February 2012 - Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
[G.R. No. 182665 : February 08, 2012]
ESTRELLA GONZALES-MEDRANO AND ASTERIO GONZALES v. FELICIANO QUETUA, PEDRO QUETUA, AND GONZALO CAPINPIN
G.R. No. 182665 (Estrella Gonzales-Medrano and Asterio Gonzales v. Feliciano Quetua, Pedro Quetua, and Gonzalo Capinpin) � Before the Court is a Rule 45 Petition assailing the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board's ruling that respondents are agricultural tenants of petitioners, on the basis of a belatedly adduced affidavit purportedly executed by 2 of the 3 respondents herein.
Zenaida Gonzales (Zenaida) owned a 191,497 square meter (sq. m.) land in Jaen, Nueva Ecija, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. NT-29578, primarily devoted to mango tree cultivation. It was later subdivided into four portions, with each portion transferred to the name of one of four siblings. 50,000 sq. m. each were registered in the names of Zenaida and petitioners Estrella Gonzales (Estrella) and Asterio Gonzales (Asterio) while the remaining 41,497 sq. m. portion of the land was registered in the name of Rodolfo Gonzales (Rodolfo).
In CAR Case No. 1392 Gapan N.E.'77, the Court of Agrarian Relations declared Soledad Lopez, Juan Miranda, Feliciano Quetua, Zoilo Quetua, Gonzalo Capinpin, Pedro Quetua, Felix dela Cruz, Cornelio dela Cruz, and Eliseo Magtalas as agricultural tenants over the said land.
The Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. No. SP-14040-CAR affirmed the CAR Decision. The Supreme Court (SC), in turn, affirmed[1] the CA Decision.
On 3 July 1998, respondents Feliciano Quetua, Pedro Quetua and Gonzalo Capinpin - together with Edmundo Quetua, Reynaldo Magtalas and Maximo Miranda - filed a Petition for Declaration of Tenancy and Maintenance of Peaceful Possession against Zenaida, Rodolfo, and petitioners Estrella and Asterio before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (FARAD) in Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija. The case was docketed as Reg. Case No. 03513'SNE'98. Respondents claimed that they were intervenors in CAR Case No. 1392 Gapan N.E.'77, and were declared therein to be share tenants over portions of the subject land. They further alleged that they were in peaceful possession of the land, smudging[2] mango trees and planting different vegetables. As the titles to the said land had been transferred to the names of petitioners, respondents prayed that the matter be referred to the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) for the execution of corresponding written leasehold contracts.
While none of the Gonzales siblings was served summons, petitioner Asterio filed a Verified Answer. He pointed out that only Feliciano Quetua, Pedro Quetua and Gonzalo Capinpin (respondents herein) were direct intervenors, while Edmundo Quetua, Reynaldo Magtalas and Maximo Miranda derived their titles through their respective predecessors-in-interest - Soledad Lopez, Eliseo Magtalas and Juan Magtalas. Also, respondents had only smudged specific mango trees and never planted vegetables. They had abandoned the landholding as early as 1982, as attested to in the Sinumpaang Salaysay of Cornelio dela Cruz, one of the intervenors in the said CAR case. Under Section 8 of Republic Act No. 3844,[3] such abandonment extinguishes any agricultural relation between tenant and landowner, because the element of personal cultivation ceases to exist. Nevertheless, in accordance with the Decision in the CAR case, respondents received their just share in the produce of the mango trees they had smudged. Finally, there was no need to refer the matter to the MARO, as the leasehold contract had already been fixed in the case cited by respondents.
In its 18 December 1998 Decision[4] in Reg. Case No. 03513'SNE'98, PARAD dismissed the Petition for lack of merit, considering that respondents had abandoned the subject landholding.
On appeal, the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), in its 10 November 2003 Decision,[5] reversed the PARAD. Citing the CAR Decision, it declared Feliciano Quetua, Pedro Quetua and Gonzalo Capinpin as tenants. However, DARAB ordered Reynaldo Magtalas, Edmundo Quetua and Maximo Miranda to vacate the areas they were claiming, as they were not tenants thereof. It reasoned that it was not the latter two, but their parents, who were the parties-in-interest in the CAR case. Petitioners alleged that the parents were still alive when the case was filed, an allegation never controverted by respondents. DARAB ordered the MARO of Jaen, Nueva Ecija to determine the area covered by the declared tenants and to execute the appropriate leasehold contract. It also ordered petitioners to respect the tenants in their peaceful possession and cultivation of their tillages.
Respondents filed a Joint Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioners Asterio and Zenaida also filed their respective Motions for Reconsideration. DARAB denied all the motions in its Resolution dated 29 December 2004.
Both parties separately appealed the DARAB Decision to the CA. Respondents' appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 89086,[6] while that of herein petitioners Estrella and Asterio was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 89131.
In due course, the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No. 89131 directed the parties to file their respective Memoranda. For their part, petitioners attached to their Memorandum dated 3 October 2006[7] an Affidavit of Clarification executed by respondents Feliciano Quetua and Gonzalo Capinpin, Jr. on 7 March 2006. The body of the affidavit stated as follows:
That we are the lawful tenants over the parcels of land covered and embraced by TCT Nos. NT-205347 NT-194160 and NT-205350, registered in the name of Zenaida B. Gonzales, Reynaldo Gonzales and Rodolfo Gonzales respectively;
That, by virtue of these presents, we state for the record that we are not caliming (sic) to be such over Lots 1-A-2-B and Lot 1-A-2-C, covered and embranced (sic) by TCT Nos. NT-205348 and NT-205349, registered in the names of Asterio H. Gonzales and Estrella B. Gonzales, respectively;
That we are now clarifying that when we filed our petition before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, we (sic) advertently (sic) alleged that we were tenants on lots covered by TCT-Nos. NT-205348 and NT-205349.
That we are executing this affidavit to attest the truthfulness of the foregoing.[8]
In the first assailed Decision dated 16 April 2007,[9] the CA affirmed the DARAB Decision, reasoning as follows:
Paragraph 4 of the Petition before the PARAD reads:
"4. That for so many years now, we are in peaceful possession of the subject landholding smudging mango trees planting different kinds of vegetables." (Underscoring Ours)
On the other hand, paragraph 4 of Asterio's Verified Answer reads:
"4. He ADMITS paragraph 4 of the PETITION except the portion alleging "x x x planting (of) different kinds of vegetables", which he denies since the petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest were only considered SMUDGERS with respect to specific trees as set forth in the case cited."
x x x
The aforequoted paragraph in the Answer is tantamount to a judicial admission on the part of the petitioners which necessarily binds them. Having previously admitted respondents' possession of the subject landholding, they may not thereafter take an inconsistent position. Thus, it behooved upon petitioners to sufficiently establish that respondents had indeed abandoned the subject landholding which they miserably failed. While they attached the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" of Cornelio dela Cruz tending to establish abandonment, as one of the intervenors in the CAR Case and helper of petitioner Asterio in the said landholding, his statement does not deserve full credence, not having been corroborated by any other unbiased and credible evidence.
Moreover, Asterio's allegations that respondents "have been receiving their just share of the produce of the mango trees smudged by them� and that despite respondents' abandonment of their obligation as share-tenants, the Gonzales siblings "are religiously complying with the mandate of the said decision (i.e., the CAR Case) to give them their just share over the harvest in accordance with the said decision" bolster respondents' claim of tenancy. The Court finds it illogical and contrary to human experience for petitioners to be still giving respondents their just share in the produce of the harvest in 1998, in deference to a 1982 decision, when, as they claimed, the respondents had already abandoned the subject landholding since 1982.[10] (Footnotes omitted)
In CA-G.R. 89131, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the CA denied in its 25 March 2008 Resolution.[11]
Petitioners then filed the present Rule 45 Petition with this Court, assailing the CA ruling on the strength of the belatedly produced Affidavit of Clarification purportedly issued by 2 of the 3 respondents.
We deny the Petition add affirm the ruling of the Court of Appeals in toto.
The status of respondents as agricultural tenants of petitioners had been established earlier in CAR Case No. 1392 Gapan N.E.'77. This Decision has long attained finality. Hence, petitioners' theory in 1998 was that respondents were their agricultural tenants, who had earlier abandoned their tillages in 1982, but who nonetheless continued to receive from petitioners their shares in the harvest of the mango trees they had smudged.
However, just before their appeal was submitted for resolution by the CA in 2006, petitioners belatedly attached to their Memorandum an Affidavit of Clarification apparently executed by 2 of the 3 respondents. On the strength thereof, petitioners changed their theory. They then claimed that respondents had never been their agricultural tenants, but were tenants of their other siblings.
We reject petitioners' change in theory.
It is a basic rule that once a party adopts a certain theory upon which a case is tried and decided by the lower court, that party will not thereafter be allowed to change his theory on appeal. To permit such action would not only be unfair to the adverse party, who would then be deprived of the opportunity to adduce additional evidence pertinent to the new theory propounded.[12] It would likewise be unfair to the trial court, which should have been accorded "a meaningful opportunity to consider and pass upon all the issues, and to avoid or correct any alleged errors before those issues or errors become the basis for an appeal."[13] Still, in the same spirit of fundamental fairness, the Court has allowed exceptions to this rule, such as "in cases of lack of jurisdiction, where the lower court committed plain error, where there are-jurisprudential developments affecting the issues, or when the issues raised present a matter of public policy."[14]
Considering that a change in theory and the production of new evidence on appeal is generally proscribed, it was incumbent upon petitioners to show that their case falls within the exceptions to this rule. At the very least, they should have explained why they had not alleged in the first instance that they never had agricultural tenants in their lands, if this was really the case. They should also have accounted for the eight-year delay in their procurement of the Affidavit of Clarification. Unfortunately, petitioners have not been able to discharge their burden.
We similarly reject the Affidavit of Clarification.
Petitioners cannot assume that this Court will take the Affidavit of Clarification at face value when respondents have expressly impugned the Affidavit.[15] More important, the due execution and authenticity of the said document was not threshed out in the courts below. We reiterate that this Court is not a trier of facts; neither does it authorize the reception of evidence where that opportunity had been available to the party during the course of the trial.[16]
The only other issue raised by petitioners is whether "the subsequent act of abandonment committed by the respondents terminates whatever tenurial rights they acquired over the subject lands."[17] The proposed issue assumes that respondents abandoned their tillages. This assumption runs contrary to the records, which show that DARAB and the CA both found that no such abandonment took place. Findings of fact of the CA will not be disturbed by this Court in a Rule 45 Petition, unless petitioners sufficiently show that their case fails within the recognized exceptions to this rule.[18]cralaw
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 89131 are AFFIRMED in toto.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) TERESITA AQUINO TUAZON
Deputy Division Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] Carlos Gonzales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 61443, 25 February 1983.[2] Smudging is the building of smoky fires under mango trees to induce off-season flowering. http://www.pcarrd.dost.gov.ph/CIN/mango/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=995 (visited on 21 December 2011).
[3] SECTION 8. Extinguishment of Agricultural Leasehold Relation. � The agricultural leasehold relation established under this Code shall be extinguished by:
(1) Abandonment of the landholding without the knowledge of the agricultural lessor;
(2) Voluntary surrender of the landholding by the agricultural lessee, written notice of which shall be served three months in advance; or
(3) Absence of the persons under Section nine to succeed to the lessee, in the event of death or permanent incapacity of the lessee.[4] Rollo, pp. 55-60.
[5] Id. at 46-54.
[6] The CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 89086 (rollo, pp. 144-150) reversed the DARAB Decision on the ground that Asterio Gonzales�s Answer filed with the PARAD did not specifically deny the claim of respondents that their predecessors-in-interest were already dead. Gonzales' Position Paper explicitly acknowledged the death of Reynaldo Magtalas and repeatedly referred to respondents as successors-in-interest. Gonzales' admission that respondents are successors-in-interest is not inconsistent with his allegation that their parents are still alive because, aside from death, permanent incapacity is also a ground for succession in the area of tenancy rights. This Decision became final and executory on 13 March 2009.
[7] Rollo, pp. 152-162.
[8] Id. at 163. The Affidavit of Clarification apparently states that affiants are not claiming (not "caliming") to be lawful tenants of the lots embraced (not "embranced") by particular TCTs in the name of the Gonzaleses. It explained that when affiants filed their petition with the DARAB, they inadvertently (not "advertently") alleged the contrary.
[9] The Court of Appeals Fourth Division Decision was penned by Justice Estela Perlas-Bernabe (now a member of this Court) and concurred in by Justices Marina Buzon and Lucas Bersamin (likewise presently a member of this Court).
[10] Rollo, pp. 31-32.
[11] Id. at 34.
[12] Spouses Ernesto and Vicenta Topacio v. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank, G.R. No. 157644, 17 November 2010, 635 SCRA 50.
[13] Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 163835, 7 July 2010, 624 SCRA 340.
[14] Guillermina Baluyut v. Eulogio Poblete, G.R. No. 144435, 6 February 2007, 514 SCRA 370.
[15] In their Memorandum filed with this Court, respondents claim that the affidavit is "non-existent and fraudulently derived from a questionable source. The due execution and its authenticity is (sic) of doubtful existence considering that respondents never entered into such a transaction." Rollo, p. 141.
[16] People v. Genosa, G.R.No. 135981, 29 September 2000, 341 SCRA 493, 395 Phil. 711.
[17] Rollo, p. 18.
[18] Spouses Braulio Navarro and Cesaria Sindao v. Perla Rico Go, G.R. No. 187288, 9 August 2010, 627 SCRA 476.
