June 2012 - Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
[G.R. No. 199398 : June 13, 2012]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GEORGE VELO Y BALBAS
G.R. No. 199398 [People of the Philippines v. George Velo y Balbas] - After deliberating on the appeal assailing the April 29, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 03750, taking into account the allegations and arguments of the parties, the Court resolves to DISMISS it for failure to show any reversible error in the challenged judgment as to warrant the exercise of its discretionary appellate jurisdiction.
The accused argues 1] that the trial court erred in allowing Norma Hernandez (Norma) to testify as an additional witness; 2] that the prosecution witnesses gave inconsistent statements; 3] that he was not at the scene of the crime; and 4] that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.
These arguments, however, do not persuade the Court. To begin with, the testimony of Norma was not presented as a newly discovered evidence pursuant to Section 2 (b) of Rule 121. She was allowed as a witness after the trial court granted the prosecution's motion for the reopening of the case under Section 24, Rule 119 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, which reads:
Sec. 24. Reopening. - At any time before finality of the judgment of conviction, the judge may, motu proprio or upon motion, with hearing in either case, reopen the proceedings to avoid a miscarriage of justice. The proceedings shall be terminated within thirty (30) days from the order granting it.
In the case of Cabarles v. Maceda,[1] it was written that the following are the requirements for the reopening of a case: (1) the reopening must be before the finality of a judgment of conviction; (2) the order is issued by the judge on his own initiative or upon motion; (3) the order is issued only after a hearing is conducted; (4) the order intends to prevent a miscarriage of justice; and (5) the presentation of additional and/or further evidence should be terminated within thirty days from the issuance of the order.
The paramount consideration of said procedural remedy is to prevent a miscarriage of justice. This was elaborated in the Cabarles case as follows:
Generally, after the parties have produced their respective direct proofs, they are allowed to offer rebutting evidence only. However, the court, for good reasons, in the furtherance of justice, may allow new evidence upon their original case, and its ruling will not be disturbed in the appellate court where no abuse of discretion appears. A motion to reopen may thus properly be presented only after either or both parties had formally offered and closed their evidence, but before judgment is rendered, and even after promulgation but before finality of judgment and the only controlling guideline governing a motion to reopen is the paramount interest of justice. This remedy of reopening a case was meant to prevent a miscarriage of justice.[2]
In this case, the requirements were complied with. First, the reopening of the case was ordered by the trial court before it rendered its judgment of conviction. Second, the order of reopening was made upon the motion of the prosecution during the rebuttal stage. Third, said order was issued only after the prosecution and the defense had been heard on their respective arguments, orally and in writing. Fourth, the order was issued to avoid a miscarriage of justice. Fifth, the presentation of additional evidence, the testimony of Norma was terminated within thirty days from the issuance of the order. The records will show that Norma testified on November 25, 2008 which was less than 30 days from October 28, 2008, the date when the order denying the appellant's motion for reconsideration of the order allowing the reopening was issued.
The Court also cannot give weight to the argument that the testimony of the prosecution witnesses should not be given credence because of some patent inconsistencies and contradiction. The inconsistencies referred to by the accused did not go into the elements of the crime. The cited inaccuracies merely dealt with the manner on how the witnesses saw the crime. Forthright witnesses are not immune from committing minor inaccuracies in their narration of events. As such, trivial inconsistencies and inconsequential discrepancies on minor details in the testimony of witnesses do not impair their credibility. In fact, such inconsistencies are considered to be badges of truth for they manifest spontaneity and erase any suspicion of a rehearsed testimony. As long as the inconsistencies are immaterial or irrelevant to the elements of the crime and do not touch on material facts crucial to the guilt or innocence of the accused as in the present case, these are not valid grounds to reverse a conviction.[3]
Under Article 248, the essential elements of the crime of murder are: (1) a person was killed; (2) the accused killed him; (3) the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248; and (4) the killing is neither parricide nor infanticide. In this case, all these elements have been sufficiently established by the prosecution. First, the eyewitnesses testified that the accused stabbed and hacked the victim. Second, the witnesses corroborated each other's testimonies that the accused held the victim's neck from behind with his left hand and stabbed the victim in the front part of his body, causing him to fall. When he was on the ground, the accused repeatedly stabbed him. Third, the attack was attended by treachery. The trial court in finding treachery stated that the killing was sudden and unexpected and the victim was not in a position to defend himself. The victim was an old man and was known to be harmless although noted to be noisy when he was under the influence of liquor. Aside from being an old fellow and drunk at the time, the victim was no match to the physical strength of the accused. He was not aware of the criminal design of the accused as the attack was sudden. Fourth, the killing was neither parricide nor infanticide.
The main defense of the accused is denial and alibi. This argument does not merit the Court's consideration. It is elementary that alibi and denial are outweighed by positive identification that is categorical, consistent and untainted by any ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter. The prosecution witnesses in this case positively and consistently testified that they saw the accused perpetrate the crime. For this reason, it was incumbent upon the accused to prove that he was at another place when the felony was committed, and that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime when it was committed.[4] Alibi and denial, if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving and undeserving of weight in law. As against the positive, direct and convincing evidence of the prosecution, the accused was only able to present denials and uncorroborated alibi.cralaw
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the April 29, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 03750 which affirmed with modification the January 12, 2009 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Luna, Apayao, Branch 26, in Criminal Case No. 5-2004, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the victim, Domingo Raquedan, in the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; P50,000.00 as moral damages; P30,000.00 as exemplary damages; and P25,000.00 as temperate damages in lieu of actual damages. (Peralta, J., Acting Chairperson, per Special Order No. 1228 dated June 6, 2012; Villarama, Jr., J., Acting Member, in lieu of Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., per Special Order No. 1229 dated June 6, 2012.)
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) LUCITA ABJELINA-SORIANO
Division Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] G.R. No. 161330, February 20, 2007, 516 SCRA 303, 314-315.[2] Id.
[3] People v. Dioneda, G.R. No. 180923, April 30, 2009, 587 SCRA 312, 318.
[4] Malana and Tiaga v. People, G.R. No. 173612, March 26, 2008, 549 SCRA 451, 465-466.