February 2010 - Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
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[G.R. No. 189503 : February 08, 2010] SEN. PANFILO M. LACSON, PETITIONER, V. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (DOJ), DOJ PANEL COMPOSED OF HON. PETER L. ONG, HON. MARMARIE P. SATIN-VIVAS AND HON. MARI ELVIRA B. HERRERA; CARINA LIM DACER, SABINA DACER-HUNGERFORD, AND AMPARO DACER-HENSON,RESPONDENTS. :
[G.R. No. 189503 : February 08, 2010]
SEN. PANFILO M. LACSON, PETITIONER, V. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (DOJ), DOJ PANEL COMPOSED OF HON. PETER L. ONG, HON. MARMARIE P. SATIN-VIVAS AND HON. MARI ELVIRA B. HERRERA; CARINA LIM DACER, SABINA DACER-HUNGERFORD, AND AMPARO DACER-HENSON,RESPONDENTS.
Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated 08 February 2010:
G.R. No. 189503 - SEN. PANFILO M. LACSON, petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (DOJ), DOJ PANEL COMPOSED OF HON. PETER L. ONG, HON. MARMARIE P. SATIN-VIVAS AND HON. MARI ELVIRA B. HERRERA; CARINA LIM DACER, SABINA DACER-HUNGERFORD, AND AMPARO DACER-HENSON, respondents.
This petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeks the nullification of the Resolution dated August 17, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 109995[1] denying petitioner's prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to nullify and set aside the Subpoena dated June 21, 2009 issued by the Department of Justice in connection with the preliminary investigation in Carina Lim Dacer, et al. vs. Senator Panfilo M. Lacson (herein petitioner), relative to the "Dacer-Corbito Double Murder Case. "[2] It also seeks to enjoin the public respondents from continuing with the preliminary investigation pending the final determination of the petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Court of Appeals.
The Antecedents of the Case
On May 11, 2001, the Department of Justice filed an Information with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, charging several respondents with the Murder of Salvador "Bubby" Dacer and his driver, Emmanuel Corbito. This was docketed as Criminal Case No. 01-191969.[3]
On February 13, 2009, Cezar O. Mancao II, one of the accused in the criminal case, executed an affidavit implicating herein petitioner in the crime.[4] On March 27, 2009, the family of Dacer filed a Complaint-Affidavit with the Department of Justice.[5] The complaint was docketed as I.S. No. XVI-INV-09C-00232. Without leave of court, the Department of Justice, in turn, issued petitioner a subpoena dated July 21. 2009 directing him to appear before the Department of Justice and submit his counter-affidavit in Carina Lim Dacer, et al v. Senator Panfilo M. Lacson, docketed as I.S. No. XVMNV-09C-00232.[6]
On August 13, 2009, in a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition (with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction)[7] before the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R.SP No. 109995, petitioner assailed the validity of the subpoena and the conduct of the investigation (which he considered a "reinvestigation") primarily on the ground that respondent Secretary of Justice and State Prosecutors acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when they initiated the "reinvestigation" of the case absent prior permission from the Regional Trial Court of Manila.[8] Finding no factual and legal basis to grant the injunctive relief(s), the Court of Appeals, in its Resolution of August 17, 2009,[9] denied the application for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction.
Pending the final disposition of the certiorari and prohibition before the Court of Appeals, petitioner comes before this Court. In a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition (with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction)[10] under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure filed on September 30,2009, petitioner seeks to:
(a) NULLIFY and SET ASIDE the Resolution dated August 17, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 109995 denying petitioner's prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to nullify and set aside the Subpoena dated June 21, 2009 issued by the Department of Justice in connection with the preliminary investigation in Carina Lim Dacer, et al. vs. Senator Panfilo M. Lacson (herein petitioner), relative to the "Dacer-Corbito Double Murder Case "[11];
(b) PERMANENTLY ENJOIN the respondents, their successors, agents and/or persons from enforcing and implementing the assailed Subpoena, conducting the "reinvestigation," and "issuing orders, notices, resolutions,decisions or any further action relative thereto until the resolution of CA G. R. SP No. 109995"[12] (underscoring supplied); and
(c) PERPETUALLY RESTRAIN respondent Department of Justice and the Department of Justice panel from hearing, and from issuing orders, notices, resolutions, decisions "or from acting or further acting on the assailed subpoena xxx until the resolution of CA G.R. SP No. 109995"[13] (underscoring supplied).
Meanwhile, the following transpired after the filing of the instant petition before this Court:
1. On November 19, 2009, the Court of Appeals dismissed the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition1[14] pending before it. However, the decision has yet to become final and executory in view of the pending motion for reconsideration of the decision filed by the petitioner on December 7, 2009[15];
2. In view of the non-issuance of the temporary restraining order by the Court of Appeals, the Department of Justice proceeded with the preliminary investigation, after which, it issued its Resolution[16] dated December 18, 2009 in LS. No. XVI-INV-09C-00232, resolving to file charges of Murder against herein petitioner. On January 7, 2010, the Informations[17] were filed before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 10272905 and 10272906; and
3. On January 8, 2010, petitioner filed an Urgent Manifestation and Motion for Resolution of Application for a Temporary Restraining Order or, Alternatively, for the Issuance of a Status Quo Order[18] praying that this Court issue a temporary restraining order against the respondents, their successors, agents and/or other persons acting under their authority, and against the presiding judge of Branch 32 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, or the judge of Branch 18 should the cases be eventually consolidated with the cases pending with the latter, to enjoin them from enforcing and implementing the outcome of the "reinvestigation" docketed as LS. No. XVI-INV-09C-00232, from acting on Criminal Cases Nos. 10272905 and 10272906 against him and from issuing orders, notices, resolutions, decisions or any further action relative thereto until the resolution of CA G.R. SP NO. 109995.[19]
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners argues that the Court of Appeals acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying his application for temporary restraining order despite the existence of valid grounds, to wit: "lack of approval of the RTC to conduct a reinvestigation, prejudgment of the [Department of Justice], prejudicial publicity, violation of due process and deficiency of the affidavits all resulting to petitioner's political persecution." [20]
Private respondents Carina Lim Dacer, Sabina Dacer-Hungerfold, and Amapo Dacer-Henson contend that the application for injunctive relief, whether preliminary or final, has become moot and academic because petitioner already filed his Counter-Affidavit in I.S. No. XVI-INV-09C-00232. [21] They say that the petition for certiorari and prohobition before the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 109995 has already been dismissed following the same rationale, [22] while the motion for its reconsideration, which is yet to be resolved, allegedly merely reiterated the issues herein raised. [23] Respondents further argue that, in any event, CA did not gravely abuse its discretion in denying petitioner's application for the following reasons: (1) petitioner has plain, speedy and adequate remedies under the rules of criminal procedure; and (2) there is no reason to disturb the rule of non-interference with the conduct of preliminary investigation." [24] Lastly, they contend that petitioner is liable for forum-shopping because the actions before the Court of Appeals and this Court involve the same or related causes and substantially the same reliefs."[25]
On the other hand, public respondents, through the Assistant Solicitor General, pray that they be excused from filing the required comment on the instant petition inasmuch as the Office of the Solicitor General has been excused by the Court of Appeals to file a Comment on the petition before it, and in the present case, private respondents are still the real parties interested in upholding the questioned acts of public respondents Department of Justice Secretary and Department of Justice Panel.[26]
As regards petitioner's latest Urgent Manifestation and Motion for Resolution of Application for a Temporary Restraining Order or, Alternatively, for the Issuance of a Status Quo Order in connection with the Informations filed against him with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, and docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 10272905 and 10272906, he submits that it becomes even more imperative for this Court to act on the petition with utmost dispatch.
Issue
The issue in this case is whether or not the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it refused to issue a temporary restraining order against the Department of Justice to prevent the latter from conducting the preliminary investigation against petitioner.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition is devoid of merit.
I.
Petitioner anchors the filing of this petition on Garcia, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al[27] where the subject of the petition for certiorari and prohibition was the resolution of the Court of Appeals holding in abeyance the resolution of the prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order against the implementation of the preventive suspension Order of the Office of the Ombudsman. This Court set aside the assailed resolution of the Court of Appeals and issued a temporary restraining order holding that:
Garcia, however, does not help petitioner's position.
In Garcia, what was sought was the injunction against a preventive suspension that was immediately executory even while the preliminary investigation was pending. We ruled that the preventive suspension must be enjoined. Herein petitioner is not under detention. Neither is there an order for his arrest. Even if there is, and the offense charged is non-bailable, the same may be the subject of a petition for bail, if, as petitioner here argues, the evidence of guilt is not strong. In other words, there is, in this case, no extreme urgency, nor is there the consequent immediate need for a preventive writ, of the nature that attended the Garcia case. Indeed, a warrant of arrest may not at all be issued.
This Court carefully looked into the applicability of the rest of the cases cited by petitioner and found that these do not apply squarely to the issues and facts of the instant case. We proceed to illustrate some.
Petitioner heavily relied on the rulings of this Court in the case of Crespo v. Mogul,[28] holding that "once the case had already been brought to Court whatever disposition the fiscal may feel should be proper in the case thereafter should be addressed for the consideration of the Court,"[29] and Decin v. Tayco,[30] declaring in its obiter dictum that "any disposition of the case thereafter as to the dismissal, conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the court."[31] Petitioner likewise cited Soberano v. The People of the Philippines,[32] to illustrate an incident where the prosecution sought leave of court prior to the conduct of a reinvestigation.[33]
Petitioner, however, failed to note that in Crespo, there was no additional accused/respondent involved. The motion to defer arraignment pending the review by the Secretary of Justice of the resolution to file the information, pertains to petitioner Crespo himself, not to some other person who has yet to be similarly charged in the same case, and over whom the Court has not yet acquired jurisdiction. Thus, We ruled:
On the other hand, the case of Decin[37] involves several accused against whom the complaint was initially dismissed by the Cadiz City Prosecutor in its Resolution of September 16, 1997, which was approved by the Ombudsman for the Military in its Order of June 15, 1998. The issue in that case is whether or not the Order of the Ombudsman for the Military may be subsequently modified or reversed by the Department of Justice despite the fact that the Ombudsman's Order has become final and executory. Clearly, the facts of Decin are not on all fours with the instant petition.
There, the accused have been earlier included in the preliminary investigation. In the instant case, petitioner is being asked to answer for the charges for the first time at the Department of Justice.
In Soberano v. People,[38] the principal issue concerns "the duty of a trial court judge when confronted with a motion to admit amended information excluding some of the accused named in the original information for utilization as witnesses for the State."[39] (Emphasis supplied) This Court did not touch on the alleged need to seek prior approval of the trial court when an accused, who has not yet been subject of the previous investigation, is made to answer for the charges in an independent preliminary investigation. There was mention of a Motion for Reinvestigation filed by the prosecution when accused Dumlao implicated other police officers. However, nowhere in that Decision did this Court pronounce that the filing of such a motion is mandatory.
The cited cases do not support the proposition of petitioner. There is no definite jurisprudence that says that he cannot be preliminarily investigated without the permission of the Court before which the first case, against Mancao and others, is pending. The petitioner is unable to point to a clear and definite right that needs to be protected. Without such right, neither can petitioner point to any injury that he may suffer. The Court of Appeals was not in error, much less did it commit grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioner's baseless application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order.
II.
Time and again, We have ruled that questions of fact should not be raised in a petition for certiorari before this Court because We are not a trier of facts.[40]
While it would seem that petitioner is merely asking for the nullification of the resolution of the Court of Appeals denying his prayer for a temporary restraining order, he is, in fact, asking this Court to determine the legality of the proceedings with the Department of Justice, a procedure that would require findings of fact. For instance, petitioner alleges that he is being persecuted, because the Department of Justice is conducting the preliminary investigation notwithstanding the absence of a prima facie case against him. However, the determination of whether or not there is a prima facie case against a person involves questions of fact; and that is precisely the duty of the Department of Justice not of the courts. Absent any showing of patent and gross abuse of discretion on the part of the Department of Justice, this Court will not interfere. And, obviously, it will do so only after, not before, the exercise of such judgment. Indeed, as presented in the petition, the allegations of political persecution, prejudgment and absence of due process are all held up solely by the argument about the alleged absence of a prima facie case against petitioner. As already stated, this would require findings of facts; would even require the exercise by this Court of an executive function. We have reread each of the cases cited by the petitioner. All reached Us after the preliminary investigations have been conducted. We were asked to rule on the findings that resulted. We were not asked, as in this case, to prohibit the conduct of the investigation.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Carpio, J., no part; Nachura, J., designated additional member per Raffle dated 1 February 2010.
SO ORDERED.
WITNESS the Honorable Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura (designated additional member per Raffle dated 1 February 2010), Chairperson, Honorable Arturo D. Brion, Mariano C. Del Castillo, Roberto A. Abad and Jose P. Perez, Members, Second Division, this 8th day of February, 2010.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd)MA. LUISA L. LAUREA
Clerk of Court
G.R. No. 189503 - SEN. PANFILO M. LACSON, petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (DOJ), DOJ PANEL COMPOSED OF HON. PETER L. ONG, HON. MARMARIE P. SATIN-VIVAS AND HON. MARI ELVIRA B. HERRERA; CARINA LIM DACER, SABINA DACER-HUNGERFORD, AND AMPARO DACER-HENSON, respondents.
This petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeks the nullification of the Resolution dated August 17, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 109995[1] denying petitioner's prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to nullify and set aside the Subpoena dated June 21, 2009 issued by the Department of Justice in connection with the preliminary investigation in Carina Lim Dacer, et al. vs. Senator Panfilo M. Lacson (herein petitioner), relative to the "Dacer-Corbito Double Murder Case. "[2] It also seeks to enjoin the public respondents from continuing with the preliminary investigation pending the final determination of the petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Court of Appeals.
The Antecedents of the Case
On May 11, 2001, the Department of Justice filed an Information with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, charging several respondents with the Murder of Salvador "Bubby" Dacer and his driver, Emmanuel Corbito. This was docketed as Criminal Case No. 01-191969.[3]
On February 13, 2009, Cezar O. Mancao II, one of the accused in the criminal case, executed an affidavit implicating herein petitioner in the crime.[4] On March 27, 2009, the family of Dacer filed a Complaint-Affidavit with the Department of Justice.[5] The complaint was docketed as I.S. No. XVI-INV-09C-00232. Without leave of court, the Department of Justice, in turn, issued petitioner a subpoena dated July 21. 2009 directing him to appear before the Department of Justice and submit his counter-affidavit in Carina Lim Dacer, et al v. Senator Panfilo M. Lacson, docketed as I.S. No. XVMNV-09C-00232.[6]
On August 13, 2009, in a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition (with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction)[7] before the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R.SP No. 109995, petitioner assailed the validity of the subpoena and the conduct of the investigation (which he considered a "reinvestigation") primarily on the ground that respondent Secretary of Justice and State Prosecutors acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when they initiated the "reinvestigation" of the case absent prior permission from the Regional Trial Court of Manila.[8] Finding no factual and legal basis to grant the injunctive relief(s), the Court of Appeals, in its Resolution of August 17, 2009,[9] denied the application for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction.
Pending the final disposition of the certiorari and prohibition before the Court of Appeals, petitioner comes before this Court. In a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition (with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction)[10] under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure filed on September 30,2009, petitioner seeks to:
(a) NULLIFY and SET ASIDE the Resolution dated August 17, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 109995 denying petitioner's prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to nullify and set aside the Subpoena dated June 21, 2009 issued by the Department of Justice in connection with the preliminary investigation in Carina Lim Dacer, et al. vs. Senator Panfilo M. Lacson (herein petitioner), relative to the "Dacer-Corbito Double Murder Case "[11];
(b) PERMANENTLY ENJOIN the respondents, their successors, agents and/or persons from enforcing and implementing the assailed Subpoena, conducting the "reinvestigation," and "issuing orders, notices, resolutions,decisions or any further action relative thereto until the resolution of CA G. R. SP No. 109995"[12] (underscoring supplied); and
(c) PERPETUALLY RESTRAIN respondent Department of Justice and the Department of Justice panel from hearing, and from issuing orders, notices, resolutions, decisions "or from acting or further acting on the assailed subpoena xxx until the resolution of CA G.R. SP No. 109995"[13] (underscoring supplied).
Meanwhile, the following transpired after the filing of the instant petition before this Court:
1. On November 19, 2009, the Court of Appeals dismissed the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition1[14] pending before it. However, the decision has yet to become final and executory in view of the pending motion for reconsideration of the decision filed by the petitioner on December 7, 2009[15];
2. In view of the non-issuance of the temporary restraining order by the Court of Appeals, the Department of Justice proceeded with the preliminary investigation, after which, it issued its Resolution[16] dated December 18, 2009 in LS. No. XVI-INV-09C-00232, resolving to file charges of Murder against herein petitioner. On January 7, 2010, the Informations[17] were filed before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 10272905 and 10272906; and
3. On January 8, 2010, petitioner filed an Urgent Manifestation and Motion for Resolution of Application for a Temporary Restraining Order or, Alternatively, for the Issuance of a Status Quo Order[18] praying that this Court issue a temporary restraining order against the respondents, their successors, agents and/or other persons acting under their authority, and against the presiding judge of Branch 32 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, or the judge of Branch 18 should the cases be eventually consolidated with the cases pending with the latter, to enjoin them from enforcing and implementing the outcome of the "reinvestigation" docketed as LS. No. XVI-INV-09C-00232, from acting on Criminal Cases Nos. 10272905 and 10272906 against him and from issuing orders, notices, resolutions, decisions or any further action relative thereto until the resolution of CA G.R. SP NO. 109995.[19]
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners argues that the Court of Appeals acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying his application for temporary restraining order despite the existence of valid grounds, to wit: "lack of approval of the RTC to conduct a reinvestigation, prejudgment of the [Department of Justice], prejudicial publicity, violation of due process and deficiency of the affidavits all resulting to petitioner's political persecution." [20]
Private respondents Carina Lim Dacer, Sabina Dacer-Hungerfold, and Amapo Dacer-Henson contend that the application for injunctive relief, whether preliminary or final, has become moot and academic because petitioner already filed his Counter-Affidavit in I.S. No. XVI-INV-09C-00232. [21] They say that the petition for certiorari and prohobition before the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 109995 has already been dismissed following the same rationale, [22] while the motion for its reconsideration, which is yet to be resolved, allegedly merely reiterated the issues herein raised. [23] Respondents further argue that, in any event, CA did not gravely abuse its discretion in denying petitioner's application for the following reasons: (1) petitioner has plain, speedy and adequate remedies under the rules of criminal procedure; and (2) there is no reason to disturb the rule of non-interference with the conduct of preliminary investigation." [24] Lastly, they contend that petitioner is liable for forum-shopping because the actions before the Court of Appeals and this Court involve the same or related causes and substantially the same reliefs."[25]
On the other hand, public respondents, through the Assistant Solicitor General, pray that they be excused from filing the required comment on the instant petition inasmuch as the Office of the Solicitor General has been excused by the Court of Appeals to file a Comment on the petition before it, and in the present case, private respondents are still the real parties interested in upholding the questioned acts of public respondents Department of Justice Secretary and Department of Justice Panel.[26]
As regards petitioner's latest Urgent Manifestation and Motion for Resolution of Application for a Temporary Restraining Order or, Alternatively, for the Issuance of a Status Quo Order in connection with the Informations filed against him with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, and docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 10272905 and 10272906, he submits that it becomes even more imperative for this Court to act on the petition with utmost dispatch.
Issue
The issue in this case is whether or not the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it refused to issue a temporary restraining order against the Department of Justice to prevent the latter from conducting the preliminary investigation against petitioner.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition is devoid of merit.
I.
Petitioner anchors the filing of this petition on Garcia, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al[27] where the subject of the petition for certiorari and prohibition was the resolution of the Court of Appeals holding in abeyance the resolution of the prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order against the implementation of the preventive suspension Order of the Office of the Ombudsman. This Court set aside the assailed resolution of the Court of Appeals and issued a temporary restraining order holding that:
In this case: for the CA to defer action on petitioner's application for an injunctive relief pending the filing of respondent's comment is to foreclose altogether the very remedy sought by petitioners when they questioned the alleged illegal preventive suspension. This is so, because the Ombudsman's Order is immediately effective and executory, and the filing of the comment by all of the respondents will entail considerable time. (Emphasis supplied)
While we do not entirely blame the CA for being too cautious in not granting any injunctive relief without first considering the counterarguments of the opposing parties, it would have been more prudent for it to have, at the very least, on account of the extreme urgency of the matter and the seriousness of the issues raised in the certiorari petition, issued a TRO while it awaits the respective comments of the respondents and while it judiciously contemplates on whether or not to issue a writ of preliminary injunction. Verily the basic purpose of the restraining order is to preserve the status quo until the hearing of the application for preliminary injunction. It is a preservative remedy for the protection of substantive rights and interests." (Emphasis supplied)
Garcia, however, does not help petitioner's position.
In Garcia, what was sought was the injunction against a preventive suspension that was immediately executory even while the preliminary investigation was pending. We ruled that the preventive suspension must be enjoined. Herein petitioner is not under detention. Neither is there an order for his arrest. Even if there is, and the offense charged is non-bailable, the same may be the subject of a petition for bail, if, as petitioner here argues, the evidence of guilt is not strong. In other words, there is, in this case, no extreme urgency, nor is there the consequent immediate need for a preventive writ, of the nature that attended the Garcia case. Indeed, a warrant of arrest may not at all be issued.
This Court carefully looked into the applicability of the rest of the cases cited by petitioner and found that these do not apply squarely to the issues and facts of the instant case. We proceed to illustrate some.
Petitioner heavily relied on the rulings of this Court in the case of Crespo v. Mogul,[28] holding that "once the case had already been brought to Court whatever disposition the fiscal may feel should be proper in the case thereafter should be addressed for the consideration of the Court,"[29] and Decin v. Tayco,[30] declaring in its obiter dictum that "any disposition of the case thereafter as to the dismissal, conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the court."[31] Petitioner likewise cited Soberano v. The People of the Philippines,[32] to illustrate an incident where the prosecution sought leave of court prior to the conduct of a reinvestigation.[33]
Petitioner, however, failed to note that in Crespo, there was no additional accused/respondent involved. The motion to defer arraignment pending the review by the Secretary of Justice of the resolution to file the information, pertains to petitioner Crespo himself, not to some other person who has yet to be similarly charged in the same case, and over whom the Court has not yet acquired jurisdiction. Thus, We ruled:
The filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal action. The Court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case, which is the authority to hear and determine the case.[34] When after the filing of the complaint or information a warrant for the arrest of the accused is issued by the trial court and the accused either voluntarily submitted himself to the Court or was duly arrested, the Court thereby acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused.[35] (Emphasis supplied)
The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a prima facie case exists warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the information in the proper court. In turn, as above stated, the filing of said information sets in motion the criminal action against the accused in Court. Should the fiscal find it proper to conduct a reinvestigation of the case, at such stage, the permission of the Court must be secured, xxx [36] (Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, the case of Decin[37] involves several accused against whom the complaint was initially dismissed by the Cadiz City Prosecutor in its Resolution of September 16, 1997, which was approved by the Ombudsman for the Military in its Order of June 15, 1998. The issue in that case is whether or not the Order of the Ombudsman for the Military may be subsequently modified or reversed by the Department of Justice despite the fact that the Ombudsman's Order has become final and executory. Clearly, the facts of Decin are not on all fours with the instant petition.
There, the accused have been earlier included in the preliminary investigation. In the instant case, petitioner is being asked to answer for the charges for the first time at the Department of Justice.
In Soberano v. People,[38] the principal issue concerns "the duty of a trial court judge when confronted with a motion to admit amended information excluding some of the accused named in the original information for utilization as witnesses for the State."[39] (Emphasis supplied) This Court did not touch on the alleged need to seek prior approval of the trial court when an accused, who has not yet been subject of the previous investigation, is made to answer for the charges in an independent preliminary investigation. There was mention of a Motion for Reinvestigation filed by the prosecution when accused Dumlao implicated other police officers. However, nowhere in that Decision did this Court pronounce that the filing of such a motion is mandatory.
The cited cases do not support the proposition of petitioner. There is no definite jurisprudence that says that he cannot be preliminarily investigated without the permission of the Court before which the first case, against Mancao and others, is pending. The petitioner is unable to point to a clear and definite right that needs to be protected. Without such right, neither can petitioner point to any injury that he may suffer. The Court of Appeals was not in error, much less did it commit grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioner's baseless application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order.
II.
Time and again, We have ruled that questions of fact should not be raised in a petition for certiorari before this Court because We are not a trier of facts.[40]
While it would seem that petitioner is merely asking for the nullification of the resolution of the Court of Appeals denying his prayer for a temporary restraining order, he is, in fact, asking this Court to determine the legality of the proceedings with the Department of Justice, a procedure that would require findings of fact. For instance, petitioner alleges that he is being persecuted, because the Department of Justice is conducting the preliminary investigation notwithstanding the absence of a prima facie case against him. However, the determination of whether or not there is a prima facie case against a person involves questions of fact; and that is precisely the duty of the Department of Justice not of the courts. Absent any showing of patent and gross abuse of discretion on the part of the Department of Justice, this Court will not interfere. And, obviously, it will do so only after, not before, the exercise of such judgment. Indeed, as presented in the petition, the allegations of political persecution, prejudgment and absence of due process are all held up solely by the argument about the alleged absence of a prima facie case against petitioner. As already stated, this would require findings of facts; would even require the exercise by this Court of an executive function. We have reread each of the cases cited by the petitioner. All reached Us after the preliminary investigations have been conducted. We were asked to rule on the findings that resulted. We were not asked, as in this case, to prohibit the conduct of the investigation.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Carpio, J., no part; Nachura, J., designated additional member per Raffle dated 1 February 2010.
SO ORDERED.
WITNESS the Honorable Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura (designated additional member per Raffle dated 1 February 2010), Chairperson, Honorable Arturo D. Brion, Mariano C. Del Castillo, Roberto A. Abad and Jose P. Perez, Members, Second Division, this 8th day of February, 2010.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd)MA. LUISA L. LAUREA
Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., with Associate Justices Japar B. Dimaampao and Francisco P. Acosta, concurring.
[2] Rollo, p. 122.
[3] Id. at 18, citing Soherano v. People, G.R. No. 154629, October 5, 2005, 472 SCRA 125.
[4] Rollo,p. 23.
[5] Id. at 128.
[6] Id. at 22.
[7] Id. at 65-121.
[8] Id. at 66.
[9] Id. at 62-64.
[10] Id. at 3-60.
[11] Id. at 56-A.
[12] Id.
[13] Id.
[14] Id. at 510-517.
[15] Id. at 518-527.
[16] Id. at 650-701.
[17] Id. at 702-708.
[18] Id. at 635-649.
[19] Id. at 643
[20] Id. at 14.
[21] Id. at 465.
[22] Id. at 468
[23] Id. at 452.
[24] Id. at 465.
[25] Id.
[26] Id. at 442-447.
[27] G.R. No. 185132, April 24, 2009.
[28] 235 Phil. 465 (1987).
[29] Rollo, pp. 4, 8, 10, 20, 25, 33, 35 and 735.
[30] G.R. No. 149991, 14 February 2007, 515 SCRA 655, 667.
[31] Rollo, pp. 9, 33 and 735.
[32] Supra note 3.
[33] Rollo, pp. 9,17-19 and 735.
[34] Crespo v. Mogul, supra note 31, citing Herrera v. Barreto, 25 Phil. 245 (1913); U.S. v. Limsiongco, 41 Phil. 94 (1920); De la Cruz v. Mujer, 36 Phil. 213 (1917); Section 1 Rule 110, Rules of Court, now Section 1 also Rule 110, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.
[35] Crespo v. Mogul, supra, citing 21 C.J.S. 123; Carrington.
[36] Crespo v. Mogul, id.
[37] Supra note 33.
[38] Supra note 3.
[39] Id.
[40] The Liga ng Mga Barangay National v. The City Mayor of Manila, 465 Phil. 529, 543 (2004); Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 378 Phil. 984, 990 (1999).
