November 2011 - Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
[G.R. No. 195376 : November 16, 2011]
SERGIO RAÑA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 195376 (Sergio Raña v. People of the Philippines) - We resolve the Petition for Review filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court by accused Sergio Raña from the 20 October 2010 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. C.R. No. 24956.
The RTC Ruling
In its Decision[1] promulgated 1 February 2000, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila found the accused Sergio Raña guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified theft[2] and sentenced him to suffer 10 years and one day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 17 years, 4 months, and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum. Accused petitioner was also ordered to pay complainant Colegio de San Juan de Letran P225,769.42 in actual damages. The RTC held that the prosecution evidence, corroborated by the findings of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), established that the books of Letran College indicated shortages in their deposits and recordings, which were under the custody of accused Raña.[3] As the school cashier, he controlled the funds and the collection of tuition and other fees from the students. According to the testimony of former co-accused Ernesto Chico, Raña instructed him to alter the amounts reflected in the cash receipt book, for which the latter would give him P1,000 in exchange.[4] Fr. Rector Rogelio Alarcon further testified that after he confronted Raña, the latter returned the receipts that were missing from the books.[5]
The CA Ruling
The CA[6] gave more credence to the findings of both the external auditors and the NBI over the defense's expert witness regarding the shortages in the books of the school. It was clear from his own testimony that Raña was responsible for the collections, and that the cash remained in his custody until it was deposited with the bank. He had possession of the missing receipts which, according to Chico, were removed by the former so that the amounts to be reported could be reduced. The CA also found that his multiple attempts to evade arrest pointed to a guilty conscience.[7] It then modified the penalty by increasing it to reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties under Article 40 of the Revised Penal Code, in accordance with Article 309.[8]
Our Ruling
We deny the Petition.
The Petition introduces a hodgepodge of issues which were never passed upon by the court a quo, and which we find, are neither relevant nor convincing enough for us to reverse the clear finding of guilt by both lower courts. Petitioner first claims that he was deprived of due process, because the Information mistakenly identified him as the "accountant" of Colegio de San Juan de Letran, when in fact he was the cashier. The prosecution evidence did prove that he was the cashier; thus, there was variance between the allegations in the Information and the evidence adduced.
Whether he was identified as the school's accountant or cashier had no substantive impact either on his defense or on the gravamen of the offense to be proved. This negligible oversight in the Information was merely a defect in form and did not prejudice accused petitioner's right to due process. The essential question is whether or not he performed the acts alleged in the body of the Information in the manner therein set forth.[9] In any case, objections relating to the form of the Complaint or Information cannot be made for the first time on appeal. The accused should have moved before arraignment either for a bill of particulars or for the quashal of the Information. Having failed to pursue either remedy, he is deemed to have waived his objections to any formal defect therein.[10]
Accused petitioner next bewails that the NBI found both the accountant and the treasurer liable for negligence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, yet the school deliberately failed to file charges against them. He gleans from the testimonies of Father Alarcon and Father Edwin Lao that this special treatment was due to the fact that these other suspects belonged to the same Dominican order as the administrators. On this point, suffice it to say that it is entirely within the authority of the prosecutor to decide which suspects should be charged, or for which particular individual probable cause is present. The alleged culpability of these two other suspects had no bearing whatsoever on the culpability of petitioner, as aptly put by the CA:
All told, all the elements of theft had been sufficiently proven by the prosecution. Even if we were to concede that Raña was not alone in what looked like an organized scheme to defraud the school, the failure to include his co-conspirators, if indeed there were others, will not, as noted above, be enough reason to exculpate him from criminal liability. This is particularly true since, other than baseless insinuations, no concrete evidence was presented to prove his allegations. It is axiomatic that he who alleges fact has the burden of proving it and a mere allegation is not evidence.
As an alternative proposal, the Petition then implicates Ernesto Chico. It quotes at length from the testimony of the defense's rebuttal witness to the effect that the system of collection in the school had no means of check or control, because the latter had not hired an internal auditor.[11] Since it was shown in Court that Chico made alterations in the cash receipt books and performed what was known as "bank reconciliation," accused petitioner argues that only Chico could have masterminded the fraud.
Questioning the factual conclusions of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, is not allowed in a petition for review with this Court;[12] less so if petitioner cites no solid basis for accusing another, pointing only to the possibility of the latter's guilt. There is no question that Chico participated in the fraud; he was discharged only because the court allowed him to turn witness for the state. The NBI's Legal Evaluation Division (LED) found as follows: "Raña, with the help and cooperation of Chico, appropriated the total amount of P225,769.00, which was part of the Colegio de San Juan de Letran's cash on hand account for the inclusive period from 1 April to 30 September 1989 which he had in his possession. To cover up the amount he appropriated for the month under reconciliation, he (Raña) included the cash on hand intended for the succeeding month."[13] The trial court allowed the discharge of Chico on a sufficient showing that the anomalies could not have been discovered without him, and that his testimony was necessary to pin down the principal and real culprit, Raña.[14] That the scheme was undertaken by both of them was alleged by the prosecution at the outset; yet again, this has no bearing whatsoever on the finding of guilt on the part of Raña.
Lastly, petitioner rehashes the same argument raised at the trial level - that the amount of P225,769.42 was not missing, but was cash actually spent and taken from the school's collections for April 1, 1989 to September 30, 1989. The RTC had already found that there was no evidence to show that the amount represented actual expenses. Instead, what appears in the Schedule of Expenses is that amounts totaling P232,187.59 were validly incurred at that time and were taken out of undeposited cash collections, including those made prior to April 1, 1989. Collections prior to that date amounted to P749,390.47, which "remained undeposited for so many years.”[15] In the Cash Audit Report, the amount of P749,390.47 was pegged as the beginning balance for auditing purposes. When the audit was conducted, the amount of P225,769.42 remained unaccounted for. Therefore, the total amount of actual expenses, P232,187.59, is different from the amount of P225,769.42 proved at trial to have been missing. This argument is not relevant to the culpability of petitioner, nor can it nullify the RTC's findings of his guilt.cralaw
There being no reversible error attributable to the appellate court, its findings are affirmed and the present Petition is denied.
WHEREFORE, the 20 October 2010 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. C.R. No. 24956 is hereby AFFIRMED.
Very truly yours,
MA. LUISA L. LAUREA
Division Clerk of Court
By:
(Sgd.) TERESITA AQUINO TUAZON
Deputy Division Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] Penned by Judge Rebecca G. Salvador in Criminal Case No. 91-96575.[2] As defined under the Revised Penal Code, Art 310 in relation to Art. 308.
[3] RTC Decision, p. 34; CA rollo, pp. 96-97.
[4] Id., p. 79.
[5] Id., pp. 64-65.
[6] Decision promulgated 20 October 2010, penned by Associate Justice Josefina Guevara-Salonga and concurred in by Associate Justices Mariflor P. Punzalan-Castillo and Franchito N. Diamante.
[7] CA Decision, p. 15; SC rollo, p. 55.
[8] Article 309, par. I states: "The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter amount the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be." According to Article 310, qualified theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two degrees than those specified in the preceding article.
[9] Matrido v. People, G.R. No. 179061, 13 July 2009, 592 SCRA 534.
[10] People v. Teodoro, G.R. No. 172372, 4 December 2009, 607 SCRA 307; RULES OF COURT, Rule 117, Sec. 9.
[11] Petition, pp. 7 & 17, citing the TSN, pp. 23-24, dated 3 October 1997.
[12] Catindig v. Vda. de Meneses, G.R. Nos. 165851 and 168875, 2 February 2011, 641 SCRA 350.
[13] Original Records, Vol. I, p. 14; cited in the CA Decision, p. 4.
[14] Order of 16 March 1994; cited in the RTC Decision, p. 14.
[15] RTC Decision, p. 35.