February 2012 - Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
[G.R. No. 155900 : February 15, 2012]
ROMEO B. DACLAN, PETITIONER v. THE HON. JUDGE SALVADOR S. ABAD SANTOS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT BRANCH 143, MAKATI CITY AND EDWIN F. FUNTANILLA, RONNIE T. SANTAYO, NORIEL M. MERCENE, BENJAMIN J. ANDRIN, JR., DOMINGO C. CAMANIA, RODOLFO B. ADAPTAR, MICHAEL M. JUBILADO, ISRAEL D. DICON, AND ALONZO V. LASCANO, RESPONDENTS.
"G.R. No. 155900 - ROMEO B. DACLAN, Petitioner v. THE HON. JUDGE SALVADOR S. ABAD SANTOS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT BRANCH 143, MAKATI CITY AND EDWIN F. FUNTANILLA, RONNIE T. SANTAYO, NORIEL M. MERCENE, BENJAMIN J. ANDRIN, JR., DOMINGO C. CAMANIA, RODOLFO B. ADAPTAR, MICHAEL M. JUBILADO, ISRAEL D. DICON, AND ALONZO V. LASCANO, Respondents. - The petitioner was one of three individuals charged in a criminal prosecution in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 143, in Makati City (RTC) for violation of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042 (The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995). The RTC found probable cause against the three accused on September 17, 2002 and caused the issuance of the warrant for their arrest.[1] Although remaining at large, the petitioner appealed to the Department of Justice (DOJ) by petition for review.[2] He also filed two motions in the RTC, the first a motion to defer proceedings,[3] and the other, a motion to recall the order of arrest.[4]
During the hearing of the two motions, respondent RTC Judge issued an order in open court holding the proceedings in abeyance relative to the petitioner pending the resolution of his appeal by the DOJ.[5] Anent the motion to recall the order of arrest, the trial prosecutor interposed an opposition, stating that the petitioner, being still at large, had not submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. Accordingly, respondent RTC Judge required petitioner's counsel to submit a memorandum of authorities on whether the RTC could resolve the incident even without the petitioner having been arrested or having voluntarily surrendered his person to the court, upon submission of which the motion to recall the order of arrest would be submitted for resolution.[6]
On October 25, 2002, respondent RTC Judge denied the motion to recall the order of arrest because "the Court has not yet acquired jurisdiction over the person of accused Romeo Daclan considering that he has not yet been arrested nor has voluntarily submitted himself to said Court's jurisdiction."[7]
The petitioner moved for reconsideration,[8] mainly arguing that the RTC already had jurisdiction over him upon his submission of the two motions and his appearance through counsel in the scheduled hearings.
On November 11, 2002, the RTC denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration.[9]
Hence, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in this Court, assailing the denial by the RTC of his motion to recall arrest order, and insisting that respondent RTC Judge thereby committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.[10]
During the pendency of this special civil action for certiorari, the petitioner was arrested pursuant to the warrant for his arrest issued by respondent RTC Judge. Consequently, the petitioner expressly manifested that his arrest had rendered his petition for certiorari moot.[11]
The RTC subsequently set aside the order of arrest.[12]
In the RTC, the public prosecutor meanwhile moved to dismiss the criminal charge against the petitioner based on a determination that there was insufficient probable cause to hold him liable for the charge.[13] Respondent RTC Judge granted the public prosecutor's motion to dismiss.[14]
The dismissal of the criminal case against him notwithstanding, the petitioner has requested the Court to still rule on his petition for certiorari for the purpose of guiding the Bench and the Bar.
We dismiss the petition for certiorari.
The arrest of the petitioner and the dismissal of the criminal action against him rendered the petition moot and academic. An issue is said to have become moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy so that a declaration on the issue will be of no practical use or value.[15] When the resolution of the issue submitted in a case has become moot and academic by virtue of supervening events, and the prayer of the petition, even if granted, has become impossible of enforcement, the case should be dismissed.[16] This result ensues, for:
xxx No useful purpose would then be served by passing on the merits of the petition. Any ruling in the instant case could hardly be of any practical or useful purpose in the premises. It is a settled rule that a court will not determine moot question or abstract proposition, nor express an opinion in a case in which no practical relief can be granted.[17]
We stress that the courts of law will not determine moot questions,[18] because they cannot indulge in academic declarations.[19] Consequently, the petitioner's urging that we nonetheless proceed to render a decision for the sake of announcing guidelines for the Bench and Bar cannot be heeded in this case, because no practical reliefs are thereby attainable if our decision will merely express an opinion. No court of law in the Philippines is permitted to engage in academic declarations.[20]cralaw
ACCORDINGLY, the Court DISMISSES the petition for certiorari for having become moot and academic.
No costs of suit."
SO ORDERED.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) EDGAR O. ARICHETA
Division Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] Records, Volume I, pp. 196-198.[2] Id., pp. 80-104.
[3] Id., pp. 75-78.
[4] Id., pp. 212-219.
[5] TSN dated October 17, 2002, pp.15-16.
[6] Id., pp. 17-19.
[7] Records Volume I. p. 262.
[8] Id., pp. 244-250.
[9] Rollo, pp. 23-25.
[10] Id., pp. 3-20.
[11] Id., pp. 77-79.
[12] Id., p. 82.
[13] Records, Volume II, p. 587.
[14] Id., pp. 664-668.
[15] Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Pascua, G. R. No. 143258, August 15, 2003, 409 SCRA 195, 202.
[16] Bongat v. Bureau of Labor Relations, No. L-41039, April 30, 1985, 136 SCRA 225, 229: Lomo v. Mabelin, No. L-68649, December 29, 1986, 146 SCRA 474, 477.
[17] Bongat v. Bureau of Labor Relations, No. L-41039, April 30, 1985, 136 SCRA 225, 229.
[18] Cole v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 137551, 338249, 139099, 139631, 139729, December 26, 2000, 348 SCRA 692, 698.
[19] Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, G.R. Nos. 96663, 103300, August 10, 1999, 312 SCRA 104, 114.
[20] Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank v. Tuazon, Jr., G. R. No. 132495, March 10, 2004, 425 SCRA 129, 134; Vda. de Dabao v. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 116526, March 23, 2004, 426 SCRA 91, 97; Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Pascua, G.R. No. 143258, August 15, 2003, 409 SCRA 195, 202; Paloma v. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 145431, November 11, 2003, 415 SCRA 590, 595; City Sheriff, Iligan City v. Fortunado, G.R. No. 80390, March 27, 1998, 288 SCRA 190, 195.