April 2010 - Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
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[G.R. NO. 184044 : April 06, 2010] MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO V. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET AL. :
[G.R. NO. 184044 : April 06, 2010]
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO V. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET AL.
Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the Court En Banc dated April 6, 2010
"G.R. NO. 184044 -MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO v. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET AL.
RESOLUTION
Back in 2008, the petitioner filed a petition in the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), praying that the COMELEC declare that the private respondents' appearances in various print and television advertisements violated the statutory ban on premature campaigning under Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code.
The COMELEC dismissed the petition, citing Lanot v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 164858, November 16, 2006, 507 SCRA 114) to the effect that a would-be candidate could never be found guilty of premature campaigning under Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code for any partisan political activity he conducted before filing his certificate of candidacy. The Court explained in Lanot that prior to filing his certificate of candidacy the candidate was not yet considered a "candidate;" hence, any activity he did to promote his future candidacy was merely considered an exercise of his freedom of expression.
The petitioner challenged the COMELEC's ruling before this Court, insisting that an adherence to Lanot would practically render Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code useless, and that candidates might easily circumvent the provision by filing their certificates of candidacies on the last day for that purpose. She claimed that any advanced campaigning previously conducted would merely be regarded as an exercise of free speech and expression, and any further activity the; candidates did to promote their candidacies from the day after filing and thenceforth would be legitimately covered by the campaign period.
However, Republic Act No. 9369 was enacted, whereby the Congress authorized the COMELEC to use an automated election system.
To facilitate the automated election system, Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, amending Section 15 of R.A. No. 8436, requires the construction of an electronic display of the official ballot that presents the names of all the candidates to be voted for, and, in addition, empowers the COMELEC to fix the deadline for the filing of certificates of candidacies, petitions for registration, and manifestations to participate in the elections. The provision then provides:
The impact of the application of Section 13 of "R.A. No. 9369 on when a person is considered a candidate became an issue in Pe�era v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 181613, November 25, 2009), where the Court said:
Pe�era thus acknowledges that the enactment of R.A. No. 9369 made it impossible for anyone to be held liable for the offense of premature campaigning, because any person is to be considered a candidate for purposes of determining his liability for any election offense only during the campaign period. This ruling encourages the early and prompt filing of certificates of candidacies in order to enable the COMELEC to prepare the electronic ballots at the soonest. No longer do prospective candidates need to wait for the deadline of filing certificates of candidacies to file theirs just to shield themselves from criminal and other liabilities for premature campaigning. The extended period for filing of certificates of candidacies is not for the purpose of making the filers official candidates in legal contemplation, but solely for the preparation of the electronic ballots. Resultantly, any partisan political activity the candidates engage in prior to the lapse of the period for filing certificates of candidacy but before the start of the campaign period is considered only as an exercise of the filers' freedom of expression as ordinary citizens.
Acknowledging the soundness of Pe�era, the petitioner now moves for the dismissal of her petition, stating that Pe�era has settled the issues she thereby raised.
WHEREFORE, finding the motion to dismiss of the petitioner to be meritorious, the Court grants it and, accordingly, dismisses the petition."
Abad, J., on official leave.
"G.R. NO. 184044 -MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO v. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET AL.
RESOLUTION
Back in 2008, the petitioner filed a petition in the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), praying that the COMELEC declare that the private respondents' appearances in various print and television advertisements violated the statutory ban on premature campaigning under Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code.
The COMELEC dismissed the petition, citing Lanot v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 164858, November 16, 2006, 507 SCRA 114) to the effect that a would-be candidate could never be found guilty of premature campaigning under Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code for any partisan political activity he conducted before filing his certificate of candidacy. The Court explained in Lanot that prior to filing his certificate of candidacy the candidate was not yet considered a "candidate;" hence, any activity he did to promote his future candidacy was merely considered an exercise of his freedom of expression.
The petitioner challenged the COMELEC's ruling before this Court, insisting that an adherence to Lanot would practically render Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code useless, and that candidates might easily circumvent the provision by filing their certificates of candidacies on the last day for that purpose. She claimed that any advanced campaigning previously conducted would merely be regarded as an exercise of free speech and expression, and any further activity the; candidates did to promote their candidacies from the day after filing and thenceforth would be legitimately covered by the campaign period.
However, Republic Act No. 9369 was enacted, whereby the Congress authorized the COMELEC to use an automated election system.
To facilitate the automated election system, Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, amending Section 15 of R.A. No. 8436, requires the construction of an electronic display of the official ballot that presents the names of all the candidates to be voted for, and, in addition, empowers the COMELEC to fix the deadline for the filing of certificates of candidacies, petitions for registration, and manifestations to participate in the elections. The provision then provides:
xxx Any person who files his certificate of candidacy within this period shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy: Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period. xxx.
The impact of the application of Section 13 of "R.A. No. 9369 on when a person is considered a candidate became an issue in Pe�era v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 181613, November 25, 2009), where the Court said:
xxx However, it is no longer enough to merely file a certificate of candidacy for a person to be considered a candidate because "any person who tiles his certificate of candidacy within [the tiling] period shall only be considered a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy." Any person may thus file a certificate of candidacy on any day within the prescribed period for filing a certificate of candidacy yet that person shall be considered a candidate, tor purposes of determining one's possible violations of election laws, only during the campaign period, indeed, there is no "election campaign" or "partisan political activity" designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to public office simply because there is no "candidate" to speak of prior to the start of the campaign period.
Pe�era thus acknowledges that the enactment of R.A. No. 9369 made it impossible for anyone to be held liable for the offense of premature campaigning, because any person is to be considered a candidate for purposes of determining his liability for any election offense only during the campaign period. This ruling encourages the early and prompt filing of certificates of candidacies in order to enable the COMELEC to prepare the electronic ballots at the soonest. No longer do prospective candidates need to wait for the deadline of filing certificates of candidacies to file theirs just to shield themselves from criminal and other liabilities for premature campaigning. The extended period for filing of certificates of candidacies is not for the purpose of making the filers official candidates in legal contemplation, but solely for the preparation of the electronic ballots. Resultantly, any partisan political activity the candidates engage in prior to the lapse of the period for filing certificates of candidacy but before the start of the campaign period is considered only as an exercise of the filers' freedom of expression as ordinary citizens.
Acknowledging the soundness of Pe�era, the petitioner now moves for the dismissal of her petition, stating that Pe�era has settled the issues she thereby raised.
WHEREFORE, finding the motion to dismiss of the petitioner to be meritorious, the Court grants it and, accordingly, dismisses the petition."
Abad, J., on official leave.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) MA. LUISA D. VILLARAMA
Clerk of Court
(Sgd.) MA. LUISA D. VILLARAMA
Clerk of Court