June 2011 - Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
[A.C. No. 8529 : June 01, 2011]
RENATO P. DRAGON V. ATTYS. ROMULUS S. PROTACIO, ANGELITA ALBERTO-GACUTAN, RAUL T. AQUINO, AND VICTORIANO R. CALAYCAY
A.C. No. 8529 - (Renato P. Dragon v. Attys. Romulus S. Protacio, Angelita Alberto-Gacutan, Raul T. Aquino, and Victoriano R. Calaycay). - Before this Court is a complaint[1] for disbarment filed by complainant Renato P. Dragon (Dragon) against then Labor Arbiter Romulus S. Protacio (LA Protacio) (now deceased) and the Commissioners of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Angelita Alberto-Gacutan (Gacutan) (now an Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals [CA]), Raul T. Aquino (Aquino), and Victoriano R. Calaycay (Calaycay) (now retired).
The instant action stemmed from complaints for illegal dismissal and money claims filed against University Plans, Inc. (UPI), docketed as NLRC NCR Case Nos. 00-01-00178-98, 00-01-00295-98, 00-01-00801-98, and 00-03-02865-98.[2] The complaints were consolidated and were heard by then LA Protacio.
Though not included as one of the respondents in the title of the case, Dragon, through counsel, answered the complaint.[3] After due proceedings, LA Protacio handed down a decision ordering therein respondent UPl and its co-respondents Joel D. Paguio, Maribel Sto. Domingo, and Dragon to reinstate therein complainants to their former positions without loss of seniority rights, and to solidarity pay complainants their backwages, 13th month pay, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees,[4] amounting to P3,013,599.50.
UPI and its co-respondents appealed to the NLRC, faulting LA Protacio for sustaining the illegality of the dismissal. They also faulted the LA for holding Dragon liable for the money claims awarded by the LA.[5] The appeal was docketed as NLRC NCR CA No. 027376-01 and raffled to the NLRC Second Division, with respondent Commissioners Calaycay, Aquino, and Gacutan, as then Commissioners.
Simultaneous with the filing of the memorandum of appeal, UPI and its co-respondents filed a Motion to Reduce Bond.[6] They averred that UPI was under receivership and most of its assets could not be disposed of. Thus, it could not afford to post a cash bond or to pay the premium for the surety bond. The only liquid asset of UPI available for immediate disposition was P30,000.00.
On April 25, 2001, the NLRC Second Division denied therein respondents' motion to reduce bond, holding that the appeal bond is fixed by law. It ordered therein respondents to post bond in the amount of Three Million Thirteen Thousand Five Hundred Ninety-Nine Pesos and Fifty Centavos (P3,013,599.50) within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, otherwise the appeal shall be dismissed for non-perfection.[7]
UPI filed a motion for reconsideration, but the NLRC Second Division denied it on March 21, 2003.[8] The Commission was not persuaded by therein respondents' allegation that they were not capable of posting the required bond, as no evidence was offered to substantiate the allegation. It pointed out that therein respondents failed to submit UPI's financial statement, the details as to their receivership, and their sources of income. The Commission declared that the law is very clear that in cases involving monetary awards, the filing of cash bond or surety bond is indispensible to the perfection of appeal. The perfection of an appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional. Accordingly, the NLRC denied therein respondents' motion for reconsideration and dismissed the appeal on ground of non-perfection.
The CA sustained the NLRC in a petition for certiorari filed by Dragon, entitled "Renato P. Dragon v. NLRC," and docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.77383.[9]
Hence, the instant administrative complaint[10] for disbarment against then LA Protacio, Justice Gacutan, and NLRC Commissioners Aquino and Calaycay. The complaint was referred to the NLRC for appropriate action.[11]
While the case was pending before the NLRC Committee on Peers, Commissioner Gacutan was appointed as an Associate Justice of the CA. Commissioner Calaycay, on the other hand, retired from the service. LA Protacio died in 2005, or long before the filing of the complaint. Thus, by the Order dated September 1, 2010,[12] LA Protacio, Justice Gacutan, and Commissioner Calaycay were dropped as respondents on the ground that the NLRC Committee on Peers no longer had jurisdiction over them. In the same Order, it required remaining respondent Commissioner Aquino to comment on the complaint.
On November 4, 2010, complainant Dragon filed a Manifestation with Prayer to Exercise Disciplinary Jurisdiction. He alleged that respondents are still members of the bar; hence, he prays that the investigation of Justice Gacutan and Commissioner Calaycay be directly conducted by the Court through the Office of the Bar Confidant.
On December 15, 2010, this Court issued a Resolution denying Dragon's manifestation and motion. Dragon then filed a motion for reconsideration and/or clarification. He sought reconsideration of this Court's Resolution dated December 15, 2010. In the alternative, he prays that this Court clarify the remedy or remedies available to him in his quest for administrative justice against Commissioner Calaycay and Justice Gacutan.
By Resolution dated March 30, 2011, this Court granted Dragon's omnibus motion for reconsideration and/or clarification, recalled this Court's Resolution dated December 15, 2010, and required Justice Gacutan and Commissioner Calaycay to file their respective comments on the complaint.
In compliance, Justice Gacutan and Commissioner Calaycay filed their Comment, denying the administrative charges against them. They assert that the complaint is baseless and was instituted solely to harass, embarrass, and dishonor respondents. They also insist that they cannot be subjected to administrative liability for denying the motion to reduce bond and for dismissing the appeal. The said Orders had not only been sustained by the CA, but are in full accord with the provisions of the Labor Code. They also point out that Dragon was indeed a party-respondent in the labor cases, contrary to his claim. Finally, they claim that they regularly performed their duty, and, thus, they cannot be held administratively liable.
We agree with respondents and dismiss the complaint against Justice Gacutan and Retired Commissioner Calaycay.
Disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction, and, as such, the power to disbar must always be exercised with great caution, only for the most imperative reasons and in clear cases of misconduct affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar.[13]
Dragon charges respondents with gross misconduct and gross ignorance of the law for issuing an Order and a Resolution, which he claims lacked factual and legal basis. Specifically, he assails the April 25, 2001 Order denying his Motion to Reduce Bond and the March 21, 2003 Resolution denying his motion for reconsideration and dismissing the appeal for non-perfection.
Indubitably, the denial of Dragon's motion to reduce bond and the consequent dismissal of his appeal was done in the discharge of respondents' quasi-judicial functions. Jurisprudence teems with pronouncements that, generally, acts of judges are not subject to disciplinary actions.[14] A judge cannot be subjected to liability � civil, criminal, or administrative � for any of his official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith. Only judicial errors tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance, bad faith, or deliberate intent to do an injustice will be administratively sanctioned. To hold otherwise would be to render a judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment.[15] Thus, in Frani v. Judge Pagayatan,[16] this Court held:
The acts of a judge which pertain to his judicial functions are not subject to disciplinary power unless they are committed with fraud, dishonesty, corruption or bad faith. For a judge to be held administratively liable, the complainant must prove that the judgment is patently contrary to law or is not supported by the evidence and made with deliberate intent to perpetrate an injustice.
In this case, Dragon did not adduce sufficient evidence to show that the denial of the motion to reduce bond and the dismissal of the appeal were tainted with bad faith or fraud.
We also note that the CA sustained the denial of the motion to reduce bond and the dismissal of the appeal by the NLRC in a petition for certiorari filed by Dragon, and there is no showing that he sought further review of the said CA Decision. In Atty. Rafael T. Martinez and Spouses Dan and Edna Reyes v. Judge Grace Gliceria F. de Vera, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, San Carlos City, Pangasinan,[17] we explained:
Complainants should also bear in mind that an administrative complaint is not the appropriate remedy, for every irregular or erroneous order or decision issued by a judge where a judicial remedy is available, such as a motion for reconsideration, an appeal, or a petition for certiorari. Disciplinary proceedings against a judge are not complementary or suppletory to, nor a substitute for these judicial remedies whether ordinary or extraordinary. For, obviously, if subsequent developments prove the judge's challenged act to be correct, there would be no occasion to proceed against her at all.
Thus, we find no prima facie case to disbar or hold administratively liable Justice Gacutan and Commissioner Calaycay.
In fine, in administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving by substantial evidence the allegations in his complaint. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the presumption that respondent has regularly performed his duties will prevail. Even in administrative cases, if a respondent judge should be disciplined for a grave offense, the evidence against him should be competent and derived from direct knowledge. Charges based on mere suspicion and speculation cannot be given credence.[18]
WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against Associate Justice Angelita Alberto-Gacutan and Retired Commissioner Victoriano R. Calaycay is DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Very truly yours,
MA. LUISA L. LAUREA
Clerk of Court
By:
(Sgd.) TERESITA AQUINO TUAZON
Asst. Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] Rollo, pp. 1-11.[2] Id. at 12-16.
[3] Jd. at 17-23.
[4] Id. at 24-41.
[5] Id. at 42-54.
[6] Id. at 56-57.
[7] Id. at 58-61.
[8] Id. at 62-65.
[9] See Decision dated November 10, 2004, Annex "5," Comment of Respondent Raul T. Aquino before the NLRC Committee on Peers.
[10] Supra note 1.
[11] See Resolution dated February 10, 2010.
[12] Annex "E,"' NLRC Compliance dated September 13, 2010.
[13] Kara-an v. Pineda, A.C. No. 4306, March 28, 2007, 519 SCRA 143, 146.
[14] Fernandez v. Verzola, A.M. No. CA-04-40, August 13, 2004, 436 SCRA 369; 373; Pitney v. Judge Abrogar, 461 Phil. 28, 34 (2003); Frani v. Judge Pagayatan, 416 Phil. 205, 212 (2001).
[15] Pitney v. Judge Abrogar, supra, at 34.
[16] Supra, at 212.
[17] A.M. No. MTJ-08-1718, March 16, 2011.
[18] Fernandez v. Verzola, supra note 14, at 373-374.
