January 2010 - Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
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[G.R. No. 185256 : January 20, 2010] JOSE JOTA FOR HIMSELF AND AS REPRESENTATIVE OF EMMA JOTA, PETITIONERS, VS. LEONIDA M. GARCIA AND ALEX GARCIA, RESPONDENTS:
[G.R. No. 185256 : January 20, 2010]
JOSE JOTA FOR HIMSELF AND AS REPRESENTATIVE OF EMMA JOTA, PETITIONERS, VS. LEONIDA M. GARCIA AND ALEX GARCIA, RESPONDENTS
Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated 20 January 2010:
G.R. No. 185256- JOSE JOTA for himself and as representative of EMMA JOTA, petitioners, -versus- LEONIDA M. GARCIA and ALEX GARCIA, respondents[*]
This resolves the Motion for Reconsideration dated 10 March 2009 filed by petitioners, Spouses Jose and Emma Jota, seeking to set aside our Resolution of 14 January 2009 that affirmed the Decision dated 20 August 2008 of the Court of Appeals and the Order dated 25 March 2005 of Branch 263 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City. In the Order dated 28 March 2005, the RTC rendered judgment by default against the petitioners, consequently ordering the cancellation of the petitioners' title, the issuance of a new title in the name of respondent, Alex Garcia, and the payment of damages in favor of respondents Leonida Garcia and Alex Garcia.
This Court finds no reversible errors on the part of the Court of Appeals and the RTC to merit reconsideration. The RTC clearly acted within its discretion when it rendered the judgment by default against petitioners, due to their failure to answer the respondents' written interrogatories. Section 5 of Rule 29 of the Rules of Court states that:
The failure or refusal to answer written interrogatories, as mandated by the above-quoted rule, is a proper basis for dismissal.[1] The petitioners' repeated insistence that the trial court could have applied other remedies that were more just and equitable cannot prevail over the court's discretion to determine which sanction under the Rules of Court should be imposed on a party who fails to comply with the modes of discovery.
The petitioners' assertions that they did not refuse to answer the interrogatories, and that they merely responded to the written interrogatories erroneously, are belied by the records. The petitioners failed to serve an answer to the written interrogatories at any time during the proceedings before the lower court. The baseless allegation in their Opposition that written interrogatories should not be allowed since they are violative of the established rules of procedure underscores their refusal to participate in the discovery proceedings. This Opposition is not, by any stretch of the imagination, a mere "erroneous" response to the interrogatories.
Even if the Court of Appeals did not require the respondents to present evidence to support their claim, the petitioners' admissions support the finding of the Court of Appeals that petitioners were not innocent purchasers for value. A purchaser in good faith and for value is one who buys property without notice that some other person has a right or interest in the property and pays the price before he or she has notice of any adverse claim or interest of another person in the same property.[2] The petitioners admitted that an adverse claim over the land had been made by Carmencita Gomez, the respondent's predecessor-in-interest. The right of a buyer to rely upon the face of a certificate of title and to dispense with the need of inquiring further is upheld only when a party has no actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that should impel a reasonable and cautious person to conduct further inquiry.[3]
Moreover, the respondents had occupied the disputed property for more than ten years before the petitioners bought it.[4] The petitioners also admitted that they were residents of the same subdivision where the disputed property is located. That the petitioners, who had already known of an adverse claim against the vendor's title over the land they were about the purchase, also overlooked that people other than the vendors occupied the disputed lot located near their residence, amounts to willful blindness. The buyer of a real property in the possession of another must be wary and must investigate the rights of the possessor. Without such inquiry the buyer cannot be said to be buying in good faith,[5] A person who deliberately ignores a significant fact that could create suspicion in an otherwise reasonable person is not an innocent purchaser for value.[6]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
WITNESS the Honorable Antonio T. Carpio, Chairperson, Honorable Arturo D. Brion, Mariano C. Del Castillo, Roberto A. Abad and Jose P. Perez, Members, Second Division, this 20th day of January, 2010.
G.R. No. 185256- JOSE JOTA for himself and as representative of EMMA JOTA, petitioners, -versus- LEONIDA M. GARCIA and ALEX GARCIA, respondents[*]
This resolves the Motion for Reconsideration dated 10 March 2009 filed by petitioners, Spouses Jose and Emma Jota, seeking to set aside our Resolution of 14 January 2009 that affirmed the Decision dated 20 August 2008 of the Court of Appeals and the Order dated 25 March 2005 of Branch 263 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City. In the Order dated 28 March 2005, the RTC rendered judgment by default against the petitioners, consequently ordering the cancellation of the petitioners' title, the issuance of a new title in the name of respondent, Alex Garcia, and the payment of damages in favor of respondents Leonida Garcia and Alex Garcia.
This Court finds no reversible errors on the part of the Court of Appeals and the RTC to merit reconsideration. The RTC clearly acted within its discretion when it rendered the judgment by default against petitioners, due to their failure to answer the respondents' written interrogatories. Section 5 of Rule 29 of the Rules of Court states that:
Section 5. Failure of party to attend or serve answers.-If a party or an officer or managing agent of a party willfully fails to appear before the officer who is to take his deposition, after being served with a proper notice, or fails to serve answers to interrogatories submitted under Rule 25 after proper service of such interrogatories, the court on motion and notice, may strike out all or any part of any pleading of that party, or dismiss the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or enter a judgment by default against that party, and in its discretion, order him to pay reasonable expenses incurred by the other, including attorney's fees (Emphasis ours).
The failure or refusal to answer written interrogatories, as mandated by the above-quoted rule, is a proper basis for dismissal.[1] The petitioners' repeated insistence that the trial court could have applied other remedies that were more just and equitable cannot prevail over the court's discretion to determine which sanction under the Rules of Court should be imposed on a party who fails to comply with the modes of discovery.
The petitioners' assertions that they did not refuse to answer the interrogatories, and that they merely responded to the written interrogatories erroneously, are belied by the records. The petitioners failed to serve an answer to the written interrogatories at any time during the proceedings before the lower court. The baseless allegation in their Opposition that written interrogatories should not be allowed since they are violative of the established rules of procedure underscores their refusal to participate in the discovery proceedings. This Opposition is not, by any stretch of the imagination, a mere "erroneous" response to the interrogatories.
Even if the Court of Appeals did not require the respondents to present evidence to support their claim, the petitioners' admissions support the finding of the Court of Appeals that petitioners were not innocent purchasers for value. A purchaser in good faith and for value is one who buys property without notice that some other person has a right or interest in the property and pays the price before he or she has notice of any adverse claim or interest of another person in the same property.[2] The petitioners admitted that an adverse claim over the land had been made by Carmencita Gomez, the respondent's predecessor-in-interest. The right of a buyer to rely upon the face of a certificate of title and to dispense with the need of inquiring further is upheld only when a party has no actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that should impel a reasonable and cautious person to conduct further inquiry.[3]
Moreover, the respondents had occupied the disputed property for more than ten years before the petitioners bought it.[4] The petitioners also admitted that they were residents of the same subdivision where the disputed property is located. That the petitioners, who had already known of an adverse claim against the vendor's title over the land they were about the purchase, also overlooked that people other than the vendors occupied the disputed lot located near their residence, amounts to willful blindness. The buyer of a real property in the possession of another must be wary and must investigate the rights of the possessor. Without such inquiry the buyer cannot be said to be buying in good faith,[5] A person who deliberately ignores a significant fact that could create suspicion in an otherwise reasonable person is not an innocent purchaser for value.[6]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
WITNESS the Honorable Antonio T. Carpio, Chairperson, Honorable Arturo D. Brion, Mariano C. Del Castillo, Roberto A. Abad and Jose P. Perez, Members, Second Division, this 20th day of January, 2010.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) MA. LUISA L. LAUREA
Clerk of Court
(Sgd.) MA. LUISA L. LAUREA
Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[*] Public respondent Court of Appeals deleted. Under Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, public respondents need not be included in the title as either petitioners or respondents.
[1] Cason v. San Pedro, 119 Phil 249, 255 (1963); Arellano v. Court of First Instance of Sorsogon, 160 Phil 47, 64-66 (1975); Insular Life Assurance Company Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97654, November 14, 1994, 238 SCRA 88, 93; Dela Torre v. Pepsi Cola Products Philippines, Inc., 358 Phil 849, 861-862; Zepeda v. China Banking Corporation, G.R. No. 172175, October 9, 2006, 504 SCRA 126, 134-135.
[2] Occena v. Esponilla, G.R. No. 156973, June 4, 2004, 431 SCRA 116, 124.
[3] Lit v. Manipon, 431 Phil 569S 582 (2002).
[4] Rollo, pp. 49-50.
[5] Lu v. Manipon, 431 Phil 569, 583 (2002), May 7, 2002 and Occe�a v. Esponilla, G.R. No. 156973, June 4,2004,431 SCRA116, 124-125.
[6] Bank of Commerce v. San Pablo, G.R. No. 167848, April 27, 2007, 522 SCRA 713, 728 and Heirs of Leopoldo Vencilao Sr. v. Court of Appeals, 351 Phil 815, 825 (1998).
