June 2011 - Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
[G.R. Nos. 180880-81 : June 07, 2011]
KEPPEL CEBU SHIPYARD, INC. V. PIONEER INSURANCE AND SURETY CORPORATION
[G.R. NOS. 180896-97. JUNE 7, 2011]
PIONEER INSURANCE AND SURETY CORPORATION V. KEPPEL CEBU SHIPYARD, INC.
"G.R. Nos. 180880-81 (Keppel Cebu Shipyard, Inc. v. Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation); G.R. Nos. 180896-97 (Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation v. Keppel Cebu Shipyard, Inc.). - On September 25, 2009, the Court rendered a decision in these consolidated cases, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Petition of Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation in G.R. Nos. 180896-97 and the Petition of Keppel Cebu Shipyard. Inc. in G.R. Nos. 180880-81 are PARTIALLY GRANTED and the Amended Decision dated December 20, 2007 of the Court of Appeals is MODIFIED. Accordingly, KCSI is ordered to pay Pioneer the amount of P360,000,000.00 less P30,252,648.09, equivalent to the salvage value recovered by Pioneer from M/V "Superferry 3," or the net total amount of P329,747,351.91, with six percent (6%) interest per annum reckoned from the time the Request for Arbitration was filed until this Decision becomes final and executory, plus twelve percent (12%) interest per annum on the said amount or any balance thereof from the finality of the Decision until the same will have been fully paid. The arbitration costs shall be borne by both parties on a pro rata basis. Costs against KCSI.
Keppel Cebu Shipyard, Inc. (KCSI) filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied in a Resolution dated June 21, 2010.
Thereafter, KCSI filed its Second Motion for Reconsideration to Refer to the Court En Banc and for Oral Arguments and its letter dated July 30, 2010. KCSI later filed another letter dated September 29, 2010, requesting for the status of its previous letter dated July 30, 2010.
In a Resolution[1] dated October 20, 2010, the Court disposed of KCSI's Second Motion for Reconsideration to Refer to the Court En Banc and for Oral Arguments and its letters dated July 30, 2010 and September 29, 2010, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to DENY the Second Motion for Reconsideration to Refer to the Court En Bane and for Oral Arguments of the Resolution dated June 21, 2010 and the Decision dated September 25, 2009 for lack of merit. Accordingly, the (1) 1st Indorsement dated August 4, 2010 of the Office of the Chief Justice, referring the attached letter dated July 30, 2010 of Atty. Emmanuel M. Lombos of SSHG Law Centre for appropriate action; (2) aforesaid letter dated July 30. 2010; (3) 1st Indorsement dated October 1. 2010 of the Office of the Clerk of Court-Third Division, referring the attached letter of Atty. Emmanuel M. Lombos of SSHG Law Center for appropriate action; and (4) aforesaid letter dated September 29, 2010 are NOTED.
On November 4, 2010, the Decision became final and executory.
On November 23r 2010, KSCI filed a Motion to Re-Open Proceedings and Motion to Refer to the Court En Banc.
In the said motion, KCSI contended that it was denied due process when the Court reviewed and reversed the Court of Appeals' finding of fact, despite its not having asked for case records containing the evidence presented at the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC), on the ground that a petition for review on certiorari is generally required to append "such material portions of the record as would support the petition," as stated in the Court Resolution dated October 20, 2010.[2]
KCSI stated that the most crucial finding of fact of the Court of Appeals was that both Pioneer and KCSI were guilty of negligence that caused the fire which destroyed the vessel, M/V Super Ferry 3; thus, it held that both parties should be liable for the loss on a proportionate basis. Both the Court of Appeals and the CIAC based their unanimous findings of fact on the testimony of dozens of witnesses contained in the transcripts of record.
KCSI stated that even as it raised prohibited factual issues in its petition before the Court, Pioneer did not attach any of those transcripts to its petition. Since it (KCSI) appealed only questions of law, it had no need to attach said transcripts, and, therefore, did not supply any of those transcripts to the Court.
Thus, KCSI questioned how the Court could have weighed those many contradictory accounts of witnesses and how it could have decided which witnesses and which portions of their testimonies to believe, since neither party attached and supplied the transcripts, and the Court had none of the transcripts of record. KCSI asserted that without the transcripts of record, the Court had no basis to review the issues of fact and to reverse the findings of fact of the CIAC and Court of Appeals, which actually read the evidence and transcripts of record. It stated that the Court has repeatedly ruled that appellate courts, such as itself, may not review issues of fact without reviewing the evidence.[3]
KCSI further moved that its Motion to Re-open Proceedings be referred to the Court en banc, which has the authority, under A.M. No. 10-4-20-SC (The Internal Rules of the Supreme Court), to act on matters and cases including those "cases that the Court en banc deems of sufficient importance to merit its attention."[4] It alleged that these consolidated cases are of transcendental importance and of paramount public interest to merit referral to the Court en banc, so that the said cases may be decided in accordance with law and the evidence.
On December 13, 2010, KCSI filed a Supplemental Motion (to the Motion to Re-Open Proceedings and the Motion to Refer to the Court En Banc) alleging the following: (1) it was denied its substantive right to due process; (2) the limitation-of-liability clause under the Ship Repair Agreement between KCSI and WG&A is valid, such that WG&A is estopped to question the same; and (3) the imposition of the six percent (6%) interest is unwarranted.
In the Supplemental Motion, KCSI argued that the limitation-of-liability clause under the Shiprepair Agreement between it and WG&A was valid, and that WG&A was estopped to question it, since WG&A was fully aware not only of the standards of KCSI, but also of other yards in the ship repair industry. KCSI pointed out that on at least 22 different occasions, it dry-docked and repaired various ships owned and/or managed by Aboitiz Shipping Corporation, members of the Aboitiz Group of Companies, WG&A, Inc., WG&A Jebsens Shipmanagement, Inc., and companies related to them under ship repair agreements incorporating the same conditions, but these conditions were never previously questioned.
The Standard Terms of the Ship Repair Agreement provide:
20. The Contractor (KCSI) shall not be under any liability to the Customer (WG & A) either in contract or otherwise except for negligence and such liability shall itself be subject to the following overriding limitations and exceptions, namely:
(a) The total liability of the Contractor to the Customer (including the liability to replace under Clause 17) or of any Sub-contractor shall be limited in respect of any and/or all defect(s) or event(s) to the sum of Pesos Philippine Currency Fifty Million only xxx
The issue on the limitation of liability was decided upon by this Court in its Decision dated September 25, 2009, thus:
Clause 20 is also a void and ineffectual waiver of the right of WG&A to be compensated for the full insured value of the vessel or, at the very least, for its actual market value. There was clearly no intention on the part of WG&A to relinquish such right. It is an elementary rule that a waiver must be positively proved, since a waiver by implication is not normally countenanced. The norm is that a waiver must not only be voluntary, but must have been made knowingly, intelligently, and with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences. There must be persuasive evidence to show an actual intention to relinquish the right. This has not been demonstrated in this case.
Likewise, Clause 20 is a stipulation that may be considered contrary to public policy. To allow KCSI to limit its liability to only P50,000,000.00, notwithstanding the fact that there was a constructive total loss in the amount of P360,000,000.00, would sanction the exercise of a degree of diligence short of what is ordinarily required. It would not be difficult for a negligent party to escape liability by the simple expedient of paying an amount very much lower than the actual damage or loss sustained by the other.
There are serious allegations in the petition that if the decision of the Court is not vacated, there is a far-reaching effect on similar cases already decided by the Court. Thus, by a vote of 4 to 1 in the Second Division that rendered the decision, the case was elevated to the En Banc for acceptance, in accordance with the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court, particularly Section 3 (n), Rule 2[5] thereof which states that the Court en banc can act on matters and cases that it deems of sufficient importance to merit its attention. In regard to this matter, ten (10) members, or two-thirds of the Court en banc, voted to grant KCSI's Motion to Refer to the Court En Banc its Motion to Re-Open Proceedings, while three (3) members dissented and two (2) members did not take part.
In view of the foregoing, KCSI's Motion to Refer to the Court En Banc is GRANTED. The Court en banc shall determine whether or not the allegations of KCSI are meritorious." Corona, C.J., and Bersamin, J., no part. Nachura, Velasco and Brion, JJ., dissenting.
Endnotes:
[1] Rollo, Vol. I, p. 3262.[2] Resolution dated October 20, 2010:
x x x x
Second. The elevation of the case records is merely discretionary upon this Court. Section 8, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides that the Court may require the elevation of the complete records of the case or specified portions thereof within fifteen (15) days from notice. It also bears mentioning that, under Section 4 (d) of the same rule, the petition for review on certiorari filed shall be �accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original, or a certified true copy of the judgment or final order or resolution certified by the clerk of court of the court a quo and the requisite number of plain copies thereof, and such material portions of the record as would support the petition." Indeed with the attachments to the consolidated petitions, the Court deemed it sufficient to rule on the merits of the case. (Rollo, Vol. II, p. 3264)
[3] Citing Asia Brewery v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103543, July 5, 1993, 224 SCRA 437; Roman Catholic Bishop of Malolos, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72110, November 16, 1990, 191 SCRA 411; Robleza v. Court of Appeals, 256 Phil. 98 (1989).
[4] Rule 2, Sec. 3 (n).
[5] Sec. 3. Court en banc matters and cases. - The Court en banc shall act on the following matters and cases:
�x x x x
(n) cases that the Court en banc deems of sufficient importance to merit its attention: x x x
DISSENTING OPINION
�BRION, J.:
I submit this Dissenting Opinion to express my objections against the reopening of the final judgment in this case and its acceptance by the Court En Banc for its review on the merits.
In a September 25, 2009 decision, the Second Division, thru Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, modified the Court of Appeals' (CA's) December 20, 2007 amended decision in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 74018 and 73934. It ordered Keppel Cebu Shipyard. Inc. (KCSI) to pay Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation (Pioneer) P329,747,351.91, with 6% interest per annum from the time the Request for Arbitration was filed until the decision's finality, plus 12% interest per annum on the said amount or any balance thereof from the decision's finality until it is paid.
In a June 21, 2010 resolution, the Court denied with finality KCSI's first motion for reconsideration.
KCSI requested to have the cases referred to the Court En Banc and set for oral arguments its Second Motion for Reconsideration and its July 30, 2010 letter. KCSI's September 29, 2010 letter requested for the status of its July 30, 2010 letter.
In an October 20, 2010 resolution, the Court denied the second motion for reconsideration and noted KCSI�s July 30, 2010 and September 29, 2010 letters.
On November 4, 2010, the decision became final and executory and was recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgments.
On November 23, 2010, or 19 days later, KCSI filed, without leave of court, the present Motion to Re-Open Proceedings and Motion to Refer to the Court En Banc, claiming that the Court gravely erred when it failed to consider the CA's principal and most crucial finding that both Pioneer and KCSI were guilty of negligence and that their joint negligence was the cause of the fire that destroyed the vessel; thus, the shared liability of both parties on a 50-50 basis. In support of its motion to refer the case to the Court En Banc, KCSI posited that these cases involve issues of transcendental importance and of paramount public interest, as it would purportedly establish a precedent allowing courts to deny any litigant due process of law.
Pioneer filed a Manifestation alleging that KCSI did not mention the fact that an Entry of Judgment had already been made, and the September 25. 2009 decision had already been recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgments. It also stated that on November 22, 2010, before KCSI filed its motion to re-open, it was given a copy of the motion for issuance of a writ of execution that Pioneer filed with the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) on that date.
In a December 6, 2010 letter to the Office of the Chief Justice (OCJ). KCSI bewailed the Court's reversal of the purported uniform findings of the CA and the CIAC without elevating the entire records of the case.
On December 13, 2010, KCSI filed its Supplemental Motion (to its Motion to Re-Open Proceedings and Motion to Refer to the Court En Banc), alleging that it was denied its substantive rights to due process; that the limitation-of-liability clause under the Shiprepair Agreement between KCSI and WG&A is valid, such that WG&A is estopped to question the same, and that the imposition of the 6% interest is unwarranted.
The Court En Banc deliberated on the case and by a vote of 10 in favor[*] and three against, [**] with two abstentions, [***] decided to lift the entry of judgment and to re-open the case. In acting as it did, the Court violated the most basic principle underlying the legal system - the immutability of final judgments - thereby acting without authority and outside of its jurisdiction. It grossly glossed over the violation of technical rules in its haste to override its own final and executory ruling.
First. A basic principle that supports the stability of a judicial system as well as the social, economic and political ordering of society, is the principle of immutability of judgments. A decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the Court that rendered it or by the highest Court of the land.[1] Once a judgment or order becomes final, all the issues between the parties are deemed resolved and laid to rest.[2] No additions can be made to the decision, and no other action can be taken on it,[3] except to order its execution.[4]
As recited above, the decision in this case was originally resolved by the unanimous vote of a Division of the Court. The Division also voted unanimously in denying the motion for reconsideration that subsequently came, and even in the denial of the 2nd motion for reconsideration that followed. The Court changed its vote, however, on the subsequent (effectively, the 3rd) motion for reconsideration, set aside the final judgment, and opened the case anew for review on the merits.
Faced with a renewed assault on the merits of a final judgment, the Court had only one recourse open to it � to simply note the motion (effectively the 3rd motion for reconsideration); it did not even have to deny this motion as it was way past the prohibited phase of filing pleadings under the express terms of the Rules of Court.[5] That the Court instead opened the case for further review despite the express prohibition of the Rules bodes ill for the respondent as this reopening cannot but be a prelude to the reversal of the final and executory judgment.
The capacity, capability and potential for imaginative ideas of those engaged in the law, in arguing about the law and citing justifications for their conclusions, have been amply demonstrated over the years and cannot be doubted. In this endeavor, however, they should not forget that certain underlying realities exist that should be beyond debate and that cannot and should not at all be touched even by the lawyers' convincing prowess. They should not forget that their arguments and conclusions do not stand by themselves and do not solely address the dispute at hand: what they say and conclude create ripple effects on the law and jurisprudence that ultimately become tsunamis enveloping the greater society where the law stands as an instrument aimed at fostering social, political and economic order.
In the context of the actions of the Supreme Court � the highest court that decides on the interpretation of the law with binding effect for the whole country � it cannot simply disregard fundamental principles (such as the principle of immutability of judgments) in its actions without causing damage to itself and to the society that it serves. A supreme court exists in a society and is supported by that society as a necessary and desirable institution because it can settle disputes and can do this with finality. Its rulings lay to rest the disputes that can otherwise disrupt the harmony in society.
This is the role that courts generally serve; specific to the Supreme Court � as the highest court � is the finality, at the highest level, that it can bestow on the resolution of disputes. Without this element of finality, the core essence of courts, and of the Supreme Court in particular, completely vanishes.
This is the reality that must necessarily confront the Court in its present action in reopening its ruling on a case that it has thrice passed upon. After the Court's unsettling action in this case, society will inevitably conclude that the Court, by its own action, has established that judgments can no longer achieve finality in this country; an enterprising advocate, who can get a Justice of the Court interested in the reopening of the final judgment in his case, now has an even greater chance of securing a reopening and a possible reversal, even of final rulings, because the Court's judgment never really becomes final. Others in society may think further and simply conclude that this Supreme Court no longer has a reason for its being, as it no longer fulfills the basic aim justifying its existence. At the very least, the Court loses ground in the areas of respect and credibility.
Second. The Rules of Court amply provides the rules on the finality of judgments,[6] supported by established rulings on this point.[7] In fact, the Rules itself expressly provides that no second motion for reconsideration shall be entertained.[8] The operational reason behind this rule is not hard to grasp � a party has 15 days to move for reconsideration of a decision or final resolution, and. thereafter, the decision lapses to finality if no motion for reconsideration is filed. If one is filed, the denial of the motion for reconsideration signals the finality of the judgment. Thereafter, no 2nd motion for reconsideration shall be entertained. At that point, the final judgment begins to carry the effect of res adjudicata � the rule, expressly provided in the Rules of Court, that a judgment or final order is with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been adjudged, binding on the parties and can no longer be reopened:[9] execution or implementation of the judgment thereafter follows.[10] Most importantly, at that point, the court � even the Supreme Court � loses jurisdiction over the case except for purposes of its execution.
In the present case, the Supreme Court no longer has jurisdiction to touch or reopen the case because the judgment has lapsed to finality and an entry of final judgment has, in fact, been made evidencing its finality. Even the Constitution itself recognizes that the reopening of a case that has lapsed to finality is outside the powers of the Supreme Court; the express constitutional power given to the Supreme Court is to review judgments of lower courts, on appeal or on certiorari, not to reopen and review its own judgment that has lapsed to finality.[11] Thus, the Court itself effectively becomes a transgressor for acting with grave abuse of discretion that the Constitution itself, under Article VIII, Section 1, has mandated the Court to check in all areas and branches of government. It becomes a question now of the old dilemna bedeviling all governments - who will guard and check on the guardians? Unnerving, to say the least, for the ordinary citizen who goes about his or her daily life relying on the order that the community has established by social compact.
Third. Finality of a judgment is a consequence that directly affects the immediate parties to the case. In a sense, it affects the public as well because the public must respect the finality of the judgment that prevails between the immediate parties. Where a ruling affects the public at large, as in the declaration of the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of a statute, the Court's declaration is binding on the general public.
Under this scheme, it is only right and proper that the Supreme Court itself be bound by the finality of the judgment that became so: by reason of the Rules that the Court itself promulgated, and by societal reasons deeper than what the Rules of Court expressly provides. If the rules for the immediate parties and the public were to be one of finality, while the rule for the Court is one of flexibility and non-binding effect because the Court may reopen at will and revisit even final rulings, what results is a monumental imbalance in the legal structure that the Constitution and our laws could not have intended. If an imbalance were intended or tolerated, then a serious re-study must perhaps be made � for a society with a heavy tilt towards unregulated power cannot but at some point fall, or, at the very least, suffer from it. If no imbalance is intended and the system is correct, then the Court may be seriously out of sync in respecting the system and must rectify its ways.
The most graphic example perhaps of the resulting imbalance is the effect of a reopened decision on the respondent, as in this case. Let it be remembered that a judgment that becomes final does not do so in a vacuum. It affects the parties and one effect is on the prevailing party whose rights under the final judgment vest on the proceeds of the judgment. This vested right is the reason why a writ of execution follows. When and if a final judgment is reopened, the Court effectively dispossesses the winning party of its right and entitlement to what the final decision decrees, all because the Court at that point wants to change its mind on a matter that is already outside of its jurisdiction to rule upon. This is no less than an act of injustice that is hard to live down for an institution whose guiding light and objective is justice.
Fourth. The only recognized exceptions to the rule on the non-reviewability of final judgments are the correction of clerical errors, the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, void judgments, and when relief from judgment is provided whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable.[12]
In considering the review of a final and executory decision, the nature of the decision must be taken into account. When the final decision is valid, it cannot be the subject of review, even by the Court En Banc. Neither can a review be entertained because of error in the judgment; "the Supreme Court is supreme because its judgment is final, not because it cannot err." A judgment even if erroneous is still valid if rendered within the scope of the court's authority or jurisdiction. It is only when the decision is void, as when there is denial of due process or when it is rendered by a court without jurisdiction, that there can be a re-opening of the case. The reason, of course, is that a void judgment is no judgment at all and a new one must be entered in the fulfillment of the court's dispute resolution function.
A still debatable instance when a final decision can be re-opened is through action on a second motion for reconsideration under Section 3. Rule 15 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court.[13] The rule states:
Sec. 3. Second Motion for Reconsideration. - The Court shall not entertain a second motion for reconsideration and any exception to this rule can only be granted in the higher interest of justice by the Court en banc upon a vote of at least two-thirds of its actual membership. There is reconsideration "in the higher interest of justice" when the assailed decision is not only legally erroneous, but is likewise patently unjust and potentially capable of causing unwarranted and irremediable injury or damage to the parties. A second motion for reconsideration can only be entertained before the ruling sought to be reconsidered becomes final by operation of law or by the Court's declaration.
Under this provision (that lays hidden in the Court's Internal Rules rather than in the Rules of Court), a second motion for reconsideration shall not be entertained, except in the "higher interest of justice" by a two-thirds vote of the Court En Banc's members. Aside from the voting requirements, a movant must substantially show that a reconsideration of the Court's ruling is necessary in the higher interest of justice, which standard is satisfied upon proving that the assailed ruling is both (1) legally erroneous, and (2) patently unjust and potentially capable of causing unwarranted and irremediable injury or damage to the parties.
Even this avenue may be closed, however, as the Court is proscribed from accepting motions for reconsideration filed after the finality of the assailed decision. In this case, KCSI filed its motion to reopen (a 3rd motion for reconsideration), without leave of court, after the denial of its 2nd motion for reconsideration (itself a prohibited motion), when a motion for the issuance of execution was already staring it in the face. This move can only be described as a brazen shot in the dark, unsupported by legal reason that the majority in the Court saw fit to entertain.
It was through the opening provided by the questionable provision of the Internal Rules that KCSI's Motion to Re-Open Proceedings and Motion to Refer to the Court En Banc sought its entry. Significantly, aside from a fig leaf reference to violation of due process (for allegedly deciding the case without the original records), the presented justification essentially referred to cited legal errors committed in the Court's three considerations of the case, i.e., in the original ponencia and in the two reconsiderations that were denied.
An eyebrow-raising aspect is that all the Court�s three considerations and ruling on the case were unanimous; not one dissent or sliver of a dissent was ever made. Yet, those who voted for the reopening were the same Members of the Division who supported the ponencia, except only for the ponente. Most unsettling of all is the realization that the Court's revisit of resolved issues, under the guise of "higher interest of justice," will mean the abandonment of settled principles of law to accommodate KCSI's arguments that had been considered and unanimously turned down in the Court's decision and resolutions.
These disturbing thoughts invariably lead to the question: if no finality can be secured even under the glaringly clear circumstances of this case, can the country's adjudication system be in grave peril? I do not believe that the problem so far is systemic; the system has had (and it still does have) its share of problems, but these have not been on the finality of judgments as this principle has been with the Court in its more that a hundred years of existence. The problem, as I see it, is individual and remediable. If only the Court and its Members will go back to first principles, and will truly reflect on the place, role, and relevance of the Court in contemporary society, then our judicial system can be and can remain the stable and reliable system that society expects it to be.
For all these reasons, I vote to simply NOTE WITHOUT ACTION KCSI's motion to re-open the case for further review on the merits. To dismiss it is to grant it recognition that it does not deserve.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) ENRIQUETA E. VIDAL
Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[*] JJ. Carpio, Morales, de Castro, Peralta, del Castillo, Abad, Perez, Mendoza, Villarama, Sereno.[**] J. Nachura, Velasco, Brion.
[***] CJ Corona, J. Bersamin.
[1] Genato v. Viola, G.R. No. 169706, February 5, 2010. 611 SCRA 677, 690: Marcelo v. Philippine Commercial International Bank (PCIB), G.R. No. 182735, December 4, 2009, 607 SCRA 778, 790: and Heirs of Maura So v. Obliosca, G.R. No. 147082, January 28, 2008, 542 SCRA 406, 418.
[2] Marcelo v. Philippine Commercial International Bank (PCIB), supra: Ang v. Grageda, G.R. No. 166239, June 8, 2006, 490 SCRA 424, 440: and Salvo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132250, March 11, 1999, 304 SCRA 632, 645.
[3] Natalia Realty, Inc. v. Rivera, G.R. No. 164914, October 5, 2005, 472 SCRA 189, 197: Toledo-Banaga v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127941, January 28, 1999, 302 SCRA 331, 341.
[4] Times Transit Credit Coop., Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 117105, March 2, 1999, 304 SCRA 11, 17: and Yu v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. Nos. 111810-11, June 16, 1995, 245 SCRA 134, 142.
[5] Rules of Court, Rule 52, Section I, in relation to Rule 56, Section 4.
[6] Rules of Court, Rule 36, Section 2.
[7] See Government Service Insurance System v. Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 71, G.R. No. 175393, December 18, 2009, and Government Service Insurance System v. Lavi�a, G.R. No. 177731, December 18, 2009, 608 SCRA 552: Gomez v. Correa, G.R. No. 153923, October 2, 2009, 602 SCRA 40: Obieta v. Cheok. G.R. No. 170072, September 3, 2009, 598 SCRA 86: Dacanay v. Yrastorza, Sr., G.R. No. 150664, September 3, 2009, 598 SCRA 20: Julies Franchise Corp. v. Hon. Ruiz, G.R. No. 180988, August 28, 2009, 597 SCRA 463: and Heirs of Emiliano San Pedro v. Garcia, G.R. No. 166988, July 3, 2009, 591 SCRA 593.
[8] Rules of Court, Rule 52, Section 2, in relation to Rule 56, Section 4.
[9] Rules of Court, Rule 39, Section 47(b).
[10] Rules of Court, Rule 39, Section I.
[11] Article VIII, Section 5(2), 1987 Constitution.
[12] Pe�a v. Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), G.R. No. 159520, September 19, 2006, 502 SCRA 383, 404: Siy v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 158971, August 25, 2005, 468 SCRA 154, 161-162; and Sacdalan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128967, May 20, 2004, 428 SCRA 586.
[13] A.M. No. 10-4-20-SC. The Internal Rules of the Supreme Court, effective May 22, 2010.
