June 2012 - Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
[A.M. No. MTJ-07-1687 (Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 99-830-MTJ) : June 27, 2012]
DOMINGO B. PANTIG v. JUDGE PASCUALA CLEOFE G. CANLAS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT [MTC], SASMUAN, PAMPANGA.
A.M. No. MTJ-07-1687 [Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 99-830-MTJ] (Domingo B. Pantig v. Judge Pascuala Cleofe G. Canlas, Municipal Trial Court [MTC], Sasmuan, Pampanga.). - Before this Court is an Administrative Complaint[1] filed by Domingo B. Pantig against Judge Pascuala Cleofe G. Canlas,[2] Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court (MTC), Sasmuan, Pampanga, for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, abuse of authority and violation of Canons 1 and 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct relative to Criminal Case No. 2078 entitled People of the Philippines v. Domingo y Salazar, et al.[3] for qualified theft.
On November 3, 1999, a criminal case for qualified theft was filed before the MTC of Sasmuan, Pampanga, presided by herein respondent Judge Pascuala Cleofe G. Canlas, against complainant Domingo B. Pantig and thirteen (13) others by a certain Jose S. Baltazar.
On the same day, complainant and his co-accused, through Mrs. Angelina Belmonte (Belmonte), complainant's niece, filed a Notice of Appearance with Motion to Participate in the Prelimininary Investigation. Belmonte then inquired from a court personnel where respondent judge was, but the former informed her, "hindi raw ito dumating at hindi na dadating." However, while Belmonte was still within the court's premises, respondent judge arrived on board a vehicle allegedly owned by then Mayor Fernando Baltazar. When Belmonte again inquired upon the arrival of respondent judge, the same court personnel quoted, "pinasundo daw ito ni Mayor." Complainant claimed that because of the Mayor's influence, he can direct respondent judge to report to his office.
On November 5, 1999, complainant narrated that they were arrested by members of the Sasmuan Police. Later on, complainant was appalled to discover that respondent judge recommended their bail at a staggering amount of Four Hundred Thirty-Five Thousand Pesos (P435,000.00) for each one of them, or a total of P6,090,000.00 for their provisional liberty. Complainant averred that Mayor Baltazar had respondent judge fetched and brought to court on November 4, 1999, in order to ensure that all accused would be forced to spend their weekend in jail.
On November 8, 1999, complainant, through counsel, filed a Motion for Voluntary Inhibition; for reduction of bail; and to set case for clarificatory questions/examination. However, respondent failed to act on it. Complainant alleged that he was already 77 years old when he was detained at the District Jail of Guagua, Pampanga. He averred that respondent judge is being biased in favor of the private complainant Baltazar and subservient to the whims and caprices of the latter's relative, Mayor Baltazar.
On December 14, 1999, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) directed respondent judge to comment on the charges against her.
In her Comment[4] dated January 12, 2000, respondent judge, in refuting the charges against her, denied all the allegations in the complaint. She narrated that on November 5, 1999, at around 2:00 p.m., she attended the parangal for the late Barangay Captain Cayetano Coronel. Respondent judge added that when she was about to leave the municipal hall premises, she met Ariel Danan, the driver of Vice-Mayor Alfredo M. Danan of Lubao, Pampanga, who volunteered to drive her to the MTC, Sasmuan, Pampanga, on board a Sangguniang Bayan ng Lubao FX vehicle with plate-no. SEE-900. She maintained that she cannot be influenced by Mayor Baltazar for she does not even ask favors from the said mayor.
Respondent judge justified that there is no need to complete the entire procedure for preliminary investigation before a municipal trial court judge can issue a warrant of arrest for the accused. She argued that if, upon searching inquiry and the accused's answers, a judge believed that the offense charged has been committed and that the accused was probably guilty thereof, and that there is a necessity of placing said accused under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice, the judge may issue the corresponding warrant of arrest.
As to the allegation that the court fixed an astronomical bail of P435,000.00 for each of the accused, respondent judge explained that it is not excessive as the value of the fish allegedly taken from the fishpond of the offended party is Two Million (P2,000,000.00) Pesos.
In his Reply dated February 14, 2000, complainant averred that a judge would normally consider the financial standing of the accused in fixing the amount of the bail or in granting a motion for reduction of bail. However, complainant claimed that due to respondent judge's special interest and attention in their case, she did not act on their motion for reduction of bail and, instead, tossed it to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga so that he and his co-accused will surely stay in jail for a long time and, thus, enabling the private complainant to retake possession of the fishpond.
Later, complainant alleged that when their case was filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 49, Guagua, Pampanga, the presiding judge thereat immediately granted their motion for reduction of bail and reduced the same from the exorbitant amount of P435,000.00 to P20,000.00. He added that when their case was referred by the court to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga for reinvestigation, the case was dismissed by the said Office in its Resolution dated January 10, 2000.
In a Resolution dated April 3, 2002, the Court resolved to refer the instant administrative case to the Executive Judge of the RTC, Guagua, Pampanga for investigation, report and recommendation.
In its Report dated July 5, 2002, Investigating Judge Isagani M. Palad found irregularities in the procedure conducted in the subject case, however, he noted no findings of malice or corrupt motives; hence, he recommended that respondent judge be simply admonished.
In a Memorandum dated August 22, 2007, the OCA found respondent judge guilty of grave abuse of authority and discretion, manifest partiality and bias, oppression, and gross ignorance of the law, and recommended that respondent judge be suspended for a period of six (6) months without pay. It disagreed with the recommendation of the Investigating Judge and argued that respondent judge deserved more than a mere admonition.
The OCA pointed to respondent judge's Order[5] dated November 4, 1999 where despite accused/complainant's motion to participate in the preliminary investigation, respondent judge denied the same on the ground that the accused had no right to participate in the preliminary investigation. Thus, denying the complainant of his right to due process.
The OCA, likewise, found that respondent judge ordered the issuance of a warrant of arrest based solely on her finding of probable cause without any justification whether it was necessary to arrest the accused/complainant in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.
The OCA gave more credence to Mrs. Belmonte's testimony[6] that she personally saw and positively identified respondent judge as the one alighting from a red car owned by Mayor Baltazar, viz-a-viz respondent judge's denial since the latter appeared to be inconsistent with her statements.
As to the imposition of excessive bail, the OCA observed that respondent judge seemed to be at a loss as to the proper application of the rules on bail. At one point, respondent stated that the fixing of bail is not a delicate matter so she left the computation to the discretion of the clerk of court. However, during the investigation, respondent made a complete turnaround by justifying her approval of the P435,000.00 bail fixed on each of the accused by claiming that ''if complainant Pantig indeed owns the subject fishpond as he claims, then he can very well afford to post the said amount."[7]
Thus, the OCA concluded that with respondent's hasty issuance of the warrant of arrest and fixing the excessive amount of bail at P435,000.00 each, she apparently ignored certain procedures and guidelines provided by the Rules of Court.
We agree with the findings and recommendation of the OCA.
Indeed, as a matter of public policy, not every error or mistake of a judge in the performance of his official duties renders him liable. In the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his official capacity do not always constitute misconduct although the same acts may be erroneous. This does not mean, however, that a judge need not observe propriety, discreetness and due care in the performance of his official functions; for this relative immunity is not a license to be negligent or abusive and arbitrary in performing his adjudicatory prerogatives.
In the instant case, we agree that respondent judge committed certain irregularities in the proceedings of the subject case.
To begin with, we find the hasty issuance of the warrant of arrest indeed irregular. Even if respondent judge finds probable cause, it is not mandatory for her to issue a warrant of arrest. She must further determine the necessity of placing the respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. It is improper for a judge to issue a warrant of arrest without any finding that it was necessary to place the accused in immediate custody to prevent frustration of the ends of justice.[8]
In Mantaring v. Roman, Jr.,[9] we reprimanded a judge in a preliminary investigation for issuing a warrant without any finding that it was necessary to place the accused in immediate custody in order to prevent frustration of justice. Similarly, in the instant case, it appeared that respondent judge ordered the issuance of a warrant of arrest solely on her finding of probable cause without any justification whether it was necessary to do so in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.
We, likewise, note with dismay respondent's Order[10] stating that complainant has no right to participate in the preliminary investigation.
While the right to preliminary investigation is statutory rather than constitutional in its fundament, it is a component part of due process in criminal justice. This must be so, because the purpose of a preliminary investigation or a previous inquiry of some kind, before an accused person is placed on trial, is to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution, and to protect him from an open and public accusation of a crime and from the trouble, expenses and anxiety of public trial. It is also intended to protect the state from having to conduct useless and expensive trials. Thus, to deny the accused's claim to a preliminary investigation would be to deprive him of the full measure of his right to due process.[11]
We also find that respondent judge required an excessive bail.
The Constitution guarantees to every person under legal custody the right to bail except those charged with offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong. Section 9, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, provides certain guidelines in fixing the amount of bail.
In the instant case, respondent judge failed to consider that complainant was already 77 years old at the time of his arrest. It was also on record that the ownership and possession of the fishpond had long been subject of litigation that the accused has yet to reap the fruits of his co-ownership. There was, likewise, no allegation that complainant would flee pending resolution of the case. More so, considering that he is part- owner of the fishpond, thus, the unlikelihood that he will just escape and leave his property. In fixing the unreasonably excessive amount of bail at P435,000.00 for each accused, respondent judge may have allowed complainant to bail out but the excessive bail in effect denied him the means to do so. Thus, in failing to consider the above-mentioned circumstances, it is clear that respondent judge disregarded the guidelines provided by the Rules of Court.
Finally, we likewise find respondent judge's act of riding the car of Mayor Baltazar rather unbecoming of her, more so, because she did so in order to conduct a preliminary investigation on the complaint filed by Mayor Baltazar's relative against complainant. Inevitably, such actuation of respondent judge unnecessarily corroded public confidence in the judiciary.
Judges need not live in solitude. As a matter of fact, the Canons of Judicial Ethics quite pointedly states: "It is not necessary to the proper performance of judicial duty that judges should live in retirement or seclusion; it is desirable that, so far as the reasonable attention to the completion of their work will permit, they continue to mingle in social intercourse, and they should not discontinue their interests in or appearance at meetings of members of the bar. A judge should, however, in pending or prospective litigation before him, be scrupulously careful to avoid such action as may reasonably fend to waken the suspicion that his social or business relations or friendships constitute an element in determining his judicial course." A judge is not only required to be impartial; he must appear to be impartial.[12]
However, considering that respondent judge died during the pendency of the case and that the appropriate penalty that could have been imposed if she were still alive and in the service is a fine of P10,000.00, the said amount will instead be deducted from her remaining retirement benefits, in view of the earlier grant of partial release of respondent's retirement benefits to surviving heirs in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence. cralaw
WHEREFORE, this Court, finding respondent JUDGE PASCUALA CLEOFE G. CANLAS, GUILTY of Abuse of Authority and Impropriety, imposes a fine in the amount of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) on her. The Fiscal Management and Budget Office is DIRECTED to deduct the imposed fine from respondent's retirement benefits and, thereafter, release the remaining retirement benefits to the surviving beneficiaries. (Mendoza, J., On official leave; Bersamin, J., designated Acting Member, per Special Order No. 1241 dated June 14, 2012).
SO ORDERED.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) LUCITA ABJELINA-SORIANO
Division Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] Rollo, pp. 1-2.[2] Now deceased.
[3] Rollo, p. 8.
[4] Id. at 37-43.
[5] Id. at 65.
[6] TSN, May 29, 2002, p. 29.
[7] TSN, June 18, 2002, p. 51.
[8] See Gutierrez v. Hernandez, Sr., A.M. No. MTJ-06-1628, June 8, 2007, 524 SCRA 1, 10.
[9] A.M. No. RTJ-93-964, February 28, 1996, 254 SCRA 158, 165.
[10] Rollo p. 109.
[11] Duterte v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 130191, April 27, 1998, 289 SCRA 721, 737-738.
[12] Cortes v. Agcaoili, A.M. No. RTJ-98-1414, August 20, 1998, 294 SCRA 423, 461-462.
