January 2012 - Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
[G.R. No. 175611 : January 16, 2012]
ENCARNACION M. DELA CRUZ, ET AL. v. RODRIGO T. POSADAS
G.R. No. 175611 (Encarnacion M. dela Cruz, et al. v. Rodrigo T. Posadas*). - This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, praying that the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated August 15, 2006, dismissing the petition for certiorari, and the Resolution[2] dated November 27, 2006, denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration, be reversed and set aside.
This case originated from a complaint for recovery of ownership filed by petitioners before the Regional Trial Court of Agoo, La Union (RTC). Respondent was declared in default; hence, petitioners were allowed to present evidence ex parte. On February 28, 1991, the RTC issued an Order which read as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Deed of Absolute Sale is hereby ordered ANNULLED. Plaintiffs are hereby directed to return to defendant the total amount P21,300.00 Philippine currency, representing the partial payment of the land upon payment of which the Transfer Certificate of Title subject of this complaint would be cancelled.
SO ORDERED.[3]
On May 6, 1993, petitioners filed their first Motion for Consignation, stating therein that �[s]aid decision had long become final and executory." On July 6, 1993, the RTC issued the following Order:
Today the Motion for Consignation came up for hearing. Atty. Diosdado V. Calonge appeared for the Movant. However, the Defendant Rodrigo Posadas moved for Postponement praying that he be given a period of Thirty (30) days from today within which to locate a certain Atty. Zenaida Abegania who is in possession of the Owner's Duplicate Copy of TCT No. T-18846. Atty. Calonge interposed no objection provided that after the lapse of [the] Thirty (30)-day period and the Defendant will not be able to produce the Owner's Duplicate Copy of TCT No. T-18846, he will be constrained to pray the Court for the cancellation of TCT No. T-18846 issued in the name of defendant and to issue another in favor of the Plaintiffs.
The Court (sic) is hereby ordered the Defendant to exert effort to produce said Certificate of Title.
SO ORDERED.
Upon both parties' motion, the RTC then issued the Order[4] dated August 12, 1993, ordering petitioners to consign the amount of P23,300.00 with the Office of the Clerk of Court, RTC, Agoo, La Union. This directive was reiterated by the RTC in its Order[5] dated June 24, 1996. All those court orders were not complied with by petitioners, who only acted on their case, again by filing the Second Motion for Consignation on October 25, 2005.
On November 8, 2005, the RTC issued the assailed Order, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Second Motion for Consignation is hereby DENIED as it amounts to a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution, something that has gone very stale.
Atty. Diosdado Calonge may withdraw the amount of TWENTY-THREE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED PESOS (P23,300.00) from the office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Agoo, La Union.
SO ORDERED.[6]
Petitioners moved for reconsideration of the foregoing Order which was opposed by respondent. On December 29, 2005, the RTC issued an Order denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration and maintaining its Order dated November 8, 2005.
Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA, alleging that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling that the second motion for consignation had gone stale, because the "RTC's Order dated February 28, 1991 had not yet become final as the decision was conditional on the payment of the P23,300.00. On August 15, 2006, the CA promulgated the Decision subject of the present petition for review on certiorari, ruling that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in denying the Second Motion for Consignation. The CA pointed out that the RTC Order, which petitioners are seeking to be enforced, became final and executory sometime in March 1991 and, thus, petitioners only had five (5) years therefrom, or until March 1996, within which to seek execution by mere motion. Hence, at the time of filing of the Second Motion for Consignation on October 25, 2005, more than five years have elapsed and so the RTC Order had been reduced to a mere right of action.
In the present petition with this Court, petitioners again allege that the RTC, affirmed by the CA, incorrectly held that the RTC Order could no longer be enforced by mere motion. They argue that the RTC decision has not yet attained finality as the same was conditional on the payment of P23,300.00 to respondent as ordered by the court. In addition, petitioners allege that the RTC decision did not become final and executory due to the absence of notice that the decision had been recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgments; and that it is the respondent who should have filed a motion for execution for it was in his interest to be paid the P23,300.00.
The petition is doomed to fail.
Petitioners' arguments are tenuous at best. The main argument that the RTC decision did not attain finality has no leg to stand on.
The cases cited by petitioners, i.e., Cu Unjieng e Hijos v. Mabalacat Sugar Co.[7] and Ignacio v. Hilario,[8] discuss the effects of judgments conditioned upon a contingency, or judgments which leave matters to be settled for its completion. In said cases, the Court held that such judgments or orders are erroneous for they contain no disposition at all, and thus, they are null and void, for the judgment cannot have any effect until the contingency or condition is fulfilled. If petitioners insist that the RTC Order dated February 28, 1991 is a conditional one, then the entire judgment is deemed null and void, including the declaration of the nullity of the Deed of Sale, adjudging them to be owners of the subject property. In line with the cases cited by petitioners, whatever declaration the court made regarding their case has no effect until the supposed conditions are fulfilled. This scenario would be fatal to petitioners' cause, as this would mean there was practically no judgment at all rendered by the trial court and ownership over the subject property would still be in question.
Fortunately for petitioners, the RTC Order dated February 28, 1991 is not a conditional one. It completely disposed of the matters at hand, leaving nothing else for its completion. It definitively ruled on the issue of ownership over the land in favor of petitioners and clearly set forth the amount that petitioners should return to respondent. The decision finally disposed of the parties� rights and nothing was left unsettled. The RTC issued a perfectly valid judgment; hence, its finality came as a matter of course when, as revealed by the records, none of the herein parties moved for reconsideration thereof, or appealed therefrom, within the time provided for in the Rules of Court. Clearly, the argument that the RTC Order of February 28, 1991 did not attain finality because petitioners did not "fulfill" the "condition" that they pay respondent the sum of P23,300.00, has no legal basis whatsoever.
Moreover, petitioners are now estopped from claiming that the RTC judgment has not attained finality, for they themselves admitted such fact in their Motion for Consignation[9] dated May 4, 1993, by stating therein that �[s]aid decision had long become final and executory," and by seeking execution, praying that an order be issued directing the Register of Deeds to cancel TCT No. T-18846. In respondent Posadas' Manifestation-Motion[10] dated August 6, 1993, he manifested his willingness to abide by the court's order for him to surrender the Owner's Duplicate Copy of TCT No. T-18846 once the amount of P23,300.00 is consigned by petitioners. Thus, upon both parties' motion, the RTC issued the Order[11] dated August 12, 1993, ordering petitioners to consign the amount of P23,300.00 with the Office of the Clerk of Court, RTC, Agoo, La Union. This directive was reiterated by the RTC in its Order[12] dated June 24, 1996. All those court Orders were not complied with by petitioners, who only acted on their case again by filing the Second Motion for Consignation on October 25, 2005, or almost nine long years after the last Order issued by the RTC.
In Arra Realty Corporation v. Paces Industrial Corporation,[13] the Court reiterated that �[t]he finality of decision is a jurisdictional event which cannot be made to depend on the convenience of the party." There is no question whatsoever that the RTC Order dated February 28, 1991 has attained finality, and by the time petitioners filed said Second Motion for Consignation, the judgment can only be enforced by independent action, no longer by mere motion, in accordance with Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which provides, thus:
SEC. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. - A final and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. The revived judgment may also be enforced by motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter by action before it is barred by the statute of limitations.
The next question then is, when was the date of its entry, from which the five-year period should be counted? Section 2, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court provides that "[t]he date of finality of the judgment or final order shall be deemed to be the date of entry x x x." As stated by the RTC in its Order[14] dated November 8, 2005, its judgment became final and executory on March 15, 1991. Said date, therefore, is also deemed to be the date of entry of the RTC Order dated February 28, 1991, from which the five (5)-year period should be counted. Petitioners incorrectly argue that it is the old provisions of the Rules of Court, stating that �[t]he recording of the judgment or order shall constitute the entry," which should be applied in this case. It has long been established that procedural rules have retroactive effect. The Court expounded on the retroactive effect of procedural rules in Valenzuela v. Court of Appeals,[15] to wit:
x x x Elementary is the rule in this jurisdiction that one does not have a vested right in procedural rules, thus:
Statutes regulating the procedure of courts will be considered as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent. The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected. Nor is the retroactive application of procedural statutes constitutionally objectionable. The reason is that as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise from procedural laws. It has been held that "a person has no vested right in any particular remedy, and a litigant cannot insist on the application to the trial of his case, whether civil or criminal, of any other than the existing rules of procedure. (Emphasis ours.)[16]
The last argument raised by petitioners, that it was respondent who should have moved for execution of the RTC Order, is of no moment. Whether it is the petitioners or respondent who moves for execution has no bearing whatsoever on the issue of whether said order can still be enforced by mere motion. The five (5)-year prescriptive period for seeking execution by mere motion runs against both parties.cralaw
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. (Perlas-Bernabe, J., no part; Reyes, J., designated additional member per raffle dated January 11, 2012)
SO ORDERED.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) LUCITA ABJELINA-SORIANO
Division Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
* The Court of Appeals and the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 31) of Agoo, La Union are deemed dropped as respondents in accordance with Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which states that the petition shall not implead the lower courts or judges thereof either as petitioners or respondents. None of the parties moved for new trial or reconsideration of the afore-quoted Older.[1] Penned by then Court of Appeals Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe (now Supreme Court Associate Justice); with Associate Justices Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and Hakim S. Abdulwahid, concurring.
[2] Id.
[3] Records, p. 116.
[4] Id. at 128.
[5] Id. at 156.
[6] Id. at 172.
[7] 70 Phil. 380 (1940).
[8] 76 Phil. 605 (1946).
[9] Records, pp. 117-118.
[10] Id. at 125.
[11] Id. at 128.
[12] Id. at 156.
[13] G.R. No. 169701, December 1, 2010, 636 SCRA 339, 345.
[14] Records, pp. 166-172; 172.
[15] G.R. No. 131175, August 28, 2001, 363 SCRA 779.
[16] Id. at 787.