearing to determine whether the TRO can be extended for another period until a hearing in the pending application for preliminary injunction can be conducted. In no case shall the total period of the TRO exceed twenty (20) days including the original seventy-two (72) hours, for the TRO issued by the Executive Judge.
4. With the exception of the provision which necessarily involves multiple-sala stations, these rules shall apply to single-sala stations especially with regard to immediate notice to all parties of all application for TRO. (Emphasis ours.)
Accusations that 'TROs for sale" have become a major source of corruption in the judiciary have seriously cast shadows of doubts on the credibility of the judiciary, and have constrained the Court to implement meticulous and strict rules and procedures. Administrative Circular No. 20-95 was widely distributed in all courts and published in newspapers, and seminars were conducted by the Court in its desire to put an end on the anomalies surrounding issuances of TROs. Although judges have in their favor the presumption of regularity and good faith in the performance of their official function, a blatant disregard of the clear and unmistakable intent of the rules renders the judge susceptible to administrative sanctions. Good faith in situations of fallible discretion inhered only within the parameters of tolerable judgment and does not apply where the issues are simple and the applicable legal principles evident and basic as to be beyond possible margins of error.[10] Observance of the law which they are bound to know and sworn to uphold is required of all judges. When the law is sufficiently basic, judges owe it to their office to simply apply it; anything less than that would be constitutive of gross ignorance of the law. On this score, we are constrained to rule that Judge Cacatian had, indeed, violated a very fundamental and familiar rule on the issuance of TROs. Finding no proof that Judge Cacatian was motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, and corruption, we agree with the findings and recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator that Judge Cacatian's failure to comply with Administrative Circular No. 20-95 constitutes violation of Supreme Court rules, directives, and circulars which is a less serious crime under Sec. 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, the imposable sanction of which under Sec.11 of the same rule is suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one nor more than three months; or a fine of more than PhP 10,000 but not exceeding PhP 20,000. But under the circumstances of this case, and considering further that this is the first violation of respondent judge, we believe that a fine of PhP 8,000 on Judge Cacatian should serve the purpose of sanction.
WHEREFORE, we find Executive Judge Efren M. Cacatian GUILTY of violating Administrative Circular No. 20-95. A penalty of FINE in the amount of eight thousand pesos (PhP 8,000) is hereby imposed on him with STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
WITNESS the Honorable Leonardo A. Quisumbing, Chairperson, Honorable Conchita Carpio Morales, Dante O. Tinga, Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. and Arturo D. Brion, Members, Second Division, this 30th day of March 2009.
(Sgd.) LUDICHI YASAY-NUNAG
Clerk of Court
Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] Rollo, pp. 44-45.
[2] " Section 4. Verified application and bond for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order.- A preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining order may be granted only when :
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(c) When an application for a writ of preliminary injunction or a temporary' retraining order is included in a complaint or any initiatory pleading, the case, if filed in a multiple sala court, shall be raffled only after notice to and in the presence of the adverse party or the person to be enjoined. In any event, such notice shall be preceded, or contemporaneously accompanied, by service of summons, together with a copy of the complaint or initiatory pleading and the applicant's affidavit and bond, upon the adverse party in the Philippines.
[3] Section 5. Preliminary injunction not granted without notice; exception.-
xxxx
However, and subject to the provisions of the preceding sections, if the matter is of extreme urgency and the applicant will suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury, the executive judge of a multiple-sala couit or the presiding judge of a single-sala court may issue ex-parte a temporary restraining order effective for only seventy-two (72) hours from issuance but he shall immediately comply with the provisions of the next preceding section as to service of summons and the documents served therewith. Thereafter, within the aforesaid seventy-two (72) hours, the judge before whom the case is pending shall conduct a summary hearing to determine whether the temporary restraining order shall be extended until the application for the preliminary injunction shall be heard. In no case shall the total period of effectivity of the temporary restraining order exceed twenty (20) days, including the original seventy-two horns provided therein.
[4] Rollo, pp. 48-49.
[5] Id. at 11.
[6] Id. at 48.
[7] People v. Abulon, G.R. No. 174473, August 17, 2007, 530 SCRA 675, 678; citations omitted.
[8] Santos v. How, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1946, January 26, 2007, 513 SCRA 25, 34.
[9] San Miguel v. Maceda, A.M. No. RTJ-03-1749, April 3,2007, 520 SCRA 205. 216.
[10] Santos, supra note 8, at 37.
