February 2010 - Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
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[G.R. No. 189732 : February 15, 2010] RJ VENTURES REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION AND RAJAH BROADCASTING NETWORK, INC., PETITIONERS, VS. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, RESPONDENT :
[G.R. No. 189732 : February 15, 2010]
RJ VENTURES REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION AND RAJAH BROADCASTING NETWORK, INC., PETITIONERS, VS. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, RESPONDENT
Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated 15 February 2010:
G.R. No. 189732 - RJ Ventures Realty and Development Corporation and Rajah Broadcasting Network, Inc., petitioners, -versus- Philippine National Bank, respondent.
Before us is the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the petitioners RJ Ventures Realty and Development Corporation (RJ Ventures) and Rajah Broadcasting Network, Inc. (Rajah Broadcasting) addressing our Resolution of December 14, 2009 "that dismissed their petition for review on certiorari outright for lack of merit. We rule as well in this Resolution on the petitioners' Motion for the Inhibition of Justice Roberto, and expound on why we.did not act on the Motion for Intervention filed by the Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption (VACC).
The petitioners asked us in their petition to reverse the Court of Appeals decision nullifying - for lack of jurisdiction - the order of the Regional Trial Court of Makati (RTC Makati) granting their motion for a writ of execution to enforce the injunction order the RTC Makati had previously issued. For a proper perspective, we explain the antecedents of this injunction order more fully below.
RJ Ventures (to be accurate, its predecessor-in-interest First Women's Credit Corporation) contracted a loan with the respondent Philippine National Bank (PNB) to purchase the "Buendia property" which the PNB then owned. RJ Ventures constituted a mortgage over the property as security for the loan that was covered by a loan agreement between the parties. After a series of loan restructuring, additional mortgages as security for the restructured loan were constituted on the following properties: (1) the Tagaytay properties owned by RPR Development Corporation which acted as accommodation mortgagor, and (2) radio and broadcasting equipment owned by petitioner Rajah Broadcasting.
When petitioner RJ Ventures defaulted in paying the loan, PNB commenced extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings against the Buendia and Tagaytay properties. The petitioners tried to stop the foreclosure proceedings by filing a petition for injunction (injunction case) with the RTC Makati, Branch 66. This attempt, failed, as Branch 66 denied the application for injunctive relief. Thus, the Buendia and Tagaytay properties were sold in execution to PNB which, much later, consolidated its titles over these properties.
Petitioner RJ Ventures reacted to these developments by filing an action for the annulment of the extrajudicial foreclosure and sale of the Buendia and Tagaytay properties [annulment of foreclosure sale case) with the RTC Makati, Branch 132.
The PNB, for its part, commenced foreclosure proceedings against Rajah Broadcasting's broadcasting equipment. The petitioners responded by applying for a temporary restraining order and/or a writ of injunction to stop the impending sale in the same injunction case it earlier filed with Branch 66. This time, Branch 66 issued a temporary restraining order under the following terms:
After hearing, Branch 66 issued an injunction order whose dispositive portion reads;
The parties litigated the propriety of the issuance of this injunction order all the way up to this Court. This Court affirmed the legality of RTC Makati, Branch 66's injunction order in a Decision where we concluded;
How did the RTC implement the injunction order?
To enforce the Supreme Court Decision that settled the propriety of Branch 66's injunction order, the petitioners filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution, essentially asking Branch 66 to: (1) declare all actions for foreclosure of PNB on any of the collaterals pledged or mortgaged to it by RJ Ventures and Rajah Broadcasting void; and (2) require PNB to return the Buendia and Tagaytay properties.
Branch 66 denied the petitioners' motion on January 10, 2008 on the reasoning that the Buendia and Tagaytay real properties were not included in the injunction order affirmed by the Supreme Court; only the chattels subject of the notice of extrajudicial sale were covered.
In the meantime, the injunction and the annulment of foreclosure sale cases, upon motion, were consolidated under Branch 132. Unrelenting but more than a year later (on February 2, 2009), the petitioners sought the reconsideration of the denial of the motion for the issuance of the writ of execution. Branch 132 granted the motion in its Order dated March 4, 2009 which reads:
The PNB assailed, via a Rule 65 petition for certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals, Branch 132's issuance of a writ of execution. The PNB filed its petition for certiorari without moving for the reconsideration of Branch 132's assailed order.
The CA granted the petition. It resolved the threshold issue of PNB's failure to file a motion for reconsideration in PNB's favor, ruling that the requirement for a motion for reconsideration is not an absolute rule; exceptions exist, as follows: (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (c) where the petitioner is deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; and (d) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process.[1]
The CA ruled that Branch 132 no longer had jurisdiction to reconsider Branch 66's denial of the motion for the issuance of the writ of execution, noting that the petitioners' motion for reconsideration was filed one (I) year from Branch 66 's order denying the motion for writ of execution, and was hence filed out of time. On the more substantive aspect of the validity of Branch 132's order, the CA said that the order was patently null and void for it did not strictly conform to the dispositive portion of the decision sought to be executed. On this point, the CA said:
Our Resolution Sought to be Reconsidered
The petitioners came to us for a Rule 45 review of the CA ruling. We denied the petition outright, as follows:
thus, giving rise to the present motion for reconsideration.
The Motion for Reconsideration
The petitioners cite the following GROUNDS m asking us to reconsider the outright dismissal that we decreed:
OUR RULING
We find the motion for reconsideration totally without merit.
As a preliminary matter, we draw attention to some obvious points that the petitioners might have overlooked or their counsel might have failed to explain to them.
First, Section 5, Rule-45 of the Rules of Court provides that the Supreme Court can deny a Rule 45 petition outright, on the Court's own initiative and without requiring the respondent to comment, under the following terms:
Second, a Rule 45 review is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion. Section 6, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court succinctly provides:
These provisions and established ruling, singly and collectively, support the outright dismissal of the petition after we found that the CA correctly ruled that Branch 132 committed a jurisdictional error in granting the writ based on the petitioners' terms. Specifically, Branch 132 had no jurisdiction to modify the terms of the injunction order that we have affirmed, and could not have validly included the return of the Buendia and Tagaytay properties to the petitioner RJ Ventures and RPR Development Corporation.
As cited above, the order granting the petitioners' application for a temporary restraining order, enjoined the PNB from foreclosing all collaterals pledged or mortgaged by the plaintiffs to the defendant particularly described in Exhibits A to L attached to the order. Exhibits- A to L enumerated and described the collaterals, all of which consisted of radio or broadcasting equipment. The subsequent order grantmg the injunction simply followed the terms of the temporary restraining order as it "enjoined the PNB from foreclosing all collaterals pledged or mortgaged by plaintiffs to defendant bank particularly described in Exhibits A to L, inclusive and hereto attached,"
We note, too, that when the case reached this Court in G.R. No. 164548,[3] the only issue that we resolved was the propriety of the injunctive relief that Branch 66 granted - the injunction on the then impending sale of radio and broadcasting equipment. The Buendia and Tagaytay properties were never mentioned in our G.R. 164458 Decision except as part of the narration of the factual incidents of the case. The exclusion of the Tagaytay and Buendia properties, and the clear reference solely to the radio and broadcasting equipment, are clear from our discussion of the substantive requisites for the grant of injunctive relief:
Thus, our Decision in G.R. No. 164548 only covered the injunction order on the sale of the radio and broadcasting equipment - Annexes A to L - and no other.
When the injunction order that we finally and fully affirmed reached the lower court for execution, that court had no jurisdiction to go beyond the terms of the injunction order, much less to interpret and effectively reverse, what we have confirmed in a final and executory judgment. We have in the past considered any deviation from this rule an example of the gravest abuse of discretion or of an.act patently committed without jurisdiction. As we said in Republic v. delos Angeles,[4] these are acts that in the recent past merited, not only the nullification of the ultra vires orders, but administrative sanctions as well for the issuer, as we did in the case of a Labor Arbiter and a retired Commissioner of the National Labor Relations Commission whom we suspended in Quijano v. Bartolabac[5] for taking the liberty of deviating from this Court's final and executory judgment.
Unfortunately, the RTC precisely did what was clearly impermissible and prohibited when our Decision in G.R. 164548 was returned to it for execution; it varied the injunction's terms and tenor. The CA, therefore, correctly nullified the patently null and void RTC order, and considered the non-filing of the requisite motion for reconsideration excused by the RTC order's patent nullity.
The petitioners also pose in their motion for reconsideration several other legal arguments to assail our conclusion.
First, PNB should not be allowed to take ownership and possession of the Buendia and Tagaytay properties pending determination of the petitioners' default m the main case. The petitioners claim that there was a final and executory decision that the borrower/mortgagor's default still has to be determined on the merits.[6]
The final and executory decision alluded to refers to the following statements in the CA decision dated February 4, 2000 in the case involving the validity of the injunction order issued by Branch 66 (which eventually came to us as G.R. No. 164548):
Second, the restoration of the status quo ante or the application of injunctive relief cannot be selective. The petitioners argue that an injunction order, once issued, seeks to preserve the status quo defined as the last actual, peaceable, unconteste status which preceded the controversy; the status quo, in this case, as in all other cases, refers to the parties' situation prior to the controversy, or prior to the filing of the complaint.
Additionally, the petitioners argue that what applies to a part should all the more apply to the whole, as this case stems from only one main incident which is the purchase of the land and all collaterals were given to secure the purchase of the land. The petitioners further claim that the radio stations were mere support-collaterals; thus, it is inconsistent for PNB to claim status quo ante for the radio stations but not for the main collateral the Buendia property; that, unless the land is returned the case will be rendered moot and academic and the injunction issued by this Honorable (Court) would be rendered useless.
Third, to allow PNB to take ownership and possession of the Buendia and Tagaytay properties pending determination of the petitioners' default in the mam case is tantamount to a pactum commissorium. The petitioners argue that the issue on whether they are in default is yet to be determined in the main case; thus, to allow PNB to take ownership and possession of the collaterals pending a determination is a clear case of automatic appropriation violating Article 2088 of the Civil Code. The situation is even worse because without a clear case of default PNB is being allowed to appropriate the collaterals for itself. The petitioners cited Montevergin v. Court of Appeals[8] which ruled the consolidation of ownership in the person of the mortgagee in equity, merely upon failure of the mortgagor in equity to pay the obligation, amounts to pactum commisorium; the only proper remedy is to cause the foreclosure of the mortgage in equity and if the mortgagee in equity desires to obtain title to the mortgaged property, the mortgagee in equity may buy it at the foreclosure sale.
a. The merits of the petitioners arguments
We see no merit in these arguments.
On the first issue, we find that the petitioners cited the CA ruling completely detached from its whole and appropriate context. The CA was simply stating that, on the issue of whether petitioner Rajah Broadcasting has a clear and unmistakable right to justify an injunctive relief, PNB should not be permitted to claim that petitioner RJ Ventures already admitted default - a matter of evidence - so as to remove any right from petitioner Rajah Broadcasting to ask for injunctive relief This is quite evident from a reading of the portion of the Court's ruling in G.R. No. 164548 that we cited above. This is the correct context upon which the cited CA ruling must be appreciated, as the main issue the CA, and this Court m G.R. No. 164548, resolved was the propriety of the injunctive relief originally granted by the RTC Makati.
Second, on the issue of the application of the status quo ante principle, what the petitioners essentially" ask us to do is to read into the assailed injunction order something that was plainly not within its contemplation. A distinct legal reality we cannot disregard, is that when Branch 66 issued the assailed injunction order, it had previously disallowed a similar application for injunctive relief to stop the foreclosure sale of the Buendia and the Tagaytay properties. The RTC's denial of the injunctive relief sought with respect to the execution sale of the Tagaytay and Buendia properties lapsed to finality after the petitioners failed to question it; thus, an auction sale of the Buendia and Tagaytay properties resulted and PNB eventually consolidated its titles over these properties. All these happened before RTC Makati, Branch 66, issued the assailed injunction order covering Rajah Broadcasting's radio and broadcast equipment. This is the situation under which the status quo ante in the injunction order covering the radio and broadcast equipment must be viewed. To repeat, this was the status quo prevailing at the time of the issuance of the1 assailed injunction order.
More importantly, Branch 66 - fully aware of its previous order denying injunctive relief on the foreclosure sale of the Tagaytay and Buendia properties - expressly limited the reach of its own injunction order, Branch 66 simply ordered PNB and its agents to refrain from doing a particular act - from foreclosing all collaterals pledged or mortgaged by plaintiffs to defendant bank particularly described in Exhibits A to L.[9]
The injunction order, in other words, was indeed selective, as it was intended to apply to a particular situation obtaining at the time of its issuance; it merely enjoined the doing of an identified particular act. With this clear intent, the injunction order cannot be executed to include other situations not intended to be covered.
On the third issue, the elements of pactum commissorium, which enables the mortgagee to acquire ownership of the mortgaged property without the need for any foreclosure proceedings, are: (1) there should be a property mortgaged by way of security for the payment of the principal obligation, and (2) there should be a stipulation for automatic appropriation by the creditor of the thing mortgaged in case of non-payment of the principal obligation within the stipulated period.[10]
We see no pactum commissorium situation in this case given the indubitable absence of any stipulation for automatic appropriation by PNB of the mortgaged properties upon petitioner RJ Ventures' default. To claim that our ruling on the injunction order was effectively a pactum commissorium that placed PNB in ownership and possession is also incorrect and is a matter outside our jurisdiction to rule upon after the finality of the injunctive relief that led to the foreclosure and sale of the Tagaytay and Buendia properties. PNB's ownership and possessory claim over the mortgaged Buendia and Tagaytay properties, too, is based on the extrajudicial foreclosure it commenced and the sale in execution that followed. The cited Montevergin case is also clearly inapplicable; what was involved in that case was an equitable mortgage, not the bonafide mortgage that obtains in this case.
Our last point on this case is a word of caution to the petitioners and their counsels.
This is a simple case involving simple facts and simple issues of law, and does not need to be complicated by the petitioners' and their counsels' actions outside this Court. We make these observations as a measure of fairness. We feel that we should bring these developments to the petitioners' and their counsels' attention as they may involve dealings with this Court outside the due bounds of ethical professional behavior and the respect due to this Court.
First, upon the petitioners' receipt of our Resolution, the petitioners' counsel appears to have gone to the press; he proclaimed that the order of Supreme Court Justice Brion which excludes the Buendia land from the collaterals to be returned to RJ came with unusual speed and parties were not even asked to comment[11] We recognize the petitioners' right to air its grievance before the press, as it is its basic constitutional right to do so. As in the exercise of any other right, the right to air grievance and to publicly comment on pending cases have their limits; the petitioners' counsel, at the very least, must be forthright in his presentation to the press.
To be exact, the Resolution we issued in .this case was a collegial decision made by the Second Division of this Court, not of any single Justice. To attribute the Second Division's action to a specific Justice is to go beyond what our Resolution on its face states. We note additionally that the press statement also tends to send the subliminal message that this Court has been unfair to the petitioners: the present petition is made to appear to have been singled out for denial and that the denial of the petition had been unusually swift.
The outright denial of unmeritorious petitions is a regular occurrence before the courts as these kinds of petitions should not be extended undue and undeserved recognition by requiring the other party to comment. As a matter of course, we immediately deny or allow further actions on new petitions at the En Banc or Division meeting of the Court following the filing of the petition. Thus, our denial of the present petition for lack of merit after more than two weeks from its filing was not unusual. The petitioners' counsel, a long-time practitioner, cannot feign ignorance of these Court practices and mode of operation.
We are equally disturbed by the petitioners' counsel's identification of a ponente when our Resolution was issued by the Division Clerk of Court m the name of the Second Division, and does not show specific action by any one Justice of the Court. The attribution of the Second Division's action on the case to a specific Justice implies, at the very least, a violation of the confidentiality of our records. It may also be interpreted as an attempt to interfere with the exercise of this Court's and its Members' judicial functions through threat of exposure to adverse publicity.
Second, we perceive the petitioners' counsel's insistence that the case be decided after full exchanges of pleadings between the parties to be an attempt to prolong the petitioners' hold on the Buendia and Tagaytay properties without legal basis: Under the circumstances of this case - i.e., the petition's- obvious lack of merit based on the clear terms of the injunction order to be executed, as affirmed by this Court in a final and executory judgment - we see no reason for a full-blown exchange of pleadings when the petition, read in light of its accompanying records and the assailed CA decision, shows on its face its clear lack of merit. A full exchange of pleadings, all the way up to the filing of memoranda, would require a delay of no less than a year in acting on a petition that on its face is patently without merit. Such move on our part, to state the obvious, is contrary to the speedy justice that we are commanded to deliver and an act as well that unreasonably prejudices the other party.
In relation with two above points, we wish to remind the petitioners' counsel that while he may claim zealous action within the parameters of the canons of professional responsibility in acting for the interests of his clients, his first duty as an officer of this Court is to the courts and to the administration of justice; he has an oath to be forthright in his representations to his client, to the public and to the courts, and to avoid delaying any man's cause. He may be treading on dangerous grounds of contempt if he persists in issuing misleading press statements and in pursuing his type of advocacy. Let this serve as a warning to counsel.
b. The VACC Motion for Intervention
That we simply noted the VACC's motion for intervention should not come as a surprise to counsel. When a petition is denied, no case remains as basis for an intervention. This is basic procedural law.
In light of the denial with finality of the petition pursuant to this Resolution, the VACC's motion for reconsideration should again be simply noted without action.
c. On the Motion for the Inhibition of Justice Abad
We deny the motion for the inhibition of Justice Abad as no basis exists for the requested inhibition or for his disqualification from participating in this case. In his letter of the Second Division, Justice Abad explained that:[12]
We see no reason not to accept this explanation.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petitioners' motion for reconsideration and the VACC's motion for intervention with FINALITY. We likewise deny the motion for inhibition of Justice Roberto Abad for lack of merit.
In light of the finality of our ruling, we shall no longer entertain any further pleading and the parties are expressly DIRECTED to desist from filing any further pleading relating to the dismissal of the petition. Let ENTRY of JUDGMENT be made in due course.
SO ORDERED. (Carpio, I, no part; Velasco, Jr., I, designated additional member per raffle dated December 7,2009)
WITNESS the Honorable Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (designated additional member per Raffle dated 7 December 2009), Chairperson, Honorable Arturo D. Brion, Mariano C. Del Castillo, Roberto A. Abad and Jose P. Perez, Members, Second Division, this 15th day of February, 2010.
G.R. No. 189732 - RJ Ventures Realty and Development Corporation and Rajah Broadcasting Network, Inc., petitioners, -versus- Philippine National Bank, respondent.
Before us is the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the petitioners RJ Ventures Realty and Development Corporation (RJ Ventures) and Rajah Broadcasting Network, Inc. (Rajah Broadcasting) addressing our Resolution of December 14, 2009 "that dismissed their petition for review on certiorari outright for lack of merit. We rule as well in this Resolution on the petitioners' Motion for the Inhibition of Justice Roberto, and expound on why we.did not act on the Motion for Intervention filed by the Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption (VACC).
The petitioners asked us in their petition to reverse the Court of Appeals decision nullifying - for lack of jurisdiction - the order of the Regional Trial Court of Makati (RTC Makati) granting their motion for a writ of execution to enforce the injunction order the RTC Makati had previously issued. For a proper perspective, we explain the antecedents of this injunction order more fully below.
RJ Ventures (to be accurate, its predecessor-in-interest First Women's Credit Corporation) contracted a loan with the respondent Philippine National Bank (PNB) to purchase the "Buendia property" which the PNB then owned. RJ Ventures constituted a mortgage over the property as security for the loan that was covered by a loan agreement between the parties. After a series of loan restructuring, additional mortgages as security for the restructured loan were constituted on the following properties: (1) the Tagaytay properties owned by RPR Development Corporation which acted as accommodation mortgagor, and (2) radio and broadcasting equipment owned by petitioner Rajah Broadcasting.
When petitioner RJ Ventures defaulted in paying the loan, PNB commenced extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings against the Buendia and Tagaytay properties. The petitioners tried to stop the foreclosure proceedings by filing a petition for injunction (injunction case) with the RTC Makati, Branch 66. This attempt, failed, as Branch 66 denied the application for injunctive relief. Thus, the Buendia and Tagaytay properties were sold in execution to PNB which, much later, consolidated its titles over these properties.
Petitioner RJ Ventures reacted to these developments by filing an action for the annulment of the extrajudicial foreclosure and sale of the Buendia and Tagaytay properties [annulment of foreclosure sale case) with the RTC Makati, Branch 132.
The PNB, for its part, commenced foreclosure proceedings against Rajah Broadcasting's broadcasting equipment. The petitioners responded by applying for a temporary restraining order and/or a writ of injunction to stop the impending sale in the same injunction case it earlier filed with Branch 66. This time, Branch 66 issued a temporary restraining order under the following terms:
The records show that petitioners received Notices of Extrajudicial Sale on the property covered by broadcasting equipment inventory located at No. 33 Dominican Hills, Baguio City (Exh. A); the property covered by broadcasting equipment inventory located at Mortgagor's transmitter house in Sitio Halang, Barangay San Roque, Antipolo, Rizal (Exh. B); the property covered by broadcasting equipment inventory located at Mortgagor's DZRJ station in 7849 Makati Avenue, corner Gen. Luna Street, Makati City (Exh. C); all to be conducted on May 10, 1999 at 10:00 o'clock in the morning at the City Hall-Baguio City, City Hall - Antipolo City, City Hall - Makati City, respectively.
Petitioners also received demand letters from defendant's counsel to turn over possession and/or control of the following:
Broadcasting Equipment Inventory located at DYRJ-FM Station, 10th Floor, Centerpoint Hotel, Plaridel Street, corner Osmefia Blvd., Cebu City (Exh. D);
Broadcasting Equipment Inventory located at DXDJ-FM Station, Rm. 310 A, B & C Banco Davao Building, San Pedro Street, Davao City (Exh. E);
Broadcasting Equipment Inventory located at DXRJ-FM Station, Carmen Hills, Pryce Plaza, Cagayan de Oro City (Exh. F);
Broadcasting Equipment Inventory located. at DYNJ-FM Station, TRB Building, J.M. Basa Street, Iloilo City (Exh. G);
Broadcasting Equipment Inventory located at the Mortgagor's Novaliches AM Station (Exh. H);
Broadcasting Equipment Inventory located at the Mortgagor's transmitter house in Sitio Halang, Brgy. San Roque, Anitpolo. Rizal, Cagayan de Oro;
Broadcasting Equipment Inventory located at Mortgagor's station in La Villa, Theresa Pension, Tuguegarao, Cagayan Valley (Exh. J);
Equipment Inventory located at the Mortgagor's DZRJ station in 7849 Makati Avenue corner General Luna Street, Makati City (Exh.K);
Broadcasting Equipment Inventory located at DYFJ-FM Station, Rm. 5, 3rd Floor Arremar Building, P. Hernandez Street, corner Margarita Street, Bacolod City (Exh. L).
xxxx
WHEREFORE, defendant Philippine National Bank or any person acting under its instruction are enjoined from foreclosing all collaterals pledged or mortgaged by plaintiffs to defendant particularly described in Exhibits A to L, inclusive and hereto attached, after posting a bond in the amount of One Million Pesos (Pl,000,000.00) to answer for all damages which the respondents may sustain by reason of the TRO if the Court should finally decide that the applicants are not entitled thereto. The hearing for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction is set on May 24, 1999 at 8:30 in the morning.
After hearing, Branch 66 issued an injunction order whose dispositive portion reads;
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, defendant Philippine National Bank or any person acting under its instruction are enjoined from foreclosing all collaterals pledged or mortgaged by plaintiffs to defendant bank particularly described in Exhibits A to L, inclusive and hereto attached, after posting a bond in the amount of P5,000,000.00 to answer for all damages which the respondents may sustain by reason of the injunction if the Court should finally decide that the applicants are not entitled thereto.
The parties litigated the propriety of the issuance of this injunction order all the way up to this Court. This Court affirmed the legality of RTC Makati, Branch 66's injunction order in a Decision where we concluded;
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 31 March"2004 and the Resolution dated 8 July 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 56119, reversing and setting aside the 28 July 1999 and 26'October 1999 Orders of the RTC, Branch 66 of Makati City in Civil Case No. 99-452, and reinstating the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued:on 28 May 1999 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
How did the RTC implement the injunction order?
To enforce the Supreme Court Decision that settled the propriety of Branch 66's injunction order, the petitioners filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution, essentially asking Branch 66 to: (1) declare all actions for foreclosure of PNB on any of the collaterals pledged or mortgaged to it by RJ Ventures and Rajah Broadcasting void; and (2) require PNB to return the Buendia and Tagaytay properties.
Branch 66 denied the petitioners' motion on January 10, 2008 on the reasoning that the Buendia and Tagaytay real properties were not included in the injunction order affirmed by the Supreme Court; only the chattels subject of the notice of extrajudicial sale were covered.
In the meantime, the injunction and the annulment of foreclosure sale cases, upon motion, were consolidated under Branch 132. Unrelenting but more than a year later (on February 2, 2009), the petitioners sought the reconsideration of the denial of the motion for the issuance of the writ of execution. Branch 132 granted the motion in its Order dated March 4, 2009 which reads:
After a review of the records, this Court is inclined to issue a "writ of execution mandating restoration of possession of the Buendia and Tagaytay property (sic) to the plaintiff.
Such restoration of possession is mandated by the Decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 164548 entitled Philippine National Bank versus RJ Ventures Realty Development Corporation and Rajah Broadcasting Network, Inc. which reinstated the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued last 28 May 1999 and which Decision has become
final and executory.
-
xxxx .
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, and finding plaintiffs motion to be well-taken, let a writ of execution issue requiring the restoration of possession of the Buendia property to plaintiff RJ Ventures Realty and Development Corporation, and the Tagaytay property to RFR Development Corporation.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.
The CA Decision
The PNB assailed, via a Rule 65 petition for certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals, Branch 132's issuance of a writ of execution. The PNB filed its petition for certiorari without moving for the reconsideration of Branch 132's assailed order.
The CA granted the petition. It resolved the threshold issue of PNB's failure to file a motion for reconsideration in PNB's favor, ruling that the requirement for a motion for reconsideration is not an absolute rule; exceptions exist, as follows: (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (c) where the petitioner is deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; and (d) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process.[1]
The CA ruled that Branch 132 no longer had jurisdiction to reconsider Branch 66's denial of the motion for the issuance of the writ of execution, noting that the petitioners' motion for reconsideration was filed one (I) year from Branch 66 's order denying the motion for writ of execution, and was hence filed out of time. On the more substantive aspect of the validity of Branch 132's order, the CA said that the order was patently null and void for it did not strictly conform to the dispositive portion of the decision sought to be executed. On this point, the CA said:
It is clear from the dispositive portion of the injunction order that what was enjoined by the trial court was the foreclosure of all collaterals pledged or mortgaged by RJ Ventures and Rajah to the PNB particularly described in Exhibits A to L. The RTC Makati City Branch 132 could not order the restoration of possession of the Buendia and Tagaytay properties, already foreclosed by PNB, in the assailed writ of execution. The Supreme Court's ruling in G.R. No. 164548 is crystal clear that only the writ of preliminary injunction of 28 May 1999 by RTC Makati City Branch 66 was to be reinstated - there was nothing in the Supreme Court's decision or in the CA decision in CA-GR SP No. 56119 about the restoration of possession over the Buendia and Tagaytay properties. A reading of the Supreme Court's decision in fact show that the High Court referred in its discussion to collaterals - radio equipments of Rajah. Additionally, to restore possession of the Buendia property to RJ Ventures is to effectively decide the pending annulment of foreclosure case.
Our Resolution Sought to be Reconsidered
The petitioners came to us for a Rule 45 review of the CA ruling. We denied the petition outright, as follows:
We RESOLVE to deny the petition for lack of merit, as the petitioners failed to show any reversible error on the part of the Court of Appeals in its ruling. We fully agree with the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the RTC Makati City Branch 132 was devoid of jurisdiction to issue a writ of execution under the terms it granted; its order effectively varied the tenor of the decision sought to be executed. Our most recent Resolution in Republic v. delos Angeles is particularly instructive:The lower court has no jurisdiction to interpret, much less reverse, this Court's final and executory judgment. We enunciated this principle as early as 1922 in Shioji v. Harvey. "The inferior court is bound by the decree as the law of the case, and must carry it into execution according to its mandate. They cannot vary it, or examine it for any other purpose than execution, or give any other or further relief, or review it upon any matter decided on appeal for error apparent, or intermeddle with it, further than to settle so much as has been remanded." An order of execution which varies the tenor of the judgment or exceeds the terms thereof is a nullity.
For the patent nullity of the writ of execution order by the RTC Makati City Branch 132, we likewise agree with the CA that the non-compliance with the filing of a requisite motion for reconsideration in a Rule 65 certiorari case is permitted In this case.
thus, giving rise to the present motion for reconsideration.
The Motion for Reconsideration
The petitioners cite the following GROUNDS m asking us to reconsider the outright dismissal that we decreed:
- THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE DISMISSED OUTRIGHT THE RESPONDENT'S PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FOR ITS FAILURE TO FILE PRIOR MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION BEFORE THE LOWER COURT
- THE LOWER COURT DID NOT COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ISSUING THE ORDER DATED 4 MARCH 2009 GRANTING PETITIONERS' MOTION FOR ISSUANCE OF WRIT OF EXECUTION. THE ORDER DATED 10 JANUARY 2009, WHICH IS IN ITSELF DUBIOUS, CAN STILL BE RECONSIDERED AS IT IS MERELY AN INTERLOCUTORY ORDER.
- IN ANY AND ALL EVENTS RESPONDENT SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO TAKE OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION OF THE SUBJECT COLLATERALS INCLUDING THE BUENDIA AND TAGAYTAY PROPERTIES PENDING DETERMINATION OF PETITIONERS' DEFAULT IN THE MAIN CASE.
- THE RESTORATION OF THE STATUS QUO ANTE OR THE APPLICATION OF INJUNCTIVE RELIEF CANNOT BE SELECTIVE.
- ALLOWING RESPONDENT TO TAKE OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION OF THE SUBJECT COLLATERALS INCLUDING THE BUENDIA AND THE TAGAYTAY PROPERTIES AS ENUNCIATED IN THE ASSAILED DECISION PENDING DETERMINATION OF PETITIONERS' DEFAULT IN THE MAIN CASE IS TANTATMOUNT (sic) TO PACTUM COMMISSORIUM.
OUR RULING
As a preliminary matter, we draw attention to some obvious points that the petitioners might have overlooked or their counsel might have failed to explain to them.
First, Section 5, Rule-45 of the Rules of Court provides that the Supreme Court can deny a Rule 45 petition outright, on the Court's own initiative and without requiring the respondent to comment, under the following terms:
SEC. 5. Dismissal or denial of petition. - The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements regarding the payment of docket and other lawful fees, deposit for costs, proof of service of the petition, and the contents of and the documents which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof.
The Supreme Court may on its own initiative deny the petition on the ground that the appeal is without merit, or is prosecuted manifestly for delay, or that the questions raised therein are to unsubstantial to require consideration.
Second, a Rule 45 review is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion. Section 6, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court succinctly provides:
SEC. 6. Review discretionary. - A review is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion, and will be granted only when there are special and important reasons therefor. The following, while neither controlling nor fully measuring the court's discretion, indicate the character of the reasons which will be considered:Third, jurisprudence firmly holds that petitions may be dismissed if they show nothing but empty arguments with no basis in law.[2](a) When the court a quo has decided a question of substance, not theretofore determined by the Supreme Court, or has decided it is a way probably not in accord with law or with the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court; or
(b) When the court a quo has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings or so far sanctioned such departure by a lower court, as to call for an exercise of the power of supervision.
These provisions and established ruling, singly and collectively, support the outright dismissal of the petition after we found that the CA correctly ruled that Branch 132 committed a jurisdictional error in granting the writ based on the petitioners' terms. Specifically, Branch 132 had no jurisdiction to modify the terms of the injunction order that we have affirmed, and could not have validly included the return of the Buendia and Tagaytay properties to the petitioner RJ Ventures and RPR Development Corporation.
As cited above, the order granting the petitioners' application for a temporary restraining order, enjoined the PNB from foreclosing all collaterals pledged or mortgaged by the plaintiffs to the defendant particularly described in Exhibits A to L attached to the order. Exhibits- A to L enumerated and described the collaterals, all of which consisted of radio or broadcasting equipment. The subsequent order grantmg the injunction simply followed the terms of the temporary restraining order as it "enjoined the PNB from foreclosing all collaterals pledged or mortgaged by plaintiffs to defendant bank particularly described in Exhibits A to L, inclusive and hereto attached,"
We note, too, that when the case reached this Court in G.R. No. 164548,[3] the only issue that we resolved was the propriety of the injunctive relief that Branch 66 granted - the injunction on the then impending sale of radio and broadcasting equipment. The Buendia and Tagaytay properties were never mentioned in our G.R. 164458 Decision except as part of the narration of the factual incidents of the case. The exclusion of the Tagaytay and Buendia properties, and the clear reference solely to the radio and broadcasting equipment, are clear from our discussion of the substantive requisites for the grant of injunctive relief:
First, respondents were able to establish a clear and unmistakable right to the possession of the subject collaterals. Evidently, as owner of the subject collaterals that stand to be extrajudtcially foreclosed, respondents are entitled to the possession and protection thereof. RBN as the owner and operator of the subject radio equipment and radio stations have a clear right over them. The instant case does not involve abstract rights, or a future and contingent rights, but a right that is already in existence. To our minds, petitioner's claim that respondents have lost their rights to the subject collaterals in the face of their admission of default is best threshed out in a full-blown trial a quo where the merits of the case can be tried and determined. Significantly, to give the trial court a fair idea of whether a justification for the issuance of the writ exists, only a "sampling" of the evidence is needed, pending a decision on the merits of the case. Hence, the determination of respondents' default and the legality of the defenses they adduced are matters appropriately subject of the trial on the merits.
Second, there is an urgent and paramount necessity to prevent serious damage. Indeed, an injunctive remedy may only be resorted to when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences which cannot be remedied under any standard compensation. PNB assails the existence of this ground by raising the argument that there is, in actuality, a pecuniary standard by which RBN's damage can be measured, as evidenced by the testimony of RBN's witness that it will suffer a loss of P1.2 Billion for the next teu (10) years.
To be sure, this court has declared that the term irreparable injury has a definite meaning hi law. It does not have reference to the amount of damages that may be caused but rather to the difficulty of measuring the damages inflicted. If full compensation can be obtained by way of damages, equity will not apply the remedy of injunction. The Court of Appeals declared that the evidence adduced by respondents more than satisfies the legal and jurisprudential requirements of irreparable injury. It behooves this court to appreciate the unique character of the collaterals that stand to be affected should the Writ of Preliminary Injunction be dissolved as PNB would have it. The direct and inevitable result -would be the stoppage of the operations of respondents' radio stations, consequently, losing its listenership, aud tarnishing the image that it has built over time. It does not stretch one's imagination to see that the cost of a destroyed image is significantly the loss of its good name and reputation. As aptly appreciated by the appellate court, the value of a radio station's image and reputation are not quantifiable in terms of monetary value. This conclusion can be gleaned from the testimony of respondents' witness, Jose E. Escaner, Jr., General Manager of RBN, thus:
xxxx
Evidently, there exists in the case, at bar a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences to respondents which cannot be remedied under any standard compensation. After a careful scrutiny of the attendant circumstances, we do not find herein a reason for reversing the reinstatement by the Court of Appeals of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction earlier issued. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, our Decision in G.R. No. 164548 only covered the injunction order on the sale of the radio and broadcasting equipment - Annexes A to L - and no other.
When the injunction order that we finally and fully affirmed reached the lower court for execution, that court had no jurisdiction to go beyond the terms of the injunction order, much less to interpret and effectively reverse, what we have confirmed in a final and executory judgment. We have in the past considered any deviation from this rule an example of the gravest abuse of discretion or of an.act patently committed without jurisdiction. As we said in Republic v. delos Angeles,[4] these are acts that in the recent past merited, not only the nullification of the ultra vires orders, but administrative sanctions as well for the issuer, as we did in the case of a Labor Arbiter and a retired Commissioner of the National Labor Relations Commission whom we suspended in Quijano v. Bartolabac[5] for taking the liberty of deviating from this Court's final and executory judgment.
Unfortunately, the RTC precisely did what was clearly impermissible and prohibited when our Decision in G.R. 164548 was returned to it for execution; it varied the injunction's terms and tenor. The CA, therefore, correctly nullified the patently null and void RTC order, and considered the non-filing of the requisite motion for reconsideration excused by the RTC order's patent nullity.
The petitioners also pose in their motion for reconsideration several other legal arguments to assail our conclusion.
First, PNB should not be allowed to take ownership and possession of the Buendia and Tagaytay properties pending determination of the petitioners' default m the main case. The petitioners claim that there was a final and executory decision that the borrower/mortgagor's default still has to be determined on the merits.[6]
The final and executory decision alluded to refers to the following statements in the CA decision dated February 4, 2000 in the case involving the validity of the injunction order issued by Branch 66 (which eventually came to us as G.R. No. 164548):
However, it must be underscored that the trial court was not being asked to make a definitive conclusion on the issue of whether or not RBN was indeed guilty of default in paying its loan or committed a breach thereof which necessitated the foreclosure. Its pronouncement on the supposed breach was, therefore, erroneous, or at the very least, premature. True or not, such conclusion is yet to be determined only after the principal action is set for trial on the merits, where the parties are given the opportunity to present their respective evidence in support of their respective claims.[7]
Second, the restoration of the status quo ante or the application of injunctive relief cannot be selective. The petitioners argue that an injunction order, once issued, seeks to preserve the status quo defined as the last actual, peaceable, unconteste status which preceded the controversy; the status quo, in this case, as in all other cases, refers to the parties' situation prior to the controversy, or prior to the filing of the complaint.
Additionally, the petitioners argue that what applies to a part should all the more apply to the whole, as this case stems from only one main incident which is the purchase of the land and all collaterals were given to secure the purchase of the land. The petitioners further claim that the radio stations were mere support-collaterals; thus, it is inconsistent for PNB to claim status quo ante for the radio stations but not for the main collateral the Buendia property; that, unless the land is returned the case will be rendered moot and academic and the injunction issued by this Honorable (Court) would be rendered useless.
Third, to allow PNB to take ownership and possession of the Buendia and Tagaytay properties pending determination of the petitioners' default in the mam case is tantamount to a pactum commissorium. The petitioners argue that the issue on whether they are in default is yet to be determined in the main case; thus, to allow PNB to take ownership and possession of the collaterals pending a determination is a clear case of automatic appropriation violating Article 2088 of the Civil Code. The situation is even worse because without a clear case of default PNB is being allowed to appropriate the collaterals for itself. The petitioners cited Montevergin v. Court of Appeals[8] which ruled the consolidation of ownership in the person of the mortgagee in equity, merely upon failure of the mortgagor in equity to pay the obligation, amounts to pactum commisorium; the only proper remedy is to cause the foreclosure of the mortgage in equity and if the mortgagee in equity desires to obtain title to the mortgaged property, the mortgagee in equity may buy it at the foreclosure sale.
a. The merits of the petitioners arguments
We see no merit in these arguments.
On the first issue, we find that the petitioners cited the CA ruling completely detached from its whole and appropriate context. The CA was simply stating that, on the issue of whether petitioner Rajah Broadcasting has a clear and unmistakable right to justify an injunctive relief, PNB should not be permitted to claim that petitioner RJ Ventures already admitted default - a matter of evidence - so as to remove any right from petitioner Rajah Broadcasting to ask for injunctive relief This is quite evident from a reading of the portion of the Court's ruling in G.R. No. 164548 that we cited above. This is the correct context upon which the cited CA ruling must be appreciated, as the main issue the CA, and this Court m G.R. No. 164548, resolved was the propriety of the injunctive relief originally granted by the RTC Makati.
Second, on the issue of the application of the status quo ante principle, what the petitioners essentially" ask us to do is to read into the assailed injunction order something that was plainly not within its contemplation. A distinct legal reality we cannot disregard, is that when Branch 66 issued the assailed injunction order, it had previously disallowed a similar application for injunctive relief to stop the foreclosure sale of the Buendia and the Tagaytay properties. The RTC's denial of the injunctive relief sought with respect to the execution sale of the Tagaytay and Buendia properties lapsed to finality after the petitioners failed to question it; thus, an auction sale of the Buendia and Tagaytay properties resulted and PNB eventually consolidated its titles over these properties. All these happened before RTC Makati, Branch 66, issued the assailed injunction order covering Rajah Broadcasting's radio and broadcast equipment. This is the situation under which the status quo ante in the injunction order covering the radio and broadcast equipment must be viewed. To repeat, this was the status quo prevailing at the time of the issuance of the1 assailed injunction order.
More importantly, Branch 66 - fully aware of its previous order denying injunctive relief on the foreclosure sale of the Tagaytay and Buendia properties - expressly limited the reach of its own injunction order, Branch 66 simply ordered PNB and its agents to refrain from doing a particular act - from foreclosing all collaterals pledged or mortgaged by plaintiffs to defendant bank particularly described in Exhibits A to L.[9]
The injunction order, in other words, was indeed selective, as it was intended to apply to a particular situation obtaining at the time of its issuance; it merely enjoined the doing of an identified particular act. With this clear intent, the injunction order cannot be executed to include other situations not intended to be covered.
On the third issue, the elements of pactum commissorium, which enables the mortgagee to acquire ownership of the mortgaged property without the need for any foreclosure proceedings, are: (1) there should be a property mortgaged by way of security for the payment of the principal obligation, and (2) there should be a stipulation for automatic appropriation by the creditor of the thing mortgaged in case of non-payment of the principal obligation within the stipulated period.[10]
We see no pactum commissorium situation in this case given the indubitable absence of any stipulation for automatic appropriation by PNB of the mortgaged properties upon petitioner RJ Ventures' default. To claim that our ruling on the injunction order was effectively a pactum commissorium that placed PNB in ownership and possession is also incorrect and is a matter outside our jurisdiction to rule upon after the finality of the injunctive relief that led to the foreclosure and sale of the Tagaytay and Buendia properties. PNB's ownership and possessory claim over the mortgaged Buendia and Tagaytay properties, too, is based on the extrajudicial foreclosure it commenced and the sale in execution that followed. The cited Montevergin case is also clearly inapplicable; what was involved in that case was an equitable mortgage, not the bonafide mortgage that obtains in this case.
Our last point on this case is a word of caution to the petitioners and their counsels.
This is a simple case involving simple facts and simple issues of law, and does not need to be complicated by the petitioners' and their counsels' actions outside this Court. We make these observations as a measure of fairness. We feel that we should bring these developments to the petitioners' and their counsels' attention as they may involve dealings with this Court outside the due bounds of ethical professional behavior and the respect due to this Court.
First, upon the petitioners' receipt of our Resolution, the petitioners' counsel appears to have gone to the press; he proclaimed that the order of Supreme Court Justice Brion which excludes the Buendia land from the collaterals to be returned to RJ came with unusual speed and parties were not even asked to comment[11] We recognize the petitioners' right to air its grievance before the press, as it is its basic constitutional right to do so. As in the exercise of any other right, the right to air grievance and to publicly comment on pending cases have their limits; the petitioners' counsel, at the very least, must be forthright in his presentation to the press.
To be exact, the Resolution we issued in .this case was a collegial decision made by the Second Division of this Court, not of any single Justice. To attribute the Second Division's action to a specific Justice is to go beyond what our Resolution on its face states. We note additionally that the press statement also tends to send the subliminal message that this Court has been unfair to the petitioners: the present petition is made to appear to have been singled out for denial and that the denial of the petition had been unusually swift.
The outright denial of unmeritorious petitions is a regular occurrence before the courts as these kinds of petitions should not be extended undue and undeserved recognition by requiring the other party to comment. As a matter of course, we immediately deny or allow further actions on new petitions at the En Banc or Division meeting of the Court following the filing of the petition. Thus, our denial of the present petition for lack of merit after more than two weeks from its filing was not unusual. The petitioners' counsel, a long-time practitioner, cannot feign ignorance of these Court practices and mode of operation.
We are equally disturbed by the petitioners' counsel's identification of a ponente when our Resolution was issued by the Division Clerk of Court m the name of the Second Division, and does not show specific action by any one Justice of the Court. The attribution of the Second Division's action on the case to a specific Justice implies, at the very least, a violation of the confidentiality of our records. It may also be interpreted as an attempt to interfere with the exercise of this Court's and its Members' judicial functions through threat of exposure to adverse publicity.
Second, we perceive the petitioners' counsel's insistence that the case be decided after full exchanges of pleadings between the parties to be an attempt to prolong the petitioners' hold on the Buendia and Tagaytay properties without legal basis: Under the circumstances of this case - i.e., the petition's- obvious lack of merit based on the clear terms of the injunction order to be executed, as affirmed by this Court in a final and executory judgment - we see no reason for a full-blown exchange of pleadings when the petition, read in light of its accompanying records and the assailed CA decision, shows on its face its clear lack of merit. A full exchange of pleadings, all the way up to the filing of memoranda, would require a delay of no less than a year in acting on a petition that on its face is patently without merit. Such move on our part, to state the obvious, is contrary to the speedy justice that we are commanded to deliver and an act as well that unreasonably prejudices the other party.
In relation with two above points, we wish to remind the petitioners' counsel that while he may claim zealous action within the parameters of the canons of professional responsibility in acting for the interests of his clients, his first duty as an officer of this Court is to the courts and to the administration of justice; he has an oath to be forthright in his representations to his client, to the public and to the courts, and to avoid delaying any man's cause. He may be treading on dangerous grounds of contempt if he persists in issuing misleading press statements and in pursuing his type of advocacy. Let this serve as a warning to counsel.
b. The VACC Motion for Intervention
That we simply noted the VACC's motion for intervention should not come as a surprise to counsel. When a petition is denied, no case remains as basis for an intervention. This is basic procedural law.
In light of the denial with finality of the petition pursuant to this Resolution, the VACC's motion for reconsideration should again be simply noted without action.
c. On the Motion for the Inhibition of Justice Abad
We deny the motion for the inhibition of Justice Abad as no basis exists for the requested inhibition or for his disqualification from participating in this case. In his letter of the Second Division, Justice Abad explained that:[12]
I last worked 23 years ago for the Government in the Office of the Solicitor General, not for former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza (PNB's counsel of record). I never represented Mr. Lucio Tan or any of his companies in the course of my private practice. I have never talked to him. I always paid for my ticket when I take Philippine Air Lines. Atty. Mendoza represented Mr. Tan and his companies in the tax case mentioned. I appeared in that case for cigarette distribution companies that did not have Mr. Tail or any member of his family in the boards. I had a significant private practice that was wholly independent of that of Atty. Mendoza.
If I had a bias, I would not have taken part in the case from the beginning.
We see no reason not to accept this explanation.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petitioners' motion for reconsideration and the VACC's motion for intervention with FINALITY. We likewise deny the motion for inhibition of Justice Roberto Abad for lack of merit.
In light of the finality of our ruling, we shall no longer entertain any further pleading and the parties are expressly DIRECTED to desist from filing any further pleading relating to the dismissal of the petition. Let ENTRY of JUDGMENT be made in due course.
SO ORDERED. (Carpio, I, no part; Velasco, Jr., I, designated additional member per raffle dated December 7,2009)
WITNESS the Honorable Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (designated additional member per Raffle dated 7 December 2009), Chairperson, Honorable Arturo D. Brion, Mariano C. Del Castillo, Roberto A. Abad and Jose P. Perez, Members, Second Division, this 15th day of February, 2010.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) MA. LUISA L. LAUREA
Clerk of Court
(Sgd.) MA. LUISA L. LAUREA
Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] The CA cited Abraham v. NLRC, G.R. No. 143823, March 6, 2001.
[2] See Lozano v. Nograles, G.R. No. 1S7883, June 16, 2009.
[3] Philippine National Bank v. RJ Ventures Realty and Development Corporation and Rajah Broadcasting Network, Inc., 503 SCRA 639.
[4] G.R. Nos. L-26112, 30240, Resolution of October 6, 2008, 567 SCRA 722.
[5] A.C. No. 5649, January 27,2006,480 SCRA 204.
[6] Rollo, p. 822
[7] Id., at 833-834.
[8] 193 Phil 338 (1982).
[9] Under Section 1, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, an injunction order may require a party or a person to refrain from a particular act or acts.
[10] Spouses Ong v. Roban Lending Corporation, G.R. No. 172592, July 9, 2008
[11] In a write-up that appeared in the Philippine Star on January 14, 2010, the news item quoted Arty. Felisberto "Junoy" Verano of the Verano Law Offices
[12] Letter to the Second Division dated February 4, 2010.
