March 2009 - Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
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[G.R. No. 173482 : March 30, 2009] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. PO3 EDUARDO DE GUZMAN :
[G.R. No. 173482 : March 30, 2009]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. PO3 EDUARDO DE GUZMAN
Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated 30 March 2009:
G.R. No. 173482 (People of the Philippines v. PO3 Eduardo de Guzman). - The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City found appellant Eduardo de Guzman guilty of simple rape and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the private complainant AAA[1] the sum of P50,000.00 as exemplary damages, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and the costs of suit.[2] On. appeal, this Court transferred[3] this case to the Court of Appeals. (CA) for appropriate action and disposition pursuant to our ruling in People v. Mateo.[4] The CA affirmed with modification the RTC's decision by ordering appellant to pay an additional sum of P50,000.00 on the ground that AAA is entitled to civil indemnity which is separate from the award of moral damages.[5]
Appellant now comes to us for redress via a notice of appeal. In a Resolution dated 11 September 2006, we required the parties to file their respective supplemental briefs if they so desire, within thirty (30) days from notice.[6] The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) complied by re-submitting its Brief for the Plaintiff-Appellee dated 24 July 2001 filed with the Court of Appeals,[7] while the appellant through counsel manifested that he no longer wished to file a supplemental brief.[8]
We affirm appellant's conviction.
AAA positively identified appellant as the perpetrator of the horrendous crime. On the day of the rape, AAA was walking along Tandang Sora Avenue in Quezon City when she passed in front of appellant who was then with two other police officers. Appellant held her by the wrist and pulled her towards a mobile car. On board the car, appellant covered her mouth with a face towel and pointed a gun at her. The car driven by appellant's companion proceeded to Camp Karingal. When AAA alighted from the car, appellant examined her eyes, mouth and ears to determine whether she was using shabu. Upon finding that she was not, his two companions told appellant to let her go as she was "negative" of shabu. Instead of releasing her, appellant made her board an owner-type jeep, placed a towel in her mouth, cuffed her arm to his, while his other hand pointed a gun at her. Appellant drove around the Camp until they reached a small hut where he carried out the dastardly deed. Fearing for her life, AAA was not able to shout for help.
After appellant released her, AAA immediately reported the incident to the police. She submitted herself to a physical examination the following day. The medico-legal officer testified that AAA had a congested labia minora and congested carunculae myrtiformis due. to "pressure inflicted on the said area brought about by rubbing of [sic] blunt object on the congested area xxx like an erect penis."[9]
On the other hand, appellant denied the charges against him. He denied ever apprehending her, averring that he saw her for the first time during his arraignment in this criminal case. He claimed to have arrested a certain Akmat Indawi Mamarinta for violation of Republic Act No. 6425[10] two days before the alleged rape incident. He insinuated this as sufficient motive for AAA to retaliate against him. He harped on the credibility of AAA's testimony that, according to him, reeked of inconsistencies. He likewise submitted that AAA's failure to resist negates the commission of rape.
Appellant's denials, which are merely self-serving evidence, cannot prevail over the positive, consistent and categorical testimony of AAA. We agree with the appellate court that the offended party's recollection of the lurid details of a humiliating experience need not be perfect. What is required is merely a credible factual narration by a credible witness. AAA's testimony was positive and straightforward even under rigorous cross-examination. Both the RTC and the CA were correct in holding that the inconsistencies[11] in her testimony are too trivial to affect the outcome of the case. In any event, these inconsistencies were clarified after the RTC asked AAA to demonstrate the "handcuffing incident" and after, it conducted an ocular inspection of the place where AAA was raped.
Anent AAA's failure to resist tenaciously, it is well-settled that physical resistance need not be established in rape when threats and intimidation are employed and the victim submits herself to the embrace of her rapist because of fear.[12] As we have ruled in People v. Sgt. Bayani:[13]
In the present case, AAA categorically testified that she was cowed into submission because appellant pointed a gun at her while her mouth was covered and her hands were tied.
It must be borne in mind that in a prosecution for rape, the offended party's candor is the single most important issue. If her testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on the sole basis thereof.[15] Thus, absent any credible imputation of ill motive on the part of AAA to falsely accuse the appellant of a heinous crime, her candid and consistent testimony should be given Ml faith and credit.[16] Appellant's attempt to discredit AAA, without an iota of evidence to substantiate his allegation of ill -motive on her part, must necessarily fail.
We agree with the appellate court that appellant cannot be found guilty of qualified rape on account of his taking advantage of his position as a police officer in committing the crime. The information was amended to include the qualifying circumstance after appellant had already been arraigned. To convict him of qualified rape when he pleaded to a charge of simple rape would be a violation of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.[17]
Although the CA was correct in awarding an additional sum of P50,000.00 in favor of AAA, said amount was denominated as moral damages in the dispositive portion of its Decision when in fact moral damages had already been awarded by the RTC, which award the appellate court affirmed. Said award should thus be correctly referred to as civil indemnity.
WHEREFORE, this Court AFFIRMS the findings of fact and conclusions of law in the Decision dated 23 March 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01699, finding appellant Eduardo de Guzman guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with MODIFICATION that he is further ordered to pay AAA P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.
WITNESS the Honorable Leonardo A. Quisumbing, Chairperson. Honorable Conchita Carpio Morales, Dante O. Tinga, Presbitero J. Velasco. Jr. and Arturo D. Brion; Members, Second Division, this 30th day of March. 2009.
G.R. No. 173482 (People of the Philippines v. PO3 Eduardo de Guzman). - The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City found appellant Eduardo de Guzman guilty of simple rape and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the private complainant AAA[1] the sum of P50,000.00 as exemplary damages, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and the costs of suit.[2] On. appeal, this Court transferred[3] this case to the Court of Appeals. (CA) for appropriate action and disposition pursuant to our ruling in People v. Mateo.[4] The CA affirmed with modification the RTC's decision by ordering appellant to pay an additional sum of P50,000.00 on the ground that AAA is entitled to civil indemnity which is separate from the award of moral damages.[5]
Appellant now comes to us for redress via a notice of appeal. In a Resolution dated 11 September 2006, we required the parties to file their respective supplemental briefs if they so desire, within thirty (30) days from notice.[6] The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) complied by re-submitting its Brief for the Plaintiff-Appellee dated 24 July 2001 filed with the Court of Appeals,[7] while the appellant through counsel manifested that he no longer wished to file a supplemental brief.[8]
We affirm appellant's conviction.
AAA positively identified appellant as the perpetrator of the horrendous crime. On the day of the rape, AAA was walking along Tandang Sora Avenue in Quezon City when she passed in front of appellant who was then with two other police officers. Appellant held her by the wrist and pulled her towards a mobile car. On board the car, appellant covered her mouth with a face towel and pointed a gun at her. The car driven by appellant's companion proceeded to Camp Karingal. When AAA alighted from the car, appellant examined her eyes, mouth and ears to determine whether she was using shabu. Upon finding that she was not, his two companions told appellant to let her go as she was "negative" of shabu. Instead of releasing her, appellant made her board an owner-type jeep, placed a towel in her mouth, cuffed her arm to his, while his other hand pointed a gun at her. Appellant drove around the Camp until they reached a small hut where he carried out the dastardly deed. Fearing for her life, AAA was not able to shout for help.
After appellant released her, AAA immediately reported the incident to the police. She submitted herself to a physical examination the following day. The medico-legal officer testified that AAA had a congested labia minora and congested carunculae myrtiformis due. to "pressure inflicted on the said area brought about by rubbing of [sic] blunt object on the congested area xxx like an erect penis."[9]
On the other hand, appellant denied the charges against him. He denied ever apprehending her, averring that he saw her for the first time during his arraignment in this criminal case. He claimed to have arrested a certain Akmat Indawi Mamarinta for violation of Republic Act No. 6425[10] two days before the alleged rape incident. He insinuated this as sufficient motive for AAA to retaliate against him. He harped on the credibility of AAA's testimony that, according to him, reeked of inconsistencies. He likewise submitted that AAA's failure to resist negates the commission of rape.
Appellant's denials, which are merely self-serving evidence, cannot prevail over the positive, consistent and categorical testimony of AAA. We agree with the appellate court that the offended party's recollection of the lurid details of a humiliating experience need not be perfect. What is required is merely a credible factual narration by a credible witness. AAA's testimony was positive and straightforward even under rigorous cross-examination. Both the RTC and the CA were correct in holding that the inconsistencies[11] in her testimony are too trivial to affect the outcome of the case. In any event, these inconsistencies were clarified after the RTC asked AAA to demonstrate the "handcuffing incident" and after, it conducted an ocular inspection of the place where AAA was raped.
Anent AAA's failure to resist tenaciously, it is well-settled that physical resistance need not be established in rape when threats and intimidation are employed and the victim submits herself to the embrace of her rapist because of fear.[12] As we have ruled in People v. Sgt. Bayani:[13]
x x x [I]t must be emphasized that force as an element of rape need not be irresistible; it need but be present, and so long as it brings about the desired result, all considerations of whether it was more or less irresistible is beside the point. So must it likewise be for intimidation which is addressed to the mind of the victim and is therefore subjective. Intimidation must be viewed in the light of the victim's perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the crime and not by any hard and fast rule, it is therefore enough that it produces fear - fear that if the victim did not yield to the bestial demands of the accused, something would happen to her at that moment or even thereafter as when she is threatened with death if she reports the incident. Intimidation includes the moral kind as the fear caused by threatening the girl with a knife or pistol. And when such intimidation exists and the victim is cowed into submission as a result thereof, thereby rendering resistance futile, it would be extremely unreasonable, to say the least, to expect the victim to resist with all her might and strength. If resistance would nevertheless be futile because of continuing intimidation, then offering none at all would not mean consent to the assault so as to make the victim's participation in the sexual act voluntary.[14]
In the present case, AAA categorically testified that she was cowed into submission because appellant pointed a gun at her while her mouth was covered and her hands were tied.
It must be borne in mind that in a prosecution for rape, the offended party's candor is the single most important issue. If her testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on the sole basis thereof.[15] Thus, absent any credible imputation of ill motive on the part of AAA to falsely accuse the appellant of a heinous crime, her candid and consistent testimony should be given Ml faith and credit.[16] Appellant's attempt to discredit AAA, without an iota of evidence to substantiate his allegation of ill -motive on her part, must necessarily fail.
We agree with the appellate court that appellant cannot be found guilty of qualified rape on account of his taking advantage of his position as a police officer in committing the crime. The information was amended to include the qualifying circumstance after appellant had already been arraigned. To convict him of qualified rape when he pleaded to a charge of simple rape would be a violation of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.[17]
Although the CA was correct in awarding an additional sum of P50,000.00 in favor of AAA, said amount was denominated as moral damages in the dispositive portion of its Decision when in fact moral damages had already been awarded by the RTC, which award the appellate court affirmed. Said award should thus be correctly referred to as civil indemnity.
WHEREFORE, this Court AFFIRMS the findings of fact and conclusions of law in the Decision dated 23 March 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01699, finding appellant Eduardo de Guzman guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with MODIFICATION that he is further ordered to pay AAA P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.
WITNESS the Honorable Leonardo A. Quisumbing, Chairperson. Honorable Conchita Carpio Morales, Dante O. Tinga, Presbitero J. Velasco. Jr. and Arturo D. Brion; Members, Second Division, this 30th day of March. 2009.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) LUDICHI YASAY-NUNAG
Clerk of Court
(Sgd.) LUDICHI YASAY-NUNAG
Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] The real identity of the private offended party is withheld pursuant to our Decision dated 19 September 2006 in G.R. No. 167693 entitled People v. Cabalquinto.
[2] CA rollo, pp. 17-25. The Decision dated 23 March 2000 was penned by Judge Jose Catral Mendoza, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding that the guilt of the accused was proven beyond reasonable doubt, the Court hereby sentences the accused, PO3 Eduardo de Guzman, to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua; to pay the private complainant the sum of P50,000.00 as exemplary damages and P50,000.00 as moral damages; and (3) to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
[3] Rollo, p. 2; in a Resolution dated 15 December 2004.
[4] G.R. Nos. 147678-87, 7 July 2004, 433 SCRA 640.
[5] Rollo, pp. 3-20. The Decision of the Fourth Division of the Court of Appeals, Manila dated 23 March 2006 was penned by Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso and concurred in by Associate Justices Portia Ali�o-Hormachuelos and Amelita G. Tolentino, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the accused-appellant PO3 Eduardo De Guzman is hereby ordered to pay the victim, [AAA], the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
[6] Id.at21.
[7] Id. at 28-49.
[8] Id. at 22-24.
[9] TSN, 1 March 1999, pp. 4, 7, Testimony of Dr. Ma. Cristina Freyra.
[10] Otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
[11] The inconsistencies alleged by the appellant mainly involved details as to which hand appellant used in driving the jeep, which, hand of appellant was cuffed to AAA's hand and the exact location of the hut.
[12] People v. Buenviaje, 408 Phil 342, 351 (2001); People v. Buendia, 373 Phil. 430, 442 (1999); People v. Gaban, 331 Phil. 87, 95 (1996).
[13] 331 Phil. 169(1996).
[14] Id. at 193.
[15] People v. De Guzman, 388 Phil. 943, 954 (2000).
[16] See People v. Abrecinoz, 346 Phil. 37, 51 (1991); People v. Escober, 346 Phil. 513, 522
[17] People v. Pambid, 384 Phil. 702, 730 (2000), citing People v. Manalili, 294 SCRA 220, 252 (1998).
