March 2012 - Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
[G.R. No. 174682 : March 21, 2012]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE v. ELMER A. BUCA AND WILLIAM B. CAINCAY, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.
"G.R. No. 174682 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee v. ELMER A. BUCA and WILLIAM B. CAINCAY, Accused-Appellants.
The appellants appeal the decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals (CA) on April 18, 2006,[1] affirming their conviction for murder[2] handed down by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 9, in Dipolog City, Zamboanga del Norte, arising from the killing of the late Estela S. Barcelo on August 11, 1987 in Sipaloc, Sibutad, Zamboanga del Norte, with Elmer Buca as the gunman and William Caincay as the driver of the get-away vehicle. They have denied being the perpetrators of the crime, with Buca insisting on their alibi. They also rely on the recantation by the primary witness for the Prosecution.
The appeal lacks merit.
First of all, Buca claimed that he had gone to Cebu City on the day that the crime was committed, and had stayed there for thirteen days just hanging around. His wife and child did not go with him, but remained home. For his part, Caincay admitted going to Sipaloc, Sibutad on August 11, 1987 but his purpose in going there had nothing to do with the killing of Barcelo. We note that both appellants were residents of Barcelona, Dapitan City, a place admitted to be less than an hour to travel from Sipaloc, Sibutad where the crime was committed.
Denial and alibi, if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving evidence having no real weight in law and jurisprudence.[3] Due to the facility by which alibi and denial can be concocted, they are not as highly regarded in judicial determination of innocence and guilt, and, certainly, they cannot overcome positive testimony placing the accused at the place where the crime is committed at the time the crime is committed.[4] Indeed, alibi, when not supported by strong and convincing corroborating evidence demonstrating not only that the accused was not physically present at the place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission, but also that it was physically impossible for him to do so, does not prevail over positive identification.[5]
Moreover, the appellants' attack against the credibility of Prosecution witness Primitiva Alfon Nadonsa de Alison is not weighty enough. The findings on credibility by the trial court are binding and conclusive on appellate courts, including this Court, unless a convincing showing is made to the effect that some facts or circumstances of consequence have been overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted that, if duly considered, would support a different outcome. The reason rests on the reality that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses and of their testimony is a matter best undertaken by the trial court by reason of its unique and unmatched opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand; and to then note and observe their demeanor, conduct and attitude under examination that do bear on appreciation of the evidence.[6] The appellants have not satisfactorily shown to us any such misappreciated or ignored fact or circumstance. As far as the RTC and the CA were concerned, de Alison positively identified Buca as the gunman who had shot the victim and Caincay as the driver of the motorcycle used by Buca to flee the scene in a very reliable manner. At the time of the incident, she was only two meters away from the gunman and the victim and twenty meters away from the parked motorcycle and its driver. Considering that the appellants had not demonstrated that she bore any improper motive to falsely accuse them of the very serious crime, she was rightly regarded by the lower courts as a competent and credible witness. Specifically, her ability to identify the perpetrators could not be doubted, for her first affidavit on the incident contained descriptions of the perpetrators that matched the features of the appellants. Besides, another eyewitness, Daniel Jerusalem, positively identified the appellants as the persons who had committed the crime, and Jerusalem's recollections materially dovetailed with those of de Alison.
The appellants cite the Sworn Statement of Recantation of de Alison to argue in favor of their exoneration. The Court cannot side with them, however, because the recantation was made only fifteen years after de Alison had executed her affidavit and had testified in the RTC, during which she had positively identified the appellants as the perpetrators. The mere retraction of testimony by a Prosecution witness does not necessarily vitiate the credible original testimony.[7] Otherwise, it would be easy for a guilty person to extricate himself from the crime by having a witness just recant and withdraw incriminating testimony. The affidavit of recantation, if made after the conviction of the accused, is unreliable and deserves scant consideration.[8] In any event, it is noteworthy that the recanted testimony was not even the only evidence on record that positively identified the appellants as the perpetrators of the crime.
The RTC and the CA failed to grant to the heirs of the victim moral damages for their mental anguish over the untimely death of Barcelo. Such award required neither pleading nor evidence, simply because death through crime always occasions moral sufferings on the part of the victim's heirs.[9] As the Court has aptly observed in one case,[10] "a violent death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on the part of the victim's family. It is inherently human to suffer sorrow, torment, pain and anger when a loved one becomes the victim of a violent or brutal killing. Such violent death or brutal killing not only steals from the family of the deceased his precious life, deprives them forever of his love, affection and support, but often leaves them with the gnawing feeling that an injustice has been done to them." Given the circumstances, the amount of P50,000.00 is reasonable as moral damages.
The CA and the RTC committed another omission when they did not recognize the right of the heirs of the victim to temperate damages. It is already settled that when actual damages for burial and related expenses are not substantiated with receipts, temperate damages of at least P25,000.00 are warranted, for it is certainly unfair to the surviving heirs of the victim to deny them compensation by way of actual damages.[11] cralaw
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals on April 18, 2006 affirming the conviction of ELMER A. BUCA and WILLIAM B. CAINCAY for murder and the penalty of reclusion perpetua, subject to the MODIFICATION of the civil damages, in that they are sentenced to solidarity indemnify the heirs of Estela Barcelo the further sums of P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as temperate damages, in addition to the P50,000.00 allowed as death indemnity and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, all of which amounts shall earn interest of 6% per annum reckoned from the finality of this decision. Costs of suit to be solidarity paid by the appellants.
SO ORDERED." DEL CASTILLO, J., on leave; PERLAS-BERNABE, J., acting member per S.O. No. 1207 dated 23 February 2012.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) EDGAR O. ARICHETA
Division Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] Rollo, pp. 5-27; penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo F. Lim, Jr. (retired), with Associate Justice Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores (retired) and Associate Justice Ramon R. Garcia, concurring.[2] CA rollo, pp. 79-93.
[3] People v. Zuniega, G.R. No. 126117, February 21, 2001, 352 SCRA 403, 418.
[4] People v. Santiago, G.R. No. 175326, November 28, 2007, 539 SCRA 198, 224.
[5] People v. Ejandra, G.R. No. 134203, May 27, 2004, 429 SCRA 364, 379; People v. Bracamonte, G.R. No. 95939, June 17, 1996, 257 SCRA 380, 384; People v. Panado, G.R. No. 133439, December 26, 2000, 348 SCRA 679, 689.
[6] People v. Rosialda, G.R. No. 188330, August 25, 2010, 629 SCRA 507, 518; Soriano v. People, G.R. No. 148123, June 30, 2008, 556 SCRA 595, 611; People v. Estepano, G.R. No. 126283, May 28, 1999, 307 SCRA 701, 707.
[7] People v. Dulay, G.R. No. 92600, January 18, 1993, 217 SCRA 103, 118; People v. de la Cerna, No. L-20911, 21 SCRA 569, 584.
[8] Molina v. People, G.R. Nos. 70168-69, July 24, 1996, 259 SCRA 138, 159; People vs. Torino, No. L-18767 and No. 18789-90, May 30, 1964, 11 SCRA 237, 293; People vs. Loste, G.R. No. 94785, July 1, 1992, 210 SCRA 614, 621.
[9] People v. Salva, G.R. No. 132351, January 10, 2002, 373 SCRA 55, 69; People v. Osianas, G.R. No. 182548, September 30, 2008, 567 SCRA 319, 340; People v. Buduhan, G.R. No. 178196, August 6, 2008, 561 SCRA 337, 367-368; People v. Berondo, Jr., G.R. No. 177827, March 30, 2009, 582 SCRA 547.
[10] People v. Panado, G.R. No. 133439, December 26, 2000, 348 SCRA 679, 690- 691.
[11] People v. Lacaden, G.R. No. 187682, November 25, 2009, 605 SCRA 784, 804- 805.