February 2010 - Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
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[G.R. No. 185921 : February 24, 2010] GEORGE L GO AND/OR JUANITO A. UY V. HON. WINLOVE DUMAYAS, PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 59, MAKATI CITY, UCPB SECURITIES, INC., SECURITY BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, ENRIQUE TAN AND KAY SWEE TUAN :
[G.R. No. 185921 : February 24, 2010]
GEORGE L GO AND/OR JUANITO A. UY V. HON. WINLOVE DUMAYAS, PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 59, MAKATI CITY, UCPB SECURITIES, INC., SECURITY BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, ENRIQUE TAN AND KAY SWEE TUAN
Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated 24 February 2010:
G.R. No. 185921 (George L Go and/or Juanito A. Uy v. Hon. Winlove Dumayas, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 59, Makati City, UCPB Securities, Inc., Security Bank and Trust Company, Enrique Tan and Kay Swee Tuan).-
This case is about the proper remedy when the complaint failed to implead indispensable parties and the correct mode of review of a dismissal of an action without prejudice.
The Facts and the Case
Petitioners George L. Go and Juanito A. Uy filed a complaint[1] for recovery of personal properties with damages against respondents United Coconut Planters Bank Securities, Inc. (UCPB Securities), Security Bank and Trust Company (Security Bank), Enrique Tan (Tan), and Kay Swee Tuan (Tuan) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City in Civil Case 07-011.
Petitioners Go and Uy alleged that Equitable Development Corporation (EDC) was the registered owner of one million shares of stock of Equitable PCI Bank covered by Stock Certificate 60406. The beneficial owner of these shares, however, was petitioner Uy. The latter in turn assigned his rights to petitioner Go. Go and Uy subsequently entrusted the stock certificate to respondents Tan and Tuan, who. without their authority and in conspiracy with the defendants UCPB Securities as stock broker, and Security Bank as transfer agent,[2] sold the shares in the stock market,[3] with the covering stock certificate cancelled in favor of the buyers.
In its answer to the complaint, defendant UCPB Securities alleged that EDC in fact authorized petitioner Go, as president and chairman of the board, to sell the subject shares as was done and that the proceeds of the sale were remitted to EDC.[4]
For their part, respondents Tan and Tuan filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds, among others, that it failed to state a cause of action and implead indispensable parties. On January 7, 2008 the RTC initially denied the motion[5] but, upon motion of Tan and Tuan, on May 5, 2008 it reconsidered its previous order[6] and dismissed the complaint on the ground that, for failing to implead indispensable parties to the case, the complaint did not state a cause of action. The indispensable parties, said the RTC, were EDC, the registered owner and seller of the shares in question, and their buyers in the stock market who should have been impleaded as "John Does." The right to file the action belonged to them.[7]
Attorneys Manuel R. Singson and Allan B. Gepty of the Singson Valdez & Associate Law Offices appeared for petitioners Go and Uy. But, while the case was pending, Atty. Singson died, resulting in the dissolution of his law firm. Atty. Gepty received the May 5, 2008 order of the RTC on May 20, 2008. On May 28, 2008 he formally informed petitioners of the law firms dissolution, of the June 5, 2008 deadline for filing a motion for reconsideration, and of the need for Go and Uy to hire new counsel.
On June 4, 2008 the Gepty & Jose Law Office entered its appearance for petitioners Go and Uy and filed, through Atty. Gepty, a motion for reconsideration of the dismissal order, contending that the non-joinder of parties was not a ground for the dismissal of the complaint. On September 9, 2008 Atty. Gepty submitted Go and Uy's written conformity to his firm's appearance in the case.[8]
Meanwhile, unaware that Atty. Gepty had filed a motion for reconsideration, Atty. Paul Bernard T. Irao also appeared for petitioners Go and Uy and on June 24, 2008 filed a motion[9] for leave to admit attached amended complaint where, taking cue from the RTC's May 5, 2008 order, it impleaded EDC and the buyers of the subject shares of stock, designating them as "John Does."[10]
On August 8, 2008 [11] the RTC denied Atty. Gepty's motion for reconsideration and Atty. Irao's motion to admit amended complaint that were both filed on behalf of petitioners Go and Uy. The RTC held that Atty. Gepty had no authority to file the motion for reconsideration for Go and Uy since he did not yet have their written conformity when he filed that motion. He submitted it only on September 9, 2008. For this reason, the filing of that motion for reconsideration did not arrest the running of the period from the May 5, 2008 order that dismissed the complaint. Such order had since become final and executory.
On the other had, the trial court ruled that Atty. Irao's motion to admit amended complaint was but a mere scrap of paper since he served a copy of it on respondents Tan and Tuan's former counsel, the Zamora, Poblador, Vasquez & Bretana law firm, which had withdrawn from the case as early as March 10, 2008. Petitioners Go and Uy's remedy, according to the RTC, was to file a new complaint. They filed a motion for reconsideration of the order but the RTC denied it on October 28, 2008.[12]
On December 2, 2008 petitioners Go and Uy received a copy of the RTC's October 28, 2008 order. On January 27, 2009 they filed the present special civil action of certiorari, assailing the orders of the RTC.
The Issues Presented
Respondents Tan and Tuan present a threshold issue: whether or not petitioners Go and Uy took the correct remedy in filing this special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court from the order dismissing their complaint.
Petitioners Go and Uy, on the other hand, present the issue of whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion in dismissing their complaint for failure to state a cause of action since it did not implead indispensable parties to whom the right to file the action belonged.
The Court's Rulings
One. Respondents Tan and Tuan point out that petitioners Go and Uy's resort to the present special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 is improper as a substitute for an appeal from the RTC's order dismissing their complaint.
But, as the Court held in Strongworld Construction Corporation v. Perello,[13] Section l(h), Rule 41 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure [14] provides that appeal is not a remedy available to a party aggrieved by an order dismissing his action without prejudice. And the dismissal of petitioners Go and Uy's complaint was without prejudice. How is this so?
Section 5, in relation to Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court (Motions to Dismiss) provides that the dismissals which bar the refiling of an action are dismissals based on a) a prior judgment, b) the statutes of limitations, c) the payment, waiver, abandonment, or otherwise extinguishment of the obligation, and d) the unenforceability of the claim. In these instances, the party's remedy is to appeal from the order of dismissal. The dismissal of petitioners Go and Uy's complaint does not belong to this category.
On the other hand, dismissals based on the other grounds enumerated in Section 1 of Rule 16, including one for failure to state a cause of action, are without prejudice. They do not preclude the refiling of the dismissed action. Here, the RTC's May 5, 2008 order dismissed petitioners Go and Uy's complaint for failure to state a cause of action. It is, therefore, a dismissal without prejudice. Their failure to appeal from such order does not bar them from refiling the action. Indeed, the RTC clearly said in its August 8, 2008 order that the remedy of Go and Uy was to file another complaint.
Given that petitioners Go and Uy have the option not to appeal the order dismissing their complaint, they are not barred from instituting a special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 to contest such dismissal pursuant to Section l(h), Rule 41 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.
Dismissals based on the other grounds enumerated in Section 1 of Rule 16, including one for failure to state a cause of action, are without prejudice because they do not preclude the refiling of the action. Here, the RTC's May 5, 2008 order dismissing petitioners Go and Uy's complaint for failure to state a cause of action is without prejudice. Their failure to appeal from it does not bar them from refiling the case. In fact, the RTC said in its August 8, 2008 order, which denied Go and Uy's motion for reconsideration, expressly said that their remedy was to file another complaint.
Since the RTC's dismissal of their complaint was without prejudice, petitioners Go and Uy may file, as Section 1 of Rule 41 explicitly provides, "an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65" to rectify the erroneous dismissal of their case.
Two. As a rule, a special civil action of certiorari assailing an RTC order should be filed with the Court of Appeals pursuant to the hierarchy of courts. An exception to this, however, is where, as in this case, the issues are not factual but purely legal. To abbreviate the review process, the court has resolved to address such issues.[15]
In its order of May 5, 2008, the trial court dismissed petitioners Go and Uy's complaint on the ground that, having failed to implead indispensable parties to the case, their complaint did not state a cause of action. These indispensable parties, said the RTC, were EDC, which was the registered owner and seller of the shares of stock subject of the action, and their buyers in the stock market, which were being impleaded in the amended complaint as "John Does." To justify the dismissal, the RTC also said that the action to annul the sale of the shares of stock in question can only be brought by these omitted parties.[16]
Truly, the trial court gravely abused its discretion. It failed to distinguish between a "real party-in-interest" and an "indispensable party." A real party-in-interest is one who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit, or who is entitled to the avails of such suit. On the other hand, an indispensable party is a party-in-interest without whom no final determination can be had in the action.[17]
If a suit is not brought by or against the real party-in-interest, the court may dismiss the action on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action. In such a case, however, the question that has to be addressed is whether the parties presently impleaded have an interest in the outcome of the litigation, not whether all persons who have an interest in such outcome have been actually impleaded. The latter question is relevant in discussions concerning indispensable parties, but not in discussions concerning real parties-in-interest.[18]
Here, the complaint alleges that while EDC is the registered owner of the subject shares of stocks, it also alleges that petitioners Go and Uy were their beneficial owners. Assuming this allegation to be true, which is the assumption in motions to dismiss, Go and Uy were real parties-in-interest because, as beneficial owners, they stood to loose the dividend incomes from those shares.[19] Similarly, respondents Tan and Tuan are also real parties-in-interest because they would be liable for damages if, as alleged in the complaint, they sold the subject shares without authority. For these reasons, the complaint cannot be dismissed on the ground that it was not brought by or against real parties-in-interest.
On the other hand, the RTC's other justification for dismissing the complaint-its failure to implead EDC, the owners of the shares, or some John Does, their unidentified buyers-does not also warrant the dismissal of the action.[20] Rule 3, Sec. 7 of the Rules of Court defines indispensable parties as those who are parties-in-interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action. Those parties possess such an interest in the controversy that a final decree would necessarily affect their rights so that the courts cannot proceed without their presence.[21]
For example, all the co-owners of a property are indispensable parties in an action for partition of that property because the court cannot divide the same with some co-owners absent and not heard on their rights. Any decision the court makes cannot bind unimpleaded co-owners and will render the partition void. When a case such as this is brought up on appeal, it is generally remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings. [22]
In this case, EDC is the registered owner and alleged seller of the shares in question. The John Does are the alleged buyers of such shares in the stock market. Both may indeed be regarded as indispensable parties who stand to benefit or be prejudiced by any decision the RTC may make regarding the validity of the questioned sale. Since petitioners Go and Uy had sought to implead them as additional defendants in the amended complaint, the RTC may then adjudicate their respective rights and obligations.
The RTC gravely abused its discretion when it dismissed petitioners Go and Uy's action and denied their motion to amend the complaint to implead EDC and the John Doe buyers. The proper remedy when an indispensable party has been left out is to implead such party at any stage of the action. The court, either motu proprio or upon the motion of a party, may order the inclusion of the indispensable party or give the plaintiff opportunity to amend his complaint in order to include indispensable parties.[23]
It is clear, therefore, that petitioners Go and Uy made the correct move when they sought to amend, through Atty. Irao, the complaint to include those parties that the RTC regarded as indispensable. They filed this motion on time since they had a pending motion for reconsideration, earlier filed through Atty. Gepty, that the RTC had not yet resolved. The latter motion halted the running of the period for appeal from the dismissal order.
And, notwithstanding that Atty. Irao also appeared later on for petitioners Go and Uy, it cannot be said that Atty. Gepty had no authority to file a motion for reconsideration for those two. The latter subsequently confirmed Atty. Gepty's authority to represent them. A party may have two or more lawyers working in collaboration in a given litigation.[24]
The fact that petitioners Go and Uy served copy of their motion to amend the complaint on the former counsel of respondents Tan and Tuan after they had withdrawn from the case will not make a scrap of paper of that motion. Respondents Tan and Tuan nonetheless filed their respective oppositions to the motion, curing any prior defect in its service.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition, SETS ASIDE the May 5, 2008, August 8, 2008, and October 28, 2008 orders of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 59, in Civil Case 07-011, and REMANDS the case to that court for further proceedings, including the joinder of the indispensable parties as discussed above.
SO ORDERED.
WITNESS the Honorable Antonio T. Carpio, Chairperson, Honorable Arturo D. Brion, Mariano C. Del Castillo, Roberto A. Abad and Jose P. Perez, Members, Second Division, this 24th day of February, 2010.
G.R. No. 185921 (George L Go and/or Juanito A. Uy v. Hon. Winlove Dumayas, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 59, Makati City, UCPB Securities, Inc., Security Bank and Trust Company, Enrique Tan and Kay Swee Tuan).-
This case is about the proper remedy when the complaint failed to implead indispensable parties and the correct mode of review of a dismissal of an action without prejudice.
Petitioners George L. Go and Juanito A. Uy filed a complaint[1] for recovery of personal properties with damages against respondents United Coconut Planters Bank Securities, Inc. (UCPB Securities), Security Bank and Trust Company (Security Bank), Enrique Tan (Tan), and Kay Swee Tuan (Tuan) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City in Civil Case 07-011.
Petitioners Go and Uy alleged that Equitable Development Corporation (EDC) was the registered owner of one million shares of stock of Equitable PCI Bank covered by Stock Certificate 60406. The beneficial owner of these shares, however, was petitioner Uy. The latter in turn assigned his rights to petitioner Go. Go and Uy subsequently entrusted the stock certificate to respondents Tan and Tuan, who. without their authority and in conspiracy with the defendants UCPB Securities as stock broker, and Security Bank as transfer agent,[2] sold the shares in the stock market,[3] with the covering stock certificate cancelled in favor of the buyers.
In its answer to the complaint, defendant UCPB Securities alleged that EDC in fact authorized petitioner Go, as president and chairman of the board, to sell the subject shares as was done and that the proceeds of the sale were remitted to EDC.[4]
For their part, respondents Tan and Tuan filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds, among others, that it failed to state a cause of action and implead indispensable parties. On January 7, 2008 the RTC initially denied the motion[5] but, upon motion of Tan and Tuan, on May 5, 2008 it reconsidered its previous order[6] and dismissed the complaint on the ground that, for failing to implead indispensable parties to the case, the complaint did not state a cause of action. The indispensable parties, said the RTC, were EDC, the registered owner and seller of the shares in question, and their buyers in the stock market who should have been impleaded as "John Does." The right to file the action belonged to them.[7]
Attorneys Manuel R. Singson and Allan B. Gepty of the Singson Valdez & Associate Law Offices appeared for petitioners Go and Uy. But, while the case was pending, Atty. Singson died, resulting in the dissolution of his law firm. Atty. Gepty received the May 5, 2008 order of the RTC on May 20, 2008. On May 28, 2008 he formally informed petitioners of the law firms dissolution, of the June 5, 2008 deadline for filing a motion for reconsideration, and of the need for Go and Uy to hire new counsel.
On June 4, 2008 the Gepty & Jose Law Office entered its appearance for petitioners Go and Uy and filed, through Atty. Gepty, a motion for reconsideration of the dismissal order, contending that the non-joinder of parties was not a ground for the dismissal of the complaint. On September 9, 2008 Atty. Gepty submitted Go and Uy's written conformity to his firm's appearance in the case.[8]
Meanwhile, unaware that Atty. Gepty had filed a motion for reconsideration, Atty. Paul Bernard T. Irao also appeared for petitioners Go and Uy and on June 24, 2008 filed a motion[9] for leave to admit attached amended complaint where, taking cue from the RTC's May 5, 2008 order, it impleaded EDC and the buyers of the subject shares of stock, designating them as "John Does."[10]
On August 8, 2008 [11] the RTC denied Atty. Gepty's motion for reconsideration and Atty. Irao's motion to admit amended complaint that were both filed on behalf of petitioners Go and Uy. The RTC held that Atty. Gepty had no authority to file the motion for reconsideration for Go and Uy since he did not yet have their written conformity when he filed that motion. He submitted it only on September 9, 2008. For this reason, the filing of that motion for reconsideration did not arrest the running of the period from the May 5, 2008 order that dismissed the complaint. Such order had since become final and executory.
On the other had, the trial court ruled that Atty. Irao's motion to admit amended complaint was but a mere scrap of paper since he served a copy of it on respondents Tan and Tuan's former counsel, the Zamora, Poblador, Vasquez & Bretana law firm, which had withdrawn from the case as early as March 10, 2008. Petitioners Go and Uy's remedy, according to the RTC, was to file a new complaint. They filed a motion for reconsideration of the order but the RTC denied it on October 28, 2008.[12]
On December 2, 2008 petitioners Go and Uy received a copy of the RTC's October 28, 2008 order. On January 27, 2009 they filed the present special civil action of certiorari, assailing the orders of the RTC.
Respondents Tan and Tuan present a threshold issue: whether or not petitioners Go and Uy took the correct remedy in filing this special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court from the order dismissing their complaint.
Petitioners Go and Uy, on the other hand, present the issue of whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion in dismissing their complaint for failure to state a cause of action since it did not implead indispensable parties to whom the right to file the action belonged.
One. Respondents Tan and Tuan point out that petitioners Go and Uy's resort to the present special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 is improper as a substitute for an appeal from the RTC's order dismissing their complaint.
But, as the Court held in Strongworld Construction Corporation v. Perello,[13] Section l(h), Rule 41 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure [14] provides that appeal is not a remedy available to a party aggrieved by an order dismissing his action without prejudice. And the dismissal of petitioners Go and Uy's complaint was without prejudice. How is this so?
Section 5, in relation to Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court (Motions to Dismiss) provides that the dismissals which bar the refiling of an action are dismissals based on a) a prior judgment, b) the statutes of limitations, c) the payment, waiver, abandonment, or otherwise extinguishment of the obligation, and d) the unenforceability of the claim. In these instances, the party's remedy is to appeal from the order of dismissal. The dismissal of petitioners Go and Uy's complaint does not belong to this category.
On the other hand, dismissals based on the other grounds enumerated in Section 1 of Rule 16, including one for failure to state a cause of action, are without prejudice. They do not preclude the refiling of the dismissed action. Here, the RTC's May 5, 2008 order dismissed petitioners Go and Uy's complaint for failure to state a cause of action. It is, therefore, a dismissal without prejudice. Their failure to appeal from such order does not bar them from refiling the action. Indeed, the RTC clearly said in its August 8, 2008 order that the remedy of Go and Uy was to file another complaint.
Given that petitioners Go and Uy have the option not to appeal the order dismissing their complaint, they are not barred from instituting a special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 to contest such dismissal pursuant to Section l(h), Rule 41 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.
Dismissals based on the other grounds enumerated in Section 1 of Rule 16, including one for failure to state a cause of action, are without prejudice because they do not preclude the refiling of the action. Here, the RTC's May 5, 2008 order dismissing petitioners Go and Uy's complaint for failure to state a cause of action is without prejudice. Their failure to appeal from it does not bar them from refiling the case. In fact, the RTC said in its August 8, 2008 order, which denied Go and Uy's motion for reconsideration, expressly said that their remedy was to file another complaint.
Since the RTC's dismissal of their complaint was without prejudice, petitioners Go and Uy may file, as Section 1 of Rule 41 explicitly provides, "an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65" to rectify the erroneous dismissal of their case.
Two. As a rule, a special civil action of certiorari assailing an RTC order should be filed with the Court of Appeals pursuant to the hierarchy of courts. An exception to this, however, is where, as in this case, the issues are not factual but purely legal. To abbreviate the review process, the court has resolved to address such issues.[15]
In its order of May 5, 2008, the trial court dismissed petitioners Go and Uy's complaint on the ground that, having failed to implead indispensable parties to the case, their complaint did not state a cause of action. These indispensable parties, said the RTC, were EDC, which was the registered owner and seller of the shares of stock subject of the action, and their buyers in the stock market, which were being impleaded in the amended complaint as "John Does." To justify the dismissal, the RTC also said that the action to annul the sale of the shares of stock in question can only be brought by these omitted parties.[16]
Truly, the trial court gravely abused its discretion. It failed to distinguish between a "real party-in-interest" and an "indispensable party." A real party-in-interest is one who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit, or who is entitled to the avails of such suit. On the other hand, an indispensable party is a party-in-interest without whom no final determination can be had in the action.[17]
If a suit is not brought by or against the real party-in-interest, the court may dismiss the action on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action. In such a case, however, the question that has to be addressed is whether the parties presently impleaded have an interest in the outcome of the litigation, not whether all persons who have an interest in such outcome have been actually impleaded. The latter question is relevant in discussions concerning indispensable parties, but not in discussions concerning real parties-in-interest.[18]
Here, the complaint alleges that while EDC is the registered owner of the subject shares of stocks, it also alleges that petitioners Go and Uy were their beneficial owners. Assuming this allegation to be true, which is the assumption in motions to dismiss, Go and Uy were real parties-in-interest because, as beneficial owners, they stood to loose the dividend incomes from those shares.[19] Similarly, respondents Tan and Tuan are also real parties-in-interest because they would be liable for damages if, as alleged in the complaint, they sold the subject shares without authority. For these reasons, the complaint cannot be dismissed on the ground that it was not brought by or against real parties-in-interest.
On the other hand, the RTC's other justification for dismissing the complaint-its failure to implead EDC, the owners of the shares, or some John Does, their unidentified buyers-does not also warrant the dismissal of the action.[20] Rule 3, Sec. 7 of the Rules of Court defines indispensable parties as those who are parties-in-interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action. Those parties possess such an interest in the controversy that a final decree would necessarily affect their rights so that the courts cannot proceed without their presence.[21]
For example, all the co-owners of a property are indispensable parties in an action for partition of that property because the court cannot divide the same with some co-owners absent and not heard on their rights. Any decision the court makes cannot bind unimpleaded co-owners and will render the partition void. When a case such as this is brought up on appeal, it is generally remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings. [22]
In this case, EDC is the registered owner and alleged seller of the shares in question. The John Does are the alleged buyers of such shares in the stock market. Both may indeed be regarded as indispensable parties who stand to benefit or be prejudiced by any decision the RTC may make regarding the validity of the questioned sale. Since petitioners Go and Uy had sought to implead them as additional defendants in the amended complaint, the RTC may then adjudicate their respective rights and obligations.
The RTC gravely abused its discretion when it dismissed petitioners Go and Uy's action and denied their motion to amend the complaint to implead EDC and the John Doe buyers. The proper remedy when an indispensable party has been left out is to implead such party at any stage of the action. The court, either motu proprio or upon the motion of a party, may order the inclusion of the indispensable party or give the plaintiff opportunity to amend his complaint in order to include indispensable parties.[23]
It is clear, therefore, that petitioners Go and Uy made the correct move when they sought to amend, through Atty. Irao, the complaint to include those parties that the RTC regarded as indispensable. They filed this motion on time since they had a pending motion for reconsideration, earlier filed through Atty. Gepty, that the RTC had not yet resolved. The latter motion halted the running of the period for appeal from the dismissal order.
And, notwithstanding that Atty. Irao also appeared later on for petitioners Go and Uy, it cannot be said that Atty. Gepty had no authority to file a motion for reconsideration for those two. The latter subsequently confirmed Atty. Gepty's authority to represent them. A party may have two or more lawyers working in collaboration in a given litigation.[24]
The fact that petitioners Go and Uy served copy of their motion to amend the complaint on the former counsel of respondents Tan and Tuan after they had withdrawn from the case will not make a scrap of paper of that motion. Respondents Tan and Tuan nonetheless filed their respective oppositions to the motion, curing any prior defect in its service.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition, SETS ASIDE the May 5, 2008, August 8, 2008, and October 28, 2008 orders of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 59, in Civil Case 07-011, and REMANDS the case to that court for further proceedings, including the joinder of the indispensable parties as discussed above.
SO ORDERED.
WITNESS the Honorable Antonio T. Carpio, Chairperson, Honorable Arturo D. Brion, Mariano C. Del Castillo, Roberto A. Abad and Jose P. Perez, Members, Second Division, this 24th day of February, 2010.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) MA. LUISA L. LAUREA
Clerk of Court
(Sgd.) MA. LUISA L. LAUREA
Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] Rollo, p. 42
[2] Id. at 43.
[3] Id. at 46-47
[4] Records, pp. 73-74.
[5] Rollo, p. 82. Issued by Judge Winlove M. Dumayas.
[6] Id. at 96.
[7] Id. at 102-103.
[8] Records, at 394.
[9] Rollo,p. 119.
[10] Id. at 124.
[11] Id. at 33.
[12] Id. at 40.
[13] G.R.No. 148026, July 27, 2006, 496 SCRA 700, 711-712.
[14] Rule 41, Section 1. Subject of appeal. - An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable:
No appeal may be taken from:
x x xx
(h) An order dismissing an action without prejudice; In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.
[15] Spouses Chita v. Ang, G.R. No. 156164, September 4, 2009.
[16] Rollo,p. 103.
[17] Carandang v. Heirs of Aquino A. De Guzman, G.R. No. 160347, November 29, 2006, 508 SCRA 469,482.
[18] Id. at 483.
[19] Bitong v. Court of Appeals, 354 Phil. 516, 543 (1998), citing Agbayani, Aguedo F., Commercial Laws of the Philippines, Vol. Ill, 1988 Ed., p. 409.
[20] Lagunilla v. Velasco, G.R. No. 169276, July 16, 2009; Macababbad, Jr. v. Masirag, G.R. No. 161237, January 14, 2009, 576 SCRA 70, 88.
[21] Macababbad, Jr. v. Masirag, supra note 20, at 88-89.
[22] Lagunilla v. Velasco, G.R. No. 169276, July 16, 2009.
[23] Macababbad, Jr. v. Masirag, supra note 20, at 88.
[24] Tones v. Rodellas, G.R. No. 177836, September 4, 2009.
