ChanRobles Virtual law Library
[ G.R. No. 130705. July 5, 1999]
VISIA FAJARDO vs. HILARIO VILLANUEVA.
FIRST DIVISION
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated JUL 5, 1999.
G.R. No. 130705 (Visia Fajardo vs. Hilario Villanueva.)
The following facts were culled from the decision of the Court of Appeals:1 [At pp. 1-3; Rollo, pp. 21-23.]
Petitioner is the lessee of a residential house and lot situated at 478 Rizal Avenue, Cebu City. The owner and lessor of said property was respondent's mother, the late Milagros Villanueva.
In 1995, Milagros gave
petitioner the option to buy the leased premises for P300,000.00. On
June 26, 1985, petitioner wrote Milagros asking for five months to make full
payment of the subject house and lot. It was only on May 22, 1987, however,
that petitioner was able to pay Milagros the amount of P200,000.00, P100,000.00
short of the agreed price. Said payment is evidenced by a receipt (Exhibit A)
stating:
Received by (sic) Mr. Vicente D. Fajardo, Sr. the amount of Two
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00) as partial payment of the Three
Hundred Thousand (P300,000.00) house and lot which located (sic)
in Cebu City. Mrs. Nene Villanueva (sgd.).
Sometime in the middle of 1991, Milagros refused to receive petitioner's payment for rentals for reasons not reflected in the record.
Milagros died on January 6,
1992. On January 27, 1992, petitioner tendered payment of the P100,000.00
to Milagros' son, respondent herein, who refused to receive the same since he
still had to go over the records of his mother. Sometime in February 1992,
respondent told petitioner that he was willing to sell the property but at the
higher price of P1.2 million.
Because of respondent's refusal
to sell the property at the agreed price of P300,000.00, petitioner
filed a complaint for specific performance against respondent before the
Regional Trial Court.
Meanwhile, since the rentals on the property had not been paid since February 1992, respondent filed an ejectment suit against petitioner before the MTCC, Cebu City.
On October 7, 1993, the RTC
rendered a decision in respondent's favor. It found that petitioner failed to
pay the balance of P100,000.00 within 5 months after June 26, 1985 as he
promised. Three days before the death of Milagros, petitioner was given 60 days
to pay the balance but petitioner also failed to pay within that period.
Furthermore, petitioner received two letters demanding that he vacate the
premises and pay back rentals. As petitioner failed to pay said back rentals,
the trial court ruled that petitioner had no right to stay in the premises and
to demand specific performance for the ale of the subject property. The
dispositive portion of the decision of the RTC reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered
dismissing the instant complaint. Defendant is, however, directed to return the
sum of P200,000.00 to plaintiff minus the back rentals to be paid by the
latter to the former at the rate of P2,200.00 a month starting February
1991. Plaintiff is likewise directed to vacate the premises for non-payment of
back rentals.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC's decision. It held that the receipt issued by Milagros "is in the nature of a partial contract,"2 [Id., at 4; Rollo, p. 4.] the subject of which is the sale of real property. Accordingly, the same is covered by the Statute of Frauds and thus, unenforceable.
Not satisfied with the Court of Appeals' decision, petitioner filed the instant petition for review.
Petitioner claims, in essence,
that there was a perfected contract of sale between him and respondent's
deceased mother. Notwithstanding the absence of any writing containing the
agreement, the Statute of Frauds does not preclude an action for specific
performance since there was ratification on the part of private respondent's
mother by the acceptance of the P200,000.00 partial payment.
In their Comment, respondent point out that the contract is not one of sale but "at most" a contract to sell, the ownership of the property not having transferred to petitioner but remained with respondent's mother.
The first issue that must be resolved is whether a contract existed between petitioner and private respondent's late mother.
The Court of Appeals held that there existed a "partial contract" between the parties. This was an inaccurate choice of words on the part of the Court of Appeals since, as a matter of law a contract exist or not at all. The requisites of a valid contract of sale are: (1) the consent or meeting of the minds of the parties; (2) determine subject matter; (3) price certain in money or its equivalent.3 [Dignos vs. Court of Appeals, 158 SCRA 375 (1988); Leabres vs. Court of Appeals, 146 SCRA 158 (1986).] These requisites are present in this case. Thus, a contract of sale exist between petitioner and respondent's mother.
Is the contract unenforceable as held by the Court of Appeals? As the contract is for the sale of real property, the same is covered by the Statute of Frauds and evidence therefor cannot be received without the writing, or a secondary evidence of its contents.4 [Article 1403 (2) (e), Civil Code] Nevertheless, the contract was ratified by the acceptance of respondent's mother of the P200,000.00 partial payments.5 [Article 1405, Civil Code.]
Now, a contract of sale may be absolute or conditional6 [Article 1458, Civil Code.] depending on whether the agreement is devoid of, or subject to, any condition imposed on the passing of title of the thing to be conveyed.7 [Romero vs. Court of Appeals, 250 SCRA 223 (1995).] A deed of sale is considered absolute in nature where there is no stipulation in the deed that title to the property sold is reserved in the seller until the full payment of the price.8 [Adelfa Properties, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 240 SCRA 565 (1995).] When the sale is not absolute but conditional, such as in a "Contract to Sell" where invariably the ownership of the thing sold is retained until the fulfillment of a positive suspensive condition (normally, the full payment of the purchase price), the breach of the condition will simply prevent the duty to convey title from acquiring an obligatory force.9 [Ang Yu Asuncion vs. Court of Appeals, 238 SCRA 602 (1994).]
The agreement between the parties was a contract to sell in which title would pass to the buyer only upon full payment of the purchase price. Petitioner continued to pay rentals to respondent's mother despite the agreement between them, a fact not disputed by petitioner. Such payment of rentals constitutes proof that title to the property was reserved to respondent's mother. Among the rights inherent in ownership are the jus possidendi, or the right to possess, and jus utendi, or the right to use of, the property. As a rule, therefore, it is anathema to the concept of ownership for the owner of a property to pay rentals for the possession and use thereof.
Moreover, the absence of a normal deed of conveyance strongly indicates that the parties did not intend immediate transfer of title, but only a transfer after full payment of the price.10 [Bowe vs. Court of Appeals, 220 SCRA 158 (1993).]
Accordingly, since the transaction between petitioner and respondent's mother was in reality a contract to sell, and considering that petitioner failed to pay the purchase price in full within the agreed period, the duty to convey title did not acquire obligatory force. Petitioner, therefore, is not entitled to the relief of specific performance.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court Resolved to DENY the petition.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) VIRGINIA ANCHETA-SORIANO
Clerk of Court
HERE FOR THE LATEST SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE
PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
QUICK SEARCH
