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[ G.R. No. L-45676. April 7, 1999]

RUFINO T. NASSER vs. PATERNO R. CANLAS et al.

FIRST DIVISION

Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated APR 7, 1999.

G.R. No. L-45676 (Rufino T. Nasser vs. Paterno R. Canlas and Aurora Fe Rivera Canlas.)

The case is a special civil action for certiorari with preliminary injunction to annul the resolution of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, Branch 02, which denied petitioner's motion to set aside judgment and to quash writ of execution and all subsequent incidents in Civil Case No. 3725, for collection of a sum of money initiated by respondents against petitioner.

On July 13, 1970, respondents Paterno R. Canlas and Aurora Rivera Canlas filed with the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, Branch 02, a complaint1 [Rollo, pp. 54-58.] against petitioner for collection of the amount of P87,000.00 representing the unpaid balance of a promissory note executed by the petitioner and endorsed to respondents, with interest at the legal rate, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs.

On August 31, 1970, respondents files with the trial court a motion2 [Rollo, pp. 59-60.] to declare petitioner in default for failure to file an answer to the complaint notwithstanding the lapse of more than fifteen (15) days from service of summons and copy of the complaint.

By order dated April 24, 1972, the trial court declared petitioner in default and authorized the clerk of court to receive the evidence of the respondents.

On February 27, 1973, the trial court rendered decision3 [Rollo, pp 65-69.] ordering petitioner to pay respondents the amount of P87,000.00, with (6%) percent interest per annum from February 1970, the sum of P1,000.00, as attorney's fees and costs.

On July 23, 1974, respondents filed with the trial court an ex parte motion4 [Rollo, pp 65-69.] for issuance of writ of execution.

On August 5, 1974, the trial court ordered the issuance of a writ of execution5 [Rollo, pp. 70-71.] and on the same date the clerk of court issued the writ.

In July 1975, two sheriffs from the Office of the Sheriff of Manila went to the office of petitioner at 1102 Philippine Banking Corporation Building, Anda Circle, Manila, to implement the writ of execution.

On August 13, 1975, petitioner filed with the trial court a motion to set aside judgment and to quash writ of execution,6 [Rollo, pp. 72-75.] alleging that he was not informed of the complaint and that the decision was void for lack of jurisdiction and due process of law; that he had good defense against the complaint for the promissory note was a simulated document and that the signature at the back of the summons indicating its receipt was not his.

On August 11, 1975, the trial court denied petitioner's motion to set aside judgment and all other pending incidents, and dissolved the restraining order against the sheriff of Manila and the sheriff of Pasig, Rizal.

On August 31, 1976, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction7 [Rollo, pp. 32-53.] against the trial court to enjoin the latter from enforcing the writ of execution, and to set aside the decision of February 27, 1973, in Civil Case No. 3725.

On December 3, 1976, the Court of Appeals promulgated a resolution8 [Rollo, pp. 32-53.] finding that the trial court acted within its jurisdiction and with no grave abuse of discretion and denied the petition for lack of merit.

On January 5, 1977, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals' decision, however, on February 8, 1977, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for lack of merit.

On April 2, 1977, petitioner filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari 9 [Rollo, pp. 9-31.] as a special civil action to set aside the resolutions of the Court of Appeals.

Petitioner submits that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the trial court did not act without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in denying his motion to set aside judgment without allowing him to submit evidence that he did not receive the summons and a copy of the complaint; that the signature at the back of the summons was not his; and that the trial court did not give him a reasonable opportunity to present expert testimony to prove the falsity of his signature.

The issues raised are clearly factual. In a special civil action for certiorari, the Supreme Court review is limited to questions of jurisdiction.10 [Rule 65, Section 1, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.] However, in an appeal via certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals, we review only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth.11 [Rule 45, Section 1, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.] The question of whether petitioner's signature in the receipt of the summons was a forgery is a question of fact. The well-settled doctrine is that findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are binding on the parties and upon this Court, with certain well recognized exceptions. This case does not come within any of the exceptions.12 [Sta. Maria vs. Court of Appeals, 285 SCRA 351, 357-358, citing Medina vs. Asistio, 191 SCRA 218, 223-224.]

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 05806.

The Court set aside the writ of preliminary injunction issued on July 18, 1977.

No costs.

Very truly yours,

VIRGINIA ANCHETA-SORIANO
Clerk of Court

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