June 2012 - Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
[G.R. No. 194462 : June 13, 2012]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GILFREDO FAUSTINO Y MENDOZA
G.R. No. 194462 (People of the Philippines v. Gilfredo Faustino y Mendoza). - We resolve the appeal, filed by Gilfredo Faustino (appellant), from the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated May 31, 2010 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03600. The CA decision affirmed with modification the June 11, 2008 judgment[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 94, Quezon City, finding the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of rape and one (1) count of acts of lasciviousness.
The RTC Judgment
In its judgment of June 11, 2008, the RTC convicted the appellant of two (2) counts of rape and one (1) count of acts of lasciviousness. It based the conviction on the testimony of the victim, AAA,[3] that the appellant inserted his penis inside her vagina on May 18, 2003 and June 26, 2003, and mashed her breasts on June 24, 2003. The RTC held that AAA positively identified the appellant as the person who had sexually abused her on three occasions. She even added that the appellant employed threat, force and intimidation to satisfy his lust. The RTC disregarded the appellant's alibi for his failure to prove that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis at the time of the commission of the crimes.
For the crime of rape, the RTC sentenced the appellant to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordered him to pay the victim P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages for each count. For the crime of acts of lasciviousness, the trial court sentenced the appellant to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years of prision correccional, as maximum.
The CA Decision
On review, the CA affirmed the RTC decision but modified the penalty imposed on the appellant for the crime of acts of lasciviousness to four (4) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum. The CA found AAA's testimony credible and convincing; the victim narrated in a clear manner how the appellant sexually abused her on May 18, 2003, June 24, 2003, and June 26, 2003. The CA explained that the testimonies of rape victims are given full weight and credence, considering that no woman, especially of tender age, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts, and subject herself to a public trial if she had not been motivated by the desire to seek justice for the wrong done to her.
The CA likewise found the appellant's defenses of alibi and denial unconvincing, as the distance of the places where he claimed to be when the crimes were committed to be a few meters away from the crime scene. The appellate court also disregarded the appellant's claim that the sexual abuses could not have been committed in a small place, and reasoned out that rape is not a respecter of people, time and place.
Our Ruling
We dismiss the appeal, but modify the amount of the awarded indemnities.
We find no reason to disturb the factual findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA. AAA's testimony that the appellant inserted his penis into her vagina on May 18, 2003 and June 26, 2003 is worthy of belief as it was clear, consistent and straightforward. We also find no compelling reason to disbelieve AAA's declaration that the appellant threatened to kill her and her mother if she shouted during the rape incidents. Contrary to the appellant's claim, the testimony and medical findings of Dr. Ruby Grace Sabino supported the victim's assertion that she had been raped. Dr. Sabino testified that she examined AAA and found "deep healing laceration" on her hymen. She added that this hymenal laceration could have been caused by the insertion of a finger, penis or any blunt instrument.[4] Dr. Sabino's Provisional Medico-Legal Report also stated that there was "clear evidence of blunt, penetrating trauma"[5] on the victim.
As the lower courts did, we also agree that the appellant committed lascivious acts against AAA on June 24, 2003. The elements of acts of lasciviousness are: (1) that the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness; (2) that it is done under any of the following circumstances: (a) by using force or intimidation; (b) when the offended woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or (c) when the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age.; and (3) that the offended party is another person of either sex.[6]
"'Lewd' is defined as obscene, lustful, indecent or lecherous. It signifies that form of immorality which has relation to moral impurity; or that which is carried on a wanton manner."[7]
In the present case, AAA testified that the appellant removed her panties and went on top of her, kissed her and touched her on different parts of her body, and mashed her breasts. Clearly, the appellant committed lewd acts against the victim. An examination of AAA's testimony also shows that she did not consent to the appellant's lewd acts. According to her, she did not resist or struggle because she was afraid of the appellant.
We uphold the rulings of the courts a quo that the appellant's alibi deserves scant consideration. Alibi is an inherently weak defense because it is easy to fabricate and highly unreliable. To merit approbation, the appellant must adduce clear and convincing evidence that he was in a place other than the situs criminis at the time the crime was committed, such that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime when it was committed.[8]
In the present case, the appellant failed to prove that it was physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene during the dates of the sexual abuses. As found by the lower courts, the distance of the places where the appellant claims to be at during the dates of the sexual abuses was merely five (5) to eight (8) meters from the locum criminis. At any rate, it is settled that alibi cannot prevail over the victim's positive identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime, particularly when there is no plausible imputation of ill motive on the victim's part to falsely implicate the accused.
We also find unmeritorious the appellant's claim that AAA's testimony should be disbelieved because her actions after the sexual abuses were contrary to standard human behavior. We emphasize that there is no standard form of behavior for a victim of sexual abuse, especially when she is of tender years. It has long been recognized that the human mind works unpredictably when placed under emotional stress. These "victims have exhibited such an incalculable range of emotions that it is unrealistic to expect uniform reactions from them."[9] In any event, AAA explained during trial that she did not immediately disclose the sexual abuses because the appellant threatened to kill her and her mother if she did. In the face of constant threats of physical harm, AAA's belated exposition of the sexual abuses she suffered cannot be taken against her.[10] Besides, the delay was not substantial because she reported the incidents to her mother on July 3, 2003, or only seven (7) days after the last sexual abuse on June 26, 2003.
Finally, we reject the appellant's defense that it was improbable for him to have raped AAA in a small house. Time and again, the Court has ruled that lust is no respecter of time and place. Rape does not necessarily have to be committed in an ideal or spacious place and can in fact be committed in places which to many would appear to be unlikely and high- risk venues for sexual advances.[11]
The Proper Penalties
The CA correctly sentenced the appellant to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count of rape in Criminal Case Nos. Q-03-118831 and Q-03-118832, as none of the circumstances enumerated in Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, are present to qualify the rape and warrant the imposition of the death penalty.
We also agree with the penalty imposed by the CA for the crime of acts of lasciviousness in Criminal Case No. Q-03-118833. The imposable penalty for the crime of acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is prision correccional in its full range. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the indeterminate penalty shall be taken from the full range of arresto mayor, which has a range of one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months. In the absence of any modifying circumstances, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty shall be taken from the medium period of prision correccional or two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months. Accordingly, the penalty imposed by the CA, i.e., four (4) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional as maximum, is within the range provided for by law.
The Civil Liabilities
- Criminal Case No. Q-03-118831 and Criminal Case No. Q-03-118832 (rape)
The award of civil indemnity to the rape victim is mandatory upon the finding that rape took place. In light of current jurisprudence that pegs the award at P50,000.00, we reduce the CA's award of P75,000.00 to P50,000.00 for each count of rape.[12]
Moral damages are awarded to rape victims without need of proof other than the fact of rape under the assumption that the victim suffered moral injuries from the experience she underwent. Thus, we affirm the award of P50,000.00 as moral damages, for each count of rape based on prevailing jurisprudence.[13]
In addition, we also award exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00 to the victim. The award of exemplary damages is justified under Article 2229 of the Civil Code to set a public example, and serve as deterrent against elders who abuse and corrupt the youth.[14]
b. Criminal Case No. Q-03-118833 (acts of lasciviousness)
The current policy of this Court is to award civil indemnity ex delicto in the amount of P20,000.00 for acts of lasciviousness upon an indubitable showing of its commission.[15] The offended party is likewise entitled to moral damages in the same way that moral damages are awarded to victims of rape even without need of proof because it is assumed that they suffered moral injury. Accordingly, we order the appellant to pay the victim moral damages in the amount of P30,000.00, pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence.[16] We additionally award P2,000.00 as exemplary damages to set an example for the public good.[17] cralaw
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 31, 2010 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03600 is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
(1) the amount of civil indemnity in Criminal Case No. Q-03- 118831 and Criminal Case No. Q-03-118832 is REDUCED from P75,000.00 to P50,000.00 for each count of rape;(2) the appellant is further ORDERED TO PAY P30,000.00 as exemplary damages in Criminal Case No. Q-03-118831 and Criminal Case No. Q-03-118832 for each count of rape; and(3) the Appellant is ORDERED TO PAY P30,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 as civil indemnity, and P2,000.00 as exemplary damages in Criminal Case No. Q-03-118833.
SO ORDERED.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) TERESITA AQUINO TUAZON
Deputy Division Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] Rollo, pp. 2-13; penned by Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., and concurred in by Associate Justices Ramon M. Bato, Jr. and Florito S. Macalino.[2] CA rollo, pp. 10-21.
[3] See People v. Cabalquinto, 533 Phil. 703 (2006).
[4] TSN, October 19, 2004, pp. 7-8.
[5] Records, p. 21.
[6] People v. Caralipio, 441 Phil. 302, 315 (2002).
[7] People v. Lizada, 444 Phil. 67, 97 (2003).
[8] See People of the Philippines v. Henry Arpon y Juntilla, G.R. No. 183563, December 14, 2011.
[9] See People v. Montes, 461 Phil. 563, 573.(2003).
[10] See People v. Sinoro, 449 Phil. 370, 382 (2003).
[11] See People v. Watimar, 392 Phil. 711, 724 (2000).
[12] See People of the Philippines v. Bernabe Pangilinan y Crisostomo, G.R. No. 183090, November 14, 2011.
[13] See People of the Philippines v. Marcelo Perez, G.R. No. 191265, September 14, 2011.
[14] See People of the Philippines v. Alfredo Delabajan, G.R. No. 192180, March 21, 2012.
[15] See People of the Philippines v. Marvilous Francisco, G.R. No. 196430, February 29, 2012 (Unsigned Resolution).
[16] See People v. Abello, G.R. No. 151952, March 25, 2009, 582 SCRA 378, 400.
[17] See People v. Poras, G.R. No. 177747, February 16, 2010, 612 SCRA 624, 647.