Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions > Year 2010 > February 2010 Resolutions > [G.R. No. 171169 : February 03, 2010] GC DALTON INDUSTRIES, INC. VERSUS EQUITABLE PCI BANK [G.R. NO. 187709] CAMDEN INDUSTRIES, INC. VERSUS EQUITABLE PCI BANK :

Sirs/Mesdames:

 

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated 03 February 2010:

G.R. No. 171169 � GC DALTON INDUSTRIES, INC. versus EQUITABLE PCI BANK

G.R. No. 187709 � CAMDEN INDUSTRIES, INC. versus EQUITABLE PCI BANK

Over time and by constant repetition, a lie may gain some semblance of truth if it is allowed to go uncontradicted. Such falsehood must be unmasked and exposed for what it really is, specially if it distorts the rule of law and beclouds the precepts of truth and justice that this Court stands for.

THE CASES

The cases referred to in Paguia's letter are (1) GC Dalton Industries, Inc. v. Equitable PCI Bank (G.R. No. 171169) which was decided by the First Division on August 24, 2009 and (2) Camden Industries, Inc. v. Equitable PCI Bank (G.R. No. 187709) which was decided by the Third Division on December 7, 2009.

Paguia sent copies of his letter to all the members of the Court, including those who had no participation in the aforementioned cases.

THE LETTER

In his letter, Paguia alleges that, as the ponente of the August 24, 2009 decision of the First Division in GC Dalton Industries, Inc. v. Equitable PCI Bank (G.R. No. 171169) and Chairperson of the December 7, 2009 resolution of the Third Division which decided Camden Industries, Inc. v. Equitable PCI Bank (G.R. No. 187709), Justice Renato Corona allegedly "ignored" the following:

(1)	Equitable PCI Bank filed two appeals of the March 30, 2005. decision (on Camden) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City;
(2)	the first appeal was through the ex abundante ad cautelam notice of appeal dated July 5, 2005 which was filed while the bank's [notion for reconsideration and/or new trial[1] was still pending with the trial court;
(3)	the bank abandoned its motion when it filed the ex abundante ad cautelam notice of appeal, thereby divesting the RTC of jurisdiction over the case;
(4)	the bank filed a second appeal and abandoned its first appeal when it filed a manifestation and notice of appeal dated September 27, 2005 and
(5)	the abandonment of the first appeal rendered the March 30, 2005 RTC decision (on Camden) final and executory.

Paguia finds it "strange" that Dalton and Camden, which were related cases, were assigned to whatever Division Justice Corona happened to be in � Dalton to the First Division when he was there and Camden to the Third Division when he transferred to it. Quite clearly, the impression Paguia is trying to create is that Justice Corona maneuvered and schemed to get control of both cases m order to favor Equitable PCI Bank, in alleged collusion with the Villaraza Cruz and Angangco Law Offices. The allegation is completely false and malicious.

Supposedly invoking the "rule of law," Paguia prays for Justice Corona's "'investigation" for the alleged "misrepresentations" in alleged collusion with the aforementioned counsel of Equitable PCI Bank.

LETTER IS FULL OF ERRORS (AND MISLEADING STATEMENTS)

Almost all the allegations of Paguia's letter are either wrong or misleading. Its timing is inappropriate, its form defective, its basis fallacious and its motive vicious.

INAPPROPRIATE TIMING OF THE LETTER

The letter was furnished to all the members of the Court on January 15, 2010. At that time, however, motions for reconsideration of the August 24, 2009 decision in Dalton (G.R. No. 171169) and the December 7, 2009 resolution in Camden (G.R. No. 187709) were still pending before the Court. By this fact alone, the circulation of the letter on January 15, 2010 was highly improper and suspicious.

First, the letter was premature. At that point, the Court still had not exercised its discretion on whether or not to reconsider its decision and resolution. It could still pass upon and correct its mistakes, if indeed there were any, in the regular course of its proceedings. However, by imputing a ''misrepresentation" of certain matters of law, the letter preempted or attempted to preempt whatever action the Court was going to take on the motions for reconsideration in the said cases.^[2]

Second, it was meant to influence the members of the Court on how the then pending motions for reconsideration were to be resolved. By making unfounded accusations and casting aspersions on the integrity of the ponente in Dalton (G.R. No. 171169) who also happened to be the Chairperson of the Third Division where Camden (G.R. No. 187709) was later decided, the letter was a not-too-subtle warning or threat to the other members of the Court that they had to adopt Paguia's arguments at the risk of being the subject of a similar complaint in the future.

Third, through his letter, Paguia was attempting to ram his way into participating in both1 G.R. Nos. 171169 and 187709. For all intents and purposes, he was assailing the August 24, 2009 decision in Dalton (G.R. No. 171169) and the December 7, 2009 resolution in Camden (G.R. No. 187709).

A very basic rule of procedure is that only those who are parties to a case have the standing to question the decision of a court.^[3] A complete stranger has no personality to assail the decision of the court, unless and until he is first allowed to intervene. Moreover, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest,^[4] that is, the one who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the gains of the suit.^[5]

Paguia is neither a party to nor a counsel for any of the parties in either Dalton or Camden (G.R. Nos. 171169 and 187709). He never sought nor was he ever granted legitimate standing or intervention in the said cases. Neither will he personally gain any benefit nor suffer any injury from the action of the Court in both cases. He does not even claim to be entitled to the "avails of the suit."

Paguia suddenly appears from nowhere and tries to intrude into the said cases wearing the mask of a "citizen, taxpayer and lawyer." But the question of whether just any concerned "citizen, taxpayer or lawyer" can seek relief even in cases where he is a total stranger can only arise in public suits.^[6] Dalton and Camden (G.R. Nos. 171169 and 187709) are undoubtedly private suits involving private parties with private interests. In relation to these cases, Paguia was neither a real party nor one with any interest therein.

Again, although a citizen's suit or a taxpayer's suit or a suit by a member of the legal profession may be granted legal standing in cases involving constitutional issues, no constitutional issue is involved in Dalton and Camden (G.R. Nos. 171169 and 187709). Paguia himself alleges no constitutional issue in his letter. Without any direct personal stake, therefore, he cannot imprudently force his way into participating in either of these cases.

Contrary to his claim that he is a "mere citizen," he is actually a "nuisance suitor" since he has no right to or interest in whatsoever in the outcome of the two civil cases which would justify his interference.^[7] And as an alleged "taxpayer," he conveniently disregards the fact that both cases involve no expenditure of even a centavo of public funds.^[8] As if these were not enough, he dares approach this Court as a "lawyer" despite his existing indefinite suspension from the practice of law.^[9] To give due course to his letter would be to unwittingly restore him lo his privileges as a member of the bar. It would be, by any reckoning, a blanket invitation to complete strangers to file pleadings or letters in other cases as false proxies for the real parties in interest.

DEFECTIVE FORM OF THE LETTER

Paguia's letter does not only attempt to intrude into cases where he is a complete stranger, it also does so in a manner that seriously violates the Rules of Court. By asking for "relief," it purports to be a motion without, however, following the standard form of motions.^[10] Contrary to Section 6, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, it does not contain proof of service on all parties concerned. As such, it is a worthless scrap of paper.

At the risk of being repetitious, it cannot be overemphasized that Paguia's letter is actually an attempt to intervene in Dalton and Camden (G.R. Nos. 171169 and 187709). Yet, again, it does not conform to the formal requisites of intervention. Besides failing to show legal interest in the matter in litigation or in the success of either of the parties or an interest against both parties, the "letter-in-intervention" was "filed" not only without prior leave of court but also after a decision and resolution had already been issued in G.R. Nos. 171169 and 187709, respectively, contrary to Sections 1 and 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court.^[11]

Furthermore, the letter is also disguised as an administrative complaint against a member of the Court. Yet it is not even verified or supported by affidavits of persons who have personal knowledge of the facts alleged therein.^[12] Not only that. An administrative case cannot be used to short-circuit judicial proceedings or substitute for judicial remedies.^[13] An administrative complaint against a judge or justice cannot be pursued simultaneously with the judicial remedies accorded to parties aggrieved by an order or judgment that is perceived to be erroneous.^[14] Resort to judicial remedies, as well as an entry of judgment in the corresponding action or proceeding, is a pre-requisite to extraordinary measures against the person of the magistrate concerned.^[15] Thus, the pendency of the motions for i reconsideration in Dalton and Camden (G.R. Nos. 171169 and 187709) proscribed the demand for an "investigation" contained in the letter.

LETTER LACKS MERIT

The issues raised by Paguia came only after the petitions in both Dalton and Camden (G.R. Nos. 171169 and 187709) were already denied. Indeed, these issues were never raised even by the real parties-in-interest in all their pleadings and motions submitted to the Court. Neither Dalton Industries, Inc. nor Camden Industries, Inc. nor Equitable PCI Bank ever claimed that the bank abandoned its motion for reconsideration and/or new trial of the March 30, 2005 decision of the RTC of Pasig City when it filed art ex abundante cautelam notice of appeal dated July 5, 2005.^[16] None of the parties ever asserted that, by the filing of the said ex abundante cautelam notice of appeal, the trial court lost its jurisdiction over the case. No party ever argued that the filing of the bank's manifestation and notice of appeal dated September 27, 2005 resulted in the abandonment of the ex abundante cautelam notice of appeal. None of the parties questioned the elevation of the records of Civil Case No. 70098 to this Court. None of the parties ever raised any concern about the participation of any member of the Court in G.R. Nos. 171169 and 187709. Yet, now comes Paguia, the author of the letter, a total stranger in the said cases and one who did not even care to establish that he had personal knowledge of his allegations, raising all these issues and pretending to know better than the parties themselves.

NEW ISSUES NOT ALLOWED

No new issue may be raised by a party in his/its memorandum; in fact, any issue raised in his/its pleadings but not included in the memorandum is deemed waived or abandoned.^[17] Given this established rule, if the parties in Dalton (G.R. No. 171169) were themselves prohibited from raising new or additional issues in their respective memoranda, what can be said of one who is not even a party to the case raising new issues by a mere informal letter in an illegitimate attempt to intervene? In other words, if the basic rules of fair play require that no new points of law, theories, issues or arguments may be raised by a party in the memorandum, then it is all the more erroneous and contrary to fairness, justice and due process for a stranger to raise new issues after a decision or resolution has already been issued.

MALICIOUS ATTRIBUTION OF ILL MOTIVES

The letter maliciously attributes to justice Corona ill motives not at all supported by the record. Without basis, it charges "misrepresentation" of legal matters, "undue interest" in the case, "collusion" with counsel for a party and "partiality" on Justice Corona's part.

The Supreme Court is a collegial court. Indeed, the Constitution requires that its conclusions in any case be always reached in consultation.^[18] Thus, whether rendered en bane or in division, all decisions or resolutions of the Court are decisions or resolutions of the Court itself and not just of a single member thereof.

In trying to pin the alleged "misrepresentations" in the August 24, 2009 decision in Dalton (G.R. No. 171169) on Justice Corona only, Paguia betrays his ignorance of the fundamental law and basic procedures of the Court. As certified by the Chief Justice, who happened to be the Chairperson of the First Division which rendered the decision in Dalton, the said decision "had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division." Like any decision or resolution of the Court, it was arrived at by the members of the Court after a careful, individual study and thorough deliberation of the facts and evidence and judicious application of the law.

Both Dalton and Camden, in fact, only affirmed the respective decisions of the Court of Appeals.

Paguia's malicious accusation of "misrepresentation" and "collusion" with Equitable PCI Bank's counsel insults Justice Corona and his colleagues in the First and Third Divisions and, ultimately, the Court itself.

It is extremely difficult to understand what Paguia means by the alleged "misrepresentations." Misrepresentation is a false statement about a material fact in any contract or other transaction that misleads the party to whom it is made. Paguia accuses Justice Corona of "ignoring" what he (Paguia) claims was a "matter of law" without, however, explaining exactly what Justice Corona supposedly misrepresented or ignored.

Paguia also insinuates alleged "partiality," because both Dalton and Camden were resolved in favor of respondent Equitable PCI Bank. But, once again, he does not substantiate his charges. Quite cleverly, he suppresses the fact that his "client" failed to pay its loans to the bank, resulting in the foreclosure of mortgage. He simply insists that his interpretation of the law is correct. But this Court is not bound to follow the mere say-so of any person (specially one who has been stripped of his license to practice law) on a particular legal point. In our legal system, it is from this Tribunal's decisions and rulings that ail courts, as well as lawyers and litigants should take their bearings.^[19]

As to the allegation in the letter that the entire records of the cases "somehow ended up under (Justice Corona's) control," the innuendo is that Justice Corona must have maneuvered to have both Dalton and Camden assigned to him. Nothing can be farther from the truth. Dalton was raffled in 2006, Camden in 2009. Justice Corona was not even a member of the i Raffle Committee for Division Cases when both cases were raffled. How could he have influenced the assignment of the cases? Nevertheless, the fact is that having the documents available to the assigned ponente is not only the standard procedure in this Court, it is also desirable as it enables him to study the same before coming up with comprehensive decisions, specially in related cases such as these.

As a collegial and deliberative body, not one member of the Court can dictate the process (from the raffling or assignment until final resolution) and outcome of any particular case. Any member can request for the records of a case for study and report. This is all but part of the regular business of the Court, an important business which it now has to drop just to attend to Paguia's pettifogging exercise.

A FINAL WORD

This Court is baffled by so many things about Paguia's letter. Why the inordinate concern of a total stranger for these cases? Who prodded this stranger to write the letter, specifically asking for Justice Corona's "investigation"? Why raise matters not even raised by the parties themselves? Why take an action which the parties themselves have deemed fit not to take? Why make a shotgun accusation that has no basis at all? Why single out a member of the Court? Why furnish copies of the letter to all the members of the Court, including those who have had no participation in either of these cases? Indeed, the letter breeds a lot of questions, not the least of which is the probability that there must be somebody orchestrating all this from behind the scenes.

Legal mercenaries and judicial saboteurs who peddle lies, distort principles of law and masquerade as crusading advocates demean not only the judicial system but also justice itself. Their schemes, machinations and attacks ought to be exposed and fended off to protect the institutional integrity of this bulwark of democracy.

WHEREFORE, the "letter-motion" of one Alan Paguia concerning the two (2) cases above-cited is hereby noted without action and expunged from the records. The request for the "investigation" of Justice Renato C. Corona is hereby denied for utter lack of merit.

Alan Paguia is ordered to SHOW CAUSE within ten days why he should not be sanctioned for making malicious and baseless accusations against a member of the Court and, ultimately, the Court itself. Other than complying with the show cause order, he is strictly ENJOINED from filing any further communication or paper relating to the same cases and issues. Any violation of this directive shall be dealt with severely.

SO ORDERED.

[Honorable Renato C. Corona took no part.]

WITNESS the Honorable Presbitero J. Velasco. Jr., Hon. Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, Hon. Teresita J. Leonardo De Castro (designated member per Raffle dated 03 February 2010), Hon. Diosdado M. Peralta and Hon. Jose C. Mendoza. Members, Third Division, this 3^rd day of February 2010.

Endnotes:

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^[1] The copy of the motion for reconsideration and/or new trial which Camden Industries, Inc. attached to its petition bears the receiving date April 22, 2005 (rollo, p. 67). This was the same copy cited in our resolution dated December 7, 2009. But based on the records of the RTC, the motion for reconsideration and/or new trial was actually received on April 19, 2005. However, no party disputes that the motion for reconsideration and/or new trial was filed on time.

^[2] The motion for reconsideration in G.R. No. 187709 was denied with finality on January 18, 2010 while the motion for reconsideration in G.R. No. 171159 was denied with finality on January 20, 2010 only.

^[3] See Foster-Gallego v. Spouses Galang, 474 Phil. 148 (2004).

^[4] Section 2, Rule 3, RULES OF COURT.

^[5] Id.

^[6] David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. Nos. 171396 et al., 3 May 2006, 489 SCRA 160.

^[7] Pepsico, Inc. v. Emerald Pizza, Inc., G.R. No. 153059, 14 August 2007, 530 SCRA 58.

^[8] Asean Pacific Planners v. City of Urdaneta, G.R. No. 162525, 23 September 2008, 566 SCRA 219.

^[9] Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 462 Phil. 135 (2003).

^[10] In this connection, Section 10, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 10. Form. � The Rules applicable to pleadings shall apply to written motions so far as concerns caption, designation, signature, and other matters of form.

^[11] Sec. 1. Who may intervene. � A person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. x x x

Sec. 2. Time to intervene. � The motion to intervene may be filed at any time before rendition of judgment by the trial court. A copy of the pleading-in-intervention shall be attached to the motion and served on the original parties. (Emphasis supplied)

^[12] See Section 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. While the Rule is made applicable to judges of regular and special courts and justices of the Court of Appeals or the Sandiganbayan, the minimum requirements therein should also be applied to administrative complaints against Justices of the Supreme Court who may only be removed by impeachment.

^[13] See extended resolution dated July 27, 2005 in Re: BGS Realty v. Basilia, A.M. OCA IPI No. 04-2118-RTJ.

^[14] Rodriguez v. Judge Gatdula, 442 Phil. 307 (2002).

^[15] Maylas, Jr. v. Judge Sese, A.M. No. RTJ-06-2012, 04 August 2006. 497 SCRA 602.

^[16] This contention is wrong. A pleading denominated as ex abundante ad cautelam and filed by a party with the express intention of reserving a succeeding remedy white pursuing a pending recourse cannot be construed as an abandonment of the latter. In Mitmug v. Comelec (G.R. No. 106270-73, 10 February 1994, 230 SCRA 54), a party who filed with the trial court an election protest ex abundante ad cautelam was deemed to have preserved his petition pending with this Court for the annulment of the election. The Court took into account the express intention of the party to pursue his pending petition, notwithstanding his precautionary protest.

In the present case, [Equitable PCI Bank] clarified in its ex abundante ad cautelam notice of appeal that "[it] should not be construed to weaken the grounds relied upon by the defendant in its motion for reconsideration and/or new trial" but that "[it] is being filed as a precautionary measure considering that the [Equitable PCI Bank] has only two (2) days from receipt of the order in the remotest possibility that [the RTC] denies its motion for reconsideration and/or new trial." The bank plainly intended to await the outcome of its motion for reconsideration and/or new trial even as it filed an ex abundante ad cautelam notice of appeal.

^[17] En banc resolution dated November 21, 2000 in A.M. No. 99-2-04-SC (In Re: Dispensing with Rejoinder); Heirs of Marasigan v. Marasigan, G.R. No. 156078, 14 March 2008, 548 SCRA 409. See also September 25, 2006 resolution in G.R. No. 171159.

^[18] Section 13, id.

^[19] Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. Employees Association v. Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., G.R. No. L-25291, 30 January 1971, 37 SCRA 244.