Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions > Year 2010 > April 2010 Resolutions > [G.R. No. 190384 : April 21, 2010] HEIRS OF SPOUSES CRISPULO FERRER AND ENGRACIA PUHAWAN, PETITIONERS VS. COURT OF APPEALS, NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, ET AL., :

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated 21 April 2010:

G.R. No. 190384 - HEIRS OF SPOUSES CRISPULO FERRER and ENGRACIA PUHAWAN, petitioners -versus- COURT OF APPEALS, NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, ET AL., respondents.

The present case involves the parties' conflicting claims of ownership over three parcels of land located in Lumban, Laguna: Lot 1873, Lot 90, and Lot 72.

In 1936, respondent National Power Corporation (Napocor) constructed the Caliraya Hydroelectric Power Plant on portions of the subject lots. In 1997, Napocor began to undertake privatization measures and decided to sell the entire power plant including the land where it stood. Petitioners, the heirs of spouses Crispulo Ferrer and Engracia Puhawan, opposed the proposed sale alleging that Napocor does not have any legal rights over the land. They claimed that portions of Lots 1873, 90, and 72 where the power plant stood were owned by their parents who, upon their deaths, passed the same to them as their legal heirs. To enjoin the sale and to collect rent for the use of the subject lots since 1936, the petitioners instituted an action for injunction and damages against Napocor before Branch 27, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santa Cruz, Laguna.

Napocor denied the petitioners' allegations and claimed that it acquired some 29,598 square meters of Lot 1873^[1] through purchase from Crispulo Ferrer's daughter from his first marriage, Oliva Ferrer.^[2] The purchase was evidenced by two deeds of sale dated August 31, 1940 and March 4, 1948, both executed by Oliva Ferrer, duly notarized, and registered under Act No. 3344 (System of Recording for Unregistered Real Estate).^[3]

Napocor also claimed ownership over 14,500 square meters of Lot 90^[4] which it acquired through purchase, but admitted that it occupied the remaining 438 squares meters of Lot 90 without any right or authority from the petitioners since 1954.

Insofar as Lot 72 was concerned, Napocor claimed that its right to occupy and use the lot stemmed from the Right of Way Agreement executed by Engracia Puhawan in its favor on April 22, 1940. The encumbrance was in fact annotated on the title.

The petitioners opposed Napocor's claims and contended that the sale of portions of Lot 1873 between Napocor and Oliva Ferrer was void. They alleged that Oliva Ferrer was merely a co-owner of Lot 1873, which fact was clearly indicated in both deeds of sale covering Lot 1873. As an heir of Crispulo Ferrer, Oliva Ferrer inherited only 3,129 square meters of Lot 1873, and the sale to Napocor of an area in excess of this amount without authority from the other co-owners was, according to the petitioners, void. To further support their claim of ownership, the petitioners presented a Certification dated January 26, 1978 issued by the Bureau of Lands stating that Lot 1873 was claimed by and surveyed for Crispulo Ferrer. They also relied on the Original Certificates of Title (OCT) Nos. P-3898 and P-3899 issued on September 25, 1977 in the name of Emiliano Ferrer, son of Crispulo Ferrer and Engracia Puhawan and one of petitioners herein.

On March 15, 2000, the RTC issued a decision dismissing petitioners' action insofar as Lot 1873 and 11 were concerned. The trial court ruled that the petitioners failed to present convincing proof of their claim of ownership over Lot 1873; other than the Bureau of Lands Certification, which by itself was not a proof of ownership, the petitioners had nothing to support their claim. In contrast, Napocor was able to present two deeds of sale covering 29,598 square meters of Lot 1873, which were duly notarized and registered under Act No. 3344. The RTC also took cognizance of the fact that Napocor has been in possession of Lot 1873 and constructed numerous structures thereon since 1936. It was thus ridiculous for petitioners or their predecessors not to raise a restraining hand or shout of protest during Napocor's long occupation and use of the lot.

As for Lot 72, the RTC found that the certificate of title covering the lot contained an entry "memorandum of encumbrance affecting the property," where Engracia Puhawan and the other heirs of Bernabe Puhawan (mother of Engracia Puhawan) granted Napocor the right of way over the lot. In the absence of proof that the entry had been cancelled, the RTC said that the easement should be respected.^[5]

Since Napocor had admitted occupying portions of Lot 90 that were not covered by the sale, the RTC declared it liable to pay rentals for the actual area occupied.^[6]

The dispositive portion of the RTCs March 15, 2000 decision read:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Denying the petition for preliminary injunction;
   
2. Dismissing the action for damages;
   
3. Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs the reasonable value of the excess area occupied by [Napocor] in Lot 90, estimated to be [438] square meters or such excess area as may be determined though a survey of Lot 90.
   
   

The petitioners appealed the RTC's decision before the Court of Appeals (CA), alleging that the RTC erred in finding that they did not have any evidence to sustain their claim of ownership. They assailed the RTC's reliance on the deeds of sale executed by Oliva Ferrer in favor of Napocor, insisting that Oliva Ferrer had no right to sell Lot 1873. Lot 1873, petitioners stated, was acquired during the marriage of spouses Crispulo Ferrer and Engracia Puhawan; Oliva Ferrer was, however, Crispulo Ferrer's child from his first marriage. At most, she can transfer only what she was bound to inherit as one of Crispulo Ferrer's heirs, which was some 3,129 square meters of Lot 1873. The sale of 29,598 square meters of Lot 1873, without authority from the other heirs, was thus void and, the notarization and registration of the deeds of sale were without any effect.

The CA, however, found no reason to reverse the trial court's ruling. In its May 12, 2009 decision, the CA held that the Bureau of Lands Certification did not establish Crispulo Ferrer's ownership of Lot 1873, it only proves that he is a survey claimant of the lot. Although petitioner Emilio Ferrer was the registered owner of portions of Lot 1873,^[8] the CA found that these portions do not pertain to those occupied by Napocor.

The CA noted that petitioners only raised and discussed issues and arguments involving their claim over Lot 1873. implying that they were not taking any issue with regard to the RTC's ruling on their claims involving Lot 90 and Lot 72. Nevertheless, the CA still resolved the matter and, like the RTC, found no basis to support petitioners' claims over these lots other than the excess area of Lot 90 which Napocor admitted occupying without authority from petitioners. Thus, the CA directed Napocor to pay the petitioners damages by way of rentals for its occupancy of the excess area of Lot 90.^[9]

The petitioners then sought a reconsideration of the CA's May 12, 2009 decision, which the appellate court denied in a resolution dated October 23, 2009. The petitioners received a copy of the CA's October 23, 2009 resolution on November 3, 2009. Thirty-eight days later, on December 11, 2009, the petitioners filed with the Court a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA in issuing its May 12, 2009 decision and October 23, 2009 resolution.

In a Resolution dated January 18, 2010. the Court resolved to deny petitioners' petition for failing to sufficiently show any reversible error in the assailed decision to warrant the exercise of the Court's discretionary appellate jurisdiction.

The petitioners now file a motion for reconsideration of our January 18, 2010 Resolution, pointing out that they filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, and thus contended that the denial for failure to show any reversible error on the CA's part was not proper. In asking the Court to give due course to their motion, the petitioners attribute the following errors committed by the CA, which are the same errors they raised in their petition for certiorari:

1. The Honorable Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked a certain and undisputed fact that, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion;
   
2. The Honorable Court of Appeals in this regard made a conclusion based on speculation, surmise, or conjecture;
   
3. Likewise, the inference made by the Honorable Court of Appeals was manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; and
   
4. The Honorable Court of Appeals thus committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
   

THE COURTS RULING


We resolved to deny petitioners' motion for reconsideration.

A certiorari petition filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is a remedy against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions, which has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion means such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.^[11] To justify the issuance of the writ of certiorari, the abuse of discretion must be grave, as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all, in contemplation of law, as to be equivalent to having acted without jurisdiction.^[12] As the party invoking the Court's exercise of its jurisdiction to issue this extraordinary writ, the petitioner bears the burden of proving that the public respondent has committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; in other words, the petitioner must raise and prove an error of jurisdiction.^[13]

In the present case, however, other than including the words "grave abuse of discretion" in its assignment of errors, the petitioners failed to allege and substantiate particular acts of the CA that can be characterized as a capricious or whimsical exercise of its judgment. More importantly, the petitioners' assignment of errors, which are actually mere conclusions of law, do not go into the jurisdiction of the appellate court. The gist of petitioners' objections to the CA ruling was the appellate court's failure to appreciate their arguments and evidence in support of their claims, but this does not amount to an error of jurisdiction. A certiorari writ will not be issued to cure errors by the lower court in its appreciation of the evidence, its conclusions anchored on the said findings, and its conclusions of law. As long as the court acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the exercise of its discretion will amount to nothing more than mere errors of judgment, correctible by an appeal or a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.^[14] Indeed, considering petitioners' assignment of errors, it was through this perspective that we reviewed the petition; we considered the petition as a petition for review on certiorari filed under Rule 45. Why petitioners insist that we treat their petition as one filed under Rule 65 is, however, not lost on us.

Under Section 2 of Rule 45, a petition for review on certiorari must be filed within 15 days from notice of the judgment, final order, or resolution appealed from. The petitioners received the CA resolution denying their motion for reconsideration on November 3, 2009; they filed the present petition 38 days later, or on December 11, 2009. As a petition for review on certiorari, it was clearly filed out of time. Nevertheless, to secure a reversal of the adverse CA judgment, the petitioners resorted to a petition for certiorari which, under Section 4 of Rule 65, may be filed within 60 days from notice of the judgment, order, or resolution assailed. In other words, the petitioners used the petition for certiorari as a substitute for the lost appeal^[15] - a practice the Court has consistently reproved. Based on this procedural lapse alone, the Court could have denied the petition, but in the interest of fully resolving the case, proceeded to examine the substance of petitioners' claims and arguments. Regrettably for petitioners, we did not find any legal error committed by the CA that merited the reversal of its ruling; hence, our resolution of January 18, 2010.

Notably, the present case stemmed from the action for injunction and damages filed by petitioners against Napocor. For an injunctive suit to prosper, the plaintiff must prove that he has a clear and positive legal right over the subject of the suit that must be protected.^[16] Since petitioners were seeking to enjoin Napocor from selling the subject lots, it was incumbent upon them show that they have a better claim of ownership over the subject lots than Napocor. But, as correctly ruled by both the RTC and the CA, the evidence which petitioners presented in support of its claim - the Bureau of Lands Certification in the name of Crispulo Ferrer and the OCTs in the name of Emiliano Ferrer - did not adequately establish their right to Lot 1873. All that the Certification proved was that Crispulo Ferrer was a survey claimant. The purpose of a survey plan is simply to identify and delineate the extent of the land.^[17] A survey plan, even if approved by the Bureau of Lands, is not a proof of ownership of the land covered by the plan. Even though the OCTs in Emiliano Ferrer's name covering portions of Lot 1873 were never contested, the CA found that the portions of land covered by his certificates of title were not those on which Napocor's power plant stood. Napocor, on the other hand, presented two deeds of sale covering Lot 1873, both duly notarized and recorded with the Registry of Deeds. Act No. 3344 declares as valid an instrument transferring rights with respect to real estate that was not registered under the provisions of the Land Registration Act but was registered, in the manner prescribed by law, in the Register of Deeds. In addition, Napocor has declared Lot 1873 for tax purposes and has occupied the subject lot since 1936. Tax declarations become a strong evidence of ownership acquired by prescription when accompanied by proof of actual possession of the property.^[18] Given the notarized and registered deeds of sale in Napocor's favor, the tax declarations in its name, and the uninterrupted and continuous possession for over 60 years, Napocor has sufficiently established its claim of ownership over the pertinent portions of Lot 1873.

It was too late for the petitioners to assail the nullity of the sale to Napocor by their co-heir/co-owner, Oliva Ferrer, of portions of Lot 1873. While Article 1410 of the Civil Code declares that an action to declare the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe, nevertheless, the long delay in instituting an action may amount to laches, which is defined as the failure to assert a right for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it has either abandoned or declined to assert it. This equitable defense is based upon grounds of public policy, which requires the discouragement of stale claims for the peace of society.^[19] From 1936 when Napocor began construction of the power plant up to 1997 when the action for injunction and damages was instituted, the petitioners made no move to assert their claim over Lot 1873; for 61 long years, the petitioners have slept on their rights, but now ironically demand vigilance on the Court's part to protect their rights. In Vda. De Rigonan v. Derecho,^[20] we held:

Although we condemn the fraudulent acts of Leandro and the five co-owners in their scheme to deprive their relatives of the latter's rightful shares in the inheritance, the fact remains that respondents and their forebears wasted their opportunity through a lifetime of indifference and apathy. They cannot now be permitted to recover property that others have possessed, developed, and invested in for sixty-five years. It would be sheer injustice to allow the latter to reap benefits after generations of predecessors passively slept on their rights. The Court aptly stated in Miguel v. Catalino:

Courts cannot look with favor at parties who, by their silence, delay, and inaction, knowingly induce another to spend time, effort, and expense in cultivating the land, paying taxes and making improvements thereon xxx only to spring from ambush and claim title when the possessor's efforts and the rise of land values offer an opportunity to make easy profit at his expense.

To grant respondents relief when they have not even offered any justifiable excuse for their inaction would be unjust. It is certainly beyond our comprehension how they could have remained silent for more than 50 years. They have only themselves to blame if the Court at this late hour can no longer afford them relief against the inequities they allegedly suffered.^[21] [Emphasis supplied.]

As to Lots 72 and 90, the CA correctly pointed out that the petitioners never took any issue with the RTC's ruling concerning the parties' rights over these lots; the petitioners devoted most of their time discussing their claims over Lot 1873. At any rate, the parties' rights with respect to these lots have been carefully considered and resolved by the RTC and CA, and we agree with their findings and conclusions.

Read in its entirety, the CA decision was arrived at after it had carefully considered the evidence and arguments presented by both parties. Its ruling was based on factual findings and grounded on sound legal principles; we find no basis to reverse it. Corollarily, no grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the CA in issuing the assailed rulings. Viewed either from the standards of Rule 45 or Rule 65, the petition utterly fails to raise issues that merit the setting aside of the CA decision and resolution.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petitioners' motion for reconsideration of our January 18, 2010 Resolution. The petitioners' petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. Costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

WITNESS the Honorable Antonio T. Carpio, Chairperson, Honorable Arturo D. Brion, Mariano C. Del Castillo. Roberto A. Abad and Jose P. Perez, Members, Second Division, this 21^st day of April 2010.

Endnotes:

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^[1] Lot 1873 had a total land area of 50,079 square meiers.

^[2] Crispulo Ferrer was previously married to Andrea Ladiana, with whom he had two children: Vicente and Oliva. When Andrea Ladiana died, Crispulo Ferrer married Engracia Puhawan in 1912. They had five children, herein petitioners: Alejandro, Emiliano, Maria, Dpminga, and Eleuteria.

^[3] Now covered by Section 194 of the Administrative Code, as amended.

^[4] Lot 90 has a total land area of 14,938 square meters.

^[5] Rollo, p. 123.

^[6] Id. at 124.

^[7] Ibid.

^[8] Covered by OCT Nos. P-3898 and P-3899. covering 11.723 and 5,430 square meters respectively.

^[9] Rollo, p.45

^[10] RULES OF COURT, Rule 65, Section I.

^[11] De Vera v. De Vera, G.R. No. 172832, April 7, 2009

^[12] Julie's Franchise Corporation v. Ruiz, G.R. No. 180988, August 28, 2009.

^[13] See Don Orestes Romualdez Electric Cooperative. Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 311 Phil 268 (1999).

^[14] Supra note 12.

^[15] Madrigal Transport, Inc. v. Lapanday Holdings Corporation, 479 Phil. 768 (2004); Tanenglian v. Lorenzo, G.R. No. 173415, March 28, 2008, 550 SCRA 348.

^[16] Boncodin v. National Power Corporation, G.R. No. 162716, September 27, 2006, 503 SCRA 611.

^[17] Director of Lands v. Reyes, 160A Phil 832 (1975).

^[18] Republic v. Court of Appeals, 216 Phil. 500 (1984): Uriarte v. People, G.R. No. 16925, December 20,2006, 511 SCRA 471.

^[19] Diaz v. Gorricho, 103 Phil. 261, 264 (1958), citing Gayondato v. Treasurer of the Phil. Islands, 49 Phil. 244 (1926),

^[20] 502 Phil. 202.

^[21] Id. at 229-230.