April 2010 - Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
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[A.M. No. RTJ-09-2172(Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 08-2892-RTJ) : April 14, 2010] JUANCHO DAACO V. JUDGE FRISCO T. LILAGAN, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 34, TACLOBAN CITY :
[A.M. No. RTJ-09-2172(Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 08-2892-RTJ) : April 14, 2010]
JUANCHO DAACO V. JUDGE FRISCO T. LILAGAN, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 34, TACLOBAN CITY
Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated 14 April 2010:
A.M. No. RTJ-09-2172 (Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 08-2892-RTJ): JUANCHO DAACO v. JUDGE FRISCO T. LILAGAN, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 34, TACLOBAN CITY
Juancho Daaco (complainant) was the plaintiff in an action for reconveyance of property filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 34, Tacloban City (RTC-Branch 34) presided by respondent Judge Frisco T. Lilagan (respondent Judge). The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 2006-02-12.
On 30 March 2006, the defendants Heirs of Banez (defendants) filed a motion to dismiss the case. On 5 March 2007, or almost a year thereafter, respondent Judge issued an Order denying the motion. On 19 March 2007, complainant filed an Amended Complaint. The defendants failed to file an answer to the Amended Complaint; hence, on 12 April 2007, complainant filed a motion to declare defendants in default. Respondent Judge gave the defendants time to submit their position paper but the latter failed to do so. Instead, defendants filed a motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint. Complainant filed a motion to expunge from the records the motion to dismiss which was allegedly filed 283 days late. Respondent Judge gave defendants ten days to file their opposition to the motion to expunge. Defendants did not file any opposition.
In the meantime, complainant twice filed a motion for the speedy disposition of the case. The motion to declare defendants in default was submitted for resolution on 11 January 2008. However, no resolution on the motion was issued as of the filing of the present administrative matter.
Complainant filed a Complaint-Affidavit charging respondent Judge with malicious delay in the administration of justice and grave violation of Article VIII of the Constitution. Complainant charged respondent Judge with willfully, intentionally and maliciously failing to issue an order of default against defendants despite complainant's two motions for speedy disposition of the case.
In his Answer, respondent Judge alleged that complainant failed to consider that a motion to dismiss is a litigated motion; and therefore, there was a need to set the same for hearing. He averred that complainant failed and refused to participate in said hearings.
As regards the motion to dismiss, respondent Judge argued that the defendants filed a Supplemental Manifestation to Dismiss and he received a communication from complainant requesting that the original motion to dismiss be immediately resolved. Respondent Judge insisted that the original motion to dismiss was never submitted for resolution because of the supplemental motion to dismiss which needed further oral arguments. Nonetheless, respondent Judge averred, he issued a resolution denying the original motion to dismiss.
Respondent Judge further contended that after complainant filed the Amended Complaint, the defendants filed their separate motions to dismiss. The motion to dismiss filed by defendant Josito Yu was denied but the motion filed by defendant Avelino Ramirez was not resolved because of complainant's motion to expunge.
In his Reply, complainant argued that from 11 January 2008 when the motion to declare defendants in default was submitted for resolution up to 25 April 2008[1] when the present administrative matter was filed, a period of 103 days had already elapsed violating Section 15(1), Article VIII of the Constitution. Moreover, respondent Judge inhibited himself from the case without first resolving the said motion.
In his Rejoinder, respondent Judge explained that prior to the filing of the motion to declare defendants in default, complainant filed a motion to amend the complaint. Since an Amended Complaint had been filed and admitted, the motion to declare defendants in default was automatically vacated because it was already superseded by the Amended Complaint. In addition, no new motion to declare defendants in default was filed by complainant. Because of the complainant's persistence to obtain a ruling on the motion, respondent Judge allegedly required the parties to submit their respective position papers regarding the motion. As regards his inhibition, respondent Judge alleged that it was complainant who prayed for his inhibition, imputing bias and partiality.
On respondent Judge's contention that the motion to declare defendants in default motion was considered vacated since the motion was filed a day before the Amended Complaint was ordered admitted, complainant countered that respondent Judge issued an order on 11 January 2008 submitting for resolution the motion to declare defendants in default. Thus, the motion could not be considered vacated.
In its Report, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) posits the view that it is not whether the filing and admission of the Amended Complaint had rendered the motion to declare defendants in default moot and academic but the fact that respondent Judge had not resolved the said motion even up to the filing of the present administrative case. It would have been more prudent and sensible on the part of respondent Judge to declare the motion as moot and academic instead of ordering the parties to submit their respective position papers. Respondent Judge's unreasonable delay in resolving a pending incident is a violation of the norms of judicial conduct and a ground for administrative sanction.
The OCA further observed that this is the sixth time that respondent Judge had been administratively charged and he had made no effort to atone and prove his worth. The OCA recommended that respondent Judge be meted the penalty of suspension from office for a period of three months without pay and other benefits effective immediately, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act should be dealt with more severely.
We agree with the findings and recommendation of the OCA.
Complainant filed his motion to declare defendants in default on 12 April 2007. Admittedly, this motion had not yet been resolved when the present administrative case was filed on 25 April 2008, or more than one year already. The motion was submitted for resolution in the Order dated 11 January 2008 issued by respondent Judge.[2] More than 90 days had elapsed and respondent Judge had not resolved the motion in clear violation of the Constitution.
Section 15(1), Article VIII[3] of the Constitution expressly mandates that cases or matters before the lower courts must be resolved within three months from date of submission. Canon 6, Section 5 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct[4] likewise provides that judges perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness.
Respondent Judge explained that since complainant filed an Amended Complaint, the motion to declare defendants in default was automatically vacated rendering it moot and academic. As correctly pointed out by the OCA, respondent Judge still required the parties to submit position papers regarding the motion and thereafter, considered the motion submitted for resolution when he issued the Order dated 11 January 2008. If respondent Judge considered the motion to have been vacated by complainant's filing of the Amended Complaint, then he should have simply issued an order declaring it to be so instead of requiring the paities to still submit their position papers.
Judges have the sworn duty to administer justice without undue delay under the time-honored precept that justice delayed is justice denied. Delay in resolving motions violates the norm of judicial conduct and is administratively sanctionable. Judges must decide cases and resolve motions with dispatch because any delay in the administration of justice, no matter how brief, deprives litigants of their right to a speedy disposition of their cases and undermines the people's faith in the judiciary.[5]
Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court classifies undue delay in rendering a decision or order as a less serious charge. Section 11 of the same Rule imposes the following sanctions for those guilty of less serious charge: (1) suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one nor more than three months; or (2) a fine of more than P10,000 but not exceeding P20,000.
The OCA also pointed out that respondent Judge had been penalized five times in separate administrative cases for various charges: (1) in A.M. No. RTJ-99-1490 for falsification of certificate of service, he was fined Pl,000; (2) in A.M. No. RTJ-01-1651 for ignorance of the law, gross abuse of judicial authority and willful disobedience of settled jurisprudence, he was fined P10,000; (3) in A.M. No. RTJ-00-1564 for falsification of certificate of service, maltreatment and violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, he was reprimanded; (4) in OCA IPI No. 01-1280-RTJ for gross of the law, grave abuse of authority and serious misconduct, he was reprimanded; and (5) in A.M. No. RTJ-06-1985 for violation of the Constitution and Code of Judicial Conduct, he was also reprimanded. Considering these circumstances, we agree with the recommendation of the OCA that suspension from office without salary and other benefits for three months is the more appropriate penalty. The Court cannot and will not tolerate habitual infractions.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Judge Frisco T. Lilagan, presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 34, Tacloban City, guilty of undue delay in resolving the pending motion and we SUSPEND him from office without salary and other benefits for three (3) months effective immediately, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED. (Perez, J., no part; Leonardo-De Castro, J., designated additional member)
WITNESS the Honorable Antonio T. Carpio, Chairperson, Honorable Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro (designated additional member per Raffle dated 6 January 2010), Arturo D. Brion, Mariano C. Del Castillo and Roberto A. Abad, Members, Second Division, this 14th day of April, 2010.
A.M. No. RTJ-09-2172 (Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 08-2892-RTJ): JUANCHO DAACO v. JUDGE FRISCO T. LILAGAN, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 34, TACLOBAN CITY
Juancho Daaco (complainant) was the plaintiff in an action for reconveyance of property filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 34, Tacloban City (RTC-Branch 34) presided by respondent Judge Frisco T. Lilagan (respondent Judge). The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 2006-02-12.
On 30 March 2006, the defendants Heirs of Banez (defendants) filed a motion to dismiss the case. On 5 March 2007, or almost a year thereafter, respondent Judge issued an Order denying the motion. On 19 March 2007, complainant filed an Amended Complaint. The defendants failed to file an answer to the Amended Complaint; hence, on 12 April 2007, complainant filed a motion to declare defendants in default. Respondent Judge gave the defendants time to submit their position paper but the latter failed to do so. Instead, defendants filed a motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint. Complainant filed a motion to expunge from the records the motion to dismiss which was allegedly filed 283 days late. Respondent Judge gave defendants ten days to file their opposition to the motion to expunge. Defendants did not file any opposition.
In the meantime, complainant twice filed a motion for the speedy disposition of the case. The motion to declare defendants in default was submitted for resolution on 11 January 2008. However, no resolution on the motion was issued as of the filing of the present administrative matter.
Complainant filed a Complaint-Affidavit charging respondent Judge with malicious delay in the administration of justice and grave violation of Article VIII of the Constitution. Complainant charged respondent Judge with willfully, intentionally and maliciously failing to issue an order of default against defendants despite complainant's two motions for speedy disposition of the case.
In his Answer, respondent Judge alleged that complainant failed to consider that a motion to dismiss is a litigated motion; and therefore, there was a need to set the same for hearing. He averred that complainant failed and refused to participate in said hearings.
As regards the motion to dismiss, respondent Judge argued that the defendants filed a Supplemental Manifestation to Dismiss and he received a communication from complainant requesting that the original motion to dismiss be immediately resolved. Respondent Judge insisted that the original motion to dismiss was never submitted for resolution because of the supplemental motion to dismiss which needed further oral arguments. Nonetheless, respondent Judge averred, he issued a resolution denying the original motion to dismiss.
Respondent Judge further contended that after complainant filed the Amended Complaint, the defendants filed their separate motions to dismiss. The motion to dismiss filed by defendant Josito Yu was denied but the motion filed by defendant Avelino Ramirez was not resolved because of complainant's motion to expunge.
In his Reply, complainant argued that from 11 January 2008 when the motion to declare defendants in default was submitted for resolution up to 25 April 2008[1] when the present administrative matter was filed, a period of 103 days had already elapsed violating Section 15(1), Article VIII of the Constitution. Moreover, respondent Judge inhibited himself from the case without first resolving the said motion.
In his Rejoinder, respondent Judge explained that prior to the filing of the motion to declare defendants in default, complainant filed a motion to amend the complaint. Since an Amended Complaint had been filed and admitted, the motion to declare defendants in default was automatically vacated because it was already superseded by the Amended Complaint. In addition, no new motion to declare defendants in default was filed by complainant. Because of the complainant's persistence to obtain a ruling on the motion, respondent Judge allegedly required the parties to submit their respective position papers regarding the motion. As regards his inhibition, respondent Judge alleged that it was complainant who prayed for his inhibition, imputing bias and partiality.
On respondent Judge's contention that the motion to declare defendants in default motion was considered vacated since the motion was filed a day before the Amended Complaint was ordered admitted, complainant countered that respondent Judge issued an order on 11 January 2008 submitting for resolution the motion to declare defendants in default. Thus, the motion could not be considered vacated.
In its Report, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) posits the view that it is not whether the filing and admission of the Amended Complaint had rendered the motion to declare defendants in default moot and academic but the fact that respondent Judge had not resolved the said motion even up to the filing of the present administrative case. It would have been more prudent and sensible on the part of respondent Judge to declare the motion as moot and academic instead of ordering the parties to submit their respective position papers. Respondent Judge's unreasonable delay in resolving a pending incident is a violation of the norms of judicial conduct and a ground for administrative sanction.
The OCA further observed that this is the sixth time that respondent Judge had been administratively charged and he had made no effort to atone and prove his worth. The OCA recommended that respondent Judge be meted the penalty of suspension from office for a period of three months without pay and other benefits effective immediately, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act should be dealt with more severely.
We agree with the findings and recommendation of the OCA.
Complainant filed his motion to declare defendants in default on 12 April 2007. Admittedly, this motion had not yet been resolved when the present administrative case was filed on 25 April 2008, or more than one year already. The motion was submitted for resolution in the Order dated 11 January 2008 issued by respondent Judge.[2] More than 90 days had elapsed and respondent Judge had not resolved the motion in clear violation of the Constitution.
Section 15(1), Article VIII[3] of the Constitution expressly mandates that cases or matters before the lower courts must be resolved within three months from date of submission. Canon 6, Section 5 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct[4] likewise provides that judges perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness.
Respondent Judge explained that since complainant filed an Amended Complaint, the motion to declare defendants in default was automatically vacated rendering it moot and academic. As correctly pointed out by the OCA, respondent Judge still required the parties to submit position papers regarding the motion and thereafter, considered the motion submitted for resolution when he issued the Order dated 11 January 2008. If respondent Judge considered the motion to have been vacated by complainant's filing of the Amended Complaint, then he should have simply issued an order declaring it to be so instead of requiring the paities to still submit their position papers.
Judges have the sworn duty to administer justice without undue delay under the time-honored precept that justice delayed is justice denied. Delay in resolving motions violates the norm of judicial conduct and is administratively sanctionable. Judges must decide cases and resolve motions with dispatch because any delay in the administration of justice, no matter how brief, deprives litigants of their right to a speedy disposition of their cases and undermines the people's faith in the judiciary.[5]
Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court classifies undue delay in rendering a decision or order as a less serious charge. Section 11 of the same Rule imposes the following sanctions for those guilty of less serious charge: (1) suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one nor more than three months; or (2) a fine of more than P10,000 but not exceeding P20,000.
The OCA also pointed out that respondent Judge had been penalized five times in separate administrative cases for various charges: (1) in A.M. No. RTJ-99-1490 for falsification of certificate of service, he was fined Pl,000; (2) in A.M. No. RTJ-01-1651 for ignorance of the law, gross abuse of judicial authority and willful disobedience of settled jurisprudence, he was fined P10,000; (3) in A.M. No. RTJ-00-1564 for falsification of certificate of service, maltreatment and violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, he was reprimanded; (4) in OCA IPI No. 01-1280-RTJ for gross of the law, grave abuse of authority and serious misconduct, he was reprimanded; and (5) in A.M. No. RTJ-06-1985 for violation of the Constitution and Code of Judicial Conduct, he was also reprimanded. Considering these circumstances, we agree with the recommendation of the OCA that suspension from office without salary and other benefits for three months is the more appropriate penalty. The Court cannot and will not tolerate habitual infractions.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Judge Frisco T. Lilagan, presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 34, Tacloban City, guilty of undue delay in resolving the pending motion and we SUSPEND him from office without salary and other benefits for three (3) months effective immediately, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED. (Perez, J., no part; Leonardo-De Castro, J., designated additional member)
WITNESS the Honorable Antonio T. Carpio, Chairperson, Honorable Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro (designated additional member per Raffle dated 6 January 2010), Arturo D. Brion, Mariano C. Del Castillo and Roberto A. Abad, Members, Second Division, this 14th day of April, 2010.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) MA. LUISA L. LAUREA
Clerk of Court
(Sgd.) MA. LUISA L. LAUREA
Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] The complaint-affidavit was dated 23 April 2008 but was received by the Office of the Court Administrator on 25 April 2008.
[2] Annex "1," Reply.
[3] Sec. 15(1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four months from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months for all other lower courts.
[4] A.M. No. 03-05-01-SC, promulgated on 27 April 2004 and took effect on 1 June 2004.
[5] China Banking Corporation v. Janolo, Jr., A.M. No. RXJ-07-2035, 12 June 2008, 554 SCRA 295.
