Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions > Year 2012 > June 2012 Resolutions > [G.R. No. 188726 : June 18, 2012] CRESENCIO C. MILLA v. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND MARKET PURSUITS, INC. REPRESENTED BY CARLO V. LOPEZ. :

Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated 18 June 2012 which reads as follows:cralaw

G.R. No. 188726 (Cresencio C. Milla v. The People of the Philippines and Market Pursuits, Inc. represented by Carlo V. Lopez).  � Before this Court is a Motion for Reconsideration dated 24 February 2012 filed by petitioner Cresencio C. Milla (Milla), moving for the reconsideration of this Court's Decision dated 25 January 2012 and praying for his acquittal, or in the alternative, for an order directing the reopening of the case for reception of defense evidence. The assailed Decision denied his Petition dated 11 August 2009 and affirmed the finding of his guilt for two counts of estafa through falsification of public documents.

In the present Motion for Reconsideration, Milla reiterates his allegations in his Petition, insisting that: (a) the mistake and negligence of his former counsel deprived him of due process, and (b) the lower courts committed a misappreciation of facts warranting a reversal of the trial court's factual findings.

A. Negligence of counsel

Milla maintains that his former counsel pursued various inappropriate remedies amounting to mistake and gross negligence that deprived him of due process. This argument fails to persuade.

In Ong v. Ciba Geigy,^[1] this Court held as follows: 

The general rule is that the client is bound by the actuation of his counsel in the conduct of the case and cannot be heard to complain that the result of the litigation might have been different had his counsel proceeded differently. In criminal cases, as well as in civil cases, it has frequently been held that the fact that blunders and mistakes may have been made in the conduct of the proceedings in the trial court as a result of the ignorance, inexperience or incompetence of counsel does not constitute a ground for new trial. The exception to this rule is when the negligence of counsel is so gross, reckless and inexcusable that the client is deprived of his day in court.^[2] (Emphasis supplied.)

In this case, the allegations that the former counsel of Milla pursued remedies that the latter deemed inappropriate for his defense is insufficient to show that petitioner was deprived of due process. It must be recalled that in the course of the trial, Milla was given several opportunities to present his defense. Moreover, even when the trial court subsequently considered his right to present evidence to have been waived, he was still allowed to file a memorandum, which his former counsel submitted. Thus, the contention of Milla that he was deprived of due process cannot be countenanced.

B. Misappreciation of facts 

Milla further asserts that the trial court committed a misappreciation of facts warranting a reversal of its findings. Specifically, he avers that the P1.6 million he received was for partial payment of taxes and other related expenses, while the other P400,000 was for the full payment thereof. He maintains that the total amount of P2 million was not for and in consideration of the alleged sale subject of this case. He then proceeds to argue that these amounts were in the nature of a cash advance or a simple loan, for which he cannot be criminally liable. These assertions cannot be sustained.

Milla misleads this Court by making it appear as though the P2 million tendered for the payment of taxes and other expenses was separate and distinct from the subject sale. On the contrary, these taxes, consisting of capital gains and other transfer taxes, resulted precisely from this sale, which was forged by Milla by falsifying the notarized Deed of Sale and Certificate of Title. Clearly, the P2 million was not merely a cash advance or loan he obtained from private complainant. Therefore, the trial court was correct in its finding, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that he was guilty of estafa through falsification of public documents. cralaw

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED. The 25 January 2012 Decision of this Court is AFFIRMED WITH FINALITY. No further pleadings shall be allowed.

SO ORDERED.  

Very truly yours, 

(Sgd.) TERESITA AQUINO TUAZON
Deputy Division Clerk of Court

Endnotes:

---

^[1] 527 Phil. 425 (2006).

^[2] Id. at 428.