February 2010 - Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
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[G.R. No. 153788 : February 10, 2010] ROGER V. NAVARRO, PETITIONER VS. HON. JOSE L. ESCOBIDO, PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC BRANCH 37, CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, AND KAREN T. GO, DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE NAME KARGO ENTERPRISES, RESPONDENTS. :
[G.R. No. 153788 : February 10, 2010]
ROGER V. NAVARRO, PETITIONER VS. HON. JOSE L. ESCOBIDO, PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC BRANCH 37, CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, AND KAREN T. GO, DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE NAME KARGO ENTERPRISES, RESPONDENTS.
Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated 10 February 2010:
G.R. No. 153788 - ROGER V. NAVARRO, petitioner -versus- HON. JOSE L. ESCOBIDO, Presiding Judge, RTC Branch 37, Cagayan de Oro City, and KAREN T. GO, doing business under the name KARGO ENTERPRISES, respondents.
We resolve petitioner Roger Navarro's (Navarro) Motion for Reconsideration dated December 28, 2009, seeking the reversal of our November 27, 2009 Decision that denied his petition for review on certiorari.
To recall, Navarro entered two lease contracts with Kargo Enterprises, a sole proprietorship, represented by its manager Glenn Go (Glenn), to rent two motor vehicles. The parties agreed that Navarro would deliver postdated checks to Kargo Enterprise as payment for the monthly rentals. When three of these postdated checks were dishonored, Kargo Enterprises made demands on Navarro to either pay the rentals due or return the leased motor vehicles. When Navarro neither paid nor returned the leased vehicles, Karen Go (Karen), as the sole proprietor of Kargo Enterprises, filed two complaints for replevin and/or sum of money against Navarro. Navarro attacked these complaints on the ground of failure to state a cause of action, contending that since Karen was not a party to the lease contracts - the actionable documents on which the complaints were based - she was not the proper party to file the same and the complaints should be dismissed.
In his Motion, petitioner Navarro reiterates his assertion that Karen is not the real party-in-interest to file the complaints against him. Navarro also claims that since the lease contracts make demand a prerequisite before a lessee can be compelled to return the leased vehicles, necessarily, the complaints for replevin must, on their face, show that demand on the lessee was first made. As no demand was made on him, the complaints are dismissible. Navarro further questions the Court's ruling that Kargo Enterprises is conjugal property, arguing that this was not established by the facts alleged in the complaints. Lastly, Navarro asserts that the lower court gravely abused its discretion in issuing the order dated July 26, 2000, directing Karen to amend her complaints to include Glenn as co-plaintiff because according to Navarro, this was tantamount to the court a quo curing Karen's lack of capacity to sue.
We find no merit in these contentions.
On their face, the lease contracts expressly provide that Glenn entered these contracts representing Kargo Enterprises as its Manager. In other words, Glenn signed the contract merely as Kargo Enterprises's agent. Since Kargo Enterprises is a sole proprietorship, it has no identity of its own and relies completely on the identity of its owner, Karen. Simply put, Karen Go is Kargo Enterprises, and is therefore the best party to file the replevin complaints against Navarro for the motor vehicles he leased from Kargo Enterprises.
We cannot understand Navarro's issue with prior notice and demand. To begin with, Karen clearly and specifically alleged in her complaint that "demands, written and oral, were made on defendant ROGER NAVARRO to pay the amount of xxx or to return the subject motor vehicle as also provided for in the LEASE AGREEMENT WITH OPTION TO PURCHASE, but said demands were, and still are, in vain to the great damage and injury of herein plaintiff"[1] Secondly, Navarro already admitted that he received the demand letter sent by Karen's counsel before the replevin complaints were filed.[2] As for Article 1669 of the Civil Code,[3] which Navarro cites in support of his claim that prior notice and demand are a condition precedent to the filing of a replevin action, this provision clearly cannot apply to this case because it falls under the Chapter on Lease of Rural and Urban Lands.
On the issue of the presumed conjugal nature of Kargo Enterprises, we invoke Art. 116 of the Family Code, which provides that "all property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved." In determining whether this legal presumption applies or not, the essential factor to consider is when the trade name was acquired. In the present case, the trade name Kargo Enterprises was registered in Karen's married name, signifying that the trade name was acquired during Karen and Glenn's marriage. Kargo Enterprises, as a trade name and as a business concern, is therefore presumed to be conjugal property. As Navarro did not adduce any proof that Kargo Enterprises was acquired solely by Karen's efforts, the jurisprudence on the matter leads us to conclude that Kargo Enterprises and all assets carried under this name are conjugal property.
Considering this conjugal character and the established fact that Karen, as a real party-in-interest, had a right to file the replevin complaints against Navarro as a representative of the conjugal partnership, Glenn is not indispensable to the complaint but a merepro-forma party. Even if Glenn is an indispensable party, his non-inclusion in the complaints is not a ground to dismiss the action. As we held in Commissioner Domingo v. Scheer[4] parties may be added by order of the court on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or such times as are just.[5]
WHEREFORE, we accordingly DENY Navarro's motion for reconsideration.
SO ORDERED.
WITNESS the Honorable Antonio T. Carpio, Chairperson, Honorable Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, Arturo D. Brion, Mariano C. Del Castillo and Roberto A. Abad, Members, Special Second Division, this 10th day of February, 2010.
G.R. No. 153788 - ROGER V. NAVARRO, petitioner -versus- HON. JOSE L. ESCOBIDO, Presiding Judge, RTC Branch 37, Cagayan de Oro City, and KAREN T. GO, doing business under the name KARGO ENTERPRISES, respondents.
We resolve petitioner Roger Navarro's (Navarro) Motion for Reconsideration dated December 28, 2009, seeking the reversal of our November 27, 2009 Decision that denied his petition for review on certiorari.
To recall, Navarro entered two lease contracts with Kargo Enterprises, a sole proprietorship, represented by its manager Glenn Go (Glenn), to rent two motor vehicles. The parties agreed that Navarro would deliver postdated checks to Kargo Enterprise as payment for the monthly rentals. When three of these postdated checks were dishonored, Kargo Enterprises made demands on Navarro to either pay the rentals due or return the leased motor vehicles. When Navarro neither paid nor returned the leased vehicles, Karen Go (Karen), as the sole proprietor of Kargo Enterprises, filed two complaints for replevin and/or sum of money against Navarro. Navarro attacked these complaints on the ground of failure to state a cause of action, contending that since Karen was not a party to the lease contracts - the actionable documents on which the complaints were based - she was not the proper party to file the same and the complaints should be dismissed.
In his Motion, petitioner Navarro reiterates his assertion that Karen is not the real party-in-interest to file the complaints against him. Navarro also claims that since the lease contracts make demand a prerequisite before a lessee can be compelled to return the leased vehicles, necessarily, the complaints for replevin must, on their face, show that demand on the lessee was first made. As no demand was made on him, the complaints are dismissible. Navarro further questions the Court's ruling that Kargo Enterprises is conjugal property, arguing that this was not established by the facts alleged in the complaints. Lastly, Navarro asserts that the lower court gravely abused its discretion in issuing the order dated July 26, 2000, directing Karen to amend her complaints to include Glenn as co-plaintiff because according to Navarro, this was tantamount to the court a quo curing Karen's lack of capacity to sue.
We find no merit in these contentions.
On their face, the lease contracts expressly provide that Glenn entered these contracts representing Kargo Enterprises as its Manager. In other words, Glenn signed the contract merely as Kargo Enterprises's agent. Since Kargo Enterprises is a sole proprietorship, it has no identity of its own and relies completely on the identity of its owner, Karen. Simply put, Karen Go is Kargo Enterprises, and is therefore the best party to file the replevin complaints against Navarro for the motor vehicles he leased from Kargo Enterprises.
We cannot understand Navarro's issue with prior notice and demand. To begin with, Karen clearly and specifically alleged in her complaint that "demands, written and oral, were made on defendant ROGER NAVARRO to pay the amount of xxx or to return the subject motor vehicle as also provided for in the LEASE AGREEMENT WITH OPTION TO PURCHASE, but said demands were, and still are, in vain to the great damage and injury of herein plaintiff"[1] Secondly, Navarro already admitted that he received the demand letter sent by Karen's counsel before the replevin complaints were filed.[2] As for Article 1669 of the Civil Code,[3] which Navarro cites in support of his claim that prior notice and demand are a condition precedent to the filing of a replevin action, this provision clearly cannot apply to this case because it falls under the Chapter on Lease of Rural and Urban Lands.
On the issue of the presumed conjugal nature of Kargo Enterprises, we invoke Art. 116 of the Family Code, which provides that "all property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved." In determining whether this legal presumption applies or not, the essential factor to consider is when the trade name was acquired. In the present case, the trade name Kargo Enterprises was registered in Karen's married name, signifying that the trade name was acquired during Karen and Glenn's marriage. Kargo Enterprises, as a trade name and as a business concern, is therefore presumed to be conjugal property. As Navarro did not adduce any proof that Kargo Enterprises was acquired solely by Karen's efforts, the jurisprudence on the matter leads us to conclude that Kargo Enterprises and all assets carried under this name are conjugal property.
Considering this conjugal character and the established fact that Karen, as a real party-in-interest, had a right to file the replevin complaints against Navarro as a representative of the conjugal partnership, Glenn is not indispensable to the complaint but a merepro-forma party. Even if Glenn is an indispensable party, his non-inclusion in the complaints is not a ground to dismiss the action. As we held in Commissioner Domingo v. Scheer[4] parties may be added by order of the court on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or such times as are just.[5]
WHEREFORE, we accordingly DENY Navarro's motion for reconsideration.
SO ORDERED.
WITNESS the Honorable Antonio T. Carpio, Chairperson, Honorable Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, Arturo D. Brion, Mariano C. Del Castillo and Roberto A. Abad, Members, Special Second Division, this 10th day of February, 2010.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) MA. LUISA L. LAUREA
Clerk of Court
(Sgd.) MA. LUISA L. LAUREA
Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] Per Karen Go's complaint for Civil Case No. 98-599, rollo, p. 132; complaint for Civil Case No. 98-598, rollo, pp. 145-146.
[2] Per Navarro's Answers dated November 24 and 25, 1998, rollo, pp. 159 and 170, where he states:
6. That, it is not true that prior notice for the termination of the LEASE AGREEMENT was received by Defendant from Lessor-Seller prior to the filing of this Complaint, except that, demand letter sent by plaintiffs counsel x x x.
[3] Article 1669 of the CIVIL CODE states: "If the lease was made for a determinate time, it ceases upon the day fixed, without need of demand."
[4] 466 Phil. 235(2004).
[5] RULES OF COURT, Rule 3, Section 11.
