June 2012 - Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
[A.M. No. P-10-2870 (Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 09-3235-P) : June 13, 2012]
PRESTIDIO HAIR SALON CO., REPRESENTED BY MARITA L. ESTABALAYA v. EFREN P. LUNA, SHERIFF III, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 37, QUEZON CITY.
A.M. No. P-10-2870 [Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 09-3235-P] (PRESTIDIO HAIR SALON CO., represented by MARITA L. ESTABALAYA v. EFREN P. LUNA, Sheriff III, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 37, Quezon City.) - Before this Court is an administrative complaint filed by Prestidio Hair Salon Company (Prestidio), represented by one of its owners, Marita L. Estabalaya, against respondent Efren P. Luna, Sheriff III-Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 37, Quezon City, for Abuse of Authority relative to the enforcement of the Writ of Execution dated October 26, 2007, issued by Presiding Judge Augusto C. Diaz, in Civil Case No. 34901, entitled Jeanette M. Belen v. Admida B. Natividad, wherein respondent levied on the properties of Prestidio, but the judgment debtor named in the writ was one Admida B. Natividad.
On May 12, 2005, Natividad sold her one-half share, as partner in Prestidio, in favor of Jeanette M. Belen, for a consideration of P100,000.00. However, Natividad deprived Belen access to the management, operations, and income of Prestidio, which prompted the latter to demand the return of the amount she had paid.
For failure to return the amount of P100,000.00, Belen filed a complaint for Sum of Money against Natividad in the MeTC, Branch 37, Quezon City, docketed as Civil Case No. 34901, Jeanette M. Belen v. Admida B. Natividad, praying for the refund of the amount of P100,000.00 and the award of damages.
In a Decision dated August 14, 2006, the MeTC rendered judgment in favor of Belen, and ordered Natividad to pay Belen the amount of P100,000.00, with an interest of 12% per annum, to be computed from July 2, 2005 until fully paid, P25,000.00 as attorney's fees, P1,500.00 as per appearance fee, P15,000.00 as moral damages, and costs of suit.
On October 10, 2006, Natividad filed a Notice of Appeal and, on July 20, 2007, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 85, Quezon City rendered judgment affirming the MeTC Decision.
Consequently, a Writ of Execution, dated October 26, 2007, was issued by Presiding Judge Augustus C. Diaz of the MeTC, Branch 37, Quezon City, directing respondent, among others, to demand from Natividad (the judgment obligor) the immediate payment, in full, of the sum of P100,000.00, plus 12% interest per annum, to be computed from July 2, 2005 until fully paid, Pl,500.00;for and as attorney's fee [per appearance fee], P15,000.00 as moral damages, and costs of suit.
In his sworn Complaint dated April 16, 2009, filed on August 28, 2009, complainant Estabalaya alleged that on February 26, 2008, respondent served and implemented the Writ of Execution dated October 26, 2007 against the properties of Prestidio, despite the vehement objection of complainant Estabalaya and her business partner, La Rizza Del Victoria, as the respondent acted with evident malice, irregularity, and illegality. Both pleaded with respondent not to proceed with the execution because the judgment obligor named in the Writ of Execution was Natividad, not Prestidio. Citing Article 1811[1] of the Civil Code, complainant maintained that even if it were true that Natividad was her former partner in Prestidio, the partnership had a personality separate and distinct from that of its individual partners. Despite their protestations, respondent proceeded to levy on the business equipment, tools, and other properties[2] of Prestidio, with an estimated value of P234,470.00. By reason of respondent's failure to observe the proper procedure in Section 9 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires that the sheriff should first make a demand upon the judgment obligor for the immediate payment of the full amount stated in the writ of execution and all lawful fees, complainant claimed that the property rights and interests of Prestidio and its owners were violated and that since its business operations had been paralyzed for several days, it should be entitled to damages. As sanction for his misdemeanor, complainant also sought respondent's termination from the service and forfeiture of all his benefits.
Complainant appended copies of the Amended Article of Partnership[3] of Prestidio Hair Salon Co., dated May 28, 2007, confirming the business partnership between complainant Estabalaya (the General Manager) and La Rizza Del Victoria; Certification[4] dated August 2, 2007, issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), attesting that Prestidio, with Company Registration No. PG200342643, was duly recorded in the Book of Partnership of the SEC; and Writ of Execution,[5] issued on October 26, 2007 by Presiding Judge Augustus C. Diaz of the MeTC, Branch 37, Quezon City, in Civil Case No. 37-34901, directing respondent to implement the judgment rendered in favor of therein plaintiff Belen (the judgment obligee) and against therein defendant Natividad (the judgment obligor), by demanding Natividad to effect the immediate payment, in full, of the sum of P100,000.00, plus an interest of 12% per annum, to be computed from July 2, 2005 until fully paid, and the further sum of P1,500.00 for and as attorney's fees, plus P15,000.00 as moral damages, and the costs of suit, and to tender the same to Belen and return the writ, with the lawful fees, to the MeTC within thirty (30) days from the date of receipt with the proceedings enclosed thereon.
In his Comment dated October 1, 2009, respondent justified his actions, stating that he proceeded by virtue of a Deed of Sale dated May 12, 2005 where Natividad (therein judgment obligor) sold her one-half share in Prestidio to Belen (therein judgment obligee), which was attested to by complainant Estabalaya as one of the witnesses. He stated that on July 25, 2007, after Natividad received a copy of the RTC Decision, which affirmed the MeTC Decision in favor of Belen, Prestidio filed an Amended Articles of Partnership with the SEC, reflecting therein that Del Victoria had replaced
If the judgment obligor cannot pay all or part of the obligation in cash, certified bank check or other mode of payment acceptable to the judgment obligee, you shall levy upon the properties of the judgment obligee of every kind and nature whatsoever which may be disposed of for value and not otherwise exempt from execution, giving the latter the option to immediately choose which property may be levied upon, sufficient to satisfy the judgment. If the judgment obligor do not exercise the option, you shall first levy on the personal properties, if any, and then on the real properties, if the personal properties are insufficient to answer for the judgment. You shall sell only so much of the personal or real property as is sufficient to satisfy the judgment and lawful fees, and make a report to this Court every thirty (30) days on the proceedings taken until the judgment in full, or its effectivity expires. (Annex C of the Complaint dated April 16, 2009). Natividad as the new partner of Prestidio. Respondent averred that Natividad had earlier informed him that she had sold her shares in Prestidio in favor of her niece, Del Victoria. In defense, he explained that he demanded payment from Natividad, but the latter refused to pay and, thus, upon Belen's request to implement the Writ of Execution, he proceeded to levy on the properties of Prestidio.
In the Memorandum dated August 16, 2010, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommended that the complaint against respondent be redocketed as a regular administrative complaint and that respondent be found guilty of misconduct and simple neglect of duty and, accordingly, be imposed the penalty of fine of P10,000.00, with the stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely. The OCA found that respondent's implementation of the writ of execution against the properties of Prestidio, when the judgment debtor named in the said writ was Natividad, was improper.
The Court adopts the findings and recommendation of the OCA, and finds the respondent guilty of misconduct and simple neglect of duty for violating Section 9 (b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a less grave offense, relative to the enforcement of the Writ of Execution dated October 26, 2007, in Civil Case No. 34901, and imposes upon him a fine of P10,000.00.
Section 9 (b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states the manner by which judgments for money may be satisfied by levy:
SEC. 9. Execution of judgments for money, how enforced. -
x x x x
(b) Satisfaction by levy. � If the judgment obligor cannot pay all or part of the obligation in cash, certified bank check or other mode of payment acceptable to the judgment obligee, the officer shall levy upon the properties of the judgment obligor of every kind and nature whatsoever which may be disposed of for value and not otherwise exempt from execution giving the latter the option to immediately choose which property or part thereof may be levied upon, sufficient to satisfy the judgment. If the judgment obligor does not exercise the option, the officer shall first levy on the personal properties, if any, and then on the real properties if the personal properties are insufficient to answer for the judgment.
The sheriff shall sell only a sufficient portion of the personal or real property of the judgment obligor which has been levied upon.
When there is more property of the judgment obligor than is sufficient to satisfy the judgment and lawful fees, he must sell only so much of the personal or real property as is sufficient to satisfy the judgment and lawful fees.
Real property, stocks, shares, debts, credits, and other personal property, or any interest in either real or personal property, may be levied upon in like manner and with like effect as under a writ of attachment.
Sheriffs play an important role in the administration of justice and they should always hold inviolate and invigorate the tenet that a public office is a public trust. Being in the grassroots of our judicial machinery, sheriffs and deputy sheriffs are in close contact with the litigants; hence, their conduct should all the more maintain the prestige and integrity of the court. By the very nature of their functions, sheriffs must conduct themselves with propriety and decorum, so as to be above suspicion.[6] As such, they must discharge their duties with due care and utmost diligence, because in serving the court's writs and processes and in implementing the orders of the court, they cannot afford to err without affecting the efficiency of the process of the administration of justice and, as agents of the law, high standards are expected of them.[7] A writ of execution requires respondent, as sheriff, or other proper officer to whom it is directed, to enforce the terms of the writ. He is mandated to faithfully and meticulously observe the proper procedure for the enforcement of the writ; otherwise, the paramount protection of the substantive rights of the parties, as in this case, specifically that of Prestidio, would be impaired.
The duty of a sheriff to execute a valid writ is ministerial and not discretionary. When a writ is placed in the hands of a sheriff, it is his duty, in the absence of any instructions to the contrary, to proceed with reasonable celerity and promptness to execute it according to its mandate. He is supposed to execute the order of the court strictly to the letter.[8] He has no authority to levy on execution upon the property of any person other than that of the judgment debtor. If he does so, the writ of execution affords him no justification, for such act is not in obedience to the mandate of the writ.[9]
Sheriffs, as officers of the court and agents of the law, are bound to use prudence, due care and diligence in the discharge of their official duties. Where rights of individuals are jeopardized by their actions, they may be properly fined, suspended or dismissed from office by virtue of this Court's administrative supervision over the judicial branch of the government.[10] For conduct that falls short of the stringent standards required of court employees, respondent is guilty of simple neglect of duty, which is defined as the failure of an employee to give one's attention to a task expected of him, signifying a disregard of a duty resulting from carelessness or indifference.[11] Moreover, a sheriff is guilty of misconduct where he failed to limit the goods to be levied to the amount called for in the writ,[12] or where he made a levy far and in excess of the value of the judgment.[13]
Under Section 23, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations, simple neglect of duty is punishable by suspension of one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months for the first offense. However, to prevent any undue adverse effect on public service which would ensue if work was otherwise left unattended by reason of respondent's suspension, the Court deems it wise to impose the penalty of fine instead. Thus, in line with jurisprudence, the Court imposes a fine, instead of suspension from service, so that respondent can continue to discharge his assigned tasks.[14]
In Mendoza v. Doroni,[15] We found therein sheriff guilty of misconduct and simple neglect of duty, for failure to follow the procedure laid down in Sections 9 and 10 (c), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, and meted him the fine of P10,000.00. Therein respondent sheriffs duty was to enforce the writ fully as ordered by therein trial court, i.e., to collect the amount of P15,000.00 from each of the four therein defendants and turn over the amount to the clerk of court or deposit it to a fiduciary account in the nearest government depository bank. By neglecting to collect the total amount of P60,000.00, he failed to implement the writ fully, to the prejudice of therein judgment creditors who were owners of the four destroyed structures.[16]
In the present case, respondent arrogated upon himself the determination of the properties to be levied upon, and exceeded the scope of his authority, by disregarding the separate and distinct personality of Prestidio, which was prejudiced, because it should not be made liable for the personal indebtedness of Natividad (the person named in the writ as the judgment obligor). Moreover, in his Comment dated October 1, 2009, respondent stated that Natividad had earlier informed him that she was no longer a partner of complainant Estabalaya, having sold her shares in Prestidio in favor of her niece, Del Victoria (the new partner of complainant Estabalaya). Thus, he cannot feign ignorance that Prestidio was not a party in Civil Case No. 34901. His supposition that he proceeded to levy on the properties belonging to Prestidio only after Natividad refused to pay the total amount stated in the Writ, cannot justify any deviation from the import of the Writ of Execution dated October 26, 2007, in Civil Case No. 34901.
Prescinding from the foregoing and considering that this is respondent's first administrative offense, we find the penalty of fine in the amount of P10,000.00 to be just and reasonable.cralaw
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent EFREN P. LUNA, Sheriff III of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 37, Quezon City, GUILTY of MISCONDUCT AND SIMPLE NEGLECT OF DUTY, and imposes upon him a FINE in the amount of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00), with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely. (Peralta, J., Acting Chairperson, per Special Order No. 1228 dated June 6, 2012; Villarama, Jr., J., Acting Member, in lieu of Justice Velasco, Jr., per Special Order No. 1229 dated June 6, 2012.)
SO ORDERED.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) LUCITA ABJELINA-SORIANO
Division Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] Art. 1811. A partner is co-owner with his partners of specific partnership property. The incidents of this co-ownership are such that: x x x (3) A partner's right in specific partnership property is not subject to attachment or execution, except on a claim against the partnership, x x x[2] The following items were levied and taken away, to wit: six (6) leather chairs; one (1) barber's chair (reclining); two (2) sets shampoo basins; two (2) sets hair steamers (micopor); one (1) sala set; one (1) set water heater (National Multipoint); seven (7) pieces wall mirror; one (1) set JVC component; one (1) set DVD player; one (1) wood counter table; three (3) pieces leather stool; two (2) set plastic organizer (Trolley); one (1) table electric fan; one (1) water tank with mirror two (2) pieces paraffin wax; one (1) pc. fire extinguisher; three (3) pieces plastic blower; and one (1) piece foot spa machine. (Complaint, pp, 2-3).
[3] The Amended Article of Partnership provides, among others, that the term for which said partnership is to exist is twenty-five (25) years; that the purpose of said partnership formed is to engage in, to manage and/or otherwise carry out the business of beauty salons, including but not limited to the purchase, by wholesale and distribution of peripheral goods and services that are connected to the operation of the business; and that each contributed P200,000.00, or a total capital of P400,000.00 (Annex B of the Complaint dated April 16, 2009.)
[4] Annex A of the Complaint dated April 16, 2009.
[5] The Writ of Execution states that: We command you to demand from Admida S. Natividad, the judgment obligor, the immediate payment in full of the sum of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00), Philippine Currency, plus an interest of 12% per annum to be computed from July 2, 2005 until fully paid, and the further sum of P1,500.00 for and as attorney's fee, plus P15,000.00 as moral damages, and the costs of suit; together with your lawful fees for service of this execution, which plaintiff, the judgment obligee, recovered in this case against said judgment obligor, and to tender the same to said judgment obligee and return this writ, with the lawful fees, to this Court within thirty (30) days from the date of receipt hereof with your proceedings enclosed thereon. (Annex C of the Complaint dated April 16, 2009).
[6] Ramas-Uypitching Jr. v. Magalona, A.M. No. P-07-2379 (Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 03-1742-P), November 17, 2010,635 SCRA 1, 5, citing Caja v. Nanquil, 481 Phil. 488, 518 (2004).
[7] Id., citing Teodosio v. Somosa, A.M. No. P-09-2610 (Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 09-3072-P), August 13, 2009, 595 SCRA 539, 556.
[8] Id. at 5-6, citing Sismaet v. Sabas, 473 Phil. 230, 239-240 (2004).
[9] Id. at 8, citing Villareal v. Rarama, 317 Phil. 589, 598 (1995).
[10] Id. at 8-9, citing Metro Manila Transit Corp. v. Santiago, 489 Phil. 1, 10 (2005).
[11] Juario v. Labis, A.M. No. P-07-2388 (Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 07-2558-P) June 30, 2008, 556 SCRA 540, 544.
[12] Caja v. Nanquil, supra note 6, at 512, citing De Guzman v. Gatlabayan, A.M. No. P-99-1323, February 20, 2001, 352 SCRA 264, 272.
[13] Id., citing V.C. Ponce, Inc. v. Eduarte, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1495, October 18, 2000, 343 SCRA 445, 459, which cited Salazar, Jr. Construction, Inc. v. Espinelli, A.M. No. P-2443, December 14, 1981, 110 SCRA 32.
[14] Juario v. Labis, supra note 11, at 544-545 citing Angeles v. Base, 443 Phil. 723, 731-732 (2003).
[15] A.M. No. P-04-1872, January 31, 2006, 481 SCRA 41.
[16] Id. at 54.
