Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions

G.R. No. 175779 (People of the Philippines v. Virginia Mendoza y Arbo @ Cris). - We resolve the appeal filed by accused-appellant Virginia Mendoza y Arbo (Mendoza) from the 18 August 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)^[1] in CA-GR. HC No. 00857.

The Facts 

The prosecution and the defense present different versions of the facts in this case.

According to the prosecution, the Makati Anti-Drug Abuse Council (MADAC) and the Makati City Drug Enforcement Unit (DEU) received a report from an informant that accused-appellant Mendoza was engaged in the illegal trade of dangerous drugs. Acting on the tip, the MADAC and the DEU organized a buy-bust operation to entrap her.^[2] 

The buy-bust operation was conducted at about 9:00 p.m. The informant introduced MADAC member Jose Guadamor to Mendoza as a scorer of shabu^.[3] She asked Guadamor how much shabu he needed, and he replied, "Katorse lang" and gave her P200. Thereafter, she took a plastic sachet containing suspected shabu from her right waist and handed it to him.^[4] Having consummated the sale, the poseur-buyer gave a signal to the buy-bust team. The team members closed in, identified themselves and arrested accused-appellant. In addition to the plastic sachet sold to Guadamor, they recovered from Mendoza the buy-bust money consisting of two marked P100 peso bills and another plastic sachet, which they also suspected contained shabu. Guadamor marked the sachets with the initials "VAM" and "VAM-1" in the presence of accused-appellant, then sent samples to the crime laboratory for testing. After due examination, it was confirmed that the sachets contained shabu or methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a prohibited drug.^[5] 

On the other hand, accused-appellant claimed that on 21 November 2002, she was on her way to buy some food.^[6] While walking, she saw MADAC operatives chasing two male persons. Unable to catch up with the two men, the MADAC operatives turned to her instead. They arrested accused-appellant and made her board their vehicle. Once inside, they demanded P5,000 for her release. Because she had no money, they brought her to the barangay  hall where she was searched, although nothing was recovered from her. Thereafter, they brought her to the Criminal Investigation Division office, and that was the first time she saw the shabu allegedly confiscated from her.^[7] 

The RTC Ruling 

Accused-appellant was charged with the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs, penalized under Sections 5 and 11 of Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act. On 28 November 2003, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 135, Makati, rendered a Decision^[8] finding accused-appellant Mendoza guilty beyond reasonable doubt of both offenses. It dismissed her defense of denial or frame-up for being unsubstantiated and ruled that the prosecution had established all the elements necessary for the illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs. It then sentenced her to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay the fine of P500,000 for the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs; and the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate term of 13 years as minimum to 18 years as maximum and to pay the fine of P10,000 for the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs.

The CA Ruling 

During the intermediate appellate review, the CA affirmed accused- appellant's conviction. It ruled that the RTC correctly found that the prosecution fulfilled its burden of proving Mendoza's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It then affirmed the sentence of the trial court, but modified the penalty imposed for the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs.

We now rule on the final review of the case.

Our Ruling 

We deny the appeal and affirm the lower court's finding of guilt as the prosecution successfully established all elements of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs.

We are faced with two different versions of the antecedent facts. The prosecution asserts that accused-appellant was arrested and charged pursuant to a buy-bust operation. Meanwhile, the defense claims that she was framed-up by the operatives because she could not come up with bribe money to secure her release.

The trial court and the CA both gave credence to the version of the prosecution, and we find no cogent reason to disturb their findings.

We have ruled that findings of fact of the trial court, particularly when affirmed by the CA, are accorded great weight.^[9]  This is because the trial judge has the distinct advantage of closely observing the demeanor of the witnesses, as well as the manner in which they testify, and is in a better position to determine whether or not they are telling the truth.^[10]

Furthermore, we generally view with caution accused-appellant�s defense of denial or frame-up, for it can be easily concocted and is a common defense ploy in most prosecutions for violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act.^[11] In order to prevail against the positive testimonies of prosecution witnesses, the defense of frame-up must be accompanied by strong and convincing evidence.^[12]

In this case, aside from her bare and self-serving assertions, the records are bereft of any evidence that would bolster the excuses of accused-appellant. We note that she did not file any complaint for frame-up and extortion against the buy-bust team. She likewise failed to point to any motive for Guadamor to testify falsely against her. The members of the buy-bust team are officers of the law who are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary.^[13] As correctly quoted by the appellate court: 

[I]n the absence of proof of any odious intent on the part of the police authorities to falsely impute a serious crime, such as that made against herein appellant, the Court will not allow their testimony to be overcome by the self-serving and uncorroborated claim of "frame-up."^[14]

This Court therefore rejects accused-appellant�s defense.

Mendoza likewise questions the weight accorded by the trial court to the evidence presented by the prosecution. She argues that, because only the poseur-buyer testified on the witness stand notwithstanding the presence of the informant and the other members of the buy-bust team, the prosecution failed to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

We are not convinced.

Time and again, this Court has ruled that �the presentation of an informant in illegal drugs cases is not essential for the successful prosecution of drug cases.�^[15] Informants are almost always never presented in court because of the need to preserve their invaluable service to the police.^[16]  Likewise, the testimonies of the other members of the buy-bust team are not necessary, for even the lone testimony of a credible witness is sufficient to convict in drug cases.^[17]

Accused-appellant furthermore prays for her acquittal on the ground that only a photocopy of the marked money was presented in evidence.

We do not agree. Non-presentation of the original marked money in evidence is not indispensable to the prosecution of drug cases.^[18] The only element necessary to consummate the crime of illegal sale of prohibited drugs is proof that the illicit transaction took-place.^[19]  In People v. Gonzaga,^[20] we had occasion to pronounce: 

The marked money used in the buy-bust operation is not indispensable in drug cases; it is merely corroborative evidence. In prosecuting a case for the sale of dangerous drugs, the failure to present marked money does not create a hiatus in the evidence for the prosecution as long as the sale of dangerous drugs is adequately proven and the drug subject of the transaction is presented before the court. Neither law nor jurisprudence requires the presentation of any money used in the buy-bust operation.

Turning now to the elements of the crimes charged, in order to sustain a conviction for the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must prove that the accused (1) sold and delivered a prohibited drug to another and (2) knew that what was sold and delivered was a prohibited drug.

Both elements are clearly present in the case at bar.

The prosecution successfully established that accused-appellant sold and delivered dangerous drugs to poseur-buyer Guadamor. During the buy-bust operation, he was introduced to Mendoza as a buyer of shabn. After they agreed on the quantity to be purchased, and after he gave her P200 as payment for the agreed quantity, she took a plastic sachet and handed it to him. In her presence, he marked it with the initials "V.A.M." Thereafter, the sachet was sent to the Physical Sciences Division for laboratory examination. When the results came back the following day, it was confirmed that the plastic sachet did indeed contain shabu, a dangerous drug.

The prosecution likewise established that accused-appellant knew that the subject matter of the transaction was a prohibited drug. While courts cannot penetrate the mind of the accused-appellant, knowledge, or intent may be determined by taking into consideration the latter's prior or contemporaneous acts, as well as the circumstances surrounding each particular case.^[21]  Here, the records show that accused-appellant was well-aware that she was engaged in the trade of prohibited drugs. In fact, after Guadamor was introduced to her, she asked him how much shabu  he wanted to purchase; and when told how much, she was aware that the quantity he requested from her corresponded to P200 worth of illegal drugs.

As to the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following elements must be established by the prosecution: (1) the accused is in possession of the object identified as a prohibited or regulatory drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.^[22]

In this case, the records show that Mendoza was caught in flagrante delicto with a dangerous drug on her person. Upon the consummation of the sale to Guadamor, the buy-bust team immediately closed in on accused-appellant, and she was found to have another sachet containing 0.09 gram of shabu  on her waist.^[23] 

Her possession of the illegal drug was not authorized by law. She failed to show any license or prescription, or to produce any evidence at all of lawful authority that would exculpate her from liability.

Finally, the facts of this case show that Mendoza freely and consciously possessed the dangerous drug in question.

All told, the totality of the circumstances in this case shows that accused-appellant committed the crimes of illegal sale and possession of a dangerous drug. The prosecution has therefore successfully discharged its burden of establishing appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

As to the applicable penalty, the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act penalizes the illegal sale of dangerous drugs with life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from P500,000 to P10,000,000 regardless of the quantity and purity of the drug involved.^[24] Therefore, the appellate court correctly imposed the penalty of life imprisonment on accused-appellant for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs.

The same law also penalizes the illegal possession of less than five grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride with imprisonment of 12 years and 1 day to 20 years and a fine ranging from P300,000 to P400,000.^[25] Taking into consideration the applicability of the indeterminate Sentence Law to drug-related offenses,^[26] the trial court should have sentenced accused-appellant to an indeterminate prison term, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by the law, and the minimum term of which shall not be less than the minimum term predefined by the same law. The CA therefore correctly modified the trial court's Decision by sentencing accused-appellant to an indeterminate prison term of 12 years and 1 day to 15 years, and to pay a fine of P300,000.cralaw

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED. The challenged Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC 00857 dated 18 August 2006 is hereby AFFIRMED. 

Very truly yours, 

(Sgd.) TERESITA AQUINO TUAZON
Deputy Division Clerk of Court

Endnotes:

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^[1] CA Decision dated 18 August 2006, penned by Associate Justice Myrna Dimaranan-Vidal and concurred in by Associate Justices Eliezer R. de los Santos and Fernanda Lampas Peralta; rollo, pp. 3-16.

^[2] TSN, 20 June 2003, pp. 3-4. 

^[3] Id. at 12. 

^[4] Id. at 14. 

^[5] Physical Science Report No. D-1650-2002 dated 22 November 2002, records, p. 41. 

^[6] TSN, 1 October 2003, p. 4. 

^[7] Id. at 9. 

^[8] RTC Decision dated 28 November 2003, penned by Judge Francisco B. Ibay; records, pp. 49-53. 

^[9] People v. Abedin, G.R. No. 179936, 11 April 2012. 

^[10] People v. Enriquez, 346 Phil. 84 (1997). 

^[11] People v. Lazaro, Jr., G.R. No. 186418, 16 October 2009, 604 SCRA 250. 

^[12] People v. Miclat, G.R. No. 176077, 31 August 2011, 656 SCRA 539. 

^[13] People v. Pagkalinawan, G.R. No. 184805, 3 March 2010, 614 SCRA 202. 

^[14] CA Decision dated 18 August 2006, p. 10, citing People v. Cueno, 359 Phil. 151 (1998); rollo, p. 12. 

^[15] People v. Legaspi, G.R. No. 173485, 23 November 2011. 

^[16] People v. Domingcil, 464 Phil. 342 (2004). 

^[17] People v. Evangelista, G.R. No. 175281, 27 September 2007, 534 SCRA 241. 

^[18] People v. Ganenas, 417 Phil. 53 (2001). 

^[19] People v. Unisa, G.R. No. 185721, 28 September 2011, 658 SCRA 305. 

^[20] People v. Gonzaga, G.R. No. 184952, 11 October 2010, 632 SCRA 551. 

^[21] People v. Lagata, 452 Phil. 846 (2003). 

^[22] People v. De Leon, G.R. No. 186471, 25 January 2010, 611 SCRA 118. 

^[23] Pinagsanib na Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 22 November 2002, records, p. 13. 

^[24] R.A. No. 9165, Article II, Section 5. 

^[25] Id. at Section 11. 

^[26] People v. Sabadlab, G.R. No. 186392, 18 January 2012.