November 2011 - Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
[G.R. No. 197199 : November 16, 2011]
RAFAEL REYES v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 197199 � (Rafael Reyes v. People of the Philippines) � We resolve the Petition for Review filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court by accused Rafael Reyes from the 23 August 2010 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. C.R. No. 00018-MIN.
The RTC Ruling
In its Decision[1] promulgated 15 April 2004, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Isulan, Sultan Kudarat, found the accused Rafael Reyes guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610[2] or the Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act and sentenced him to suffer the straight penalty of 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor and to pay P 4,157.00 in actual damages, P10,000 as attorney's fees, and costs of the suit. The RTC was convinced by the testimony of the 13-year-old victim himself, AAA,[3] that on the night of 16 June 2001, the accused injured him by slapping his face several times and striking his head with a bicycle rim. Accused allegedly used rattan rope to tie the child to a copra weighing scale and then held him at knifepoint. The RTC gave weight to accused petitioner�s admission that he did lay hands on AAA, because the latter had stolen several items from his store, including accused's own watch.[4]
The CA Ruling
The CA[5] rejected petitioner's claim that it was AAA's mother who had caused the child's injuries; it instead found AAA�s testimony truthful, frank, and consistent. The Medical Certificate issued by Dr. Ronald A. Jaramillo and the case study report of the Municipal Social Welfare Officer, as the latter explained in her testimony, confirm that AAA was maltreated and traumatized by the accused.[6] However, the CA modified the straight penalty of prision mayor and instead imposed 4 years, 9 months, and 11 days of prision correccional as minimum, to 6 years, 8 months, and 1 day of prision mayor, as maximum.
Our Ruling
We deny the Petition.
Accused petitioner asks for a review, claiming that the appellate court overlooked several crucial details which would have shown loopholes in the case for the prosecution. He claims that it was only AAA who testified regarding the incident, and such self-serving assertion cannot be relied upon. He also questions the probative value of the Medical Certificate of Dr. Jaramillo, arguing that without the latter's own testimony in court, the said certificate constitutes hearsay. Accused petitioner theorizes that it was the mother of AAA who beat him up after learning of his theft, and subsequently coached the child to testify falsely.[7]
We find no solid reason to disturb the findings of the CA. Reevaluation and calibration of the evidence necessarily involve consideration of factual issues; an exercise that is not appropriate for a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Generally, the Court is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh again the evidence introduced in, and considered by, the tribunals below. When supported by substantial evidence, the findings of fact of the CA are binding on the parties and are not reviewable by this Court, unless they fall under any of the following recognized exceptions.[8] No such exceptions are applicable here.
Even if we yield to petitioners misguided assumption, the factual points he raises are still not meritorious. The Medical Certificate was properly admitted upon the RTC's order dated 18 July 2002, to which the defense never interposed any objection.[9] The trial court also adjudged AAA's testimony to be indicative of a dependent and trustworthy recollection and his narration consistently straightforward.[10] The age-old rule is that, when supported by the evidence on record, the task of assigning values to the testimonies of witnesses and weighing their credibility is best left to the trial court, which forms firsthand impressions of them. Trial courts have the advantage of observing the demeanor of witnesses in the exact moments that they testify.[11] Moreover, as previously held by the Supreme Court, the testimonies of children of sound mind are likely to be more truthful than those of older persons, so that once it is established that they have fully understood the character and nature of an oath, their testimonies should be given full credence.[12]
It is misleading for petitioner to claim that the RT'C based its findings on AAA's testimony alone. Five witnesses appeared in court for the prosecution: Barangay Chairperson Guillermo Togonon, Police Officer Jennifer Prudente, Social Welfare Officer Daisy Aduaya, the mother of AAA, and AAA himself.[13] The RTC not only based its ruling on the totality of the prosecution evidence; it also highlighted the admission twice made by the accused that he did hit AAA: first, before the barangay chairperson, and second, before the trial court judge.[14] cralaw
Petitioner then argues that his act has not been proven to be prejudicial to the child's development. He reiterates that the Medical Certificate never established that his act prejudiced or even affected the development of the child.
Section 3(b) of R.A. 7610 defines child abuse as the maltreatment of a child, whether habitual or not, which is committed through any of the following:
a) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional maltreatment;
b) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being:
c) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and shelter: or
d) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child resulting in serious impairment of his growth and development or in his permanent incapacity or death. (emphasis supplied)
As we have held in Araneta v. People:[15]
The prosecution need not prove that the acts of child abuse, child cruelly and child exploitation have resulted in the prejudice of the child because an act prejudicial to the development of the child is different from the former acts. x x x
(T)he use of "or" in Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610 before the phrase "be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child's development" supposes that there are four punishable acts therein. First, the act of child abuse; second, child cruelty; third, child exploitation; and fourth, being responsible for conditions prejudicial to the child's development. The fourth penalized act cannot be interpreted, as petitioner suggests, as a qualifying condition for the three other acts, because an analysis of the entire context of the questioned provision does not warrant such construal.
Thus, prejudice to the child's development is not an element of the crime of child abuse and need net be proved separately from the fact of actual physical abuse in order to warrant conviction. It is, as the Court has long resolved, merely one of the modes punishable under the crime generally designated as child abuse. Lastly, petitioner cannot escape the correct penalty as imposed by the Court of Appeals simply by arguing that the acts alleged in the Information constitute the crime of serious physical injuries, and not child abuse under R.A. 7610. Clearly, it is R.A. 7610 which should apply, as it is the specific special law punishing child abuse, and not the Revised Penal Code. It is undisputed that the victim, AAA, is a child at the time of the commission of the crime, being only 13 years old, and it is clear that R.A. 7610 does not require the physical maltreatment to be habitual. The interplay of R.A. 7610 with the Revised Penal Code is allowed only if R.A. 7610 itself so allows, as Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code states:
Offenses which are or in the future may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the contrary.
There being no reversible error attributable to the appellate court, its findings are affirmed, and the present Petition is denied.cralaw
WHEREFORE, the 23 August 2010 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. C.R. No. 00018-MIN is hereby AFFIRMED.
Very truly yours,
MA. LUISA L. LAUREA
Division Clerk of Court
By:
(Sgd.) TERESITA AQUINO TUAZON
Deputy Division Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] Penned by Judge German M. Malcampo in Criminal Case No. 2845, rollo, pp. 56-80.[2] Enacted 17 June 1992, in particular Sec. 10(a), Article VI.
[3] The identify or the victim is withheld, pursuant to R.A. 7610, R.A. 9262, and A.M. No. 04-10-11.
[4] TSN, 28 May 2003, pp. 11-12.
[5] Decision promulgated 23 August 2010, penned by Associate .Justice Ramon Paul L. Hernando and concurred in by Associate Justices Romulo V. Borja and Edgardo T. Lloren.
[6] CA Decision, p. 11, rollo, pp. 43-44.
[7] Petition, p. 22-23.
[8] Spouses Sevilla v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150284, 22 November 2010, 635 SCRA 508.
[9] CA Decision, p. 10, rollo, p. 42.
[10] RTC Decision p. 23, rollo, p. 78.
[11] People of the Philippines v. Alvin del Rosario, G.R. No. 189580, 9 February 2011, 642 SCRA 625.
[12] People of the Philippines v. Albert Te�oso, G.R. No 188975, 5 July 2010, 621 SCRA 614.
[13] RTC Decision, p. 2, rollo, p. 57.
[14] RTC Decision, p. 22, citing TSN, 28 May 2003, p. 11.
[15] G.R. No. 174205, June 27, 2008, 556 SCRA 323, 334.