November 2011 - Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
[G.R. No. 147193 : November 16, 2011]
SPOUSES ALFREDO G. VELAYO AND JOVITA F. VELAYO v. COURT OF APPEALS, NATY MIRANDA, NATALIO SALONGA, AND REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 147193 (Spouses Alfredo G. Velayo and Jovita F. Velayo v. Court of Appeals, Naty Miranda, Natalio Salonga, and Republic of the Philippines) - Sometime in 1990, the Republic of the Philippines sought to expropriate contiguous properties located at J.P. Rizal Avenue, Guadalupe Viejo, Makati for road-widening purposes. Accordingly, it filed an expropriation case against Guillermo Tantuco, et al. on 10 February 1990. This was docketed as Civil Case No. 90-080 in Branch 66 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.[1]
Erlinda Rafon (Rafon) and Naty Miranda (Miranda) allege that they are the owners of two residential houses erected on Lot 5, Block 43, J.P. Rizal, Guadalupe Viejo, Makati (Lot 5). Natalio Salonga (Salonga), on the other hand, claims ownership of a house located in Lot 7, Block 43, J.P. Rizal, Guadalupe Viejo, Makati (Lot 7).
Alfredo G. Velayo and Jovita F. Velayo (petitioners) filed a Motion for Leave to File and Admit Complaint in Intervention in Civil Case No. 90-080, alleging that they are the owners of the properties claimed by Rafon and Miranda. They do not make any claim of ownership of the home on Lot 7. In an Order dated 26 March 1993, the lower court granted their Motion.
On 1 August 1997, the court promulgated its Decision. Rafon did not submit evidence of her ownership of the other house in Lot 5,[2] thus the dispositive portion of the Decision does not dispose of her claim. It reads:
SO ORDERED.
Petitioners appealed the trial court's Decision with the Court of Appeals, but the latter, finding no error in the Decision appealed from, affirmed it on 31 May 2000.[3] Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals on 13 February 2001.[4]cralaw
Hence, the instant Petition for Review via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The trial court ruled that Miranda was able to prove, by preponderance of evidence, her ownership of the residential houses built on Lot 5. She presented a Deed of Sale of the property executed in her favor by Carlos Frialde, the carpenter who had built the house in question sometime in 1970. To corroborate her testimony, she also presented the testimonies of Lydia Frialde, the wife of Carlos Frialde; and of Catalino Reyes. Furthermore, Miranda herself testified that she was the actual occupant of the house at the time it was expropriated.
The trial court likewise found the evidence of Salonga sufficient to prove that he was the owner of Lot 7 and thus the one entitled to just compensation from the government for the expropriation of his house. He also presented a 14 August 1991 Deed of Sale covering the property that was executed by Antonio Cruz in his favor, as well as a Declaration of Real Property and Tax Receipts under his name for the years 1987 to 1990.
The Court of Appeals, in sustaining the lower court's ruling, rationalized as follows:
There is no plausible explanation why Naty Miranda has remained the occupant of the property notwithstanding the alleged sale of the same to the intervenors as far back as 1959. Moreover, there still is a tax declaration in the name of Felisa Mercado for the year 1985 (Exhibit "6" & �7�, Record, Volume V, pp. 13-14) as well as in the name of Cenon Arcera for the year 1991 (Exhibit "7-a", Record, Volume V, p. 15). Thus the trial court stated: "The Court could not with certainty ascertain that the tax declarations and receipts submitted by the intervenors refer to the house in question x x" (Decision, p.4 last paragraph). We agree with the trial court that credence is not due to the evidence presented by intervenors-appellants.
On the other hand, the Deed of Sale executed in favor of Naty Miranda (Record, Volume II, pp. 37) coupled by her occupancy of the house is strong evidence of her bona fide claim of ownership and better right over the property. Naty Miranda's claim is moreover corroborated by the testimony of witness Catalino Reyes (TSN, 16 March 1995, pp. 129-134) that the property that belonged to Felisa Mercado is located not on the present Lot 5, but is located across the riverside (Ibid. p. 130).
On the question of whether Natalio Salonga is entitled to compensation, appellants attaching a location map, claim that Lot 7, Block 43 which was claimed by Salonga could not have been affected by the road-widening as it is located in the interior and does not adjoin J.P. Rizal Avenue. As appellants have no stake or interest on Lot 7, they therefore have no personality to raise this issue.
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the judgment appealed from, the same is AFFIRMED.
Petitioners, to prove their ownership of Lot 5, presented documents to trace their title to one Felisa Mercado (Mercado). She had allegedly bequeathed the property to a Cenon Arcera (Arcera), who in turn sold "Lot No. 5, Block 43'' to petitioner Alfredo Velayo. They claim that Carlos Frialde, the supposed predecessor of Miranda, was their mere lessee who had no right to transfer ownership of the property.[5]
Petitioners question the trial court's finding that Miranda was able to prove her ownership of the residential house built on Lot 5. They aver that the trial court simply overlooked the fact that there had been a continuity of possession of Lot 5, since the time of Mercado and Arcera up to the present.[6]
As to Lot 7, Petitioners posit thus:
. . . the residential house purportedly sold by the spouses Antonio Cruz and Remigia L. Cruz to, and bought by, defendant-appellee Natalio Salonga was admittedly situated at Lot No. 7 Block 45 and significantly stated and described as "TNT, 395 J. RIZAL AVE., GUADALUPE VIEJO, MAKATI, METRO MANILA." . . .
Significantly, defendant appellee Natalio Salonga has no signature on the supposed Deed of Sale of the supposee (sic) involved house in this case, he never testified nor appeared in court; nor has he signed or verified any pleading . . . or the foisted verified Motion for Reconsideration filed February 9, 1993.
All these, the lower court's statement of facts failed to consider.
We disagree with petitioners' contention and would have denied the present petition for primarily raising factual issues. In any event, even if we proceed to examine the substance of the assailed Court of Appeals' Decision, we would still uphold it, as we do in this case.
It is important to remember that factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding on this Court.[7] Thus, we have ruled:
The Court cannot be tasked to go over the proofs presented by the parties and analyze, assess and weigh them to ascertain if the trial court and appellate court were correct in according them superior credit. The fact that the Court of Appeals adopted the findings of fact of the trial court makes the same binding upon this Court. The findings of the Court of Appeals are conclusive upon the parties and carry even more weight considering that these coincide with the factual findings of the trial court.[8]
Petitioners insist that what they present before this Court is a question of law, asserting that the Court of Appeals' conclusion and inference from the evidence presented is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible.[9] Miranda, in contrast, asserts that the appellate court's Decision is in accord with the law and established jurisprudence and is fully supported by the evidence on record.[10]
We hold that the findings of the courts a quo are amply supported by the evidence on record.
Lot 5
Petitioners argue that, among other requirements, for entitlement to just compensation in expropriation cases, the claimant should have previously declared the property for purposes of realty taxation and paid the said tax. In claiming that the lower court's award to Miranda violates this principle, they contend thus:
The appealed Decision has grossly incurred a reversible error when it failed to consider the basic precept in the payment of just compensation in expropriation cases�only those who have proven their claims of ownership and/or equitable possession of expropriated properties and who have declared same for taxation purposes and have been actually paying their realty taxes need be entitled thereto. As it is, the questioned Decision inequitably allowed such payment to supposed expropriation properties of defendants claimants who have not even declared such for realty taxation purposes.[11]
It is true that it is the owner of a property sought to be expropriated who is entitled to just compensation. However, the reliance placed by petitioners on the failure of respondents to declare their respective claimed properties for realty taxation purposes, to prove that the latter are not the owners of those properties, is misplaced. It is well-settled that tax declarations or realty tax payments are not conclusive evidence of ownership, but are mere indicia of a claim of ownership. But neither does the non-presentation of realty tax payments necessarily disprove respondent Miranda's ownership. What is important is the positive evidence of either party in support of their respective ownership claims. As stated by the trial court, when the DPWH conducted ocular inspection to determine who were the occupants of the houses to be affected by the expropriation, it was reported that Miranda was the actual occupant of the house on Lot 5.[12]
From the evidence presented by petitioners in the trial court, Mercado executed a document entitled "Huling Kalooban o Testament" in favor of Arcera on 15 April 1942; Arcera, on 7 August 1959, also executed a document entitled "Paglilipat ng Karapatan at Pag-Papamana" in favor of petitioners.[13] We agree with the pronouncement of the trial court�should the facts be as petitioners claim, there was no plausible explanation why Miranda had remained as the occupant of the property at the time of the expropriation and thus the Mercado document does not address the issue of ownership of the house on Lot 5.
Moreover, the lower courts correctly ruled that one could not determine, with certainty, that the Tax Declarations and Tax Receipts� which at best could be indicia of ownership�submitted by petitioners referred to the house in question. Miranda's claim, on the other hand, is corroborated by the testimony of witness Catalino Reyes that the property that belongs to Mercado is located, not on the present Lot 5, but across the riverside. Thus, it is possible that the Mercado document could have referred to another property, but not to Lot 5.
Petitioners further claim that Miranda's predecessor, Carlos Frialde, was their mere lessee; thus he had no authority to transfer ownership of the home erected on Lot 5 which is their property. However, petitioners present no evidence to sustain this claim.
We affirm the appellate court's finding that the Deed of Sale executed in favor of Miranda, coupled with her occupancy of the house, is strong evidence of her bona fide claim of ownership and better right over the property. We have ruled in Espiritu v. De Guzman, et al.[14] that when one's possession is proven by a deed of sale, the rescission of which has never been requested or discussed, one's possession must be respected, to wit:
When the defendant's possession is proven by a deed of perfect conveyance of the ownership and property rights inherent therein, as a deed of purchase and sale, said possession must be respected, provided the public instrument in which such title is attested has not been impugned and the sale has not been judicially declared to be null and void.
Lot 7
We also agree with the pronouncement of the appellate court that petitioners lack the personality to question the award of the lower court with regard to Lot 7. Petitioners, to recall, do not claim ownership of the house on Lot 7.
A case should be dismissed for lack of personality to sue when the plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest; dismissal, due to lack of personality to sue is grounded on failure to state a cause of action.[15] Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court defines a real party in interest, viz:
A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.
Since petitioners would neither benefit from nor be injured by whatever judgment this Court may render with regard to Lot 7, they are not the real parties in interest. Hence, thus they have no cause of action to raise this appeal.cralaw
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals in toto.
Very truly yours,
MA. LUISA L. LAUREA
Division Clerk of Court
By:
(Sgd.) TERESITA AQUINO TUAZON
Deputy Division Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] Rollo, p. 164.[2] Id. at 79.
[3] CA-G.R. CV No. 56747; Penned by Associate Justice Portia Ali�o-Hormachuelos, concurred in by Associate Justices Ma. Alicia Austria Martinez, (now a retired member of this Court) and Elvi John S. Asuncion.
[4] Rollo, p. 53.
[5] Id. at 33.
[6] Id. at 15.
[7] Ceballos v. Intestate of Emigdio Mercado, G.R. No. 155856, 28 May 2004, 430 SCRA 323.
[8] Acosta v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 140967, 26 June 2003, 405 SCRA 55.
[9] Rollo, p. 33.
[10] Id. at 168.
[11] Id. at 29.
[12] Id. at 79.
[13] Id. at 17.
[14] 37 Phil. 124 (1917).
[15] Evangelista v. Santiago, G.R. No. 157447, 29 April 2005, 457 SCRA 744.
